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Abstract 
This thesis undertakes an interpretative analysis of belief change in respect of the 
European policy of the British Conservative and Labour parties over the period 
from 1945 to 1975. It applies an anti-foundational model to the study of belief 
change and by applying this model over a significant period of time, it seeks to 
provide a more detailed and nuanced understanding of how traditions of belief 
have developed in post-war British European policy. Having considered 
theoretical and methodological issues associated with an interpretative study, the 
thesis then examines explicitly the belief change of a sequence of key elite 
figures in each party. This is achieved by contextualising the dlites within the 
broader changes of international relations and domestic politics. The approach 
reveals the extent to which 61ites have reacted in complex ways to situations 
which challenge long held beliefs, in turn impacting on traditions of belief. The 
investigation also shows that 61ite beliefs about foreign policy have not only 
been influenced by particular views of the world but by confidence in policy 
proposals. Once this confidence has been challenged, dlite beliefs have shown 
rapid states of change. Underlying this change is the desire of dlites to present a 
convincing and coherent narrative on foreign policy. This study also finds that 
while the foreign policy approaches of the Conservative and Labour Parties may 
have appeared similar, very different rationales and beliefs motivated policy 
initiatives. On the basis of these findings, it is concluded that the changes in 
belief over time are significantly accounted for by the theoretical model used in 
this thesis. 
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Introduction 
Chapter One 
Interpreting Europe: 
Conservative and Labour Beliefs 1945-1975 
No man can wholly escapefrom the kind of culture he acquiredfrom his early 
environment. 
T. S. Eliot 
Character is not cut in marble - it is not something solid and unalterable. It is 
something living and changing 
G. Eliot. ' 
1.1 Introduction 
Britain's membership of the EU has been described as "perhaps the 
most profound revolution in British foreign policy in the twentieth century". 2 
Others seek to downplay the significance of membership arguing that "Britain 
was pursuing its consistent view of how Europe ought to relate to the rest of the 
world. There was no conversion to the ideal of European union". 3 It is, above 
all, "a record not of triumph, but rather of bewilderment ... in which Britain 
struggled to reconcile the past she could not forget with the future she could not 
avoid"'. 4 What is clear is that the definition of Britain's relationship with 
Europe is contested by political practitioners and academics alike. As a 
consequence, the field of study of this relationship is heavily subscribed, more 
so since the end of the Cold War. 5 
1 Eliot, T. S. (1948) Notes Towards a Definition of Culture, London: Faber and Faber, p43; G. Eliot 
(1900) Middlemarch: A Study ofProvincial Life, New York: H. M. Caldwell, vol. 2, book VIII, 
chapter LXXII, p322 Mr Farebrother to Mrs Casuabon; for the quotation at the begirming of the 
thesis, Francis Bacon, (2005) OfEmpire (1607), London: Penguin, p73 
2 Reynolds, D (199 1) Britannia Overruled London: Longman, p23 8 
3 George, S (1999) An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, P edition, Oxford: 
OUP, p40 
' Young, H (1998) This Blessed Plot: Europe From Churchill to Blair, Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press, pI 
5 Marsh, D et al, (1999) Post War British Politics in Perspective, Cambridge: Polity Press, p2 
Introduction 
The original contribution of this thesis is to examine how 61ite ideas 
have been significant in the development of European policy during the period 
1945-1975. It does so by studying both the Conservative Party and the Labour 
Party, as the parties in power during this period, throughout their time in and 
out of office. It uses the concept of traditions of thought to determine how 
Europe has been conceived of by elite actors and the tra ectory of this i 
perception over time. Underpinning the aim of the thesis are four objectives. 
First, much of the literature on Britain's relationship with Europe 
centres on the period after entry. 6 By covering the period 1945-1975, this thesis 
offers a counter-weight to the current literature by raising the profile of the pre- 
entry era as significant to the final reasons for and the approach to entry. It is 
by examining this period that dynamics in Britain's post-entry relationship can 
be understood more clearly. 
Secondly, where texts cover the period of 1945-1975, these can be 
classified into two groups: 'thin' histories as a prelude to a more thorough 
examination of post-entry dynamics and episodic studies dealing only with 
shorter periods of time or particular events within the era. 7 The impact of 
6 The list is lengthy, covering various policy areas concerning member states examples including the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) or the European Foreign 
and Security Policy (EFSP) and the treaties since Britain's accession. Broader studies include: 
Wallace, W (ed. ) (1980) Britain in Europe, London: Heinemann; Northcott, J (1995) 7-he Future of 
Britain and Europe, London: Policy Studies Institute; Aspinwall, M (2004) Rethinking Britain and 
Europe: Plurality Elections, Party Management and British Policy on European Management, 
Manchester: MUP; Forster, A (2002) Euroscepticism in British Politics, London: Routledge; Baker, 
D., A. Gamble, and S. Ludlam, (1993a) '1846... 1906 ... 1996? Conservative Splits and European 
integration', Political Quarterly, vol. 64.4, pp420-434 
7 By no means complete these include: Geddes, A (2004) The European Union and British Politics, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; George, Awkward Partner; Greenwood, S (1992) Britain and 
European Co-operation Since 1945, Cambridge: Blackwell; May, A (1998) Britain and Europe Since 
1945, London: Longman; Young, J (2000) Britain and European Unity, 1945-1999,2 nd edition, 
2 
Introduction 
Europe on political parties is an area which has received little attention and is 
8 limited to episodic studies. A further original contribution of this thesis is in 
presenting a longitudinal study of how Europe has impacted on both leading td 
political parties throughout the period. 
Third, literature specific to Britain's European policy frequently 
excludes the wider context. This thesis argues that the development of ideas 
towards Europe was contingent upon ideas held about other interests, and that 
these must form the context in which European policy was developed. 
Finally, this thesis focuses on elite actors but differs from other agency- 
centred texts by arguing that the provenance of ideas held by dlites and their 
subsequent development was crucial to the way in which they engaged with 
'Europe'. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan are all good examples of thin pre-entry histories. Periodic studies include: 
Brivati, B and H. Jones (eds. ), (1993) From Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and Europe Since 
1945 Leicester: Leicester University Press, Daddow, 0 (2002) Harold Wilson and European 
Integration: Britain's Second Application to Join the EEC, London: Frank Cass; Ellison, J (2000) 
Threatening Europe: Britain and the Creation of the European Community, 1955-1958, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan; Kaiser, W (1996) Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European 
Integration, 1945-1963, Basingstoke: Macmillan; Kitzinger, U (1969) The Second Try: Labour and 
the EEC, Oxford: Pergamon Press; Staerck, G and W. Kaiser (eds. ) (1999) British Foreign Policy, 
1955-64: Contracting Options London: Macmillan; Woodhouse, R (1995) British Policy Towards 
France, 1945-51, Basingstoke: Macmillan; Young, J (1990) Britain, France and the Unity ofEurope, 
1945-1951, Leicester: LUP 
8 Ball S. and A. Seldon (1994) Conservative Century Oxford: OUP, 'biblio'; Crowson, N. J. (2007) 
The Conservative Party and European Integration Since 1945, London: Routledge; for an example 
see: Onslow, S (1997) Backbench Debate within the Conservative Party and its Influence on British 
Foreign Policy, 1948-1957, London: Macmillan 
9 Otte, T and N. Ashton (eds. ) (2001) The Makers of British Foreign Policy From Pitt to Thatcher, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan; Shlaim, A., P. Jones, K. Sainsbury (1977) British Foreign Secretaries Since 
1945, Newton Abbot: David and Charles 
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In pursuing these aims the thesis adopts a method of analysis drawn 
from the work of Mark Bevir in The Logic of the History of Ideas. 10 Bevir's 
theory is based on an anti-foundational approach in which the role of ideas held 
by individuals is central. It is particularly suited to this thesis in its efforts to 
chart the development and transition of ideas held by dlites over the period 
studied. The methodological framework developed from Bevir's theory will be 
the subject of chapter two. 
1.2 The Historiography of Britain's European Policy 
Outlining the contours of Britain's foreign policy in the post-war era 
forms the stock approach of general histories. " The three areas of interest -the 
Empire and Commonwealth, the United States and the Cold War, and Europe 
then become specialisations. 12 
Literature covering the specific dynamics of Britain's European policy 
begins with three themes: the 'missed opportunities' thesis 13 , the 'awkward 
10 Bevir, M (1999) The Logic ofthe History ofIdeas, Cambridge: CUP 
" Bartlett, C. J. (1989) British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century, Basingstoke: Macmillan; 
Curtis, M (1995) The Ambiguities of Power: British Foreign Policy Since 1945, London: Zed Press; 
Frankel, J (1975) British Foreign Policy, 1945-1973, London: OUP for the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs; Northedge, F. S. (1962) British Foreign Policy: The Process of Readjustment, 
London: Allen and Unwin; Reynolds, Britannia Overruled; Sanders, D. (1990) Losing an Empire, 
Finding a Role, London: Macmillan; Smith, S., M. Smith and B. White, (eds. ) (198 8) British Foreign 
Policy: Tradition, Change and Transformation, London: Unwin Hyman; Young, J and M. Dockrill 
(eds. ), (1989) British Foreign Policy, 1945-1956, Basingstoke: Macmillan 
12 Examples include: Douglas, R (2002) Liquidation of Empire: The Decline of the British Empire, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan; Heinlein, F. (2002) British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945- 
1963, London: Frank Cass; Greenwood, S (200 1) Britain and the Cold War, 1945-1991, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan; Hopkins, F. G. Staerck and M. Kandiah (eds. ), (2003) Cold War Britain, 1945-1964, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
13 Dell, E (1995) The Schuman Plan and the British Abdication of the Leadership of Europe, Oxford: 
Cassell; Denman, R (1996) Missed Chances: Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century, London: 
Orion Press; Lord, C (1996) Absent at the Creation: Britain and the Formation of the European 
Community, 1950-2, Aldershot: Dartmouth Press; Young, This Blessed Plot 
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partner' thesis 14 and the 'uniqueness' thesis. 15 While there is a wealth of 
literature dealing with Britain and Europe up to 1963, the period after that is 
less thoroughly documented. 16 Periodisation has resulted in small, focused 
studies so the categorisation of literature on Britain's European policy in terms 
of specific areas of interests or particular arguments conveys a fragmented 
picture of the relationship and the ideas inherent in that relationship. 17 
A more systematic analysis is proposed by Oliver Daddow 18 in which 
the changing nature of Britain's relationship with Europe, and the consequent 
literature emanating from this, is conveyed in terms of 'schools' defined by 
time. Daddow uses the 'schools' approach to understand the historiography of 
Britain and Europe. Reflective of the categorisation in Cold War studies'9,, 
these schools are: orthodox, revisionist and post-revisionist. The notion of 
distinct schools is defended on the grounds that although there may be 
differences between authors, there are enough common features to identify a 
familial resemblance. In other words, adherents to a school may 'see' the world 
in the same way even if they reach different conclusions. He argues "[tlhese 
schools ... are socially constructed, that is, driven by different communities of 
14 George, Awkward Partner 
15 Kaiser, Using Europe, p3; Young, This Blessed Plot, p7 
16 Young, Britain and European Unity, pvii 
17 By no means exhaustive, these include: Dell, The Schuman Plan; Ovendale, R (ed. ), (1984) The 
Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945-1951, Leicester: LUP; Zametica, J (ed. ), 
(1990) British Officials and British Foreign Policy, 1945-1950, Leicester: LUP; Burgess, S. and G. 
Edwards (1988) 'The Six Plus One: British Policy Making and the Question of European Economic 
Integration, 1955' International Affairs vol. 64, pp393-413; Daddow, Harold Wilson and European 
Integration; Bange, 0 (1999) The EEC Crisis of 1963: Kenne4 Macmillan and Adenauer in 
Conflict, New York: St. Martin's Press; Ellison, Threatening Europe; Brivati and Jones From 
Reconstruction to Integration 
18 Daddow, O. J. (2000) Rhetoric and Reality. ý The Historiography of British European Policy 1945- 
1973, PhD thesis, University of Nottingham; Daddow, 0 (2004) Britain and Europe Since 1945: 
Historiographical Perspectives on Integration, Manchester: MUP 
19 Gaddis, J. L. (1983) 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War' 
Diplomatic History vol. 7.3, pp 171-204 
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individuals who look at the world in different ways, who have opposing 
agendas and who cite different sources in support of their respective cases". 20 
When we look at these three schools, we examine their social composition, the 
time in which their views became dominant, the genre with which they are 
associated and the themes of their arguments. 
The orthodox school is composed predominantly of members of the 
interested international 61ite and a section of the British intelligentsia; their 
views gathering momentum from the early 1950s and waning only during the 
1980s. The genres with which they are associated are political memoir, 
autobiography and biographies as well as journalistic accounts and 'instant' 
histories. These advance themes about Britain of separateness, backwardness, 
introspectiveness and the weight of historical constraints. 21 
In contrast, the revisionist school is composed mainly of academics, 
their challenge dating from the 1970s and peaking during the 1990s. The genre 
with which the revisionists are associated is academic literature based on the 
extensive use of primary sources in which is articulated a different history of 
Britain's European policy, highlighting assumptions in the themes of the 
orthodox school and confronting several of their key arguments. 22 
Finally, the post-revisionist school is composed of an emerging group 
of young academics and can be traced to the mid- I 990s. Like the revisionists, 
20 Daddow, Britain and Europe, p36 
21 Daddow, Britain and Europe, p49-50; see authors such as Dell, Camps, and Denham 
22 Daddow, Britain and Europe, p59,67,90,104; examples are John Young, Ovendale and Deighton 
Daddow, Britain and Europe, p114,117-8,122,133-7; emergent authors are Liz Kane, James 
Ellison, Wolfram Kaiser and Helen Parr. 
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this group relies on the extensive use of primary sources and their arguments 
are presented in academic texts. The post-revisionists are distinct from the 
revisionists in their focus on different dimensions of Britain's European policy, 
and their subsequent challenging of key assumptions held by both the orthodox 
and revisionist schools. 23 
When we examine the literature on Britain's European policy, we 
therefore begin with the dominant theme, that of 'missed opportunities'; 
analysing how this thesis was initially presented then challenged by the 
revisionist literature, and subsequently how both of these arguments have been 
further contested by the post-revisionist school. 
1.2.1 Missed Opportunities 
The central theme of orthodox and revisionist literature has been the 
politics of blame and later exoneration. Orthodox writers began the missed 
opportunities thesis which has subsequently generated its own momentum and 
inevitably influenced all later material. As Daddow argues, "the very phrase 
'missed opportunities' has, by dint of repetition, become one of the most 
,, 24 common critiques of British European policy among euroenthuslasts. We 
might consider this thesis as having two parts; the initial political argument 
whose aim was to force a redirection of British foreign policy and a subsequent 
focus on the economic argument as 'The Six' were able to demonstrate the 
success of their course. 
23 Daddow, Britain and Europe, p 114,117-8,122,133-7; emergent authors are Liz Kane, James 
Ellison, Wolfram Kaiser and Helen Parr. 
24 Author's italics, Daddow, Britain and Europe, p6l 
7 
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The early political members of the orthodox school consisted of the 
founding fathers of Europe: Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and Paul-Henri 
Spaak and key Americans such as Dean Acheson, George Ball and the Dulles 
brothers. 25 Thus the literature, in Milward's view, has been dominated by the 
'legends of great men 126 ;a small group of individuals with a shared view. In its 
European context, this meant a push to reorganise the political and economic 
structure of the participant states while in the American context, it had both an 
idealist and realist interpretation. The idealists viewed European federalism as 
a mirroring of the American system and one which would stop future conflicts 
while the realists viewed European integration as an important adjunct to the 
U. S. policy of contai=ent. 27 
Important to the political dimension was the propagation of certain 
myths and images to instil the idea of European unity as natural and to capture 
the field of articulated ideas. Hence Europe was presented as dynamic, on the 
28 
move, contrasting with a drifting Britain on the sidelines. Monnet's memoirs, 
for instance, demonstrate the author's own beliefs in the need to seize historic 
moments of opportunity, coupled with his conviction dating to at least 1940 of 
the need for economic, political and military union. Defining this as a need for 
Europe, the "discourse about grasping the opportunity to build a new Europe, 
25 Jean Monnet, (1888-1979), Robert Schuman (1886-1963), Paul-Henri Spaak (1899-1972), Dean 
Acheson (1893-1971), George Ball (1909-94), John Foster Dulles (1888-1959) Allen Welsh Dulles 
(1893-1969) 
26 Milward, A (2000) The European Rescue ofthe Nation State, London: Routledge, p318 
27 Daddow, Britain and Europe, p70,76 
28 Daddow, Britain and Europe, pp62-6 
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free from conflict, [became the] federalist discourse" . 
29 Alternatives were 
increasingly marginalized. 
In creating a simple image of the natural and successful path to unity in 
contrast to the unnatural and ultimately unsuccessful path of British foreign 
policy, these decisions were invested with moral meaning. Furthermore, 
Daddow claims that frequently written out of integrationist history is how 
Britain's own discourse faced a formidable force of opposition in Europe and 
America by key members of the ruling intelligentsia. 30 
A number of key groups facilitated the wide appeal of the orthodox 
position, disseminating their arguments widely to establish the federalist 
discourse as received wisdom. The British Federal Union established in 1938 
could count among its members such later significant players as Eric Roll, 
Michael Palliser, John Pinder and Richard Mayne. 31 Links between the Federal 
Union and The Economist provided a platform for these ideas to spread, the 
chief exponents being Miriam Camps and Christopher Layton. 32 Elsewhere, 
political enthusiasts such as Anthony Nutting, Roy Denman, Edmund Dell, 
" Monnet, J (1976) Mimoires, Paris: Fayard, p432; Monnet also cited in Daddow, Britain and 
Europe, p73 
30 Daddow, Britain and Europe, p79 
31 Sir Eric Roll, (1907-2005), Sir Michael Palliser (b. 1922), John Pinder, (b. 1924), Richard Mayne, 
(b. 1926) were all civil servants of significance involved in British European policy; Roll, E (1995) 
Where Did We Go Wrong? From the Gold Standard to Europe, London: Faber and Faber; Pinder, J 
and R. Pryce (1969) Europe After de Gaulle: Towards the United States of Europe, London: 
Harmondsworth; Mayne, R. (1993) 'Jean Monnet, Europe and the British: A Witness Account', in 
Brivati, and Jones, From Reconstruction to Integration 
32 Camps was also on the payroll of the Ford Foundation who influenced the emphasis on British 
attitudes in her studies. Daddow, Britain and Europe, p87-95, Camps, M (1964) Britain and the 
European Community, 1955-1963, Oxford: OUP; Layton, C (1960) Britain's European Dilemma, 
London: European Youth Campaign 
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Edward Heath and Roy Jenkins continued to reinforce the discourse of missed 
opportunities. 
33 
1.2.2. Awkward Partner? 
The revisionist challenge began by questioning certain key assumptions 
of the orthodox argument. By challenging the received wisdom, it does not 
seek to locate where Britain went 'wrong', but rather to explain what impelled 
foreign-policy decision-makers to arrive at particular assessments. Britain 
cannot be said to have missed opportunities if there were none perceived to be 
missed. 
34 
Two assumptions within the missed opportunities thesis highlighted by 
revisionists are first, that Britain was in some way willing to join Europe and 
secondly that even if it had been, it could assume a leadership role. An 
examination of Whitehall beliefs demonstrated low levels of enthusiasm. Not 
that British decision-makers were anti-European instead, revisionists argue 
British Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries were part of a "broad 
consensus within Whitehall which recognised the growing importance of 
Europe to Britain but which were not prepared to narrow the horizon to Europe 
alone". 35 This provides evidence for the first argument. For the second Young 
33 Dell, The Schuman Plan; Denman, Missed Chances; Heath, E (1962) The New Europe, London: 
Conservative Political Centre; Nutting, A (1960) Europe Will Not Wait, London: Hollis and Carter; 
Those using Europe to fulfil personal agendas include: Boothby, R (1962) My Yesterday, Your 
Tomorrow London: Hutchinson Press; Fyfe, D. M. (1964) Political Adventure: The Memoirs of the 
Earl of Kilmuir, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Macmillan, H (1972) Pointing the Way, London: 
Macmillan 
34 Daddow, Britain and Europe, p 116 
35 Barnes, T (1987) 'From Eden to MacMillan, 1955-59' in P. Hennessy and A. Seldon, Ruling 
Performance: British Governments From Attlee to Thatcher, Oxford: Blackwell, pp98-149, p13 1; For 
the same view, Burgess and Edwards, 'The Six Plus One', p413; Dutton, D (1997) Anthony Eden: A 
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argues, for instance, that even had Britain wanted to join, the ability to 
dominate the European agenda would have been difficult. 36 Examples can be 
cited where British attempts to shift the European project from its federal 
aspirations have been rebuffed, while in Europe, there was in no sense a 
consensus on waiting for Britain to take the lead, the Six being active in 
shaping their own future. 37 Elsewhere, some revisionists argue that the 
European project was being actively steered away from Britain as an attempt to 
exclude it. 
38 
Some literature during the 1960s began to contest the dominance of the 
orthodox argument, but it was not until the 1970s, when access to the Public 
Record's Office (PRO) documents for the early post-war period became 
available, that a plethora of texts began to analyse the Labour Govermnents of 
1945-5 1. Inevitably these included an examination of Labour's foreign 
policy. 39 Research queried the presumed Atlanticism of Bevin and Attlee, with 
conclusions ranging from: Labour's lack of interest in Europe; the need for an 
American presence in European defence; and the desire to create an alternative 
'third force' grouping, ultimately foiled by economic limitations. 40 
Life and Reputation, London: Arnold, p307; Kaiser, Using Europe, p43-4; Daddow, Britain and 
Europe, p 118 
36 Young, Britain and European Unity, p53-4 
37 Tratt, J (1996) The Macmillan Government and Europe: A Study in the Process ofPolicy 
Development, London: Macmillan 
38 Hitchcock, W (1997) 'France, the Western Alliance and the Origins of the Schuman Plan, 1948- 
1950', Diplomatic History vol. 24.4, pp603-30, p628 
39 Beloff, N (1963) The General Says No: Britain's Exclusion Form Europe, Harmdonsworth: 
Penguin; Ovendale, Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945-1951, Morgan, K. O. 
(1984) Labour in Power, 1945-1951, Oxford: Clarendon; Pelling, H (1984) The Labour 
Governments, 1945-1951, London: Macmillan 
40 Newton, S (1985) 'The 1949 Sterling Crisis and British Politics Towards Integration', Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 11, pp 169-182 
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In summary, the revisionists contend that Britain did not reject Europe 
between 1945 and 1960; the relationship was far more subtle. By analysing 
moments of non-conflict between Britain and the Six, they argue the picture is 
far more complex though concede that because the presentation of British 
policy was clumsy it was seized upon for the arsenal of the orthodox school. 
1.2.3. Unique Britain 
While the orthodox school contains an identity which is relatively easy to 
discern, the revisionist's principal identity formation was one of contrast with 
the orthodox arguments. However, as the previous section illustrated, the 
conclusions reached by revisionists have varied widely. Although they may 
share a similar world view, the overall coherence of their position is 
questionable. Daddow identifies a nascent third grouping in the literature 
concerning Britain's European policy, although he concedes that to call this a 
school in its own right may be premature. Rather, "it signals a step-change in 
the evolution of revisionist historiography". 41 Despite not explaining the 
change in revisionism Daddow does identify two new interests in the research 
of post-revisionists, namely the economic dimension and the international 
setting. One might conclude then, that in the era of the Cold War it was the 
political struggle that gained pre-eminence in studies of Britain's European 
policy. Now in the era of globalisation, it is towards the economic struggle that 
historians are drawn. 
41 Daddow, Britain and Europe, p 163 
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A difference of technique is noted between post-revisionists and 
revisionists. The emergent post-revisionist grouping has focused on the 
negotiations for the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and the first and second 
applications to join the EEC, again reflecting the release of these documents at 
the PRO under the thirty year rule. 42 In so doing, it argues that the division of 
departments within Whitehall has produced differing accounts depending on 
whether they were based on economic departments such as the Treasury or 
Board of Trade, or political departments such as the Prime Minister's office or 
the Foreign Office. An economic analysis of the dispute over Bevin's 
intentions in foreign policy shows that the economic crises Labour faced in the 
late 1940s defined their political approach to foreign policy; the Washington 
Loan Agreement of 1945, the Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the devaluation of the 
pound in 1949 punctuated attempts to drive a policy based on socialist ideals. 43 
While shifting the focus to economic considerations the post-revisionists 
have also re-contextualised Britain's European policy. Rather than place the 
focus entirely on what was happening in Britain, the emphasis shifts to 
examining European institutions or other member states and developments 
beyond the EEC. This has resulted in two differences in their interpretations: a 
reticence to pass judgement on the rights and wrongs of Britain's European 
policy and a tendency to see Britain as a weaker international power. To pass 
judgements on the rights and wrongs of Britain's past European policy seems 
42 Kaiser, Using Europe; Kaiser, W. (1993) 'To Join or Not to Join? The 'Appeasement' Policy of 
Britain's First EEC Application' in Brivati and Jones, From Reconstruction to Integration; Ellison, 
Threatening Europe; Daddow, Harold Wilson and European Integration; Ruane, K (2000) The Rise 
and Fall of the European Defence Community: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis ofEuropean 
Defence, London: Macmillan 
43 Newton, 'The 1949 Sterling Crisis'; Rooth, T (2000) 'Economic Tensions and Conflict in the 
Commonwealth, 1945-c. 195 1' Twentieth Century British History vol. 13.2, pp 121-143 
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now, to post-revisionists, to be largely irrelevant. "Seeing Britain as one of a 
number of second-ranking actors behind the United States" argues Daddow, 
"has made it easier for historians to reinterpret Britain's past policy as subject 
to the comings and goings of international diplomacy". 44 This view ultimately 
challenges any concept of British uniqueness. 
Differences of technique also distinguish post-revisionists from 
revisionists. The post-modernist influence on some interpretations is reflected 
in a destabilizing effect on narrative structure, with post-revisionists, like 
revisionists, contesting the simplification of events by the orthodox school. 
However, post-revisionists contest further the imposition of a second narrative 
on the past by revisionists. 45 
Another feature of post-revisionist technique is the shift of episodic 
studies from times of conflict to times either preceding or immediately 
subsequent to the conflict. This, it is argued, does more than simply describe 
the confliCt46 and further challenges the institutional approach by claiming that 
such moments in history contain collections of individuals and so are highly 
pluralized. This makes the idea of an over-arching narrative not only unstable, 
but largely irrelevant for it neglects the complexities of varying departmental 
pressures, personal agendas and the interplay between them. "By demanding 
closer attention to agency-driven explanations of Britain's European policy, 
post-revisionist historiography reminds us that the definition one ascribes to a 
44 Daddow, Britain and Europe, p 172 
45 Ellison, Threatening Europe 
46 Ruane, The Rise andFalloftheEDC; Daddow, Britain andEurope, p176 
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given thing or event has a great leverage over how historical events are 
interpreted. iA7 
In this section, we have used Daddow's 'schools' approach to identify 
three strands of thought and perspective in the literature concerning Britain's 
European policy: orthodox, revisionist and post-revisionist. It was shown that 
these three schools are historically situated and are constitutive of particular 
communities, each with their own agendas. In the next section, the most 
appropriate school for the aim of this thesis will be selected followed by an 
analysis of the various methods available for the study of elite ideas. 
1.3 Interpreting Europe 
This thesis places itself within the third school identified by Daddow, 
namely post-revisionism. Daddow's uncertain conclusion about the direction of 
post-revisionist literature means that it is ripe for definition. Returning to the 
thesis objectives, four were earlier outlined: first, to provide an account of the 
pre-entry era as a counter-weight to the dominant post-entry literature; 
secondly, through this account, to provide some perspective on the episodic 
studies current in post-revisionist approaches; thirdly, to ensure the account 
places British European policy within a broader context of interests and 
pressures; and fourth, to show that that the ideational dynamics underpinning 
Britain's European policy can be best understood by a study of dlite actors 
rather than of institutions. 
47 Daddow, Britain and Europe, p 184 
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Four features characterising Daddow's definition of post-revisionism 
apply in this thesis. First, a greater distance from the period of time being 
studied affords greater objectivity than the more emotive texts from the period. 
Secondly, although there are many more sources from which to draw 
information, the focus on the individual allows for a targeted use of such 
sources. Thirdly, this thesis recognises the validity of some orthodox arguments 
and some revisionist arguments. Finally, it also recognises, like the disparate 
works of the post-revisionist school, that the economic dimension and 
international setting require greater focus. 
Despite these characteristic similarities, the post-revisionist school 
requires an organising and theoretical perspective which is provided by an 
interpretative approach. While Daddow identifies the application of post- 
modernist techniques such as deconstructionism in the post-revisionist school 
this section examines this and other methodologies to discern which is most 
suitable for the realisation of the objectives stated above and for the overall aim 
of the thesis. 
Marsh argues that much of the literature on post-war British politics is 
superficial and ahistorical, with narrative accounts lacking a location in a 
theoretical framework. He concludes that "the interpretation of the past is often 
shaped by present political concerns which are not always expliCit,,. 
48 For 
example, an approach defined by rational choice theory assumes an equilibrium 
leaving little ability to explain change and imbalance. Where change is 
48 Marsh et al. Postwar British Politics, p1 -2 
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recognised, it is viewed in simplistic terms such that 1945 provides a 
watershed, as does 1979. This overlooks arguments about the definition of 
change, for instance that a lack of overt transformation does not mean that 
change fails to occur, or how change is conceptualised, either based on policy, 
idea or governmental change. 49 
Some explicit challenges have been made to such assumptions, not least 
over the validity of the 'consensus thesis'. 50 First questioned by Pimlott in the 
late 1980s, the following decade saw a proliferation of texts questioning the 
credibility of the post-war political consensus. Marlow concluded that the 
validity of the concept of consensus has been sustained through intertextuality; 
the assumption of its existence and the sustaining of the assumption by large 
numbers of authors rather than the use of in-depth empirical analysis. 51 When 
closely examined, the concept of consensus proves illusory. 52 Our analysis of 
literature concerning Britain's post-war foreign policy indicates this may also 
be true here. 
Furthermore, an analysis that focuses exclusively on post-war Britain, 
Hay adds, will fail to acknowledge the considerable impact of the war, 
arguably the most significant factor in accounting for change in the years that 
49 Marsh et a]. Postwar British Politics, p5,9-10 
50 Pimlott, B (1988) 'Myth of Consensus' in L. M. Smith (ed), The Making of Great Britain: Echoes of 
Greatness, London: Macmillan; Jones, H and M. Kandiah (1996) The Myth of Consensus: New Views 
on British History, 1945-1964, Basingstoke: Macmillan; Marlow, J. D. (1995) Questioning the Post- 
war Consensus Thesis: Towards an Alternative Account, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing; Seldon, A 
(1994) 'Consensus: A Debate too Long? % Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 47.4, pp501-514; Kavanagh, D 
(1997) The Reordering ofBrilish Politics: Politics After Thatcher, Oxford: OUP; Kerr, P (1999) 'The 
Postwar Consensus: A Woozle that Wasn'tT, in Marsh et al. Postwar British Politics, p66-86 
51 Marlow, Questioning the Post-war Consensus Thesis, 
52 pirnlott, 'The Myth of Consensus' 
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followed. 53 This raises the twin problems of the extent of context and of 
structure versus agency. For example, using 1945 as a cut-off point in academic 
study is of limited use since although it reflects the distinction of a state at war 
and at peace, it is an artificial break in terms of the continuity of ideas. 
Accounts which prioritise the actions of agents, or 'insider' accounts, will 
prioritise the immediate actors, factors, motives and intentions with a reliance 
on first-hand data. Structure-centred accounts, or 'outsider' accounts, 
contextualise the actors, limiting their action. To illustrate the point, Hay 
highlights debates over British exceptionalism as peculiarities of the British 
state which largely exonerates individuals of responsibility. Rose asserts that 
"the tradition of writing about British ... politics is to assert uniqueness through 
false particularisation. Every institution, individual and event is described with 
nominal differences implying the absence of generic qualities". 54 Geddes 
tailors this criticism to the study of Britain and Europe arguing "It would be 
absurd to claim that Britain alone has been influenced by a distinct sense of its 
own history and an idea of its place in Europe and the World. Historical 
55 
exceptionalism is actually the European norm, not a peculiarly British trait". 
What Hay, Rose and Geddes refer to is the tendency of academics in the 
'British School' to opt for historical institutionalism. 56 Descriptively thick but 
theoretically thin, the institutional approach is criticised precisely for its 
53 Hay, C (1999) 'Continuity and Discontinuity in British Political Development' in Marsh et al, 
Postwar British Politics, pp23-42, p30 
54 Rose, R (1991) 'Comparing Forms of Comparative Analysis', Political Studies, vol. 39.3, pp446- 
462, p450 
53 Geddes, The European Union and British Politics, p28 
56 Geddes, The European Union and British Politics, p22; Rhodes, R. A. W. (1995) 'The Institutional 
Approach' in D. Marsh and G. Stoker, Theories and Methods in Political Science, pp42-57, p47 
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historical focus and its consequent bias towards the unique rather than its 
ability to make generalisations. Institutionalism is also criticised for its 
prescriptive, perspective-based and idealised concept of the virtues of liberal 
democratic government. 57 In the study of international relations, it also suffers 
from a dependence on structural explanations that are limited in their ability to 
explain change. Institutionalism has been forced to account for its methods and 
theoretical content by the rise of theoretically specific approaches including 
behavourism, rational choice theory, and variants of post-modemism, including 
deconstructionism. 
Both behaviourism and rational choice theory are defined by their 
positivist heritage. Positivism is modelled on the natural sciences and claims 
that through inductive and deductive reasoning, a predictive science of politics 
is possible. The core assumption of positivist methods in the social sciences is 
that political systems are closed, and as such they can be observed objectively. 
Behaviourism examines aggregates of particular phenomena to draw causal 
inference based on probabilities while rational choice theory assumes the rules 
of the game and the actor's role in the game are sufficient to predict an actor's 
behaviour. 
However, problems arise for both these approaches when it is postulated 
that two actors in a similar context and similar situation in respect to the 'role' 
played in any given game may behave differently. If they conceive of their 
context differently and conceive of their relationship to others as different, 
37 Marsh, D. and G. Stoker, Theories and Methods in Political Science, p8 
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predictions become difficult if not impossible. Furthermore, we could postulate 
then that ideas held about our enviroranent are capable of influencing the game 
so that rules we hold about X are different before and after X is employed, 
invoked, engaged with and so on. This makes the concept of closed systems 
redundant. 58 
Deconstructionism rejects the positivist assumptions about observable 
facts and instead analyses sedimented rules and meanings which condition the 
political construction of social, political and cultural meanings and identities. 
Discourses are constructed through hegemonic struggles which aim to take 
political and moral leadership through a specific articulation of meaning and 
identity. Social systems become unstable as everything becomes invested with 
political currency and so is open to hegemonic capture. In foreign policy the 
focus is on the fracturing and forging of state functions such as maintaining the 
physical security of the state, ensuring international economic competitiveness 
and domestic electoral survival. Criticism of deconstructionist analysis rests on 
its relativism in textual analysis, questioning its relevance if there is no priority 
afforded to any one textual interpretation. The deconstruction of concepts only 
takes us so far with the normative implication that such newly acquired 
knowledge requires a concomitant commitment to restructuring our 
understandings to make such knowledge meaningful in practice. 59 
58 Hay, C (2004) 'Taking Ideas Seriously in Explanatory Political Analysis', British Journal of 
Politics and 1nternational Relations, vol. 6.2, ppl42-149, p143 
59 Deconstructionism's critics include Rorty, R (199 1) 'Two Meaning of Logocentrism' Essays on 
Heidegger and Others, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
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What emerges is a picture of territorial defence between different 
theoretical approaches. This thesis examines the role of ideas and beliefs held 
by particular key individuals and the ways in which these were articulated 
about Britain's European policy. It posits that ideas and beliefs are subject to 
change so we can dismiss various theoretical approaches as inappropriate to 
this study. 
Behaviourism and rational choice theory are rejected as this study does 
not seek to make predictions about actors' behaviour, neither does it assume 
that ideas are fixed. Institutionalism implies a structural determinism that this 
thesis, in its focus on ideational change, seeks to question. Finally, 
deconstructionism seems to offer an appropriate approach but is rejected for its 
focus on hegemonic practices when this thesis contests the assumption that all 
behaviour can be accounted by such an approach. 
Whereas deconstructionism focuses on the historical conditions of the 
possibility of meaning and action, this thesis adopts a hermeneutic approach. 60 
A hermeneutic approach is one in which for example, in examining a text, we 
do not evaluate the coherence or prescriptive element of the text or even its 
historical conditions of possibility, but rather the meaning the text has when 
located in its social context. Furthermore, it claims this is only possible by an 
analysis of the hermeneutic meanings ascribed by individuals at any given time 
60 There is a well established tradition of hermeneutics from Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer 
and Paul Rocoeur among others. Heidegger, M (1962) Being and Time, translated by John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, 7 Ih Edition, Oxford: Blackwell; Gamaer, H-G (1976) 
Philosophical Hermeneutics, translated by David E. Linge, Berkeley: University of California Press; 
Ricoeur, P. (1981) Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, translated by John B. Thompson, 
Cambridge: CUP 
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and about any given object. Therefore, this thesis concerns itself with the 
interpretation of the hermeneutic meanings that key individuals held about 
Britain's relationship with Europe. In so doing, it adopts an anti-foundational 
position and an approach which relates the beliefs individuals hold to the 
cultural and intellectual traditions in which they were socialised, thus providing 
a platform for ideational change. It is by adopting such an approach that it is 
possible to identify how dlite ideas have been significant to the development of 
Britain's European policy during the pre-membership period. 
Studies of ideational change share similarities to methodologies based on 
psychology. Perception-based theories have been used by both orthodox and 
revisionist academics to show that foreign policy behaviour will vary according 
to whether politicians use one of three types of belief system: a policy based on 
a model or paradigm of international relations; one which bases decisions on 
expectations and probabilities; and one focusing only on a small number of key 
features so as to manage international relations and their world view on the 
feedback received .61 The idea of image and perception has been currency in 
foreign policy analysis since the 1950s, informing its own niche of 
behaviourism. It is an approach which makes the distinction between the 
psychological and operational environments of the decision-maker: the ways in 
which an individual defines choices and takes decisions and the results of 
implementing those decisions and choices. In this decision-making, it is not 
61 Lord, C (1993) British Entry to the European Community under the Heath Government of 1970- 
1974, Aldershot: Dartmouth, p3; Lord can be cast as a revisionist, while an orthodox account which 
uses perception theory is Shlaim, A et al (1977) British Foreign Secretaries Since 1945, London: 
David and Charles; and to a lesser extent, Frankel, J (1975) British Foreign policy, 1945-1973, 
Oxford: OUP 
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how the environment or milieu is, but how the decision-maker imagines it to 
be. 62 
Identifying the importance of perception is one aspect but to be able to 
analyse the images of decision-makers, accounting for the way in which they 
are formed and modified, is another. We might ask in the first instance, what is 
an image and what informs the perception an individual held? Developments 
on this approach include George's work on 'operational codes', a misleading 
term for the deductive approach which seeks to lay bare the philosophical and 
instrumental architecture of an individual's belief system. 63 An inductive 
approach includes Axelrod's cognitive mapping as a guide to the internal logic 
processes of decision-makers. 64 Both of these approaches are highly descriptive 
and lack either an explanatory or predictive capacity. However, the issue of 
perception has been used in approaches which seek to illuminate with 
explanatory power. Consistency theory is one adopted by Jervis who argues 
that decision-makers respond positively to information consistent with existing 
images and counter dissonance by selective perception and highly biased 
interpretation. 65 
Theories which deal with perception and misperception have challenged 
rationalist assumptions governing foreign policy studies. They question the 
62 Sprout, H and M Sprout, (1957) 'Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics', 
Journal of Conj7ict Resolution, vol. 1.4, pp309-328, p314 
63 George, A. L (1969) 'The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political 
Leaders and Decision-Making', International Studies Quarterly, vol 13.2, pp 190-222 
'4 Axelrod, R (1976) Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press; Clarke and White, Understanding Foreign Policy, p 139-142 
65 Jervis, R (1976) Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press; Clarke and White, Understanding Foreign Policy, pl 46 
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capacity of individuals to live up to rationalist models which have hitherto been 
ascribed to their behaviour. The main criticism of these approaches derives 
from the focus on the individual and his or her 'mental state' in the 
construction and execution of foreign policy. A more informative function 
would trace the formative influences of social and ideational factors in the 
perceptions or beliefs of individuals. While there is descriptive consensus 
emerging on how the decision-making process looks, there is little theoretical 
consensus about why it looks as it does. 66 
Jervis proposes a four-stage pattern of perceptions and misperceptions. 
First, discrepant information is regarded as a one-off, a misperception in itself 
prompting no attitude change. Second, discrepant information is recognised but 
its validity is rejected, or if it cannot be explained and therefore invalidated, it 
is accepted as an anomaly without any impact on the individual's framework of 
interpretation. Third, if the discrepant information is accepted and cannot be 
invalidated or ignored as an anomaly, the individual may undertake efforts to 
shore up their existing beliefs by searching for new information. Finally, when 
discrepant information is either so strong or frequent as to lead to a conflict of 
attitudes, aspects of an individual's belief system may be sloughed off in 
favour of coherence and consistency. 67 
While this shows a conservative tendency in attitude change, Jervis points 
to key areas where beliefs held by individuals are more inflexible, such as 
events occurring in early adult life, especially those in which the individual was 
66 Kinder, D. R. and Weiss, J. A. (1978) 'In Lieu of Rationality: Psychological Perspectives on Foreign 
Policy Decision-Making', Journal of Con 
67 Jervis, Perception, p288-298 
flict Resolution, vol. 22.4, pp707-35 
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personally involved or his or her nation was, such as a war. 68 As these events 
and 'learning' occasions are largely experienced within the domestic 
environment, this is where most basic ideas about politics are learned and these 
ideas colour the individual's views of international relations. "Often without 
realising it, most decision-makers draw on their own knowledge of their 
domestic political systems in their efforts to understand others'... domestic 
politics has supplied both his [sic] basic political concepts and the more 
detailed lessons about what strategies and tactics are appropriate to reach 
desired goals". 69 Furthermore, the effect of time is taken into consideration by 
Jervis who points out that early adult experiences have little chance of being 
enacted until a generation later, once the individual has achieved a position of 
power within the political community. 70 
Jervis's consistency theory provides a useful guide to what we might 
expect to find when we examine ideational change but lacks the theoretical 
depth to explain why this is the case. In Chapter Two it will be demonstrated 
that an interpretative approach is theoretically complementary to the insights 
provided by consistency theory. 
1.4 Conclusion 
This study examines how elite ideas have been significant to the 
development of Britain's European policy, 1945-1975. This chapter has 
outlined three types of interpretation of this policy: orthodox, revisionist and 
post-revisionist. It found that the orthodox school consisted mainly of 
68 Jervis, Perception, p239,249-55 
69 Jervis, Perception, p283 
70 Jervis, Perception, p260 
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contemporary practitioners with a specific political agenda while the revisionist 
challenge was spearheaded mainly by academics. Finally, it was argued that 
post-revisionism benefited by a distancing from events and the debate between 
orthodox and revisionist beliefs. 
This chapter also outlined four objectives: first, to raise the profile of 
Britain's pre-entry era as significant to the study of current relations with the 
EU and as a means of providing perspective on the current periodisation of the 
post-revisionist literature; secondly, to do this by providing a detailed 
examination of the whole period that Britain was 'outside' of the European 
Community and of when parties are in and out of office; thirdly to examine the 
role of context, both economic and international; and finally to posit that how 
individuals gained and developed their ideas is crucial to an examination of the 
way in which they engaged with Europe. 
To achieve these objectives it was argued that a specific methodological 
approach was necessary, rejecting many standard theories in favour of an 
interpretative approach rooted in hermeneutics. Consistency theory was shown 
to provide a guide to inform our interpretative approach. In Chapter Two we 
examine the interpretative approach proposed by Bevir and how this can 
provide a methodological framework for analysing the significance of dlite 
ideas in the development of Britain's European policy. 
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Chaptcr Two 
Theoretical Approach and Methodology Issues 
Human reason is a tincture almost equally infused into all our opinions and 
manners, ofwhatform 'soever they are; infinite in matter, infinite in diversity 
Michel de Montaigne' 
2.1 Introduction 
This study employs the theoretical approach developed by Mark Bevir in 
The Logic of the History of Ideas. 2 In this, Bevir argues for an anti-foundational3 
approach for the interpretation of how ideas emerge and develop over time. In 
this chapter we first outline the content and criticisms of Bevir's theory. 
Secondly, we identify any potential problems in applying Bevir's theory to a 
study of British political dlite ideas. Thirdly, we offer a framework for the 
application of Bevir's theory. The chapter concludes by offering a preliminary 
account of Conservative and Labour foreign policy traditions. 
2.2 The Logic of the History of Ideas 
The core of Bevir's argument is how to locate, and justify the location of, 
the means through which individuals in the present may recover the intentions of 
individuals from the past. Bevir claims distinction from the relativism inherent in 
postmodernist thought. While deconstructionists may treat direct statements 
from authors in the past as merely an act of self-interpretation and so equal to 
any other text, 4 Bevir actively embraces these statements as the means through 
which we can retrieve meaning. He tackles head-on the role of structure and 
1 Montaigne, M. de (197 8) The Complete Works: Essays, Travel Journal, Letters, translated by 
Donald M. Frame, 3 rd edition, Stanford: Stanford University Press 
2 Bevir, M (1999) The Logic of the History of Ideas, Cambridge: CUP. Henceforth called the 
Logic 
3 In Bevir's earlier works he labels this anti-foundational, reflective of Rorty's work, while later 
arguments presented by Bevir use the label post-foundational. Rorty, R (1979) Philosophy and 
the Mirror offature, Princeton: PUP 
4 See deconstructionists such as Derrida; Derrida, J (1973) Speech and Phenomena, Illinois: 
Northwest University Press 
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agency, proposing instead examining the recovery of intentions from agents in 
the past by using concepts such as narrative, tradition, belief and dilemma. He 
argues that it is possible to construct a methodological framework through which 
one can identify the historical meaning of the ideas held by individuals and their 
transmission and modification over time. It is to these operational concepts that 
we now turn. 
2.2.1 Narrative 
In human sciences, the role of the narrative is to perform as a story, 
relating people and events to make intelligible relationships between narrative 
structures and our agreed understandings of what constitutes objective 
knowledge of the world. 5 Bevir points to the use of narratives by historians as 
explanations for actions through causes, but adds "every form of explanation 
works by postulating pertinent connections between entities or events. Narrative 
explanations relate actions to the beliefs and pro-attitudes that produced them". 
This is done by focusing on two types of connection, conditional and volitional, 
so that human action is explained by relating the two to create an intelligible 
narrative of the past. 7 
Conditional connections reflect the themes that "are immanent within 
and given immediately by the beliefs they connect" while volitional connections 
are "what a will creates whenever it first decides to act upon a pro-attitude and 
5 Bevir, M and R. A. W. Rhodes (1998) 'Narratives of "Thatcherism"', Western European 
Politics, vol. 2 1.1, pp97-119, p98-9 
' Where a pro-attitude is a motive rather than a belief and a motive is prompted by a reason, 
desire or need. See Bevir, Logic, p286-298; Bevir, M (2000) 'Narrative as a Form of 
Explanation', Disputatio, vol. 9.1, pp 10- 18, p 13 
7 Where the conditional connection is the relation of beliefs, actions and pro-attitudes in a way 
which makes them intelligible to each other, volitional connections involves the use of will, the 
intention to act upon those beliefs and pro-attitudes. Bevir, 'Narrative as a Form of Explanation', 
p15,16 
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then does So,,. 8 Bevir's approach prioritises the role of volitional connections, as 
these are the ones that lead to a change in one's stance towards the content of a 
proposition, not a change in the content of the proposition. 9 
At the crux of such an approach is the attempt to decentre the traditional 
role of the narrative. Bevir argues "[t]he past does not present itself to historians 
as a set of isolated facts upon which they impose a narrative so as to bring the 
facts to order. Rather, the past, like all experience, presents itself as an already 
structured set of facts". 10 From this, Bevir claims "it is possible to judge 
competing narratives by [the] agreed standards of objectivity" of accuracy, 
comprehensiveness, consistency and so forth. " 
Narratives, or the "webs of interpretation" we hold as individuals, 
provide a map, questions, a language and a historical story of any particular 
event or subject in tiMe. 12 Yet, they do not operate in isolation, they are a 
6structured set of facts', which leads us to the second of Bevir's concepts: 
beliefs. 
2.2.2. Beliefs 
The concept of 'weak intentionalism', or individual viewpoints, consists 
of thoughts or beliefs; "we take individual viewpoints to be the beliefs authors 
express in their utterances", where a belief is defined as "the psychological state 
a Bevir, Logic, p222,298 
9 Bevir, Logic, p30 
10 Bevir, 'Narrative as a Form of Explanation', p 18 
11 Bevir and Rhodes 'Narratives of "Thatcherism"', P99 
12 Bevir and Rhodes 'Narratives of "Thatcherism"', p99 
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in which one holds a proposition true". 13 Hence beliefs are linked to meaning in 
that we cannot identify a belief independently of a meaning relevant for the 
particular individual. This allows us to place individuals as being central to 
understandings of belief and ideas. 
Further, we may identify beliefs in our attempt to recover meaning by 
assuming them to be sincere, conscious and rational. We should assume, Bevir 
claims, that beliefs are normally sincere as we do not inhabit a world in which 
our beliefs are normally deceptions. 14 In other words, our definitions of 
insincere, irrational and unconscious beliefs derive from our original definitions 
of rational, sincere and conscious beliefs. 
These beliefs operate in relation to each other, largely in a consistent 
manner to form what Bevir labels a 'web of beliefs', refuting the possibility of 
any independent beliefs. ' 5 Thus, all our understandings are filtered through our 
beliefs, where our beliefs are structured equally to one another and where no 
priority or hierarchy is attached to any particular belief. This approach rejects 
claims to foundational knowledge or beliefs to which one can refer all other, in a 
sense, secondary beliefs. It further rejects the atomistic individualism of logical 
empiricism on the one hand, and structuralism on the other. Where the former 
dismisses social factors, focussing only on how an individual comes to their 
beliefs by a process of pure reasoning and observation, the latter claims social 
factors are the only determinants of individuals' beliefs. In these diametrically 
opposed positions, logical empiricism will view only those beliefs reflective of 
13 Bevir, Logic, p 129 
14 Bevir, Logic, p128 
13 Bevir, Logic, p165 
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pure reasoning as significant, not those which might demonstrate how one's 
beliefs may be informed by inherited traditions which operate within a society. 
Structuralists, or 'irrationalists' demonstrate an individual's beliefs with 
reference only to the inherited traditions, leaving no scope for human agency. 
Bevir's presentation of his argument has been criticised for establishing a straw 
man. 16 A more accurate presentation of these two opposing approaches would 
concede some middle ground, but Bevir can be forgiven for exaggerating these 
alternative arguments as a method of explaining his own which occupies the area 
in between. 
For Bevir, the concept of the belief invests individuals with agency. 
Although it is inherited from the intellectual traditions which operate in the 
social setting, these traditions are not enough of an explanatory tool. Rather, the 
individual is able to adjust the inherited intellectual tradition by accepting a new 
understanding, modifying it, or indeed, rejecting it. In this way, Bevir contends, 
the content of any intellectual tradition is changed over time. The method Bevir 
uses to justify this approach is semantic holism, a concept which implies that the 
objectivity of a belief depends on its relationship to other beliefs; there are no 
self-supporting beliefs. 17 He does concede that structuralists would argue any 
latitude an individual believes they have over whether to decide on accepting, 
rejecting or modifying a new understanding is still circumscribed by the 
intellectual traditions in which the individual operates. 18 
16 Brooks, T (2002) 'Review of The Logic of the History of Ideas, by Mark Bevir', International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 10.4, pp505-6; Stem, R (2002) 'History, Meaning, and 
'nterpretation: a Critical Response to Bevir', History ofEuropean Ideas, vol. 28.1, ppl-12 
17 Bevir, Logic, p 190-1 
18 Bevir, Logic, p197 
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Bevir's theory has attracted both admiration and criticism. 19 On beliefs, 
criticism has focused on two points: the collapsing of meaning and intention, and 
the assumption that beliefs are sincere, conscious and rational. Ankersmit, for 
example, questions the use of intentionalism on two grounds. Theoretically, he 
rejects Bevir's attempt to equate logically intention and meaning without an 
adequate argument for doing so. To say 'S intends to say p' Ankersmit argues, is 
not the logical equivalent to statements about the meaning of p. One details the 
intention while the other has the meaning at stake. 20 Methodologically, 
Ankersmit continues, Bevir's argument for weak intentionalism is 
epistemologically redundant in the practice of historical writing. For example, 
two historians using the same text may come to different conclusions as to the 
intentions of the author. 21 Even using Bevir's criteria of objectivity does not help 
us here since comparisons of the relative merits of each conclusion are 
circumscribed by the text as the object. 
19 Ankersmit, F (2000) 'Comments on Bevir's The Logic of the History of Ideas', Rethinking 
History, vol. 4.3, pp321-331; Bevir, M and Frank Ankersmit, (2000) 'Exchanging Ideas', 
Rethinking History, vol. 4.3, pp351-372; Brooks, 'Review'; Brooks, T (2003) 'Does Bevir's 
Logic Improve our Understanding of Hegel's Philosophy ofRight? ', Paper presented to the PSA 
Conference, Leicester; Burns, R. M. (2002) 'Language, Tradition, and the Self in the Generation 
of Meaning', History ofEuropean Ideas, vol. 28.1, ppS 1-75; Frohnen, B (2000) 'Tradition, Habit, 
and Social Interaction: A Response to Mark Bevir', Hunianitas, vol. 14.1, pp108-116; Garnett, J 
(2002) 'Whose Logic? Reflections on Gender in the History of Ideas', History of European 
Ideas, vol. 28.1, pp77-82; Lane, M (2002) 'Why History of Ideas at allT, History of European 
Ideas, vol. 28.1, pp33-41; Martin, J (2002) 'The Political Logic of Discourse: a Neo-Gramscian 
View', History of European Ideas, vol. 28.1, pp2l-3 1; Megill, A (2000) 'Imagining the History 
of Ideas', Rethinking History, vol. 4.3, pp333-340; Munslow, A (200 1) 'Book Review: The Logic 
of the History of Ideas', History in Focus, Institute of Historical Research website 
http: //www. histoCy. ac. uk/ihr/Focus/Whatishisto[y/munslow2. html accessed 20/06/03; Munslow, 
A (2002) 'Objectivity and the Writing of History', History ofEuropean Ideas, vol. 28.1, pp43-50; 
Palonen, K (2000) 'Logic or Rhetoric in the History of Political Thought? Comments on Mark 
Bevir', Rethinking History, vol. 4.3, pp301-310; Pippin, R (2001) 'Mark Bevir and The Logic of 
the History ofIdeas', Mind, vol. l. 10, issue 437, ppl63-168; Rayment-Pickard, H (2002)'Derrida 
and Fidelity to History', History ofEuropean Ideas, vol. 28.1, pp13-20; Stem, 'History, Meaning, 
and Interpretation'; Stuurman, S (2000) 'On Intellectual Innovation and the Methodology of the 
History of Ideas', Rethinking History, vol. 4.3, pp3ll-319; Young, B (2002) 'The Tyranny of the 
Definite Article: Some Thoughts on the Art of Intellectual History', Rethinking History, vol. 4.3, 
pplOI-I 17 
2" Ankersmit, 'Comments on Bevir's The Logic ofthe History ofIdeas', p324 
21 Ankersmit, 'Comments on Bevir's The Logic of the History ofIdeas', p325 
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This argument is supported by Lane who, amongst others, questions the 
ability of a text to generate just one meaning and goes on to contest the priority 
of the audience over the author in locating the meaning of a text. 22 If this is the 
case, she argues, a contemporary reading of an historical text would accept its 
meaning at face value for the individual themselves rather than attempting to 
grasp the meaning of the text. 23 This is a point with which Stem concurs. Fixing 
the meaning of an utterance with reference to the understanding reached by its 
audience does not result in it being fixed by intentions, certainly if the author 
intended one thing in the utterance only for the audience to understand 
something else. 24 As Munslow argues, if intention equates with the meaning of a 
text, then why not just concentrate on the teXt? 
25 
The second criticism is based on Bevir's assumed use of rational action 
theory. Bevir contends that an individual's beliefs, we must presume, are 
sincere, rational and conscious. Stem argues Bevir's use of 'presumption' is 
ambiguous so as to remain confusing since Bevir appears to unpack his 
presumptions unevenly, depending on the presumption to which he is referring. 26 
It is a point Bevir concedes by stating that his priority of presumption rests on 
rationality. 27 Pippin argues further that the difference between presumption and 
expectation as pursued by Bevir is neither interesting nor decisive. 28 
22 Lane, 'Why the History of Ideas at allT p34; Munslow, 'Objectivity and the Writing of 
History', p3; Munslow, 'Book Review: The Logic of the History of Ideas'; Pippin, 'Mark Bevir 
and The Logic ofthe History ofIdeas', p 166 
23 Lane, 'Why the History of Ideas at allT p35 
24 Stem, 'History, Meaning and Interpretation', p3,4 
25 Munslow, 'Objectivity and the Writing of History', p3 
26 Stem, 'History, Meaning and Interpretation', pl 1-12 
27 Bevir, M (2002) 'Clarifications', History of European Ideas, vol. 28.1, pp83-100, p89 
28 Pippin, 'Mark Bevir and The Logic ofthe History ofIdeas', p168 
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Stuurman points out that Bevir's emphasis upon rational individuals and 
his search for consistency and coherence indicate he is a rationalist, a view 
supported by his lack of attention to the role of power either as the idea as mode 
of power, or the interplay of power and dominance in the field of ideational 
exchange. 29 This rationalist bias coupled with his individualism means Bevir's 
4presumption' approach is flawed on a number of counts. For example, the use 
and phrasing of ideas is tempered by power so as to soften or avoid completely 
some concepts and ideas while a search for consistency and coherence overlooks 
those areas of inconsistency, incoherence and evasive language which can be 
equally telling. Moreover, consistency and coherence is unconvincing since at 
any one time an individual may indeed reflect consciously on certain concepts, 
but will accept without reflection a larger part of their conceptual vocabulary 
which is taken for granted. While this rationalist approach highlights the 
importance of argumentation and consistency, it overlooks the role played by 
rhetoric, hyperbole and irony. 30 
Thus, Bevir's adherence to a rationalist strategy, it is implied, acts as a 
constraint, one buttressed by his individualism. The author of a text, Stuurman 
argues, writes for an intended audience which, due to the role of power, will 
censor the individual immediately in terms of the content of the text. This lack of 
attention to the social within the discursive practice of the individual thus 
overlooks how we might limit what we say depending on where we are and with 
whom we are talking, be it verbally or textually. Furthermore, the act of 
transmitting ideas frequently occurs within a social group of, what Stuurman 
" Stuurman, 'On Intellectual Innovation', p3l I 
30 Stuurman, 'On Intellectual Innovation', p312; see also, Bums, Pippin, Lane, Martin and 
Young who also make similar points. 
I 
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terms, "intellectually significant others". 31 So whereas the ideas transmitted have 
a political content, they are also significantly placed within a politically pre- 
structured lexical field. 
2.2.3 Tradition 
Bevir argues that "all people at all times set out from an inherited set of 
shared understandings they acquired during the process of socialisation. We 
necessarily acquire a way of seeing the world along with the values, concerns, 
and assumptions others impart to us". 32 A tradition is communicated from 
teacher to pupil and so provides the theories with which people construct their 
understanding of the world. The teacher-pupil dynamic is at first one-way only, 
but is later a metaphor for the way in which we relate to other individuals; at any 
one time we might be teacher or pupil to a new understanding. 
The tradition is the starting point of the individual's web of beliefs, but 
there is scope for human agency through the ability to accept, modify, or reject 
the tradition or aspects of the tradition. So, tradition is unavoidable as the 
starting point, but not the final destination of the web of beliefs held by 
individuals. 
in using the concept of tradition, Bevir rejects essentialism or the 
immutable core of a tradition, since the role of agency makes unpredictable the 
changes one might identify with a tradition. We may adopt a belief transmitted 
by a teacher without taking the other ideas associated with it. Further, Bevir 
31 Stuurman, 'On Intellectual Innovation', p313 
32 Bevir, Logic, p201 
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warns against hypostatising traditions; applying an underlying substance 
independent of the individual's beliefs. "Traditions are not fixed entities people 
happen to discover. They are contingent entities people produce by their own 
activities", he claims. 33 Although individuals may conceive of traditions as 
unified and containing a core, they are incorrect as they respond selectively to 
different parts of the web they inherit. 
Bevir's procedural individualism means individuals may not exist 
beyond the beliefs held by the specific individuals; agency implies that traditions 
do not determine the beliefs of the specific individual. So the continuation of a 
tradition only exists by reference to "shared understandings and temporal links 
that allow us to associate its exponents with one another. 04 Hence we learn from 
an individual teacher, not society; we may read a book written by an individual, 
not society. Bevir outlines an 'appropriate' temporal link as one where the 
beliefs must have started for each successive component, described as the 
teacher to pupil, pupil's pupil, and so on. He presents it this way to show the 
historical j ourney of a belief, when the teacher to pupil relationship is assumed at 
every transmission, with the modifications and extensions added by the pupil 
before the pupil assumes the role of teacher. 35 Such a tracing will reveal that 
beliefs held by current exponents may differ utterly from earlier exponents of the 
same tradition. "A tradition must consist of a series of instances that resemble 
one another precisely because they exercised a formative influence on one 
another in a definite historical chain". 36 
33 Bevir, Logic, p203 
3' Bevir, Logic, p204 
35 Bevir, Logic, p204 
36 Bevir, Logic, p205 
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As well as temporal connections, traditions must exhibit suitable 
conceptual connections. By necessity the provision of an individual's web of 
beliefs by a tradition, defined as a consistent world view, means it is also 
relatively consistent and coherent. Without the conceptual connection, they offer 
no explanatory value in the history of ideas, and further, cannot exist without 
reference to a web of beliefs. So Bevir concludes that a tradition must consist of 
webs of belief which are linked to one another both temporally and conceptually 
but concedes that beyond this conclusion it is impossible to define any clear 
limits to what counts as a tradition. 37 
As traditions act as a starting point for an individual's web of beliefs 
from which traditions they are free to modify, extend or even reject, it follows 
that traditions are the product of beliefs. If an individual modifies, extends or 
rejects a tradition, they can only do so with reference to another tradition which 
thus raises the prospect of multiple traditions rather than one monolithic tradition 
defining an era. However, the danger is that the wider a tradition is defined, the 
less explanatory power the concept holds. The crucial question lies in defining 
the limits of analysis. Bevir and Rhodes identify four traditions in their study of 
Thatcherism: Tory, Whig, Liberal and Socialist. 38 While O'Brien identifies four 
within Socialism alone: ethical, democratic socialist, liberal and Marxist. 39 
We cannot claim that an individual within a political party holds beliefs 
we associate with labels used to define the traditions of the party. Hence we 
37 Bevir, Logic, p206 
38 Bevir and Rhodes, "Narratives of Thatcherism", p 100 
39 O'Brien, D (2003) Interpreting New Labour: Beliefs, Traditions and Dilemmas, unpublished 
thesis: Newcastle University, p63 
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cannot say that a Labour Party member's beliefs can be traced to a tradition of 
ethical socialism, social democracy, liberalism or Marxism simply by virtue of 
their being perceived as participating in a tradition of Socialism. If the "majority 
political parties are in themselves coalitions of diverse elements", we may only 
assume the broader, parent, traditions of Tory, Whig, Liberal, or Socialist 
although our expectations may be that a portion of the Labour Party member's 
beliefs will correspond with the broad tradition of Socialism. 40 
Bevir is taken to task over his use of tradition as an explanatory tool in 
the quest to answer the individualist question of 'how do I develop my beliefs in 
relation to the beliefs other people already holdT This, according to Frohnen, 
fails to appreciate three points: that traditions are worthy of examination in their 
own right as concrete, social realities. Secondly, traditions are composed of 
intellectual and practical habits and go beyond any background understanding 
offered by Bevir. Finally, traditions combine social groups and practices, adding 
purpose and inner logic that over time coheres so shaping human character and 
conduct. 
41 
j 
Bevir's rejection of Oakeshott's conception of traditions as privileging a 
set of beliefs or experiences fails to consider his appreciation that whatever we 
might deem a tradition will rest, at least tacitly, on understandings and habits 
that individuals accept most of the time without subjecting them to rational 
analysis. 42 In this sense, Frohnen deploys the same argurnerýt employed by 
Stuurman and Bums in relation to beliefs. Similarly, he claims further that 
40 Guttsman, W (1968) The British Politicalbite, London: MacGibbon and Kee, p87 
41 Frohnen, 'Tradition', p 108-9 
42 Frohnen, 'Tradition', p 109 
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Oakeshott's concept of 'modes of conduct' allows us to know how to behave, 
respond, or articulate an idea appropriately. This requires us to act "according to 
pre-existing standards of excellence and perceiving oneself to be a constituent 
part of one's tradition". 43 So while ideas have a social role overlooked in belief, 
so too have sets of understandings. 
Hence Frohnen's biggest problem with Bevir's approach is the emphasis 
Bevir places on the tradition as a starting point. According to Frohnen, a 
tradition must be seen instead as a process of habitualisation, not pedagogically, 
as suggested by Bevir. Such habitualisation means traditions cannot be seen as 
malleable, as Bevir claims, because they do not depend directly on the actions 
and beliefs of individuals. Collective action still allows for agency and change 
but does point to their limits, in contrast to Bevir's elevation of the individual. 
"Individuals do not radically alter traditions, least of all through a redefinition on 
the basis of abstract principles. Traditions undergo modifications in the course of 
events", although Frohnen's example cites the prospect of "higher order 
traditions". 
44 
Like Frolmen, Burns rejects Bevir's argument that traditions merely 
perform as the starting point of any individual's socialisation, rather he claims it 
is "crucial to acknowledge that the individual must be said to remain 
fundamentally dependent on beliefs received by others throughout his or her 
life". This is because most of us, throughout our lives, are incapable of checking 
43 Frohnen, 'Tradition', pI 11 
44 Frohnen, 'Tradition', p 113 
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the truth of a vast number of beliefs, attitudes and values imparted to us and so 
are accepted uncritically, whether child or adult. 45 
This has implications for Bevir's concept of the spherical 'web of 
beliefs' in which one changed belief will have a ripple effect on all other beliefs 
as they are modified accordingly. On the contrary, Bums claims that changing 
one belief requires us to keep all other beliefs unchanged for the purposes of 
changing that specific belief. This he links with Bevir's claim that traditions are 
somehow limitless, contesting the proposition that necessary limits are a 
conceptual confusion and claiming it to be a non-sequitur to suggest that a series 
of limited states of consciousness can succeed each other in the mind so as to 
make the human mind free from all limits. 46 
The ability to explain change within a tradition requires further 
clarification. Bevir has thus far alluded to the ability of the individual to respond 
to beliefs, and so traditions, by reference to modification, extension, and 
rejection. The process by which this is achieved is through the operational 
concept of the dilemma to which we turn next. 
2.2.4 Dilemmas 
Bevir employs two methods of explanation; synchronic and diachronic. 
Traditions have a synchronic explanatory value in that they are able to explain 
the content of an individual's web of beliefs at any one time, while changes in 
belief over time use diachronic explanation. Bevir uses the concept of the 
43 Bums, 'Language, Tradition and the Self', p56 
46 Bums, 'Language, Tradition and the Self, p60 
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dilemma as the means by which to explain why people adjust and transform 
traditions. Dilemmas are defined as "authoritative understandings that put into 
question their existing webs of belief'. 47 They prompt changes of belief as they 
are a new belief raising a question within the individual's web of beliefs. Thus 
we can understand changes of belief by reference to dilemmas; that a web of 
beliefs is "the product of a series of modifications made to an inherited tradition 
in response to a series of dilemmas. 'A8 
If we accept Bevir's semantic holism, we cannot ascribe to any particular 
belief a foundationalism which would structure our beliefs in a hierarchical. 
form. We therefore cannot reduce a dilemma to one basic type; a dilemma might 
affect any area of our beliefs be they philosophical, moral, religious and so on. 
As experiences are theory laden, no one experience or dilemma can require an 
individual to change a belief in any one way. 49 So the historian might draw on a 
dilemma to explain why an individual changed a belief in the way that he or she 
did. 
The impact of the dilemma is to change a belief and thus change a 
tradition, so Bevir reverses the structuralists' argument by shifting from 
understanding how a tradition impacts upon an individual to how an individual 
impacts upon a tradition. 50 The form of explanation appropriate to a change of 
belief begins with the task of providing a rational reconstruction of the reasons 
that the people concerned had for changing their beliefs in the way they did. This 
47 Bevir, Logic, p221-2 
48 Bevir, Logic, p222 
49 Bevir, Logic, p222 
50 Bevir, Logic, p223 
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cannot be explained solely by an alleged experience or observation by the 
historian, for neither of these is pure, but only by exploring the multiple ways in 
ý ell 
which a new understanding interacts with a web of beliefs. -- 
Bevir urges the historian to treat the dilemma as a belief for there is no 
logic of discovery to be certain that the recovery of the dilemma is correct. It 
must be assessed by criticising and comparing rival accounts of the past. From 
this they can show how a new understanding posed the questions it did by 
52 
exhibiting its relationship to the other beliefs in the relevant web of beliefs. He 
uses the metaphor of a stone dropped in water creating ripples that weaken 
further away from the point of contact. 53 This is based on the premise that an 
individual will need to modify all related beliefs to that one which is under threat 
from a new understanding to regain a coherent web of beliefs. Moreover, this 
does not allow the historian to explain dilemmas by reference to traditions as one 
might with beliefs since "dilemmas are beliefs that People reach by exercising 
their reason to make sense of their experiences against a background of a 
tradition they inherited". 54 
Bevir's concept of the dilemma echoes other philosophers such as Kuhn, 
Popper, Laudan and Toulmin in their attempt to conceptualise the way 
individuals reason against an inherited body of knowledge so as to develop that 
body of knowledge. 55 However, Bevir differs for his concept is specific to the 
31 Bevir, Logic, p226 
52 Bevir, Logic, p233 
53 Bevir, Logic, p237 
54 Bevir, Logic, p234 
55 Kuhn, T (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: UCP; K. Popper (1972) 
Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford: Clarendon Press; L. Laudan (1977) 
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process undertaken by the individual, and so dismisses their arguments as 
attempts to theorise change in ways that characterise the scientific community, 
namely empirically, since not everyone reasons in this way. 56 However, Bevir 
does allow for multiple individuals to change their belief as long as they hold in 
common the belief under threat. Thus a common dilemma results from a 
common belief, while what results may indeed be a multiple of new beliefs 
depending on how any specific individual interacted with the dilemma. 
Much of the criticism levelled at Bevir's conception of beliefs is 
applicable to his conception of dilemmas, particularly so since Bevir urges the 
historian of ideas to treat a dilemma in the same way as a belief. 57 However, 
Stuurman offers a critique of the deployment of the dilemma by Bevir claiming 
it is ambiguous. If all experience is theory-laden, he proposes, then there are two 
possible interpretations, one which is that the theory in question is conscious and 
rational, which supports Bevir's point, but one which is tacit and a-rational 
which does not. In this latter case, we cannot assume an individual can theorise 
the process of intellectual change even if the individual attempts a rational 
overhaul of his or her entire web of beliefs. We cannot even assume that the 
58 
rational overhaul will be either complete or even fully rational. 
Hence, we return to the second criticism of Bevir's theory on beliefs; that 
beliefs cannot be presumed to be sincere, conscious or rational. Moreover, if 
ideas can have a political content, operate within a political context thus limiting 
Progress and Its Problems, Berkeley: University of California Press; S. Toulmin (1972) Human 
Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts, Princeton: PUP 
5' Bevir, Logic, P228 
57 Bevir, Logic, p233 
58 Stuurman, 'On Intellectual Innovation', p314 
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our options of expression, there must be scope too for the role of emotional 
responses. Stuurman points to the neglect of moral ideals, citing an example that 
we might gain a strong feeling for freedom if we have personal experience of 
persecution. 59 Yet the abstract point remains irrespective of the moral content. 
We need only have a strong reaction as a consequence of a direct experience. 
Bevir can explain this with reference to his approach, but his rationalist 
commitment, Stuurman would contend, disallows an essentially moral or 
emotional dimension. 
Again, this has implications for the conception of the web of beliefs. 
Even if a new idea enters our system of belief, there remains the ambiguous 
distinction between whether the idea is simply placed in the web or if it is 
integrated into a coherent network; the former not requiring the same rational - 
approach as the latter. Furthermore, if we conceive of emotional or emotionally- 
inspired responses, it is unclear why these should be treated as necessarily 
unconscious or irrational, but rather as present within the new idea or 
understanding being ushered in. 60 
Martin backs this point by illustrating the contrast of Bevir's method of 
internally based change via a dilemma with the transformations of discourse 
deployed by Laclau. Here rationality itself is the object in a hegemonic struggle 
to (re)define the limits of, and the modes of thinking about, the social world. 
This process of rearticulating aspects of our social world is the product of a 
59 Stuurman, 'On Intellectual Innovation', p314 
60 Stuurman, 'On Intellectual Innovation', p315 
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challenge to meanings, and thus impacts on our meaning of rationality too. 61 The 
individual cannot be divorced from such a process, and in Bevir's terms, may 
even be influenced by it. 
The dilemma is regarded as a straitjacket elsewhere since its function is 
to explain a new belief only in relation to other beliefs held by the individual, 
rather than, at least in part, in relation to the beliefs of others. 62 By using Bevir's 
argument, what would it matter that an individual came to change his or her 
beliefs if there was no reference point through which to make such a change 
relevant? Furthermore, how is the historian of ideas to understand the meaning 
of such a change of belief unless there is some reference beyond the web of 
beliefs held by the individual. An individual is just as likely to make a change of 
belief by recognising conceptual change as he or she is by accepting a new 
understanding. 
Finally, the weight accorded to the dilemma and the ultimate search for 
coherence and logic undermines the power of the dilemma as an act in itself. 
Moments of paradox, ambiguity, dilemma and internal conflict, Palonen 
suggests, are marginalised by Bevir when instead their exploration alone can be 
a fruitful endeavour. 63 
61 Martin, 'The Political Logic of Discourse', p29-30 
62 Lane, 'Why the History of Ideas at allT, p38; Palonen, 'Logic or Rhetoric', p307 
63 Palonen, 'Logic or Rhetoric', p307 
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2.2.5 Summary 
Bevir proposes an approach which has implications for historians in the 
ways in which they locate and justify the location of intentions and meanings of 
individuals in the past. This approach contains four key operational features: 
narrative, belief, tradition and dilemma. The narrative is the individual's web of 
interpretation, containing a structured set of facts. Belief is the medium through 
which we may recover meaning. Semantic holism is the concept through which 
we understand that no belief is foundational, so all beliefs are open to revision 
equally. Traditions function as the starting point of any individual's web of 
beliefs and later operate as an influence on all subsequent developments of 
beliefs. The dilemma challenges an existing belief to which the individual can 
respond by accepting, modifying or rejecting it. 
These operational features allow the historian to provide an explanation 
both synchronically through the tradition and diachronically through the 
dilemma providing a coherent chronological account. The use of weak 
intentionalism, or the individual viewpoint, locates meanings only in terms of 
those understood by the individual receiving or delivering them. Coupled with 
procedural individualism which claims beliefs exist only when they are given 
meaning by an individual and not independently of the individual, these two 
concepts raise the role of agency in the evolution of ideas. 
Critics of Bevir's theory have responded to his three main operational 
concepts. On belief they have challenged his collapse of meaning and intention 
as problematic if different individuals analysing the same text came to different 
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conclusions when ascribing meaning to the text. Bevir's attribution of greater 
significance to the meaning reached by an audience rather than that of the author 
is also challenged as confusing. Presuming rationality, Bevir's critics claim, 
divorces from analysis the role of irrationality and ignores the function of power 
in our use of language. 
On traditions, Bevir is criticised for his failure to acknowledge the role of 
habitualisation and the social role of ideas. Furthermore, questions are posed 
about the apparent flexibility Bevir accords to the individual in relation to 
traditions, with critics agreeing that traditions do not act either as simply a 
starting point or operating as the distant influence Bevir proposes. 
On dilemmas, critics return to the question of the rational individual, 
equating the problems of the dilemma to those raised about belief. Further, 
critics query the rational implications of Bevir's 'web of belief, claiming that a 
new idea may simply be added rather than considered and ordered in the belief 
structure with all its implications considered and ordered with equal measure. 
2.3 Methodological Concerns 
Bevir's Logic, has generated a wide rangq of responses, yet few scholars 
have been concerned with the actual application of his approach to test its 
credentials. 64 While this study seeks to test Bevir's approach it recognises the 
possible difficulties as highlighted in the critique. Bevir has attempted to address 
64 Brooks, 'Does Bevir's Logic Improve our Understanding of Hegel's Philosophy of Right? '; 
O'Brien, Interpreting New Labour are the exceptions 
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some of these 65 and these shall be considered in this section when outlining the 
concerns facing this thesis. 
When seeking to apply this theory, we may pose some questions such as: 
to whom should such a study be applied? Does Bevir's emphasis on the 
individual exclude the role of social contexts? Does Bevir's adoption of 
rationalism in his treatment of beliefs help the historian to recover meaning? 
How can we address the problem of meaning and intention outlined by Bevir's 
critics? And finally, how can we arrive at a more fruitful definition of a 
tradition? These questions and difficulties will now be addressed. 
2.3.1 The Subject 
The first question is: to whom should such a study as proposed by Bevir 
be applied? Bevir presents a 'logic' for the history of ideas which, by its very 
title, implies the universality of its application. It should, in theory, be possible 
to recover the meaning any utterance had for the individual in question as long 
as there are relics available to the historian. The implicit assumption that one 
should seek to locate the meaning of utterances of intellectual ideas distorts the 
possibility that ideas may serve other functions. Bevir argues that historians will 
be prepared to ascribe unexpressed beliefs of greater complexity to philosophers 
more readily than to popularisers on the basis that "we hold theories such as that 
philosophers tend to be more concerned than popularisers with the consistency 
65 Bevir, M (2000) 'Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Power: A Response to Critics', Rethinking 
History, vol. 4.3, pp341-350; Mark Bevir, 'Clarifications', History of European Ideas, vol. 28.1, 
pp83- 100; Mark Bevir, (200 1) 'On Practices', Humanitas, XIV, no. 1, pp 117-119 
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of their work". 66 The application of Bevir's theory elsewhere would generally 
hold that this is an accurate assessment. 67 
Bevir's theory should be applicable to any individual the historian wishes 
to examine. Bevir goes some way to accommodating the short-fall in consistent 
output by non-philosophers by using 'presumptions'. "Presumptions tell us what 
properties we can legitimately predicate of objects when we consider the 
dominant form of reasoning to them" so that "a presumption in favour of rational 
belief plays the same role in a study of Besant [populariser] as in one of Hobbes 
[philosopher]. -)M 
This thesis undertakes an examination of 'popularisers'. We hold theories 
that popularisers are individuals who disseminate ideas and beliefs to a wider 
audience than that normally available to a philosopher. The 'popularisers' in this 
study are the leading members of the political dlite. This thesis focuses on the 
Prime Minister and one other leading member of the 61ite, be it the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer or the Foreign Secretary. In an examination of the British political 
dlite, we must assume that all ideas and new understandings that form part of the 
party's policies or approach will usually have the support of the party leader. 
However, there are implications for a study based on popularisers. 
Retuming to Bevir's claim about the theories we hold about philosophers, the 
implicit assumption is that first, popularisers do not necessarily seek to present a 
66 Bevir, Logic, p 172-3 
67 Brooks, 'Does Bevir's Logic Improve our Understanding of Hegel's Philosophy of Right? % 
O'Brien, Interpreting New Labour 
68 Bevir, Logic, p173 
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consistent and reasoned body of thought on the argument they wish to present. 
Second, they do not necessarily seek to express their thoughts, however 
consistent or reasoned, in lengthy or multiple tracts. Both of these points would 
indicate some difficulty in obtaining a consistent understanding of the beliefs a 
populariser may hold, or indeed to locate them faithfully within a tradition of 
thought. This is not to say that the value of examining the role of popularisers is 
any less significant. 
There is merit in undertaking an analysis of popularisers. This is based 
on the effect the role of popularisers has. There is always an implied audience 
when we consider an utterance made, otherwise such beliefs would never be 
aired. However, with a populariser, the audience is explicit and part of the 
individual's consciousness when making an utterance. The populariser is integral 
in articulating and disseminating an idea or their understanding of the content of 
a tradition of thought to a wider audience than that normally available to a 
philosopher. Thus, they are also a means of articulating modifications of 
traditions to a wider audience. This makes the role of the populariser powerful in 
a different way to that of the philosopher. 
In taking the role of disseminator, the populariser is able to transmit new 
understandings to a greater number of people than those traditionally available to 
a philosopher (unless the philosopher also adopts a specific role as populariser). 
Yet, in this role, the populariser is expressing their own beliefs, if we assume 
Bevir's claim that their beliefs are sincere, conscious and rational. The 
populariser is not merely the mouthpiece of the ideas and beliefs of a 
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philosopher, but they appropriate ideas expressed by philosophers and 
incorporate them into their own web of belief without necessarily adopting the 
entire web of beliefs expressed by the philosopher. To illustrate the point, we 
might consider Keynesian theory in literature as different from Keynesian theory 
in practice. 
Although we might recognise that a philosopher will seek to present a 
body of consistent and reasoned thought, there is too a premium placed on 
popularisers to present a new understanding in a consistent manner. We might 
agree with critics of Bevir who claim that an individual is likely to tailor the 
language of an utterance to suit the audience to whom the utterance is made, but 
for the populariser to alter the content would raise issues of consistency which 
would make the populariser's role untenable. For instance, if Churchill's Fulton 
Speech, in which he uttered the term 'Iron Curtain', was at odds with the 
speeches he made to his Party either in the Commons or at the Party Conference, 
there would be issues of consistency over how Churchill was presenting his 
beliefs about the future of international affairs which in turn might lead to 
speculation over the consistency of Churchill's beliefs in themselves. 
Again, although a populariser may not write a coherent and reasoned 
body of arguments in support of their ideas and beliefs, we can select certain 
popularisers who do commit pen to paper in a defence of their ideas and actions. 
When we examine politicians, we will search for their autobiographies or we 
may examine speeches and articles written by them for clues of their beliefs. We 
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may expect a politician as a populariser to seek to present a relatively consistent 
and reasoned body of work, be it through speeches, articles or their life story. 
2.3.2 The Social Context 
It is thus possible to defend the examination of the beliefs of popularisers 
but such an examination needs to be mindful of the role of popularisers in the 
social context. This leads us to our second question: does Bevir's emphasis on 
the individual exclude the role of social contexts? The role of the populariser has 
two facets: to whom is the populariser disseminating new understandings and 
how successful are they in doing so? According to Bevir's use of weak 
intentionalism and pro-attitudes, we might recover the meaning of the first facet, 
but would have difficulties locating the success of the second if we rely only on 
the individual under examination. 
When we examine the ideas and beliefs of dlite politicians, we assume 
the audience to whom they are disseminating this new understanding to be either 
their political party, other political parties, the electorate as a whole, including 
interested parties to the particular understanding, and, in the case of 
understandings revolving around issues of foreign policy, the political dlites of 
foreign states. As stated before, the utterance need not be inconsistent, and must 
arguably be very consistent, if the populariser is to be successful in transmitting 
this new understanding, irrespective of the type of language that is used to tailor 
any such utterance for a particular audience. 
For the role of the populariser to have meaning their success in 
transmitting new understandings needs some form of measure. The ability to 
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transmit new understandings means an audience receives new understandings 
which they may accept, modify, or reject. Critics of Bevir question the 
explanatory value of his elevation of the audience over the author in the recovery 
of meaning. This is indeed problematic if we consider that what an author 
intended for his or her audience to understand from a new idea is at odds with 
the demonstrable understanding the audience reaches. There needs to be some 
form of measure by which we can identify the meaning an author, as a historian 
of ideas, intended on the one hand, and to treat as separate, the meanings 
attributed to that author reached by any given audience. In order to achieve this 
with Bevir's theory, we would need to inspect the beliefs of the entire audience 
available to the populariser. This is a difficult and monumental task to achieve. 
This study concerns itself only with the beliefs of the popularisers and not the 
audience per se, so a suitable alternative is required. 
The ability to provide some indication of the success of the populariser in 
articulating new understandings is useful in that it shows that the modification of 
traditions is not only relevant to the individual concerned. As it stands, Bevir's 
theory can be used to demonstrate how traditions can be modified by individuals 
in a way which is meaningful for them. To demonstrate how traditions of 
thought which have been modified by an individual may be meaningful for other 
individuals, we would need to inspect all their beliefs. If our primary aim is to 
examine the changes of belief undergone by leading members of the British 
political dlite, to examine all beliefs for their success would cloud the primary 
aim. 
53 
Theory 
In the study of Britain's relationship with Europe, as expressed by key 
popularisers, we may not link the meaningfulness of the modification of the 
populariser's beliefs with that of an interested group of individuals. However, 
we may discover that the language used and meaning conveyed by an individual, 
a 'populariser' in this study, has an impact on the language and meaning 
conveyed by interested groups; that in short, the meaning of the individual's 
modification has been accepted, or indeed rejected by a larger group. This may 
be seen as an interaction with the new understanding presented by the individual. 
Therefore, some method of identifying the impact of a new 
understanding is of use since otherwise we may identify the modification of a 
tradition by an individual, but question whether this is relevant in terms of the 
groups to which an individual may wish to express this modification. We may 
ask, if a tradition has changed for an individual, does this have meaning beyond 
the scope of the individual, and if it does not, how relevant is the modification 
for the state of the tradition? Concomitantly, we may ask, if a tradition has 
changed for an individual, and if it has scope beyond the individual, how can we 
demonstrate or identify the relevance of the modification for the state of the 
tradition? 
2.3.3 Adapting Statecraft 
Bulpitt offers a macro approach to understanding the British polity; it is a 
'top-down' approach which is concerned with explaining the 'system' as a 
whole. Yet, he concedes immediately the problem of such an approach is that it 
promises more than it can deliver. "It promises a total picture of party politics. 
What it delivers is merely a macro perspective prioritising some particular 
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aspect(s) of the polity's operations". 69 Instead, Bulpitt breaks down his macro 
approach to an 'in-time' analysis suggesting a snapshot of macro polity with, in 
his case, a focus on governing. 
The method Bulpitt employs for such an analysis is the concept of 
statecraft. As he adopts a top-down approach, his concern is with high politics 
and thus defends his adoption of 'the Court', defined as the "formal Chief 
Executive, plus his/her political friends and advisers". 70 This is justified on the 
grounds that "only 'the Court' will adopt a macro or general perspective when it 
comes to developing policy" with a view to how any development impacts on 
policy elsewhere. 71 
Bulpitt evokes five operational features: party management, a winning 
electoral strategy, political argument hegemony, governing competence and 
another winning electoral strategy. The operational features of Bulpitt's 
statecraft concept which are of interest here are those of party management and 
political argument hegemony. Party management is the ability of a leader to 
balance the demands and pressures of the different components of the party, be 
they back-benchers or the constituencies, and varies whether the party is in or 
out of power. Political argument hegemony is described as "a party achieving an 
easy predominance in the 61ite debate regarding political problems, policies and 
the general stance of government ... it refers to a winning rhetoric in a variety of 
69 Bulpitt, J (1995) 'Historical Politics: Macro, In-Time, Governing Regime Analysis', Paper 
? resented to the PSA Conference, University of York 
70 
Bulpitt, 'Historical Politics: Macro, In-Time, Governing Regime Analysis' 
1 Buller, J (2000) 'The Statecraft Interpretation: Present Problems and Future Prospects for a 
Macro Analysis of UK Politics", Paper presented to the Narratives Group, Department of 
Politics, University of Newcastle, p2 
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locations, winning because either the framework of the party's arguments 
becomes generally acceptable, or because its solutions to a particularly important 
problem seem more plausible than its opponents"'. 72 
Using these two features of the statecraft concept requires some 
justification, Bulpitt argues that ideas and policies are downgraded by the 
approach which would seem inimical to this study. Yet Bulpitt's application of 
statecraft is concerned solely with the subsistence level of goverment; the 
gaining and maintaining of office. It is also presented as a cycle in which the 
operational features must be met in order for the party to be successful. 
However, as this thesis is not measuring the overall success of a party in 
achieving statecraft, it is not necessary to use all of Bulpitt's operational 
features. Instead, it is possible to use parts of his operational features as a means 
of measuring the effect utterances and new understandings presented by 
popularisers within a party may have on the party itself. So whereas he concedes 
"some policies assume importance as part of the governing code ... ideas, as 
commonly defined, will always be part of the political support mechaniSMS03, it 
is precisely these aspects which are important in the analysis of ideational 
change in this thesis. 
The idea of argument, continues Bulpitt, is cruder than ideology or 
theory, but is a more comprehensive concept. Because it is based on a winning 
rhetoric which is appealing in its ability to transcend policy areas, it is suitable to 
72 Bulpitt, J (1986) 'Mrs Thatcher's Domestic Statecraft', Political Studies, vol. 34, ppl9-39, p2l- 
2 
73 Bulpitt, 'Historical Politics'; Bulpitt defines the goveming code as a set of coherent principles 
underlying policies or policy related behaviours whereas the political support mechanism acts to 
assist the governing code. 
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the study of Europe which would come to represent an area of high politics and 
grand strategy. This is why it is a suitable measure of the effectiveness of 
popularisers in the successful transmission of their beliefs. For instance, we 
might consider that the concept of the 'three circles' in post-war British foreign 
policy was a successful transmission of a new understanding by Churchill as a 
populariser, as it was accepted beyond his period as leader of the Conservatives. 
We can tell it was accepted by the use of language associated with the three 
circles concept by later politicians. Such an understanding was constitutive of a 
set of beliefs about Britain's role in the world that appealed and which were 
accepted by many to whom Churchill expressed this concept. 
Although Bevir and Bulpitt offer different theoretical approaches, neither 
is antithetical to the other, precisely because they seek to discover different 
things. They offer no points of conflict and can therefore be seen to be 
complementary to each other. If the historian wishes to examine whether a new 
understanding uttered by an individual has had an impact upon other individuals, 
examining the success of political argument hegemony in corollary with party 
management is a clue to its acceptance or rejection without applying a detailed 
Bevirian analysis to each of those individuals. There is little in Bevir's theory 
which allows the historian to understand the change in traditions over time, 
without some form of benchmark. 
This study, therefore, includes an analysis of the social context. This 
social context is defined by those groups of individuals to whom the utterer, the 
politician, is directing his or her understandings of the world. These groups of 
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individuals include, primarily the politician's party, opposing political parties 
and particular interest groups such as trade unions and sectoral business groups. 
This analysis is necessary to highlight possible enviromnental factors that 
influence the politician's aim of articulating new understandings. 
Given the thesis topic charts the rise of Europe in the understandings of 
politicians, it is also necessary to outline the international context. Europe is 
initially regarded as a facet of foreign policy, therefore, in the understandings of 
politicians it is placed within the spectrum of foreign policy concerns. These 
concerns may highlight areas of constraint or difficulty which a study based 
entirely on the individual may overlook. Therefore, this thesis offers a brief 
sketch of the international situation to search for envirorunental constraints that 
impact upon a politician's ability to articulate new understandings. 
2.3.4 Rationafism 
One key concern of Bevir's critics is the role he ascribes to rationality. 
Bevir assumes the individual to be rational, conscious and sincere in the beliefs 
he or she adopts. This has been questioned on two counts: that it minimises the 
role of insincere, irrational and unconscious beliefs, and prioritises rationality as 
a concept that somehow, unlike all our other beliefs, is not submitted to the same 
degree of revision. 
Martin used Laclau's argument that meaning is contested in a battle of 
political hegemony to demonstrate that concepts such as rationality are hijacked 
in the process of redefining the social world. Without subscribing to this 
approach we can appreciate the point that what makes beliefs and actions 
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rational at one point in time may seem absurd at another. Such an argument 
corresponds with Bevir's approach, however. Bevir argues that an individual's 
beliefs will favour rationality and consistency, but that these are governed by 
how our beliefs relate to shared facts and theories about the world. 
He rejects the implicit sociological assumption made about him by his 
critics that individuals are wholly rational or conscious. Rather, he uses 
consistency over the assumption that individuals are wholly rational or 
conscious. This allows, he argues, for insincere, unconscious and irrational 
beliefs, just as much as those we hold without question. 74 Furthermore, his use of 
rational, conscious and sincere as the concepts by which we measure beliefs is 
based on the argument that our definitions of insincere, irrational and 
unconscious beliefs derive from these concepts in the first place. 
If we accept Bevir's point that the beliefs individuals hold need some 
form of consistency, we can accept the point that consistency collapses into 
rationality, rather than using an exterior form of rationality by which to measure 
an individual's beliefs. Rationality here is accepting that something makes sense, 
so consistency is the picture of things we accept that makes sense to us. So in a 
study of individuals, rationality is what makes sense to the individual and 
consistency is the scope of rationality. 
As stated earlier, we can hypothesise that it may be in the self-interest of 
a populariser to be consistent in his or her utterances. Bevir argues that an 
74 Bevir, 'Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Power', p346 
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individual, as the product of their social context, will include the influences of 
that context in their beliefs. This allows for a conception of power in Bevir's 
individualist account which critics believe to be lacking. Traditions, he claims, 
offer the conceptualisation of power as a form of social influence that operates 
through the individual. Hence, in the consistency we can hypothesise an 
individual might adopt in the expression of their beliefs, we can include also a 
need to be consistent in relation to social power. This thesis therefore adopts 
Bevir's conception of rationality and the individual when we understand 
rationality to mean the consistency with which one understands the social world 
in which the individual operates. 
2.3.5 Meaning and Intention 
The main problem encountered by Bevir's critics was the apparent 
collapse of intention into meaning. Bevir's defence of such criticism has been to 
identify weak intentions as the objects to which historians should tie meanings, 
where the objects are specific individuals not the texts themselves. The point 
Bevir is making is that objects in themselves have no intrinsic meanings, only 
the meanings that individuals place upon them. For example, one text may result 
in different meanings arrived at by different individuals. The relevance of such a 
result, according to Bevir, is to demonstrate for whom these different readings 
are significant, rather than to claim a text had such a meaning in itself. 
To follow a route where a text seemingly has intrinsic meaning is to reify 
the text, something which an anti-foundational approach does not allow. 
Therefore, a suitable analysis of intentionality locates the meaning utterances 
have specific to the individual expressing those beliefs. This stands, Bevir 
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contends, irrespective of whether the individual uses rhetorical devices. When 
rhetorical devices such as irony, tongue-in-cheek or mock innocence are used, 
they are deployed to promote specific responses to ideas that an individual 
wishes to highlight. An examination of the relevant beliefs and pro-attitudes of 
the individual concerned would reveal this. 75 When we examine a politician, we 
should not seek to identify fixed meanings in their works, but rather the 
meanings the individual's ascribed to their work. For example, when we 
consider the utterances made about Europe by Churchill, we should not seek to 
find any fixed meanings, but rather we should attempt to recover the meanings 
Churchill himself ascribes to his utterances. 
One problem emerges when we consider the utterances made by a 
politician, that of authorial ownership. For instance, when a politician delivers a 
speech, we can assume that the authorship is not entirely his or hers. There are 
writers and aides that assist in the preparation of a speech. This has implications 
for where we attribute the meanings and beliefs of an individual; should this 
only be to the individual delivering the speech or should there be an explicit 
acknowledgement of the role of co-authors? When we examine historical 
narratives the issue of authorial ownership does not exist. It is Presumed that the 
beliefs expressed in a speech belong to the individual delivering the speech. But 
in an analysis of the distinctive beliefs held by individuals, this issue becomes 
more important. How can we relate the content of a speech which may have 
numerous authors to the beliefs and intentions of one individual? 
's Bevir, 'Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Power', p348-9 
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The presumption which exists in general historical narratives rests on the 
claim that if the individual under scrutiny is prepared to put his or her name to a 
speech, then we can locate ownership of that speech to him or her. Using Bevir's 
approach, we might then ascribe the speech as an expression of the individual's 
beliefs. Furthermore, if we adopt Bevir's weak intentionalism and procedural 
individualism, we study the meanings a work has for the particular individual, 
not the prior purposes of its author. 
When we apply Bevir's theory, conceptual priority is given to sincere, 
rational and conscious beliefs with the implication being that we should interpret 
works in terms of the sincere, rational and conscious beliefs of their authors 
unless we have good reasons not to. 76 In this case, we might presume the beliefs 
expressed to be a reflection of the sincere, rational and conscious beliefs of their 
deliverer unless we had grounds not to do so. If the speech contains co-authors, 
we might still locate the beliefs of the individual concerned expressed within it 
when we compare this to other instances of the expressed beliefs of the 
individual. But the grounds upon which we might reject this conclusion are 
when we discover other expressions of belief which are at odds with the speech 
in question. 
We can accept Bevir's position on meaning and intention when we 
consider that Bevir offers a method of interpreting the beliefs of individuals, just 
as other areas of academic discipline may offer alternative methods. 
Furthermore, we can prescribe the grounds upon which to locate the meaning 
76 Bevir, Logic, p142-171 
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and intention of authors when this is unclear. The process of historical writing is 
not just the chronological narration of events and motives. It includes also the 
interpretations of subjective historians. By using Bevir's criteria of objectivity, 
we may evaluate the competing interpretations, but this is not to render them 
invalid. 
2.3.6 Defining Traditions 
The last of the questions raised by Bevir's theory is how can we arrive at 
a more fruitful definition of a tradition? If we recall, a tradition was defined by 
Bevir as a way of seeing the world in which is incorporated values, concerns and 
assumptions. It is communicated by teacher to pupil as it forms the starting point 
of our socialisation. As we develop so too does our ability to question our 
values, concerns and assumptions challenged by ideas and information 
originating from different traditions. The tradition forms the backdrop from 
which we will begin our process of inquiry allowing the agency of the individual 
to accept, modify, or reject aspects of the tradition. Furthermore, traditions have 
no essential core; they are contingent entities people produce by their own 
activities, not fixed entities that people happen to discover. 77 Finally a tradition 
consists of temporal and conceptual links; temporal links are demonstrated by 
historically similar instances that have an influence on each other, conceptual 
links refer to the similarity of content. Beyond this relatively abstract definition 
of a tradition Bevir conceded it was impossible to define any clear limits on what 
could be counted as a tradition. 78 
'17 Bevir, Logic, p203 
78 Bevir, Logic, p206 
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If we seek to apply Bevir's theory, such a definition is inadequate. It 
offers no indication as to what can or should be included as a temporal link and 
how often we should seek such links. The argument that a tradition has temporal 
resonance seems self-explanatory. Yet his presentation of such temporal links 
suggests a linearity which is at odds with the flexibility Bevir seeks to evoke. 
Further, Bevir highlights that a tradition requires conceptual connections which 
again seems self-explanatory, if not tautologous. Again, Bevir offers no 
definition of a conceptual connection, or the number of different conceptual 
connections that are required to define a tradition. If we can locate just one 
conceptual connection, does this constitute a tradition? Bevir's apparent 
vagueness is a necessary result of his weight on individual agency. This 
identifies that the role of agency makes unpredictable the changes one might 
identify with a tradition and so it identifies that a tradition has no immutable 
core. If a tradition has no immutable core, it then follows that its limits are 
uncharted. 
However, we can use what little Bevir provides to build a more adequate 
definition of a tradition. Frohnen's chief objections to Bevir's theory of 
traditions, we will recall, is that he failed to address the possibility that traditions 
are worthy of examination in their own right as concrete and social realities, that 
they are composed of intellectual and practical habits, and combine social groups 
and practices to form a coherent logic. 
These need not be objections. Bevir is so vague that it is perfectly 
plausible to conclude that traditions are indeed concrete social realities, but that 
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our definition of a concrete social reality is not independent of the individual, 
and so is a reflection of a series of shared understandings that we have about the 
world. They may have the appearance of being concrete and real only because 
we accept without question a number of understandings which make this 
possible. Furthermore, our concrete and social reality is not fixed. There will be 
points in time where particular understandings that form part of these shared 
understandings become questioned and possibly altered. If we accept this first 
point, then the points Frohnen adds about their composition and coherence all 
fall under Bevir's theoretical umbrella so the differences appear to be a question 
of terminology than of theoretical difference. 
Frohnen's objections raise some interesting possibilities about the limits 
we might place on traditions. For example, we might recognise that within any 
given society, there are areas of life which have some organisational limits. 
Thus, we might recognise that within Western society there is a set of shared 
understandings about the role of intellectual inquiry which we might term 
academia. Furthermore, we might recognise that academia is not one intellectual 
inquiry or a monolithic set of understandings, but rather splits into smaller 
groups of shared understandings which we might term disciplines. Finally, we 
might recognise that within each discipline there are sets of shared 
understandings about the pursuit of intellectual inquiry which might highlight 
different ways in which to succeed in such inquiries. This is not to say that any 
of these sets of shared understandings are mutually exclusive or cannot be inter- 
changed, but merely to recognise that we arrange our sets of shared 
understandings. Furthermore, this is not to ascribe to these sets of shared 
65 
Theory 
understandings a fixed meaning, only to highlight an organisational tendency 
which the individual uses to help him or her make sense of the world. 
If we accept Bevir's claim that a tradition is a way of seeing the world in 
which is incorporated values, concerns and assumptions, this does not preclude 
accepting that as part of our assumptions we make seeing the world as more 
intelligible by organising our shared understandings. Such a conclusion is 
implicit in Bevir's theory and has been demonstrated by application of his 
theory. For example, Bevir and Rhodes define traditions as a set of shared 
theories, narratives and associated practices before then outlining the traditions 
which narrate Thatcherism. 79 We can see that Bevir uses traditions as a means of 
demonstrating how we organise our way of seeing the world. Here lies an 
apparent conflation between organisational tendencies and ideational tendencies. 
However, we can imply from Bevir that ideational tendencies might, as a 
consequence of being a set of shared understandings, form an organisational 
tendency. 
However, Bevir does not demonstrate the temporal and conceptual 
linkages he advocates in defining the traditions which narrate Thatcherism. 
Rather, he uses a short-hand assumption of their existence. If we adopt the 
concept that individuals adopt organisational tendencies in which their shared 
theories of the world might be located, we can go further in defining traditions 
than Bevir demonstrates. 
79 Bevir and Rhodes, 'Narratives of Thatcherism', p98 
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2.3.7 Summary 
In assessing the difficulties highlighted by Bevir's critics and Bevir's 
responses to these criticisms, this section has identified that certain popularisers 
may demonstrate an equal ability to record their beliefs to those of philosophers. 
Furthermore, it identified that popularisers perform a particular function, that of 
disseminating ideas and new information and that such a function required 
consistency on the one hand and some form of measure on the other. Thus it was 
argued that a complementary method was the political argument hegemony and 
party management concepts in the statecraft approach which would provide an 
indication of how successful an idea has been transmitted. Bevir's defence of his 
use of rationality as the consistency of beliefs an individual holds was accepted 
as was his method of identifying meaning and intention. Finally, in searching for 
a more defined conception of traditions, we used Frohnen's objections to 
demonstrate that traditions may be concrete social realities, but that these need 
have no essentialist core. Moreover this led to an analysis of Bevir's own 
application of traditions to identify that individuals make the world intelligible 
by adopting organisational tendencies. We demonstrated the possibilities for our 
organisation of shared understandings in the pursuit of intellectual inquiry. We 
now turn to examine how this might manifest itself within our shared 
understandings of what constitutes another organisational tendency, British 
politics. 
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2.4 Traditions of British Politics 
Greenleaf defines libertarianism and collectivism as the boundaries of 
British politics. 80 By questioning the nature of man, his relationship to society 
and the location of political authority in any given society, these limits have 
produced three distinct strands of thought: Liberal, Conservative and Socialist. 
In this section we briefly outline the themes of libertarianism and collectivism 
and the salient points of the Liberal, Conservative and Socialist strands of 
thought. 
Libertarianism contains four main themes: the rights and freedoms of the 
individual, ensuring political and civil liberties; a limited government which 
does not violate the first principle of individualism; the separation of powers and 
the diffusion of authority within the state; the rule of law to safeguard the rights 
of the individual. In contrast, collectivism contains four opposing themes: a 
stress on the public good which elevates the rights of the community; the 
creation of the conditions of both equality and social justice; a public authority 
to create social harmony through state regulation which would not exist 
naturally; the rule of law is required to safeguard the rights of the individual and 
the community. 
81 
Although this study does not concern itself with the evolution of ideas 
from Liberal Party dlites, both the Conservative and Labour Party have been 
indebted to ideas emanating from the Liberal strand of thought so it is worth 
recapping their key features here. The Liberals have five defining points: an 
" Greenleaf, W. H. (1975) 'The Character of Modem British Politics', Parliamentary Affairs, 
vol. 28.4, pp368-85, p374 
81 Greenleaf, 'The Character of Modem British Politics', p375-8 
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emphasis on individualism and rationality; scepticism towards traditions and 
established centres of authority; a belief in freedom; a conviction of 
egalitarianism; and a stress on the importance of private property. 
The Liberal tradition embodies the dialectic to which Greenleaf refers, 
encompassing both old or classical liberalism with its adherence to laissufaire 
economics, and new or social liberalism with its adherence to forms of state 
intervention to promote greater social justice. The classical liberal tradition 
emerged as the dominant economic doctrine during the nineteenth century and 
became influential in the conduct of foreign affairs. Influenced by the ideas of 
Adam Smith, 82 classical liberalism emphasised the self-interest and self- 
sufficient nature of humans, developing a theory of meritocracy "in which 
rewards are distributed according to individual talent and hard work". 83 A 
laissez-faire approach ensured minimal state involvement based on Smith's 
principle that individual welfare rather than national power was the correct goal 
of economics. Bentham's utilitarianism developed this line of individualism in 
terms of the principle of happiness while J. S. Mill provided a modified 
synthesis. 84 It is the formulation of this strand that we examine when we 
consider liberal beliefs about foreign policy. 
The Conservative tradition is also defined by five themes: pessimism 
about the power of man's reason; support for authority and hierarchy; belief in 
an organic and evolutionary society; the principle of private property; and a 
82 Adam Smith (1723-1790) 
83 Heywood, A (1994) Political Ideas and Concepts, Basingstoke: Macmillan, p9 
84 Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873); Mill, J. S. (1994) Principles of 
Political Economy, edited by Jonathan Riley, Oxford: OUP 
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commitment to national unity. The tradition is aligned with libertarianism and 
stresses the overriding importance of national unity. Conservatism and 
nationalism were linked by Burke, but it was Disraeli who popularised the idea 
of One Nation and added a social dimension which was lacking from the 
85 Liberals. It meant a paternalist approach to social reform while championing 
unity over national identities. It was an attitude that trumpeted themes that unify 
rather than differentiate society, while the Liberals were identified in 
Conservative demonology as the anti-national party. 86 
Nationhood was linked to duty and duty was linked to class. Disraeli 
formulated a particular brand of nationhood in which class-bound institutions 
were invested with the responsibility to uphold the civil rights of all and elevate 
the condition of the people. Political success came with an extended franchise, 
party organisation and subscriptions. "Disraeli profoundly believed that England 
should be one nation, not two, He thought this aim could only be achieved if the 
Tory Party were true to its traditions ... Such a party should not be egalitarian, or 
classless. " Rejecting the exclusivity of laissez faire "the Tory Party could 
properly defend the national institutions and enlist in their support the bulk of 
the nation. The nation would then support the national party, and the national 
party would represent and protect the nation". 87 
The Labour Party is an amalgam of different groups which coalesced at 
the turn of the twentieth century: labourism, Marxism, Fabianism and ethical 
85 Burke, E (1969) Reflections on the Revolution in France, London: Penguin; Disraeli, B (1998) 
Sýbil, or the Two Nations, Oxford: Oxford World Classics 
8. Norton; Lynch, P (2000) 'The Conservative Party and Nationhood', The Political Quarterly, 
vol. 7 1.1, PP5-67, p59; Gilmour, I (1977) Inside Right, London: Hutchinson and Co., p77 
87 Gilmour, Inside Right, p86 
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socialism. As successors of the radical tradition, their "theorists were not tied [to 
the current political system] for they were advocating an ideal system which 
might be created but which did not yet exiSt,,. 
88 Five themes define this 
approach: an optimistic view of human nature; equality in the economic and 
social sphere; unions to ensure this equality; the state as a tool, not as belonging 
to one class; and nationalism born from defending domestic workers. "Socialism 
involved from the beginning a -critique of existing inequality under capitalism 
and a programme for redistribution and equalization of income". 89 We can locate 
the origins of the Labour Party tradition within the communitarian strand 
outlined by Greenleaf. 
Labourism worked with the system and rejected revolutionary solutions. 
This limited the effects of Marxism, whose enduring legacy has been a refutation 
of class collaboration in syndicalism and a nascent but marginalized 
revolutionary element. The Fabians' approach was underpinned by Jevons's 
economic theory of utility and the doctrine of positivism. Ethical Socialism 
provided moral depth with its "utopian vision of a New Jerusalem". The 
Independent Labour Party (ILP) embodied this strain of socialism and was 
committed to one objective: "the collective ownership of the means of 
production, distribution and exchange - interpreted through the light of Christian 
nonconformity rather than Marxism or Fabian elitism". 90 
As these traditions evolved, they informed two dominant strands of belief 
in the 1930s: democratic socialism and corporate socialism. Democratic 
88 Birch, Responsible and Representative Government, p32 
89 Leach, Political Ideology in Britain, p69 
" Foote, The Labour Party's Political Thought, p34 
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socialism incorporated the idealism of ethical socialism with the gradualism of 
fabianism. Based on Keynesianism, it focused on full employment and economic 
planning. The Corporate socialist tradition was a further change, adopting the 
ideas of Keynesian liberalism and the administrative elitism from the right and 
the functional government ideas of revolutionary syndicalism and guild 
socialism from the left. 91 In foreign policy it was dominated by the right which 
had successfully won the debate over anti-militarism in 1935 one marked by 
Attlee's eclipse of the Labour leader and pacifist George Lansbury. 
Both political parties developed beliefs about the content and conduct of 
foreign policy. Hill describes foreign policy as "the sum of official external 
relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international 
relations". 92 It is the set of goals that outline how a particular state will interact 
with other states and which are designed to protect national interests, national 
security, ideological goals and economic prosperity. The British foreign policy 
tradition assumed certain 'givens': the geopolitics of an island nation, its global 
reach, its commercial basis and its military influence through the navy. 93 It was 
an approach defined by Palmerston's distinction between interests and alliances; 
while interests were perpetual, alliances were temporary. 94 It was echoed by 
Disraeli who argued British interests were material interests. 95 
91 Foote, The Labour Party's Political Thought, p 175,182 
92 Hill, C (2003) The Changing Politics ofForeign Policy, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p3 
93 Hill, 'Past and Present', p28-9; 93 Rothstein, A (1969) British Foreign Policy and its Critics, 
1830-1950, London: Lawrence and Wisehart, p 14 
94 Attributed to Palmerston, in Hill, C (1988) 'Past and Present in British Foreign Policy', in 
Smith, Smith and White, British Foreign Policy, pp24-49, p28 
95 Rothstein, British Foreign Policy and its Critics, p 13 
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The liberal legacy in foreign policy is free trade, an umbrella term for 
limited government involvement, economic freedom and competition, drawing 
from the works of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and John StUaft Mill. 96 
Increasing the possibilities of wealth creation through unhindered competition, 
private enterprise and free access to markets combined the objectives of personal 
freedom and laissez-faire economics is the means through which to guarantee 
prosperity and individual liberty. This argument propelled Liberal opposition to 
the Corn Laws, favouring instead the free trade of their cotton manufactures to 
wheat exporting countries to lower domestic wages inflated by tariffs. As 
economic conditions became less favourable this increased with the collapse of 
domestic agriculture and a reliance on staples such as coal, heavy engineering 
and manufacturing. Cobden provided a moral dimension to this by consistently 
advocating the principles of peace, non-interference, and free trade. 97 Critical of 
the balance of power system in Europe, he advanced ideas of international 
arbitration and mutual disarmament. This provided a crucial national security 
dimension to foreign policy. 
Free trade was argued to be more patriotic as it treated the nation as a 
whole allowing for the enrichment of all individuals, rather than preferring one 
group. In reality it sought to extend this to only two producing groups: 
landowners and manufacturers. Later developments included Home Rule, the 
idea of self-government to the Empire, but it was the First World War and 
16 Smith, A (1970) The Wealth of Nations, London: Penguin; Ricardo, D. On the Principles of 
Political Economy and Taxation; Mill, J. S. (1965) Principles of Political Economy, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul 
97 Richard Cobden and John Bright were part of the 'Manchester Liberals' 
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economic depression which fatally undermined the free trade ideal of "peace, 
prosperity and social progress". 98 
Conservative foreign policy beliefs stress national unity and the strong 
state. Self-respect is only possible if respected internationally through a strong 
state and with the power to influence world affairs. Disraeli made the first 
explicit link of party and Empire in which the Empire became the projection of 
Britain's greatness on a global scale. 99 The nation state was regarded as the 
"highest form of human organisation that mankind has yet evolved". ' 00 
Patriotism achieves unity in foreign policy and was explicitly linked with 
a love of one's country. It did not reject internationalism but only through the 
lens of the nation so that "[i]n the Conservative tradition, internationalism is 
regarded not as the converse, but as the child of nationality". 101 It relies on 
notions of tradition, continuity and loyalty to sustain a sense of national pride. It 
requires the nation to be independent while it also places no ideal higher than 
that of the country. 102 Although "Conservatives claim no monopoly of 
patriotism" they "reflect most on the past and set most store by our national 
heritage [so] must be more conscious of our national greatness. " 103 
Disraeli's Crystal Palace speech in 1872 linked patriotism to the Empire 
and cemented this with moral content by the idea of a 'mission' and 
98 Green, The Crisis of Conservatism, p2 
99 Norton, The Conservative Party, p78 
White, R. J. (1950) The Conservative Tradition, London: Nicholas Kaye, pI 14 
White, The Conservative Tradition, p 114 
102 White, The Conservative Tradition, p 116,121 
"' Clarke, D (1973) The Conservative Party, London: Conservative Central Office, p7; Norton, 
The Conservative Party, p79 
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organisation. A contemporary, Lord Hugh Cecil was able to remark "our 
vocation has been to undertake the government of vast areas of uncivilised 
populations and raise them gradually to a higher level of life ... In carrying out 
this work of civilisation we are fulfilling what I believe to be our national 
mission". 104 Joseph Chamberlain articulated the creation of a 'single organism' 
Empire by the bonds of sentiment and better administrative machinery, 
envisaged political federation and protective tariffs. 105 Dropping federation but 
emphasising tariff reform formed the basis of a renewed Conservative 
identity. 106 Hints were even made about the possibility of revenues from tariffs 
being ploughed into domestic social reform, further enhancing Conservative 
stock within the working class. 107 
The Labour Party's thoughts on foreign policy were considered an 
extension of domestic policy ideas, forming "an organic whole, because our 
foreign policy is a function of our domestic policy and both spring from our faith 
that the future belongs to Socialism. "' 08 They embodied "basic beliefs about 
international politics and the forces at work within it, [with) moral values ... and 
appropriate symbols calculated to arouse desired emotional responses. "109 
Foreign policy focused on four themes: internationalism, international working 
class solidarity, anti-capitalism and anti-militarism. 
104 White, The Conservative Tradition, p241 
105 Chamberlain in a speech to his Birmingham constituents, 1897, in White, The Conservative 
Tradition, p244 
106 Green, The Crisis of Conservatism, p20 
107 White, The Conservative Tradition, p244-248; Green, The Crisis of Conservatism, p2l 
108 Arthur Henderson, (1863-1935), former Liberal who became Labour Party leader, 1908-10; 
1914-17; 1931-2; LPCR, (1929) p156 
"' Gordon, M. R. (1969) Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy, 1914-1965, 
California: Stanford University Press, pviii 
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Labour's internationalism identified national sovereignty as the root of 
conflict and war, and proposed allegiance to a higher moral authority. 110 
National identity would participate through a world govermnent. Since the 
majority of issues arising out of national interests were played out between small 
groups of vested interests; states, capitalists and the propertyless within the state, 
world government would regulate the relations between these various groups 
ending the divisiveness of patriotism and nationalism. "' 
Working class solidarity reflected a general class consciousness and a 
specific support of the Soviet Union. It meant rallying co-operation across 
international borders and linking their aims. Recognising that workers across 
national boundaries shared the same interests, the Memorandum on War Aims 
called for the complete democratisation of all countries. It urged the end of 
imperialism and secret diplomacy, the public control of foreign policy as of 
domestic policy, and the establishment of a supra-national authority, such as the 
League of Nations. 112 Pro-Soviet sentiment was a far more radical and militant 
strand and generally disfavoured. 
Anti-capitalism consisted of three beliefs: traditional foreign policy was 
the vehicle serving the interests of the capitalist ruling classes; a conviction that 
peace would be more secure once capitalist anarchy was overcome; and later, a 
growing unease with the rising dominance of American capitalism. 113 
"' Quelch, H (1912) 'Socialism and Foreign Affairs', The British Socialist, vol. 1, no. 12, pp530- 
538 
... Leonard Woolf, 1880-1969; Woolf, L (1916) International Government London: Fabian 
Society, pp354-6 
112 Labour Party (1917) Memorandum on WarAims, London: no name, pp3-6 
113 Gordon, Conflict and Consensus, p32 
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Imperialism was seen as the by-product of an expanding capitalism which 
needed to distribute surplus goods but which had disintegrated into a conflict 
orchestrated by finance capitalists seeking to preserve themselves at the expense 
of the working classes. 114 Instead, financial gains should be distributed to avoid 
self-accumulating credit and disposing surplus through higher wages or greater 
dividends. It was the theory of rent applied to international relations. 
World co-operation and justice was based on anti-militarism. This 
opposed a foreign policy backed by force, even if used defensively, as not only 
immoral but inexpedient. Justice should be based on disarmament, pacification 
and conciliation. Militarism was a discredited method of aggrandisement and 
aggression, echoing Hardie's point that socialism opposed all war in the abstract 
for an empire of free people could not be built by force. ' 15 
Labour's Perception of Britain in the world rested on assumptions such 
as an assumed leadership role and national superiority, manifesting itself in 
'Little Englandism' and the idea that "a Great Power, consciously or 
unconsciously, must govern in the interests of civilisation as a whole". ' 16 At the 
very least was the assumption to provide leadership until colonised states were 
able to govern themselves. 117 Perhaps the greatest assumption was that foreign 
policy could be made in the same way as domestic policy. Fielding states, "for 
114 J. A. Hobson, 1858-1940; Hobson, J. A. (1948) Imperialism, London: Allen and Unwin; 
Pelling, H (1954) The Challenge ofSocialism, London: Adam and Charles Black, p331 
115 Snowden in Hansard, (1916) House of Commons Debates, 5h Series, vol. 68,23/02/1916, 
cols. 719-21; Hardie in Hansard, (1900) Debates, 3 rd Series, vol. 88,7/12/1900, cols. 298-9; 
Bealey, F. (1970) The Social and Political Thought of the Labour Party, London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, p56-7,79 
116 Gupta P. S. (1975) Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964, London: 
Macmillan, p8,10; Porter, B (1968) Critics of Empire, London: Macmillan, p126; Shaw, G. B. 
(1900) Fabianism and the Empire, London: G. Richards, p4l 
117 Gupta, Imperialism, pI 1- 13 
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socialists the problem of squaring international facts with ideals derives in large 
measure from a misunderstanding of the nature of foreign policy", adding, "it is 
perhaps natural that a party attached to a set of a priori principles should find it 
difficult to accept limitations placed on a Labour government in its handling of 
inter-state relations". ' 18 
Responding to these assumptions created changes from the Party's 
inception to the outbreak of World War Two. The attempt to translate socialist 
principles into a realistic set of policies while the international situation 
deteriorated was undermined by the failure of the League of Nations, forcing a 
split in 1935. Radicals called for class warfare and linked themselves with the 
Soviet Union. Pacifists stuck to traditional foreign policy ideas but had no 
response to failed anti-militarism. An alternative group modified the party's 
position to defensive collective security on the grounds that European fascism 
had fatally weakened labour movements across the Continent so that rearmament 
was a small price to prevent this happening in Britain. It was coupled with a 
change of 61ite sympathetic to this programme and was underlined by the 
labourist tradition motivated by assessments of their own needs. The Party as a 
whole, however, regarded this as a temporary check to their outlook rather than a 
complete change of, their fundamental beliefs and these new assumptions came 
into play in 1945. 
118 Fielding, R (1970) A Socialist Foreign Policy?, Fabian Tract 40 1, London: Fabian Society, p2 
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2.5 Conclusion 
Bevir's theory provides a method for the recovery of ideas held by 
individuals in the past. It was found that in a study of 61ite British attitudes 
towards European integration this method was fruitful as few studies provide in- 
depth analyses of ideational change. Bevir's theory suffers from some criticisms 
such as lacking a measurement for the success of transmitting new ideas and an 
ambiguous definition of a tradition. Bulpitt's statecraft approach was used to 
buttress Bevir's theory through the use of two operational concepts: the political 
argument hegemony function and party management. 
In seeking to define traditions more clearly it was demonstrated that as 
individuals we develop organisational tendencies with which to make the world 
more intelligible. Identifying two broad intellectual traditions, libertarianism and 
collectivism, we also identified three organisational tendencies: the Liberal, 
Conservative and Labour Parties. We have traced ideas influential to these 
groups as a backdrop to the ideas that emerge later in this study. 
The following chapters of this study begin by tracing the background 
influences and experignces of the dlites under examination. They then set out the 
context in which 61ite actors were operating by providing a brief summary of the 
domestic, international and economic environment. The foreign policy dilemma 
which faced these dlites is then analysed to trace what ideas were being 
deployed, how they were defended and justified through conceptual connections. 
Finally, in assessing the effectiveness of the transmission of ideas, the 
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environmental constraints posed by the parliamentary party, the opposition and 
interested groups such as the trade unions are examined. 
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Chapter Three 
The Labour Party, 1945-1955 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we begin to apply Bevir's interpretative theory. We 
examine the beliefs held by the Labour leader, Clement Attlee and the Foreign 
Secretary, Ernest Bevin who have been selected as key players involved in the 
strategic direction of Britain's foreign policy, 1945-1951. It is argued that, 
respectively, their inherited beliefs stemmed from the traditions of democratic 
socialism and labourism. It is then proposed that Attlee and Bevin modified their 
beliefs about Britain's interests in response to the perceived dilemma of reduced 
capabilities. 
This chapter begins by tracing the conceptual and temporal links that tie 
Attlee to the democratic socialist tradition and Bevin to the tradition of labourism. 
it then provides a historical summary of the period 1945-1955 covering both the 
domestic and international landscape. Finally, the content of the dilemma of 
reduced capabilities as articulated by Attlee and Bevin is examined before 
analysing the impact upon the traditions of social democracy and labourism of 
Attlee and Bevin's modified beliefs. 
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3.2 Elite Beliefs 
In the previous chapter the groupings of thought constitutive of the labour 
movement were identified as labourism, democratic socialism, Fabianism, 
Marxism and ethical socialism. In foreign policy, these groupings shared beliefs 
in internationalism, working class solidarity, anti-capitalism and anti-militarism. 
To identify Attlee and Bevin's beliefs it is first necessary to trace the transmission 
of relevant ideas, identifying both the temporal and conceptual links in the webs 
of beliefs of the relevant individuals. 
3.2.1 Clement Attlee' 
Described as one of Britain's most successful Prime Ministers, Attlee's 
political career began in 1919 with his election as Mayor of Stepney, becoming 
MP for Limehouse, 1922-1950 and then West Waltharnstow, 1950-55.2 Appointed 
as Parliamentary Private Secretary (PPS) to Ramsay MacDonald, Attlee was 
Under-Secretary for War in 1924. In 1929 he was Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster then Postmaster General in 1930-1. With the Party's split in 1931, 
Attlee became deputy leader before being elected leader in 1935, a position he 
held for the next twenty years. During the War, Attlee joined the Coalition as 
Lord Privy Seal, 1940-42, then as Deputy Prime Minister, 1942-45. He also 
served as Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1942-3 and Lord President of 
the Council, 1943-5. 
1 Attlee, Clement Richard (1883-1967) 
2 Cook, C and Stevenson, J (2000) Britain Since 1945, London: Longman, p222 
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Attlee's background was affluent and conservative middle class. He was 
educated at Haileybury and University College, Oxford. His family values 
reflected the predominant liberalism of the day while his education reinforced the 
notion of an established order and patriotism. Attlee was later to describe himself 
as "basically a Victorian". 3 He was "in a number of ways encapsulated within the 
language and traditions of his school dayS"4 exhibiting "excessive respect for 
authority [and an] obsession with tradition. "5 With no interest in the Christian 
social reform groups at university, 6 Attlee's early politics found expression in 
strong resistance to tariff reform and idealistic imperialism with an admiration for 
"strong ruthless rulers". 7 
Attlee's moderate and pragmatic approach to politics, his belief in 
socialism, his early alignment with middle class moderate socialists, and nurturing 
of future identifiable democratic socialists would imply an affiliation to this 
tradition. The tradition of democratic socialism arose during the late nineteenth 
century but was relatively vague until Evan Durbin made clear the distinctions in 
1940.8 Until then it was distinguished from liberal and ethical socialist traditions 
by an implicit belief in egalitarianism and democratic institutions. ' Its 
3 Attlee quoted in the News Chronicle, 1953 
4 Saville, J (1993) The Politics of Continuity London: Verso Press, p 112 
5 Burridge, T (1985) Clement Attlee: A Political Biography London: Jonathan Cape, pl 2-3; Harris, 
K (1982) Attlee London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p9; Saville, The Politics of Continuity p] 12; 
Williams F (1948) The Triple Challenge London: Heinemann, p56 
6 This had been a popular starting point for other social reformers of the twentieth century such as 
Beveridge and Tawney. 
7 Burridge, Clement Attlee p 18 
8 Durbin, E (1940) The Politics ofDemocratic Socialism, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
9 Desai, R (1995) Intellectuals and Socialism: Social Democrats and the Labour Party, London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, p35 
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characteristic themes are a broad ethical commitment and a belief in social justice. 
In practical terms democratic socialism was about modifying property relations 
and managing capitalism coupled with a pragmatic view of the need to connect 
with the electorate. 10 When we examine Attlee's beliefs we can identify four areas 
which tie him conceptually and temporally to this tradition. 
Firstly, modifying his inherited liberal beliefs, Attlee accepted the need for 
a state role and social justice, departing from the paternalism and philanthropy of 
liberalism. Prompted by a visit to an economically deprived area of London's East 
End during his early career, Attlee rejected the belief that poverty was the result 
of moral delinquency. His shift towards egalitarianism was complemented by a 
continued belief in institutions. Burridge remarks, 
He turned to socialism precisely because he was so fundamentally - 
emotionally - conservative. Socialism would appear to him as the best 
method of preserving and extending the cultural values acquired from his 
family life and higher education, not as a device for replacing them by 
revol uti onary ones. " 
Secondly, he actively dismissed the progressive liberalism of the Fabians and 
Marxist socialism in his modification of beliefs; the Fabians for their lack of 
individualism, the Social Democratic Federation (SDF) for its doctrinal 
exclusivity. 12 He "attacked capitalism not as a Marxist but as a middle class 
10 Brivati, B (1997) Hugh Gailskell, London: Richard Cohen Books, p294-296 
11 Burridge Clement Attlee, p20 
12 Burridge, Clement Attlee, p30; Golant, W (1969) 'The Early Political Thought of C. R. Attlee', 
The Political Quarterly, vol. 40.3, pp246-255, p248. It should also be noted that neither did Engels. 
He felt that Hyndman's interpretation of Marx's thought was far from a true representation of 
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Victorian who felt pangs of responsibility because he belonged to the class which 
had caused to flourish ugliness, poverty and human misery". 13 What distinguished 
Attlee from social liberals was his attraction to the ideal society as espoused in the 
works by Ruskin and Morris. 14 Attlee commented, "I was not a scientific person 
and was never attracted by Marxism ... I have never had much faith in the 
inevitability of socialism". 15 Instead, Attlee's concern was to challenge social 
organisation for its complicity in perpetuating human misery. 16 His antipathy to 
revolutionary change coincided with the growth of empirical evidence about 
social conditions with solutions rooted in collective action and greater democratic 
participation giving the working class the chance to make their own demands. 17 
Thirdly, Attlee recognised that political shifts after World War One meant 
broadening the Party's appeal claiming, I think there was a danger in our 
movement in pre-war days of taking too narrow a view - in that we conceived that 
what appeared the ideal life for us was the ideal life for everybody ... we were too 
Webby". He went on, "[w]e shall have to allow for greater variety but our 
principles stand, and must stand, it is only the application that must be various. "18 
Using the symbol of respectability meant, "Not only were members of the Labour 
Marxist belief and thus divorced himself from the only official organ of Marxist thinking in 
Britain at the time. 
13 Golant'Early thought, p248 
14 John Ruskin (1819-1900); William Morris (1834-1896); See: Ruskin, J (1867) The Political 
Economy of Art, London: Smith, Elder and Co; Morris, W (1891) News From Nowhere, or, An 
Epoch of Rest: Being Some Chapters from a Utopian Romance, London: Longman; Vest, E. B. 
(1956) The Socialism of Morris and Ruskin Chicago: University of Illinois Press; Burridge, 
Clement Attlee p29 
15 Attlee, C (1952) 'Socialist Faith in the Past and the Future' in Forward 05/07/52 
16 Attlee, C. R. (1920) The Social Worker London: G. Bell and Sons, pl. 4; Golant, 'Early thought, 
P724 8 
Golant, 'Early Thought', p249 
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Party fit to rule Britain because they represented the working class but also 
because the leaders of the party were not too dissimilar in manner and personality 
from the kind of person who led in the past". 19 
, Attlee appealed to this notion of respectability directly in 1945.20 
Patriotism formed the second part of Labour's broadening appeal, based on 
Attlee's own inherited beliefs and the cohesive power he felt this provided during 
the First World War. "In time of war" he wrote, "there is one overwhelming issue 
which may affect a union of people who differ widely in their conceptions of the 
society to which they belong, "21 a theme manifest in his maiden speech in 1922.22 
Finally Attlee adopted Keynesian economic beliefs as the most effective in 
addressing the inequities of the capitalist system which, as it stood, did not 
provide the material basis of a good society. 23 Respectability was needed in 
domestic economic policy and in handling economic interests abroad to challenge 
the Conservative hold and perceptions of failure after the second Labour 
Government. 24 Attlee's understanding of this reflected its importance: "Foreign 
18 Golant, 'Early Thought', p247 
19 Golant, 'Early Thought', p254; It was at Ramsay MacDonald's request that Attlee was first 
known as Major Attlee in Parliament. 
20 Attlee, C (1954) As it Happened, London: Heinemann, p142. Attlee's election broadcast 
included "The Labour Party is ... the one party which most reflects in its representation and 
composition all the main streams which flow into the great river of our national life. Our appeal to 
ou, therefore, is not narrow or sectional". 
Attlee, C (1937) The Labour Party in Perspective, London: Gollancz pI 22 
22 Burridge, Clement Attlee, p42 
23 Burridge, Clement Attlee, p52 
24 Weiler P (1993), Ernest Bevin, Manchester: MUP, p77; Attlee, As it Happened, p75. The onset 
of the Great Depression and the fall of the Second Labour Government caused tension as Labour 
Party leaders felt they were victims of a 'banker's ramp' and the National Government's election 
platform had been based on Labour's economic negligence. 
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and economic affairs are so much interwoven in these days and the relationship 
between home and foreign affairs so close". 25 
Attlee was central to the Party's modifications of its foreign policy 
traditions during the 1930s by rejecting anti -m il itarism. He also rejected the anti- 
capitalist tradition. Although his belief in internationalism included the ideal of an 
equitable world economy, his support for working class solidarity was qualified. 
The traditions of foreign policy were ideals; the process of translating them into 
workable policy continued into Labour's third government. 
The Labour Party stood for "the constructive, positive, forward-looking 
idea of a Co-operative World Commonwealth ... based on the Socialist faith in the 
Brotherhood of Man". 26 Written into the Party constitution, the objective was 
"... to assist in organising a Federation of Nations for the maintenance of peace 
and freedom". 27 In rejecting the anti-militarist tradition Attlee argued: "Socialist 
pacifism was a product of the optimistic Victorian era when the British Navy 
ruled the seas and when the idea of a world war seemed remote". 28 However, the 
First World War "was a forcing house of change. The old world passed away and 
a new one was born". 29 Support for the League of Nations reflected the tradition 
of internationalism now backed by economic sanctions and rearmament. For 
Attlee, defence of the League was inextricably bound with the notion of social 
25 Attlee, As it Happened, p 169 
26 LPCR, (193 4), pI 10 
27 Bealey, F (1970) The Social and Political Thought of the British Labour Party, London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, pl. 40 
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justice; an extension of domestic aspirations. 30 Neutrality was not an option, 31 the 
power and legitimacy of the League rested in its moral force and in the rule of 
law. 32 
Appeasement affirmed this modification while war ushered Labour into 
power. Attlee defended the Coalition: "Our decision is another pledge of our faith 
in international socialism. Our partnership in governmental power is an act 
intended to translate that faith into deeds from which there can be no retreat". 33 
Those deeds required a New World Order based on collective security in which a 
collective authority would control military and economic power and be secured on 
the foundations of socialism and democracy. 34 
Attlee's belief in working class solidarity was qualified on two counts: it 
did not extend to varieties of socialism which were unconstitutional; and it 
contained the normative assumption of the superiority of British socialism. 
Despite his claim that "the socialist idea has to be worked out in every country in 
accordance with the native genius of the people of that country 05 he perceived all 
other powers to be flawed, while Britain was a "first class power". 36 He added, 
28 Attlee, C (1954) As It Happened, London: Heinemann, p96 
29 Attlee, As it Happened, p 83 
30 Attlee, As it Happened, p 103 
31 Attlee, As it Happened, p99 
32 Burridge, Clement Attlee, pI 10-111; Labour Party Conference Report (1935) On League of 
Nations Sanctions, in Bealey, British Labour Party Thought, p 144-149 
33 LPCR (1940), p 122 
34 Labour Party (1940) Labour's Peace Aims, London: Transport House; LPCR (1940), 
35 Attlee, C (c. 1940-1) Notes on Socialism, ATLE 1/19, Churchill College, Cambridge 
36 Attlee, C (1944-6) Notes on post-war problems, ATLE 1/24, Churchill College, Cambridge 
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"We do not seek to thrust our views upon other nations we are seeking to set an 
example". 37 
Spurred by egalitarianism, a belief in democratic institutions and a vision 
of the 'good society', Attlee transposed these into foreign affairs. The dilemma of 
pacifism was modified to a belief in the morality of internationalism and the 
legitimacy of the rule of law. This modification left unchallenged the conception 
of the international economy, the ideal of redistributive measures remaining as a 
mirror of domestic policy. It was a vision of a good and essentially socialist and 
democratic inspired commonwealth of sovereign states, hence Attlee did not 
modify his beliefs about the emphasis on the international and not regional, in 
which Britain's role was superior and imbued with responsibilities of leadership. 
3.2.2 Ernest Bevin 38 
Bevin's political career began in 1911 when he became a full time official 
in the Docker's union. By 1918, he was a leading figure in the National Transport 
Workers' Federation, achieving prominence for his defence of workers during the 
Shaw Committee in 1920. In 1922 he formed the Transport and General Workers' 
Union (TGWU), soon to be the biggest single union, acting as its General 
Secretary until 1940. The failed General Strike in 1926 prompted Bevin to 
reinforce the links between the unions and the Labour Party, gaining increased 
influence through the TUC General Council in the 1930s. During the Second 
37 Attlee, C and Bevin, E (1946) Britain's Foreign Policy, London: Transport House, p32 
38 Bevin, Ernest (1881-195 1) 
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World War he was Minister of Labour and Foreign Secretary during the Attlee 
Governments. He resigned due to ill health in 1951 and died shortly after. 
According to Bullock, Bevin "did not fit easily into any of the accepted 
divisions of labour opinion, left-wing, right-wing, or middle of the road 5ý . 
39 
40 However, as the "greatest trade unionist leader of the twentieth century" , one 
might expect Bevin's beliefs to reflect the labourist tradition and in his early life 
we can trace certain events and experiences which tie him temporally and 
conceptually to this tradition. The themes characteristic of labourism are working 
class political organisation to redress the imbalance of wealth creation, a moral 
critique of capitalists rather than capitalism, the protection of indigenous workers 
from imported labour and an emphasis on the self-reliance and independence of 
individuals. When we examine Bevin, we can identify events and beliefs which 
mirror the themes of labourism. 
First, his personal circumstances influenced his beliefs greatly. At the 
other end of the spectrum from Attlee, Bevin was an illegitimate child and 
orphaned, aged eight. 41 Unskilled, his early employment was irregular. Having 
gravitated from a rurally depressed area, he moved to Bristol, a city of deep class 
conflict which left its mark and deepened his "hostility to the economic and social 
39 Bullock, A (1960) The Life and Times ofErnest Bevin: Volume One, Trade Union Leader, 1881- 
1940, London: Hei nernann, p 143 
40 Ramsden, J (ed), (2002) The Oxford Companion to Twentieth Century British Politics, Oxford: 
OUP, p54 
41 For biographies of Bevin see: Bullock, Ernest Bevin; Stephens, M (1981) Ernest Bevin: 
Unskilled Labourer and World Statesman London: TGWU, Transport House; Weiler, Ernest 
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system under which he lived: he hated its exploitation, its injustice and its 
inequal ityi. 42 Bullock adds that "poverty and need coloured [Bevin's] experience 
from his earliest days" resulting in a permanent sense of insecurity. 43 He 
identified the weakness of collective action so we can identify Bevin's belief in 
the need for strong organisation; "the cast of his mind was practical rather than 
revolutionary or utopian. Instinctively he turned to organisation rather than 
agitation , 44 resulting in the formation of the TGWU. 45 Thus, Bevin's early 
experiences created a belief in a politically strong working class defending its own 
interests. 
Second, Bevin combined this with a critique of capitalists, initially by his 
involvement in work disputes and expanding this into a call for an adequate social 
system for unemployment rather than reliance on piecemeal charity. 46 Bevin's 
belief in social justice was again demonstrated at the Shaw Committee in 1920 in 
which he argued that the working class had a right to full membership of British 
society. Moral credibility for this claim came from the First World War so that 
"[i]mplicitly, Bevin was arguing that the state had failed to recognise a 
corresponding obligation to the men who had accepted its claim over their 
lives". 47 Bevin's beliefs were underpinned by an economic understanding derived 
Bevin; Evans, T (1946) Bevin London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd; Williams, F (1952) Ernest 
Bevin London: Gollancz 
42 B ul lock, Ernest Bevin, p3 7 
43 Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p2, p6 
44 Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p37 
45 Weiler, ErnestBevin p12 
46 Weiler, Ernest Bevin p6 
47 Weiler, Ernest Bevin p29 
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from reading Chiozza Money's Riches and Poverty. 48 Echoing Hodgskin's 
arguments, Money identified the disproportionate distribution of national wealth 
between a rich minority and the rest of society. 49 "In [Bevin's] eyes, an economic 
and social system which produced such results stood self condemned. It could and 
should be changed" . 
50 Bevin's critique of capitalism thus contained a deeply 
moral timbre. 
Third, Bevin's morality was the product of his nonconformist background. 
Weiler remarks, "as with so many in his generation of Labour leaders, chapel 
going clearly exerted a formative influence ... nonconformism taught the equal 
dignity of all men, and the worthiness of the humble". 5 1 Bullock adds that 
nonconformism fostered "in men with little or no education ... a strong sense of 
duty and conscience, self-respect, a passion for justice and a conviction of 
righteousness". It also gave him "a religious faith and moral principleS". 52 But his 
early "evangelical fervoUe"53 was replaced by interest in the Bristol Socialist 
Society (BSS) where "the roots of their socialism were as much moral as 
economic, and they were more influenced by the generous love of humanity 
preached by William Morris, Edward Carpenter and Bruce Glasier than by the 
Marxist doctrines of class hatred and economic determinism". 54 At that time it 
presented to Bevin a secular equivalent to the spiritual transformation promised 
" Money was a liberal MP. Money, LC (1910) Riches and Povert)v, 11 th ed 1914, London: 
Methuen and Co. 
49 For Hodgskin, see Chapter 2 
50 Bullock, The Life and Times ofErnest Bevin, pI 3 
51 Weiler, Ernest Bevin, p4 
52 Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p8-9 
53 Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p8 
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by his nonconformist religion . 
55 Thus we can identify as an influence in Bevin's 
labourism the tradition of ethical socialism's religious zeal and visionary appeal. 
Finally, Bevin's beliefs in foreign affairs were defined by his first aim: to 
secure the protection of indigenous workers. In the Party cleavage between 
pacifists and realists, Bevin campaigned for rearmament and sanctions while his 
support of non-intervention over the Spanish Civil War was justified as a defence 
of "labour movement institutions ... over broader political objectives". 
56 Criticised 
for jettisoning Labour internationalism, Bevin's main concern was to achieve the 
standard at home first, not for gains to be diluted by obeisance to foreign policy 
ideals in uncertain times. Arguably, this outlook provides a guide to Bevin's post- 
war approach. His belief in the power of union strength militated against any 
erosion of it from overseas, and given his success at home, there was a distinct 
possibility of expanding the success abroad. He looked at international affairs 
through the lens of domestic worker needs first then international worker needs 
57 second . 
Such beliefs are criticised for being a return to the support of British 
nationalism and imperial iSM58 but this would presuppose a departure in the first 
place. Instead, we can consider that Bevin's experiences had been entirely formed 
54 Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p 14 
55 Weiler, Ernest Bevin p6 
56 Bevin quoted in Weiler, Ernest Bevin, p95. The lack of arms also curtailed the option of a strong 
response. 
57 Bevin Papers, BEVN 1/4 : TUC Papers, 1932-3; BEVN 3/2 Bevin and Eden Correspondence, 
Bevin to Eden, 8/12/42, Churchill College Archive, Cambridge 
58 Weiler, Ernest Bevin, p96 
93 
Labour, 1945-1955 
by his domestic experiences and therefore his views on foreign policy were 
circumscribed by these beliefs. As noted in chapter two, the belief in superiority 
was a cultural norm rather than a specific attribute of labour thinking. Further, 
Bevin developed his belief into a strategy in which imperial groupings could 
provide the foundations of an international trading bloc based on pooling raw 
materials, thus reducing competitions for goods and providing the basis for wider 
worker equality. In short, Bevin sought the extension of worker gains in Britain 
elsewhere, but only at no cost or threat to those gains of the domestic worker. 
To summarise, Attlee's beliefs were linked to the tradition of democratic 
socialism in four ways: the need for a state role and social justice; challenging 
social organisation through democratic means; establishing patriotism and 
respectability as key features of a maturing Labour Party; and adopting 
Keynesianism as the method through which to engineer just socio-economic 
change. His belief in social justice was extended to foreign policy as well as 
nurturing a belief in collective security backed by the rule of law and a continued 
faith in the superiority of British socialism. Bevin's beliefs were similarly linked 
to Labourism in four ways: the need for strong and unified collective action to 
achieve pragmatic goals; a critique of socio-economic imbalances; a moral vision 
of social justice inspired by nonconformist roots; and the continued search for 
worker equality at home and abroad. 
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3.3 Historical Setting 
To understand the circumstances under which Attlee and Bevin identified 
the dilemma of reduced capabilities and the context which defined their 
subsequent modifications of belief, it is necessary to first summarise the domestic 
and international situation. 
3.3.1 The Domestic Situation 
The Labour Government was swept into power in 1945 with a majority of 
146 seats after fighting a campaign based almost entirely on its planned domestic 
politics. Couched in terms of 'the people's peace', the programme established the 
National Insurance Act in 1946 providing comprehensive social provision with 
benefits for unemployment, sickness and maternity. 59 In 1948, the National Health 
Service Act provided free medical, dental and opticians' services. The National 
Assistance Act of 1948 abolished all poor laws and provided help for those 
without income. 60 Nationalisation of various key industries and interests began in 
1946 with the Bank of England then the coal industry, electricity, inland transport 
in 1947 and iron and steel in late 1949. Labour's electoral success is attributed in 
part to the promise nationalisation held of preventing a return to the economic 
sclerosis of the interwar years. 
59 Labour Party Manifesto (1945) Let Us Face The Future, London: Labour Party, 
http: //www. psr. keele. ac. uk/area/uk/man/lab45. htm accessed 07/01/2003 
60 Cook and Stevenson, Britain Since 1945, p 132 
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The damaged and fractured nature of the British economy in 1945 has 
been documented in detail elsewhere. 61 The Government faced three key events 
concerning the economy. The end of lend-lease 62 prompted the negotiation of the 
Washington Loan Agreements in December 1945. From this stemmed the 
convertibility crisis of 1947 and finally the devaluation of sterling in 1949. The 
end of lend-lease overturned the belief in Government and Whitehall that this 
could continue, after hostilities, to rebuild the British economy. 
63 Negotiations 
64 were crucial to maintain living standards and enable Labour's programme. The 
Loan consisted of $3.75 billion at two percent interest to be repaid over fifty years 
beginning in December 1951. It also required ratifying the agreement reached at 
Bretton Woods 65 in 1944, the disbanding of the Sterling Bloc and convertibility, 
the free exchange of Sterling for Dollars. 66 Convertibility was due to take effect 
from mid 1947. Signs of economic recovery began in 1946 67 but a bad winter and 
coal shortages cut industrial output by a quarter and contributed to the balance of 
payments problems leading to the summer crisis. Massive capital outflows created 
a run on the Bank of England's reserves amounting to $4.1 billion during 1947 
61 Twenty-five percent of pre-war wealth was lost, along with 50 percent of invisible income and 
60% of the export market. Weiler, Ernest Bevin p148 
62 Lend-lease was the American system of supplying military hardware and raw materials to the 
allies, mainly Britain. 
63 Ovendale, R (1984) The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments 1945-1951 
Leicester: LUP p4 
" Jefferys, K (1993) The Labour Party Since 1945 London: Routledge, p14 
65 The Bretton Woods agreement was signed by 44 countries in July 1944, establishing an 
international monetary and payments system based on experiences during the 1930s and the failure 
of the Gold Standard. The stability afforded by this system was seen as essential to underpinning a 
liberal international trade regime. Institutions of Bretton Woods included the International 
Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later the World 
Bank) and the International Trade Organisation, (later General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - 
GATT). 
66 The British had hoped for an interest free and condition free loan of $5 billion. Kochavi, A 
(200 1) Post Holocaust Politics, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, p2 
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compared with $900 million in 1946. Economic crisis led to political crisis with 
an attempt by Cripps to depose Attlee as leader. Convertibility was not reinstated 
until December 1958.68 Finally, Sterling was devalued in September 1949 by 
thirty percent. 69 This followed a summer of balance of payments deficits and 
further speculative pressures on the Bank of England. Devaluation was widely 
anticipated although the Labour government failed to warn their French 
counterparts in advance, leading to acrimony and further disillusionment over 
Britain's foreign policy direction. 70 
Significant pressure on the Government came from within its own ranks, 
the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), over foreign and defence policy. 71 Dissent 
mobilized behind the concept of the 'Third Force' and peaked by mid 1947. The 
'third force' idea was most cogently expressed by the Keep Left group who 
wished to avoid a Cold War politics in which Europe and the Middle East would 
suffer. Their motivating beliefs were the redundancy of national sovereignty in 
preventing wars and the focus on what the war had been fought for rather than 
against. "The task of British socialism must be, " they argued, "to save the smaller 
nations from this futile ideological warfare [the Cold War] and to heal the breach 
between the U. S. A and U. S. S. R ... It would 
be a betrayal of British and European 
67 Jefferys, The Attlee Governments, p25 
68 Ramsden, Twentieth Century British Politics, p 164 
69 Newton, 'The 1949 Sterling Crisis', pI 76 
70 Newton, 'The 1949 Sterling Crisis'; Rooth, T. (2000) 'Economic Tensions and Conflict in the 
Commonwealth', Twentieth Century British History, vol. 13.2, ppl2l-143; Toye, R (2000) 'The 
Labour Party's External Economic Policy in the 1940s', The Historical Journal, vol. 43.1, ppI 89- 
215 
71 Alderman, RK (1964/5) 'Discipline in the Parliamentary Labour Party, 1945-51', 
Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 18, pp293-305, p294 
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socialism if we meekly accepted Communist leadership. But it would be equally 
fatal to accept American leadership in exchange for dollars". 72 Instead they urged 
partnership with France to "form the keystone of the arch of world peace". 73 From 
this it was claimed the UN would become a real entity, Britain would gain real 
economic benefits and establishing collective imperial markets would create an 
economically and politically strong and independent Europe. 74 The movement 
was adversely affected by the declaration of Marshall Aid and was eventually 
subsumed within the broader 'Bevanite' group where they continued to argue that 
Europe was the focus of potential conflict between the superpowers. 75 
72 Crossman, RHS et al (1947) Keep Left: By a Group of Members of Parliament, London: New 
Statesman and Nation, p35 
73 Crossman et al., Keep Left, p38 
74 Crossman et al., Keep Left, p40-1; Jefferys describes Keep Left as 'radicalists' although their 
arguments were more in tune with the prevailing feeling in Europe with key members such as 
RWG MacKay integral to the wartime federalist movement in Britain. Parts of the broader labour 
movement had also been supportive of European unity during the war; the ILP, Tribune and GDH 
Cole expressing formulations towards this end. See Jefferys, The Labour Party Since 1945, p 12; 
Newman, M (1980) 'British Socialists and the Question of European Unity, 1939-45', European 
Studies Review, vol. 10.2, pp75-1 00 
75 Bevan, A (1952) In Place of Fear, London: William Heinemann, p124; MacKay went on to 
establish the PLP Europe Group with Christopher Shawcross in the late 1940s became vice- 
president of European Parliamentary Union (EPU) and along with twenty-five other Labour MPs, 
attended the Hague Congress in May 1948. MacKay, unlike the wider Keep Left Group, held 
particular views about Britain and Europe's future making him distinctly Europeanist. The 
government's response to the Schuman Plan provoked Mackay to deliver a withering attack on 
Labour's off icial policy. See Mackay, RWG (1949) Western Union in Crisis: Economic Anarchy 
or Political Union? Oxford: Blackwell; Mackay, RWG (1950) Heads in the Sand: A Criticism of 
the Official Labour Attitude to European Unity, Oxford: Blackwell; Mackay, RWG (1951) 
European Unity, Oxford: Blackwell; Mackay, RWG (1953) Whither Britain? Oxford: Blackwell; 
in particular Mackay, Heads in the Sand. See also: Minion, M (2000) 'Left, Right or European? 
Labour and Europe in the 1940s: The Case of the Socialist Vanguard Group', European Review of 
History, vol. 7.2, pp229-248, p234; Minion, M (2000) 'The Fabian Society and Europe During the 
1940s: The Search for a Socialist Foreign Policy', European Historical Quarterly, vol. 30.2, 
pp237-70; Wilford, R. A. (1980) 'The Federal Union Campaign', European Studies Review, vol. 1 0, 
ppl 01-114 
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3.3.2 The International Situation 
The international dimension to the Labour government included 
consideration of Britain's defence needs and the emergent Cold War, the changes 
to the Empire and Anglo-American relations. The first pressing need was for a 
defence strategy Britain could afford, "the dominant theme of the Attlee 
governments [being] to reduce the resources allocated to defence as rapidly as 
possible". 76 
By 1947, the 'three pillar strategy' of Britain, the Middle East and sea 
communications between them evolved. The needs claimed by the Chiefs of Staff 
(COS) and the limits placed by Cabinet on expenditure maintained tensions. The 
result was the ping-pong of defence estimates in order to meet the three pillar 
strategy on the one hand, and secure a long-term defence investment strategy on 
the other. The need for European defence was exacerbated by the onset of the 
Cold War in which initially Britain was being frozen out by the US and USSR. 
A shift in relations meant the withdrawal of the British military presence 
in Greece and Turkey, prompting the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 as an 
explicit measure of counter-communism. 77 The announcement of Marshall Aid in 
June 1947 provided the economic backing to that political move and engaging 
76 Gorst, A (1992) 'Facing the Facts? The Labour Governments and Defence Policy 1945-50', in 
N. Tiratsoo (ed) The Attlee Years, London: Pinter, pp 190-209, p190-2 
77 The Truman Doctrine was a formal declaration by the United States to aid those free countries 
resisting attempted subjugation by outside pressures. It was the beginning of the policy of 
containment. 
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America in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 78 (NATO) in 1949 sealed the 
shift with defensive capacity. 
While the domestic policy achievements of the Labour Governments of 
1945-51 are well documented 79 , Jefferys claims, "[i]n overseas policy, the legacy 
of these years was equally far reaching", marking the transition from Empire to 
Commonwealth. 80 This view has been disputed .81 The transition from Empire to 
Commonwealth was a necessity borne from the multilateral condition of post-war 
trading relations and growing pressures for self-determination. Independence was 
granted to Transjordan in 1946, India and Pakistan in 1947, with Ceylon and 
Burma 82 becoming independent in 1948. In the same year, the British Nationality 
Act conferred to all Commonwealth citizens the status of 'British subject' leading 
to the first wave of Jamaican immigrants. Less successfully the State of Israel was 
formed in 1948 after guerrilla warfare over the British mandate forced retreat, a 
78 NATO originally had twelve member states: the US, UK, France, Italy, Benelux, Portugal, 
Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Canada. The Treaty's remit was to treat an attack on any one of 
the members as an attack on all and by taking the necessary action to maintain and restore the 
security of the North Atlantic area, including the use of armed force. Disputes within NATO were 
to be settled by co-operation and collaboration. 
79 Morgan, K. O. (1984) Labour in Power 1945-1951, Oxford: Clarendon Press; Jefferys, K (1993) 
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81 Left wing critics such as Ralph Miliband, John Saville, Tom Nairn, Perry Anderson and Leonard 
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state of emergency was declared in Malaya in an attempt to suppress communist 
insurgency and in 1951, British oil assets in Iran were nationalised. By then, of 
the 457 million people under British rule in 1945, seventy million remained in a 
less cohesive Commonwealth which had changed to accept the monarch as the 
head of the Commonwealth, not necessarily the head of state. 83 
Initial relations between Britain and the United States were strained dating 
from the Potsdam Conference where American policy required Soviet assistance 
to end the war with Japan while making clear they had no territorial ambitions in 
Europe. The Truman Administration initially assumed the role of mediator 
between Britain and the Soviet Union, wary of Britain's claims to restoring her 
Empire. 84 Clashes with the Soviet Union produced a rapprochement in Anglo- 
American relations by mid-1946, Kennan's Long Telegram indicative of the 
change in attitude-85 The Truman Doctrine of March 1947 sealed the change, 
replacing Britain in support of anti-Communist royalists in Greece and assistance 
to the Turkish Government in protecting the Black Sea Straits from Soviet 
control. The following summer, Marshall Aid provided financial assistance to 
European states worth $17 billion over four years in a bid to boost economic 
recovery and American exports while diminishing Soviet influence over the west 
of Europe. 86 
82 Ceylon is now Sri Lanka, Burma now Myanmar 
83 Pearce, Attlee's Labour Governments, p70 
84 Kochavi, Post Holocaust Politics, p7 
83 W (1947) 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct', Foreign Affairs, vol. 25.4, pp566-583 
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Labour's approach to Europe was defined by defensive, economic and 
political considerations. Defence concerns were motivated by resolving the 
German question and establishing European security. The 1946 Dunkirk Treaty 
united Britain and France against German attack and was expanded in 1948 to 
include the Benelux countries with the Brussels Treaty Organisation (BTO) as a 
precursor to a US presence in NATO, 1949. Economic dislocation across Europe, 
housing loss, refugees, malnutrition and damaged infrastructure hampered the 
prospect of recovery. 87 Coal supplies were co-ordinated through the European 
Coal Organisation later replaced by the administrative arm of Marshall Aid, the 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) whose remit included 
evaluating methods of economic integration. " Political instability posed a further 
threat in France, Greece and Italy. The BTO contained clauses on political and 
cultural co-operation by eliminating areas of conflict through a Consultative 
Counci 1.89 
The Schuman Plan was announced by French Foreign Minister, Robert 
Schuman, on the 9th May 1950. Declaring that "world peace cannot be 
safeguarded without the making of constructive efforts proportionate to the 
87 Hearl, D (1994) 'Britain and Europe Since 1945, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 47.4, pp515-53 1, 
p516; Monnet, J (1978) Memoirs, translated by Richard Mayne, London: Collins, p225,233; 
Young, J (1990) Britain, France and the Unity ofEurope, 1945-51 Leicester: LUP, p35 
88 OECD website: 
http: //www. oecd. or%, Jdocument/48/0.2340, en 2649 201185 1876912 1111.00. html accessed 
02/02/2003 
89 Text of the 'Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self 
Defence', 17/03/48 from http: //www. ena. lu/mce. cfi-n accessed 21/07/05 
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dangers which threaten it"90 he outlined a plan to pool French and German coal 
and steel production. This was to "provide for the setting-up of common bases of 
economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe" where war 
would become materially impossible. 91 A high authority would rapidly secure the 
modernisation of production and the raising of living standards achieved through 
transitional measures. 92 The purpose of the proposed organisation was to "ensure 
, 93 the fusion of the markets and the expansion of production'. The High Authority 
would be composed of an equal number of representatives from member states 
and whose institutions "will in no way prejudice the methods of ownership of 
enterprises". 
94 
3.4 tlite Beliefs and Tradition Change 
In this section we examine the content of the dilemma of reduced 
capabilities before analysing what aspects of belief were modified. It is argued 
that the modifications gained coherence by the late 1940s forcing a re- 
conceptual isation of Labour Party foreign policy traditions. The remaining period 
demonstrated the popularising of this modified set of beliefs. Finally, we can see 
90 'Declaration on behalf of the French Government by Mr. Robert Schuman, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Paris, 9h May 1950' in Archives of the European Communities (AEC) (1983) Opening of 
the Historical Archives of the European Communities to the Public, Luxembourg: Office of the 
Official Publications of the European Communities, p89; Also see Monnet, Memoirs, pp298-305 
where much of the original press conference document is reprinted; European Communities Press 
and Information (1972) Uniting Europe: The European Community Since 1950 Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities; European Commission (2002) Fifty 
Years of the ECSC Treaty: Coal and Steel Statistics, Luxembourg: Office for Off icial Publications 
of the European Community. See Bullock, A (1985) Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary Vol. 3, 
Oxford: OUP, chapter 21 for an account of the Schuman Plan 
91 AEC, Archives, p89 
92 Such as a production and investment plan, compensatory mechanisms and a fund to rationalise 
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how this re-conceptualisation did not allow for the further challenge presented by 
the Schuman Plan. 
3.4.1 Identifying the Dilemma 
The perceived dilemma of reduced capabilities was accepted by Attlee and 
Bevin, prompting a modification of beliefs about the Labour Party's foreign 
policy ideals. This in turn prompted modifications of the traditions of democratic 
socialism and labourism. When Attlee and Bevin referred to reduced capabilities 
in international politics, they refer to several facets of the emerging post-war 
settlements of power relations and resources. We can identify these as: first, an 
apprehension of the unilateral power wielded by America; secondly, the 
consequent fear that this might impact upon Britain's ability to establish a 
defensive balance of power in Europe; thirdly, that reliance on the symbol of 
power, the Empire, was in jeopardy; and finally, the recognition that capitalist 
states, namely the United States, might not co-operate with Labour's socialist 
plans. 
3.4.1.1 American Dominance 
American dominance took two forms: economic hegemony and political 
and strategic pre-eminence. Apprehensions about the new economic power 
wielded by the United States took three forms: the British economy would 
become subject to American economic direction; the British trading capacity was 
being sustained by American assistance; and Marshall Aid allowing the US to 
94 AEC, Archives, p90 
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exercise meaningful influence in Europe. Of American political and strategic pre- 
eminence, one fear in particular dominated: the atom bomb. 
In the autumn of 1945, Bevin outlined the fear of economic dominance by 
the United States when discussing the Washington Loan Agreement, being uneasy 
about accepting terms that "would leave us subject to economic direction from the 
United States". 95 Although the Government expressed shock and dismay, the 
96 
warnings had been clear for at least six months. Attlee too recognised the 
problems associated with this absolute shift in international power, stating "We 
had to have the loan. We knew how much we risked when we accepted 
convertibility, but Keynes urged us to take the risk. 
07 Within Cabinet there was a 
split by those on the left who argued against accepting the conditions of the loan 
as an attempt to "discard our power to enforce a discriminatory commercial 
policy". 98 Advice from Keynes that this was a good offer, and from Sir Edward 
Bridges, 99 that if Congress knew the "planned economist element in the British 
Cabinet [was] materially influencing the present negotiations there [was] hardly 
any hope of Congress approving our agreement"100 prompted the marginalizing of 
Party dissent by, among others, Attlee and Bevin. 
95 PRO CAB 128/4 CM 50 (45) Confidential Annex, 6/11/45 
96 Bernard Baruch, 'Letter to President Truman, April 20'h 1945, on his visit to London and 
meetings with Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and others', Baruch Papers, Princeton 
University, Seeley Mudd Library. 
http: //www. fpp. co. uk/Historv/Churchill/Baruch/to Truman 200445. htmi accessed 20/07/05 
97 Harris, Attlee, p 180 
98 Emanuel Shinwell, PRO CAB 128/4 CM 50 (45) Confidential Annex, 6/11/45 
99 Sir Edward Bridges, Head of the Home Civil Service, 1945-1956; Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury, 1945-1946; Secretary to the Cabinet, 1938-1947 
100 PRO CAB 128/2 CM 58 (45) no date, no reference 
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During the autumn of 1946 Bevin reflected in Cabinet that the American 
loan formed the basis of Britain's economic revival, acting as a 'prop' to her 
traditional trading status. 101 It contained the continued belief in Britain's 
international trading role and need to assert this role given the history of hostility 
between the United States and Soviet Union, "both of whom sought to strengthen 
its own position without regard to our point of view". 102 The linking of Britain's 
international trading recovery to American economic assistance had been made 
during the war, early signals from the American administration being that it 
expected Britain to make full use of her Empire rather than depend on US 
financial help. It was noted in private by the Americans that the British economy 
would take possibly up to seven years before it could operate properly. ' 03 
However, the message had been mixed with trade liberalisation measures inherent 
in ratifying the Bretton Woods Agreement, and the continued sense that the 
United States was keen to further infiltrate traditional British markets. It was not 
lost on Bevin who in June 1949 urged against American pressure for Britain to 
pursue deflationary measures as these constituted "a major threat to the economic 
stability of the rest of the world". Feeling the Americans did not appreciate fully 
the political situation, Bevin continued, "persistence in their existing policies 
might well destroy the foundation of European reconstruction which had been so 
laboriously created in recent years; it might fatally weaken the capacity of 
Western Europe to resist communist aggression; and it might have disastrous 
101 PRO CAB 129/13 CP (46) 386 18/10/46 
102 Ernest Bevin, PRO CAB 128/3 CM 35 (45) Minute I Confidential Annex, 25/09/45 
103 Baruch, 'Letter to President Truman, April 200' 1945', From: 
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consequences in South East Asia". 104 Bevin's change of belief was in part 
supported by the increased polarisation of the United States and Soviet Union and 
the dispute over Iran; both meaning the increased strategic value in retaining parts 
of the British Empire. 
At the turn of 1948, Bevin said he sought to achieve economic 
consolidation in the west of Europe with a paralleled political dimension 
reflecting the British way of life and founded on a military defence against 
communism. Reflecting the impotence he felt in being able to provide Western 
European security, Bevin added "We are not yet in a position to give firm 
assurances as to the role we intend to play in operations on the continent of 
Europe. We shall sooner or later be forced into admitting our situation or refusing 
to discuss it. Either course is likely to land us into trouble". 105 Such was Bevin's 
concern that he planned to discuss the matter candidly with General Marshall. 106 
An appraisal of possible solutions towards European Economic integration took 
place during the summer of 1948. It left Bevin to reiterate the link between Britain 
being financially powerless to support the European economy and concrete efforts 
at unity until Marshall Aid. 107 
Intimately linked with this particular assessment of American economic 
hegemony was the strategic significance of the development of nuclear weaponry. 
104 PRO CAB 134/220 Economic Policy Committee Meetings 1949, EPC (49) 22,24/06/49 
105 Bevin to Inverchapel, PRO FO 800/460 26/1/48 
" Bevin to Inverchapel, PRO FO 800/460 26/1/48 
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Attlee's position regarding American dominance differed slightly from Bevin's, 
though they remained complementary in their outlook. Charged with the overall 
strategic direction of British foreign policy, Attlee was concerned with the 
development of the British atomic bomb; the degree of secrecy pursued in doing 
so being questioned by some academics. 108 The motivation was simple: to secure 
British interests. This was in part driven by feelings of patriotism and fear of an 
American return to isolationism. Attlee was to state, "we could not agree that only 
America should have atomic energy". 109 By far, the greatest reason to develop the 
bomb was as a diplomatic tool to be used against the United States; the 
motivations being that if Britain ever needed to deploy the threat of an attack or 
an actual attack the US might not support her and the bomb would enhance 
Britain's international status, especially as her role as an ally of the US. 110 
Underpinning Attlee's approach was a belief that the sheer destructiveness of 
atomic weapons should imply their international control, pressing Truman to 
make a public acknowledgement to this effect during the late summer of 1945 
resulting in the Washington Declaration in November 1945.111 
3.4.1.2 Weakness in Europe 
The dilemma of reduced capabilities resulted in an absolute sense of 
weakness in European affairs, largely over the future of Germany and the 
potential threat of Russia in the ensuing power-vacuum. Bevin appreciated this 
Jos Burridge, Attlee, p235 
" Williams, F (1961) A Prime Minister Remembers, London: Heinemann, pl 18-9 
110 Burridge, Attlee, p237; Gowing, M (1974) Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic 
Energy, 1945-52, London: Macmillan, p400-500 cited in Burridge, Attlee, p367 
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weakness in three ways: the small, but incremental steps towards Western 
European security resulting in NATO; the desire to achieve security through 
entrenched economic relations; and the balancing of such economic relations with 
Britain's traditional trading role. 
Bevin recognised that the impact of such power shifts was possibly to 
ccrule out a gradual deepening of Anglo-European economic co-operation" 
because of the multilateralist conditions of the Loan. ' 12 In contrast, when Bevin 
was appointed Foreign Secretary, he had been anxious to establish a framework 
for future close co-operation at the European level, a belief he considered 
necessary. 113 In this he saw the relations of Europe develop from a close link 
between Britain and France and from which could stem political, economic and 
military co-operation as the ultimate objective. Bevin desired a link between 
Britain and European powers along the Dunkirk model. Although this was 
rejected early on by the Americans, 114 Bevin continued to believe in its 
effectiveness-' 15 It continued to be an objective, leading to the cultural, economic 
and social clauses of the otherwise military alliance of the BTO although these 
remained institutionally weak. 
111 Washington Declaration, signed 15/11/45. Signatories were the President of the United States, 
Truman, and the British and Canadian Prime Ministers, Attlee and MacKenzie-King. 
112 PRO CAB 129/13 CP (46) 386,18/10/46 Proposal of Study for Close Economic Co-operation 
with Our Western European Neighbours. 
113 PRO FO 371/49069, Z. 9595,13/08/45; Woodhouse, British Policy Towards France, pl; 
Young, Britain, France and the Unity ofEurope, p 14 
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Bevin had modified the traditional foreign policy concept of the European 
balance of power during the war. In discussions with Eden, he had stated "the 
achievement of collective security is not solely or even primarily a political 
problem, and any plan which sets itself merely to secure a balance of political 
forces will not last". 116 For Bevin, it was necessary that any future settlement of 
European relations was founded on an economic system to which all could 
recognise they had a stake in maintaining. Later, Bevin reiterated this belief, while 
adding that there would be an inevitable coalescence of powers in Europe: the 
west towards Britain, the East towards Russia. With this shift, Bevin regarded the 
maintenance of a stable economy, and a lead in both social reform and military 
power as the attractions around which Britain could forge a balance of like- 
minded interests. 117 Reflecting on the American political system, Bevin remarked 
that its success rested on "[knitting] together ... the development of interstate 
commerce and of those common services which no state can afford to do 
without". Seeing this as significant to the developments in Europe, he argued "no 
permanent settlement will be secured by any system of purely political groupings 
that run counter to the economic facts". " 8 
Bevin was concerned that an inability to influence directly the 
developments in Europe would pose the threat of compromising Britain's 
remaining power and economic cohesion. "If we are to strengthen our ties in 
116 Bevin to Eden, BEVN 3/2 Ernest Bevin and Anthony Eden Correspondence, 8/12/42, Churchill 
College Archives, Cambridge. 
117 Bevin to Cranbournc, BEVN 3/1 Letters and Correspondence, 1/2/44, Churchill College 
Archives, Cambridge 
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Western Europe" he argued, "we may be faced ... with the necessity of taking a 
single plunge into a full customs union". Bevin's understanding reflected the 
changes brought about by the trade liberalisation agenda of the United States and 
the consequent loss of most favoured nation status. Although economic gains 
were possible, the potential political advantages would have to be weighed against 
consideration for the colonies and Commonwealth. ' 19 The caution resulted in a 
preference for the complementarity of economies rather than integration. 120 
Underlying this caution was a belief that Europe was politically unstable and 
economically weak and therefore not an attractive option in rebuilding an 
economy as the "world's principal trading nation". 121 
3.4.1.3 Imperial Jeopardy 
The Labour Government presided over the independence of India and the 
transition of the Empire into the Commonwealth. The process undertaken by the 
Government was a necessary response to both internal and external pressures and 
can be seen as the slide towards arrangements defined by informal economic 
preferences. The dilemma of reduced capabilities provided the most stark example 
of Attlee and Bevin's attempts at both retaining those aspects of Empire necessary 
for Britain's economic and strategic interests and international standing while 
reducing to a minimum the costs involved. Air power and nuclear weapons had 
made redundant the concept of Empire by land possession. The role of Empire in 
18 Bevin to Eden, BEVN 3/2 Ernest Bevin and Anthony Eden Correspondence, 8/12/42, Churchill 
College Archives, Cambridge. 
119 PRO CAB 129/13 CP (46) 386,18/10/46 
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Attlee and Bevin's beliefs was largely strategic. There were at least two examples 
of the Empire being used to buttress Britain's international standing; first against 
the Americans and then, later, with the Americans against the Soviet Union. 
Finally, the notion of Empire was reconceptualised, translating it into the more 
politically acceptable, but ultimately weaker, notion of the Commonwealth. 
The ratification of Bretton Woods was an American precondition to the 
Washington loan and was widely perceived as breaking up the Sterling Group. 
Left wing Cabinet members like Shinwell complained that in return for vague 
promises of co-operation Britain was being asked to dismantle a distinct 
commercial policy. Other Cabinet members such as Cripps and Dalton were more 
circumspect, recognising that members of the Sterling Group were trying to break 
out, with or without American assistance, while maintaining the Sterling Group 
was against the Labour policy of multilateral ism. 122 However, while postwar 
negotiations were still ongoing, Bevin was aware that of the three powers, 
Britain's weaker status was a hindrance and aimed to use both the UN and the 
Dominions to boost its position and off-set American dominance by making sure 
the British voice was heard. 123 
A year later, Bevin's emphasis on Britain's status as the world's principal 
trading nation caused concern and uncertainty towards plans for a European 
customs union. Instead, he recognised that the American loan formed the basis of 
121 PRO CAB 129/13 CP (46) 3 86,18/10/46 
122 PRO CAB 128/4 CM 50 (45) Confidential Annex, 6/11/45 
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Britain's economic revival, acting as a 'prop' to her traditional status. 124 Bevin 
clearly believed this had both strategic and political benefits. "By associating 
ourselves generally with the United States", he argued, "we have subscribed to a 
policy designed to bring upon high and sustained levels of employment and 
consumption in every country. This policy, if it can be achieved, is in the best 
interests of the United Kingdom as the world's principal trading nation, and 
further would promote political stability in all parts of the world. " 125 By early 
1948 Bevin was able to summarise the first aim of British foreign policy as being 
the mobilisation of political forces in Western Europe against the perceived Soviet 
threat with American and Dominion backing, 126 a policy which shared Attlee's 
absolute support. 127 
The significance of identifying the dilemma of reduced capabilities was 
that it left relatively intact the symbolic issues of identity, nationalism and 
sovereignty. Britain's identity in foreign policy was based on the Empire. Though 
it was recognised that the Empire was no longer the force it once was, and that 
American pressure to dismantle it in favour of multilateral trade existed, these 
were both embraced as positive developments in terms of traditions of Labour 
foreign policy belief. Instead, we can see that Attlee and Bevin pursued a policy 
of 'shoring-up' as much as was possible both in terms of international opinion and 
indigenous pressures, converting demonstrable losses into positive democratic 
123 PRO CAB 128/3 CM 35 (45) Minute I Confidential Annex, 25/09/45 
124 PRO CAB 129/13 CP (46) 386,18/10/46 
123 PRO CAB 129/16 CP (47) 35,18/1/47 
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developments. Although this applied to particular countries, such as India, the 
shift within the whole empire to a more informal Commonwealth signalled this 
reconceptualisation. 
The effect of creating a Commonwealth out of a fragile Empire was a 
corresponding change in nationalism. The Commonwealth allowed the free 
movement of British subjects within it, but its members were not equal. Canada 
was the first to break with the traditional and largely feudal relationship of British 
subjecthood, using citizenship as the mediating factor. The British Nationality Act 
of 1949 was the response, described as "reactive" with no appraisal of interests 
except to retain as much of the pre-1949 system as possible. It favoured an 'open 
door' policy, but one which was selective; preferring the free and permanent 
movement of Dominion citizens and encouraging only the temporary movement 
of colonial subjects. 128 Again, in terms of domestic nationalism, there is evidence 
that changes within Empire were shored up, conceding only the margins and in 
those areas no longer tenable. 
3.4.1.4 The Threat of Capitalism 
There persisted a fear that capitalist states would not cooperate with a 
socialist Labour Government. This was a continued belief stemming from the 
collapse of the Second Labour government in 1931. Attlee's beliefs reflected a 
127 PRO CAB 127/341 Personal Files of Sir Norman Brook, 7/5/48 
"' Hansen, R (1999) 'The Politics of Citizenship in 1940s Britain: The British Nationality Act', 
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fear of American capitalists while Bevin's recognised the potential threat from 
European capitalism. 
Attlee had already outlined the potential sclerosis of socialism and the 
labour movement if their approach was reduced to a class struggle. If a socialist 
government were to come to power, he argued, the capitalists would not co- 
operate, and vice versa, if the relations between them remained fixed on narrow 
interests. 129 Such was Attlee's concern that the Truman Administration would 
reject Labour's domestic plans that he went to Congress to present the case for the 
Government during negotiations for the Washington Loan Agreement. He made 
three vital points. 130 
First, he established his democratic credentials by stating: "I come before 
you as the Prime Minister of Great Britain, but in accordance with our 
constitutional practice, I am also a party leader, the leader of a majority recently 
returned to power in the House of Commons. " 
Second, he extended this common point by linking the Party to the 
tradition of freedom: 
I wonder how much you know about the British Labour Party? ... I think 
that some people over here imagine that Socialists are out to destroy 
freedom, freedom of the individual, freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion and freedom of the press. They are wrong. The Labour party is 
129 Attlee, C (1937), 'The Labour Party in Perspective' in Bealey, British Labour Party Thought, 
F 153 
30 The Guardian, 14/11/1945 
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in the tradition of freedom-loving movements which have always existed 
in our country ... We in the Labour party declare that we are in line with 
those who fought for Magna Carta and Habeas Corpus, with the Pilgrim 
Fathers and with the signatories of the Declaration of Independence. 
Finally, Attlee outlined a visionary but practical foreign policy which relied on 
sustaining capitalist forms of exchange: 
We believe that we cannot make a heaven in our own country and leave 
a hell outside. We believe this not only from the moral basis of our 
movement, which is based on the brotherhood of man without distinction 
of race or creed, but also from an entirely practical standpoint. We seek 
to raise the standard of life of our people. We can only do so by trading 
with the rest of the world, and as good traders we wish to have 
prosperous customers. 131 
Bevin was also wary of capitalists; however his eyes were fixed on developments 
in Europe. His appraisal of foreign policy in 1945 concluded that Europe may 
become the 'hunting ground' of bad capitalists, "with a low wage standard that 
would be a great danger to everybody else in Western industry". ' 32 After the 
announcement of the Schuman Plan, his beliefs showed little change, fearing it 
would develop towards the pre-war arrangement of cartelisation: restricting 
production to favour producer interests rather than those of workers. 133 The 
deterioration in relations between Britain and France also worried Bevin who 
sought to make the French authorities understand his idea of the "wider global 
131 'Prime Minister's Address before Congress' 13/11/45, from 
http: //www. ibiblio. org/plia/policy/post-war/451113a. htmi accessed 05/05/03 
132 LPCR (1945), p 116-8 
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potential of production and expanding markets rather than a protective intra- 
European affair which might look like a producers' cartel of regular production 
with falling demand". 134 In his last meeting as Foreign Secretary, Bevin reiterated 
the problems of pre-war European capitalism: "Pre-war experiences of German 
iron and steel cartels was bound to cause uneasiness about the ultimate effects of 
the arrangements now proposed". 135 It was a fear fed by reports from the British 
Ambassador in Paris, Oliver Harvey, that the French envisaged a 'Charlemagne's 
Europe' with the implication that it would lead to Catholic control rather than 
unity. 136 The supranational dimension clearly affected Bevin's belief in the need 
for defensive security, raising the question that, had the Schuman plan existed in 
1930, what would have happened to British coal in 1940? 137 
3.5 Modifications 
The dilemma Attlee and Bevin faced operated at two levels. First, in an 
absolute sense, Britain faced a dramatic reduction in available resources which 
awaited any incoming government in 1945. Second, this prompted modifications 
to the beliefs of both Attlee and Bevin, impacting upon their interpretations of 
democratic socialism and labourism respectively. In this section, we examine the 
ways in which the dilemma of reduced capabilities prompted Attlee and Bevin to 
modify their beliefs about Britain's interests. These changes are then contrasted 
with the ways in which other beliefs were buttressed. Finally, this section then 
133 PRO CAB 128/17,22/06/50 
134 PRO CAB 128/18,4/7/50 
135 PRO CAB 128/19,22/3/51 
136 PRO FO 371/89189, Oliver Harvey to Ernest Bevin, 16111150 
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deploys Bulpitt's measurements: the success of establishing political argument 
hegemony and the effectiveness of party management. 
The dilemma of reduced capabilities undermined ideas about Britain's 
international status. Attlee and Bevin modified their beliefs when identifying 
discrepant information and applying counter-strategies. They identified 
unparalleled American dominance, countering this threat to great power status 
with strategies such as linking Britain's international trading recovery to 
American financial assistance and the development of an independent atomic 
bomb. The weakness felt in Europe was identified as being unable to provide a 
decisive security solution. The strategy to counter this was to draw in American 
involvement, ultimately using the weight of the US and dominion power through 
Canada as the anchor of a powerful security buffer in NATO. In terms of Empire, 
both American pressure and internal nationalism provided the discrepant 
information; the strategies used to counter these were by granting independence to 
non-strategic or indefensible states while transforming the nature of relations into 
a politically weaker but still coherent Commonwealth. Finally the threat of 
capitalism was a fear as much related to Britain's weakened economic state as to 
the historical baggage of the Labour Party and was met by a direct appeal by 
Attlee to Congress. 
Reduced capabilities challenged the notion of Britain's great power status, 
forcing a re-conceptualisation rather than a rejection of its component parts. Great 
137 PRO FO 3 71/96343,23/8/51 
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power status can be broken into three constituent parts; economic, political and 
military, where the state in question has either superiority or parity. During the 
latter stages of the war, the attempt to re-establish Britain's great power status was 
defined by the idea of the 'Big Three'; Britain's place at both Yalta and Potsdam, 
accepting new responsibilities such as the administration of one of the German 
zones, and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. By 1945, Britain could 
claim to have ended the war with her Empire intact and thus, symbolically at least, 
emerged not only victorious in military terms, but also politically and with the 
foundations of economic recovery in place. 
The period of 1945-51 forced a redefinition of these constituent parts. For 
instance, while Attlee was apprehensive about the American possession of the 
atomic bomb, his decision to develop a British atomic bomb was couched in terms 
consistent with his belief that after Hiroshima atomic secrets had only a limited 
existence. Proliferation and the arbitrary use of nuclear weapons were his main 
fears. To this effect, he wrote to Truman in the summer of 1945 arguing the case 
that atomic bombs were to be used in securing peace alone. After months of 
seeking an answer, the non-committal response from Washington prompted the 
new belief that it was essential for Britain to develop its own bomb during the 
interim period until the UN could take control. Attlee's beliefs regarding nuclear 
weapons were therefore a modification of his long-held belief in internationalism. 
Inherent in this belief in internationalism was a leadership role for Britain, again 
supporting the concept of great power status and the ability to provide direction to 
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the future of an international organisation. To do this, Britain required a bomb, 
while in the interim period, it served to defend British interests as separate from 
America. 
Modifications of belief occurred over military power. The 'three pillar 
strategy' identified that access to the Middle East and its resources was of enough 
strategic importance to focus short to medium term defence policy. This reflected 
the wholesale application of cost-cutting to British foreign policy in both absolute 
financial terms and in associated potential risks that the government was prepared 
to accept. Cabinet debates focused on defence policy preceding the strategy and 
continuing after it; the level at which defence policy should be pitched, the range 
of time it should cover and its associated costs. It meant jettisoning non-strategic 
defence roles and politically problematic areas such as Palestine. This was the 
area of greatest difference between Bevin and Attlee; the former concerned with 
being able to demonstrate Britain's continued great power status while the latter 
fearful of the impact upon the domestic economy. Eventually, Bevin's position 
tipped the balance, while the Korean War sealed the Labour position on defence. 
The withdrawal of defensive troops in Greece and Turkey, the 
amalgamation of the British and American zones in Germany and referral of the 
Palestine question to the UN modified foreign policy by engaging American 
involvement in the direct security needs of Europe and to a lesser extent, the 
Middle East. In short, the more costly dimensions of international security in 
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which Britain was involved were transferred as much as possible to the US. 
Despite initially cool relations, the US presented an economic threat to Britain, 
while the Soviet Union was both an economic threat and a potential security 
threat. It proved a successful strategy in Europe as clear efforts were made to 
achieve defensive security with the Dunkirk Treaty and the Brussels Treaty. This 
was helped by the contraction of the British military presence in Europe and its 
supplanting by an American one, first with the Truman Doctrine and then with the 
establishment of NATO. Where this was less successful, for instance with the lack, 
of a clear American policy towards the Middle East, certainly with regards to 
Palestine, left Attlee frustrated. 138 
These modifications were complicated by the Labour Party's ambitious 
domestic agenda. Drawing in an American presence presupposed an adherence to 
the traditional British approach to the international economy. Here the 
government was at its most defensive on the one hand resisting any encroachment 
of its economic plans and traditional economic trading while on the other seeking 
to secure as safely as possible the domestic changes upon which it had been 
elected. While resistant to the idea of accepting the American loan for fear it 
would leave Britain subject to economic direction by the United States, Bevin 
modified this belief into accepting a relationship in which American help acted as 
a 'prop' to Britain's traditional trading patterns. American dominance in 
international relations remained a cause for concern in terms of domestic policy as 
indicated by Attlee's speech to congress in November 1945. When Parliament 
rridge, Attlee, pp249-267 
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voted on the issue in December 1945, Attlee allowed a free vote: both as a 
measure to express government resentment by abstentions and no votes and to 
demonstrate the full democratic process that the Labour Government was willing 
to allow. 
These examples show that Attlee and Bevin both sought only to modify 
their beliefs about strategies in order to maintain the wider belief in Britain's great 
power status. They may have engaged with a process of modifying the content of 
Britain as a great power, but did not challenge it as a concept. There were several 
reasons for this, both in terms of political ideology and practicality. Attlee's 
democratic socialist beliefs contained a pragmatic assessment of the future of the 
Labour Party's appeal, resting upon the twin concepts of patriotism and 
respectability. These were shared with Bevin who stated his intention to pursue a 
traditional foreign policy. Undoubtedly Attlee's avowed Victorianism did not 
envisage Britain without the Empire, it being a defining feature of Britain's 
international status throughout his life. 
There were also practical considerations in pursuing a respectable foreign 
policy such as reviving the British economy through re-establishing traditional 
commercial links with Dominion and colonial states. It also served to rebuff, if 
not fully pre-empt, criticism from the Conservative opposition. The idea of ending 
the defining characteristic of great power status was not only anathema to Attlee 
and Bevin, but to so-called 'radicalists' such as the Keep Left group. Although 
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Keep Left urged an independent foreign policy, independent from both American 
and Soviet influence, they never made it an exclusively euro-centric policy. The 
'Third Force' idea always envisaged the use of Empire and its extension to 
include remaining outposts of Continental empires both as the source of economic 
independence and for the social and economic improvement of colonial states. It 
was a vision framed in the belief of great power status. Finally, the idea of 
jettisoning the basis of economic recovery would not be entertained, being 
regarded as political suicide not only in its revolutionary implications, but in its 
unpatriotic symbolism. 
Finally, we turn to measurements of the success of Attlee and Bevin in 
securing support for their interpretations of foreign policy, beginning with party 
management. The main areas of conflict within the PLP arose over foreign and 
defence policy, with a consistent stream of dissent registered in voting practices of 
backbench MPs- 139 In meeting this criticism, Labour leaders had taken a step 
away from the experiences of the Second Labour Government in which 
MacDonald had denounced criticism as disloyalty. Instead, Alderman argues, "the 
Party leaders took a major step forward by according formal recognition to the 
respectability of criticism, acknowledging it to be their duty to meet it in good 
time rather than merely to suppress it". 140 The main priority, it was asserted, was 
the manner in which dissent was articulated: that it should be respectable and 
139 Alderman, 'Discipline in the PLT, p294 
140 Alderman, 'Discipline in the PLT, p295 
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follow the rules of debate rather than descend into the realms of personal mud- 
slinging. 
Change to accommodate this expression of individual opinion was 
formalised during the 1946 Labour Party Conference and consisted of two main 
reforms of the party machinery - one being a liaison committee and the other 
being the establishment of informal links between the party leaders and 
backbenchers over particular policy areas. The spur for change had been prompted 
by the heated debates over the Washington Loan agreement the previous 
December during which backbenchers were told no action would be taken against 
those voting against the government. In these early stages, the leaders resorted to 
calls of loyalty rather than discipline but by 1950, the slim majority implied a 
curtailment of this freedom of expression although Alderman notes that most MPs 
were happy to toe the Party line. 14 1 This was despite changes to the composition 
of the PLP. While trade union sponsored MPs constituted just over a quarter of 
the PLP in 1945, this had almost halved from its pre-war number in contrast to 
constituency sponsored professional MPs whose figures more than doubled in the 
same period to represent a third of the PLP. 142 Berrington argues that it was 
professional and university educated MPs who provided Bevin with the most 
criticism in contrast to the loyalty derived from union sponsored MPs. 143 
141 Alderman, 'Discipline in die PLP', p301 
142 Berrington, H (1973) Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons, 1945-55, Oxford: 
Pergamon Press, p3l-2 
143 Berrington, Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons, p35 
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Party management was clearly made easier by the size of the majority, and 
diffusing potential threats to the Party message. It also married the manifestation 
of dissent to the concept of respectability allowing Attlee and Bevin to 
demonstrate the wider appeal of the party to the electorate and its democratic 
credentials overseas while removing the sting of Tory criticism. In terms of 
political argument hegemony, the most important success needed was, within the 
Party, to maintain cohesiveness and support. With the emergence of Keep Left 
into an organised group, Bevin's first reaction at the Party Conference in May 
1947 was to accuse critics of his approach to foreign policy as stabbing him in the 
back, and challenged such disloyalty when in his years in the unions he was 
accustomed to the loyalty of the leaders and the rank and file. Arguably, this was 
the greatest conduit for political argument hegemony: the election and 
maintenance of a Labour Government had been an end in itself for many union 
leaders, thus support of foreign policy was happily left to the leaders. While this 
accounted for the labourist section of the PLP, the more intellectual members of 
Keep Left could only argue their case until the point of American involvement. 
Once Marshall Aid was announced, their dissent largely petered out. 
In maintaining the government's voice on foreign policy, the Party's 
national executive proved useful. Consisting of twenty-seven members, only two 
were from the left until 1948, which grew to four by 1950. While it was noted that 
from 1948 the party had shifted slightly to the right, the left wing members of the 
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NEC were useful in corralling any remaining dissent from the left. 144 Party 
management proved the more influential, with a shift towards the right by 
mainstream opinion, itself establishing hegemony within the Party over the 
political argument. 
The significance of these modifications of belief undertaken by Attlee and 
Bevin and the effects of this on the PLP were that by 1948, the nascent battle over 
the direction of foreign policy had been won. Attlee and Bevin had adopted the 
traditional approach to foreign policy, adding only changes of detail both in 
socialist content, and in terms of modifying their own beliefs. These changes had 
been accepted in large part by the party through methods of management rather 
than an overall argument hegemony. When the Schuman Plan was announced, 
this became important as it was left to Bevin and Attlee to determine the outcome 
of the political argument about engagement in the process. 
In terms of the concept of great power status, the Schuman Plan presented 
a dilemma in itself- the proposed loss of sovereignty, despite the assurances in the 
declaration that forms of ownership of production were not under threat, did not 
correspond to the definition acceptable to Attlee and Bevin. Keeping sovereignty 
intact was not a principle to which either Attlee or Bevin adhered; both were 
supportive of membership of the UN and NATO. However, the loss of 
sovereignty was to be traded for a benefit commensurate with great power status; 
" Rubinstein, D 'Socialism and the Labour Party: the Labour Left and Domestic Policy, 1945-50, 
from http: //www. wliatnextiournal. co. uk/Pages/History/Lableft. html accessed 3/7/05 
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a pre-eminent position within the UN or NATO satisfied this. While the UN was a 
truly international organisation, NATO was a regional grouping, the significant 
difference between NATO and the budding ECSC being the membership of the 
United States. Trading sovereignty in Europe over a goal that was imprecise over 
its future direction, proposed by a state which had witnessed repeated changes of 
government, and involving the future of a previously aggressive state, did not 
provide a convincing argument for its ability to provide commensurate benefits. 
The preference by Bevin at least for a free trade system rather than a customs 
union was due in part to the economic pressures facing Britain and the fear that 
engagement in such a proposal might further weaken the economy. Furthermore, 
despite American support for the idea, the very lack of a distinctive American 
presence stood in contrast to the policy pursued by Attlee and Bevin for the past 
four years. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has applied Bevir's interpretive theory to the Labour 
Government of 1945-51 and particularly its foreign policy. This was done-by 
tracing the conceptual and temporal links that tied Clement Attlee's beliefs to the 
tradition of democratic socialism and Ernest Bevin's beliefs to the tradition of 
Labourism. The dilemma of reduced capabilities was identified, showing that the 
economic impact of war outstripped the range of traditional geopolitical 
responses, forcing Attlee and Bevin to modify their beliefs. This process of 
modification was short-lived and retained within it several beliefs relating to great 
power status. Finally, it was argued that the modifications of belief that Attlee and 
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Bevin made were relatively successful so that by the time of the Schuman 
Declaration, the Party's beliefs were more stable and support for the declaration 
was more muted. 
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Chapter Four 
The Conservatives, 1945-1956 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we continue to apply Bevir's interpretative theory. 
Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden are selected as the key players involved in 
the strategic direction of Britain's foreign policy. It is argued that Churchill and 
Eden held beliefs expressive of the tradition of the conservative patriotic right. 
The dilemma Churchill and Eden faced was how to re-establish the traditional 
British foreign policy approach which existed before 1939. 
This chapter begins by tracing the links that tie Churchill and Eden to the 
tradition of the patriotic right. It then provides a historical summary of the 
period, 1945-1956. Churchill was the main determinant of Conservative foreign 
policy, articulating the 'three circles' concept while Eden implemented that 
vision. We examine the dilemma of re-establishing a traditional foreign policy 
and the impact of this upon their beliefs through modification. Finally we 
examine the effect of Churchill and Eden's articulations on party management 
and the political argument. 
4.2 Elite Beliefs 
In Chapter two, we identified the traditional patriotic right, economic 
liberalism, paternalistic Whigs and the progressives as traditions constitutive of 
the Conservative Party. In foreign policy beliefs, these were expressive of: the 
continued need to maintain historic and imperial links, buttressed, on the part of 
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the patriotic right, by a robust defence of sovereignty; the limited role of the 
state on the part of economic liberalism; for the paternalistic Whigs some state 
role at home and abroad without the corrosiveness to sovereignty of integration; 
and finally, the progressive tradition which believed in social and economic 
benefits from some degree of pooled sovereignty. 
4.2.1 Winston Spencer Churchill' 
The son of Randolph Churchill and grandson of the seventh Duke of 
Marlborough, Winston Churchill was educated at Harrow and Sandhurst, joining 
the army in 1895. Active in the Boer War, he was also a journalist. He was 
elected Conservative MP for Oldham 1895-1906, then Liberal MP for 
Manchester North West until 1908, then for Dundee until 1922, in Epping as a 
Constitutionalist from 1924-193 1, then as a Conservative until 1945. From 1945- 
1964, Churchill was the Conservative MP for Woodford. His career in 
Parliament began as Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) for the Colonies 1905-7, 
President of the Board of Trade 1908-1910, Home Secretary in 1911, First Lord 
of the Admiralty from 1911-1915, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in 
1915, Minister of Munitions from 1917-1919 and Secretary for War 1918-1921. 
in the interwar period, he was Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1921- 
1922, then Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1924-1929. After a period out of 
office, Churchill was made First Lord of the Admiralty at the outbreak of war, 
before becoming Prime Minister and Minister of Defence from 1940-1945. 
' Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill, 1874-1965 
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Leader of the Opposition from 1945-195 1, he became Prime Minister again from 
2 1951 until his retirement in 1955. 
When we trace Churchill's beliefs, we can identify four conceptual and 
temporal links to the tradition of the patriotic right: the role of Churchill's father, 
the value of history to the making of Churchill, early beliefs in domestic affairs 
and early foreign policy beliefs. 
First, the influence of Churchill's father came through in his personality 
and the impact of his early death. Described as brash in his personality, 
Randolph was also a political opportunist with a career embodying dramatic 
3 
shifts over the franchise and Home Rule. A member of the 'Fourth Party', a 
ginger group vociferously critical of the Liberal government and of the 
Conservative front bench, Randolph was a powerful orator. He demonstrated an 
independent conservatism which Churchill would echo later in his career. The 
founder of Tory Democracy, 4 Randolph's values were traditional, rather than 
entirely progressive, seeking to increase and entrench Conservative support. 
Jenkins claims that Randolph's early death meant Winston's "desire to cut a 
figure" was motivated by a fear he too would die young. 5 
Secondly, Churchill undertook four points of personal development: 
devouring the works of Gibbon and Macaulay, arch-imperialist historians; 
2 Eccleshall and Walker, Biographical Dictionary ofBritish Prime Ministers, p295 
' Jenkins, R (200 1) Churchill, Basingstoke: Macmillan, p 11 
4 Tory Democracy was a response to the 1867 Reform Bill doubling the size of the electorate and 
was a means of appealing to new voters without needing to commit to social reforms. Its effect 
was minimal. 
'Jenkins, Churchill, p 18 
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analysing Parliamentary facts; military training and j ournalism; and nurturing his 
link with America. The influence of Gibbon and Macaulay is clear in Churchill's 
style of oratory and writing. 6 With a view to political office, he also read the 
Annual Register, digesting political facts from the time of his birth. What 
Jenkins describes as 'cutting a figure' before death, Churchill called achieving 
6personal distinction', with the House of Commons as the platform for his public 
speaking. Indeed, for Churchill, it was less what Gibbon had to say than the 
manner in which he said it that mattered. 7 Establishing his personal charisma and 
political style were clear markers for Churchill, reminiscent of his father's 
success. Further early influences on Churchill were combining his nascent 
writing skills with his military training to explore troubled parts of the Empire 
during which he met Bourke Cockran. An American Democrat turned 
Republican, Cockran's influence was at least twofold: he introduced the young 
Churchill to the excitement of New York, and he provided a further template for 
Churchill's own oratorical desires. 8 
Third, Churchill's early domestic policy beliefs coalesced around three 
related points: Rowntree's study on poverty; the nouveau riche industrialists of 
the Edwardian era as a malign influence; and protectionism. 9 Churchill's early 
association with the Liberals was with the 'little Englander' section, in part the 
legacy of his father's progressivism and a reaction to the contemporary domestic 
6 Jenkins, Churchill, p25 
' Moran, Lord (1966) Winston Churchill: The Struggle For Survival, 1940-1965, London: Heron 
Books, p 123,779 
' Jenkins, Churchill, p29; Churchill even made reference to Cockran in his Fulton Speech. See 
http: //www. ena. lu? lanR=2&doc=13720 accessed 05/11/2004 
9 Jenkins, Churchill, p85 
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situation. 10 The social reform agenda and the emergence of the Labour Party 
prompted Churchill to define his beliefs. "Socialism" he argued "seeks to pull 
down wealth" while "Liberalism seeks to raise up poverty". While "Socialism 
would destroy private interests, Liberalism would preserve private interests ... by 
reconciling them with the public right". Finally, "Socialism would kill 
enterprise" whereas "Liberalism would rescue enterprise from the trammels of 
privilege and preference. "" Simplified as these points were, his critics portrayed 
Churchill as ndve, Beatrice Webb commenting "such ideas as he has are a good 
jumble of old-fashioned Radicalism and mere Toryism; at present wishing to be 
advanced, old-fashioned Radicalism is in the ascendant". 12 He developed some 
supply-side economic beliefs, but his social reforms remained ultimately driven 
by a patrician style. 13 Radicalism was present in political beliefs, calling for 
abolition of the House of Lords and desiring equality while retaining absolute 
deference for the institution of the monarchy. 14 
Fourth, Churchill's foreign policy beliefs became more muscular as the 
threat of war increased. His shift to the Liberal Party in 1904 stemmed from his 
frustration at the Conservative failure to appreciate this danger. 15 His early 
statements contained two beliefs: in case of war, Britain should ally with France 
against Germany and not opt for neutrality, but equally that Britain should not 
seek a war either. 16 Once at war, Churchill's "big-navy policy ... became central 
Jenkins, Churchill, p94 
Manchester Guardian, 5/05/190 8 quoted in Jenkins, Churchill, p 132 
12 N. and J. McKenzie, (eds) (1983-4) Diary of Beatrice Webb, London: Virago, vol. 11, p287, 
326 and vol. III, plOO 
" Jenkins, Churchill, p151-2. Although Jenkins also remarks that this is true of most social 
reformers from Chamberlain to Bevan. 
" Jenkins, Churchill, p 168,173 
15 Churchill, W. S. (1930) My EarlyLife, p383 
16 Jenkins, Churchill, p211-2 
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to his whole political identity". 17 Underlying this policy was Churchill's firm 
belief in the requirement of Empire, remarking "The British navy is to us a 
necessity ... Our naval power involved British existence ... the whole fortunes of 
our race and Empire.. -it is the British navy that makes Great Britain a great 
power". 18 
Churchill's war experiences were chequered, being deemed responsible 
for the failure at the Dardanelles and adventurism in his support for the White 
Army in Russia's civil war. 19 He later rejected the Locarno Treaty not as a pact 
of mutual security but as an entangling commitment, preferring to leave France 
to "stew in her own juice". 20 He was supportive of the idea of European unity as 
early as 1930, recognising the failure of Versailles to halt the emnity between 
France and Germany. 21 Ostracised over his rejection of self-government in India, 
Churchill aligned with die-hard imperialists. He moderated his position, 
softening his rhetoric on India, supporting the League of Nations and the need 
for an armed defence of collective security. Becoming leader of the coalition 
government in 1940, Churchill's policy was to avoid losing the Empire and to 
return the country in the same state as it was in 1939 at least geo-politically. 
However, "Churchill's willingness to sacrifice all to defeat Germany did not 
necessarily serve the best interests of Britain as a world power" argues one 
17 Jenkins, Churchill, p222 
" Churchill, R. (1969), Winston S. Churchill, London: Heinemann, vol. 2, p563; Jenkins, 
Churchill, p236-7 
" Churchill is blamed for pushing a solely naval-based solution and a failure to coordinate 
ground troops into effective planning resulting in a late addition of troops who were felled 
almost immediately. Blame is heightened further since both Kitchener and Fisher had serious 
misgivings about Churchill's approach. 
20 Attributed to Churchill, Jenkins, Churchill, p398 
" Young, This Blessed Plot, p 10 
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commentator who concedes that "the strategic realities of Britain's position were 
out of Churchill's control". 22 
4.2.2 Anthony Eden 23 
Educated at Eton and Christ Church College, Oxford, Eden came from a 
minor aristocratic family in the North East. His background was naturally 
conservative with a devout Anglican mother and atheist father. Elected MP for 
Warwick and Leamington in 1923 until he retired in 1957, Eden's Parliamentary 
career began as Private Secretary to the PUS at the Home Office from 1924- 
1926, then to the same post in the Foreign office in 1926, Parliamentary Private 
Secretary to the Foreign Secretary in 1927, he became PUS at the Foreign 
Office, 1931-1933. Lord Privy Seal from 1933-1935, Eden was briefly the 
Minister without Portfolio for the League of Nations Affairs before becoming 
Foreign Secretary from 1935 until 1938. With the outbreak of war, Eden was the 
Secretary of State at the Dominions Office until 1940 before a brief tenure as 
Secretary of State for War and then Foreign Secretary from 1940 until 1945, 
retaining the position in opposition and again, once in office from 1951 to 1955 
before finally becoming Prime Minister in 1955, then resigning in 1957 in the 
wake of the Suez crisis of 1956.24 
In tracing Eden's beliefs, we can identify four points that link him to the 
tradition of the patriotic right: the importance of World War One in shaping 
Eden's political desires; the patriotic defence of British interests in his maiden 
" Eccleshall and Walker, Dictionary ofPrime Ministers, p301 
23 Robert Anthony Eden, 1897-1977 
24 Eccleshall and Walker, Dictionary ofPrime Ministers, p315 
135 
Conservatives, 1945-1956 
speech; his encounter with the realpolitik of the 1930s; and his opposition to 
appeasement. 
Alert to politics from the age of eleven, Eden's political beliefs were 
shaped most by his experiences in the First World War by military service in 
Passchendaele and the Somme. 25 So when Eden sought a life in politics after the 
war, "his motivation was simple. The experience of war, and the close 
companionship he had forged with all classes of soldiers, had brought home to 
him more vividly than life at Windlestone [the family home] ever could, the true 
state of what Disraeli called 'the condition of England' and had developed in 
him a sense of responsibility for his country's welfare". 26 Eden's volatility is 
17 
attributed to his father's own mood swings. An aesthete and cultured Eden had 
a love of literature and languages which would develop into an academic interest 
in oriental languages and literature at university. 28 
As for many of his peers, the War was a deeply influential period shaping 
beliefs and attitudes Eden was to hold for the rest of his life. 29 "In war he had 
learned about the precarious demands of leadership... and he had learned that 
executive responsibility was best fulfilled through practical attention to detail 
[mistrusting] instant solutions, particularly the panaceas of political leaders". 30 It 
was a theme which imbued Eden's maiden speech on the subject of adequate 
25 He was deeply affected, also by the fact that two of his brothers were killed in action and his 
father also died during the war. 
2' Thorpe, D. R. (2003) Eden: The Life and Times of Anthony Eden, First Earl of Avon, 1897- 
1977, London: Chatto and Windus, p4l 
27 Thorpe, Eden, p17-21 
28 Thorpe, Eden, p47 
2' Eden, A (1976) Another World, 1897-1917, London: Allen Lane; Thorpe, Eden, p3 
30 Thorpe, Eden, p42 
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military provisions and established him as a patriotic defender of the British 
interest. His progressive views on domestic policy were rewarded with his first 
political appointment. Based on the belief that the Conservatives needed to take 
a more progressive line with the rise of Labour and the fall of the Liberals, he 
endorsed a property-owning democracy as the Conservative's answer to 
Socialism. 31 
Eden's beliefs were influenced by the realpolitik of the interwar years. A 
pupil of the diplomacy of fellow Francophile, Austen Chamberlain, Eden felt 
Anglo-French understanding was the key to maintaining political stability in 
Europe. 32 His beliefs also developed about the League of Nations. Initially 
cautious, the invasion of Manchuria by Japan in September 1931 meant Eden 
modified his beliefs over the need for the League. He thought it would be an 
impotent entity without American involvement. Above all, Eden thought the 
League imperative to the defence of British interests. Whereas Europe was 
committed to operating within the conventions of the League, America was 
adding pressure which eventually led to an open rebuff from Eden in a speech in 
February 1932. The episode revealed to Eden the need to base foreign policy on 
long term British interests, and that only through the League were those interests 
best served. 
33 
Eden made two important political friendships: to the arch-imperialist 
'Bobbety' Cranbourne and Jim Thomas, the three resigning together over 
31 Thorpe, Eden, p58-68; Eden's belief in the concept of a property-owning democracy owed 
much to Noel Skelton who had developed the idea, in Thorpe, Eden, p82,98 
32 Thorpe, Eden, p 102 
33 Thorpe, Eden, pl 14-7 
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Munich. 34 An exploratory tour of Europe in 1934 with a British Memorandum 
on disarmament led nowhere but Eden's beliefs crystallised seeing French 
political disorganisation, German militarism and the Italian obsession with 
Germany. 35 As British representative to the League of Nations Eden was a key 
voice within the Goverment over how best to avoid a future conflict. He 
dismissed pacifist or sanction-based solutions, preferring to negotiate from 
strength and so supporting rearmament. 36 His resignation came as Chamberlain 
practised personal diplomacy at odds with official policy. A fillip to Eden's 
position was that it was shared by Roosevelt. 37 
Eden and Churchill were unlikely political partners having shared little in 
common before the formation of the National Government. 38 War meant they 
shared the same beliefs about the need to maintain British interests as the 
cornerstone to maintaining British power but existing differences only increased 
over time most notably over America. Churchill brokered the lend-lease deal 
while Eden felt that "the common language should not delude the British into 
believing that the Americans also had common interests. He was wary of the 
price the Americans might eventually exact from Britain for their SUpport.,, 39 
Churchill's wartime strategy, lack of preparation over Yalta, and the exclusion 
of France from the talks all horrified Eden. 40 
34 'Bobbety' Cranboume was later Lord Salisbury; Thorpe, Eden, p125-6 
33 Thorpe, Eden, pp 130-5 
36 Thorpe, Eden, p 13 9,154 
31 Thorpe, Eden, P194-206 
38 Thorpe, Eden, P109 
39 Thorpe, Eden, p270 
40 Thorpe, Eden, p271,303,307. In fairness, Roosevelt had vetoed the French from attending 
Yalta and Churchill acquiesced, despite Eden's beliefs that it was crucial for French involvement 
in a peace process which would intimately affect them. 
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In assessing both Churchill and Eden up to 1945, it is possible to trace 
their beliefs to a tradition of the patriotic right, though their manifestations were 
different. Both were deeply patriotic and aware of their nation's inheritance. 
Churchill's expression of his patriotism was founded on a romanticised view of 
the role of Empire whereas Eden's was based on a pragmatic assessment of 
British economic and strategic needs. Churchill's beliefs regarding America and 
its intentions were more benevolent whereas Eden's were reflective of 
realpolitik, feeling that Britain should concede as little ground to other states as 
possible. Finally, over Europe, Churchill's approach was didactic, preferring to 
offer inspiration to the concerted effort for a workable solution. Eden, in 
contrast, was distinctly more pragmatic, becoming involved in the process. 
Having established the roots of Churchill and Eden's beliefs in foreign affairs, 
we now turn to establishing the historical context of the period under analysis. 
4.3 The Historical Setting 
The period can be broadly split in two, marking the periods of dominance 
by Churchill first and Eden second. Churchill set the agenda for retaining as 
traditional a role in foreign policy as possible by conceding ground to the Labour 
Government's domestic policy agenda. The Conservatives responded to electoral 
defeat with internal party reform, creating a clear policy research role and 
rearticulating the Party's principles of thought. One Nation Toryism defined the 
progressive direction of the Party, while in international affairs Churchill 
capitalised on his wartime role. With Churchill performing the role of trailblazer 
in expressing Party beliefs, Eden's role was limited to that of enforcer and so the 
Cold War and Imperial context in which this occurred is important. 
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4.3.1 The Domestic Situation 
Defeat in 1945 prompted questions over party organisation and the lack 
of a political programme. As commented upon at the time, "[T]he Conservatives 
lacked a doctrine. It was fatal that they lacked a method toovi. 4 1 RAB Butler was 
made chair of the Conservative Research Department (CRD) and charged with 
42 
co-ordinating the Conservative Party's domestic policy revival. He did this by 
creating the Conservative Political Centre (CPC) whose aims were to foster 
knowledge among the activists of party policy and a flow back of ideas to keep 
the Party in step with grassroots thinking. He also instigated the rearticulation of 
party principles and a root and branch reorganisation of the Party. This made it 
more meritocratic by changing its funding methods, linked the Conservative and 
the National Liberal parties at constituency level, 43 and democratised candidate 
selection 44 with the end result accounting for an estimated third of the Tory 
recovery by 1951 . 
45 He appointed Quentin Hogg to rearticulate party principles 
published as The Conservative Case. 46 By raising Disraeli's profile, the 
Conservatives were equated with a more inclusive form of Toryism. 47 While 
proposing the organic theory of society, Hogg was keen to identify strongly with 
those totems of conservative tradition such as Church, liberty and industry. 
There were, despite the appearance of consensus, very different motivations 
41 Bum, W. L. (1947) 'The General Election in Retrospect', The Nineteenth Century and After, 
CXLII, p 18 
42 Butler, RAB (1902-1982) was in the Baldwin tradition of paternalism. Key assistants to 
Butler, his 'backroorn boys' included Enoch Powell, lain Macloed, and Reginald Maudling. See 
Charmley, Conservative Politics, p125; Butler, RAB (1971) The Art of the Possible, London: 
Hamish Hamilton, p140-1 
43 The Woolton-Teviot Agreement of 1947 
44 The Maxwell Fyfe Committee Report, 1948 
45 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, p5 
46 Hailsham, Viscount (1959) The Conservative Case Middlesex: Penguin Books 
47 Hailsharn, The Conservative Case, p20,35 
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behind the One Nation Toryism that emerged in the late 1940s and the 
nationalisation programme of the Labour Government. The success of this 
rearticulation was sealed with the emergence in 1951 of the One Nation Group. 48 
This was the outward manifestation of a subtle shift in party power 49 to those 
who had only experienced war, appeasement and the slump before it. 50 
Once in Government emergency measures were initially used, 1953 
being the first time tax cuts in income and purchase tax were introduced and 
excess profits tax abolished. 51 Rationing ended, the economy improved, while 
decontrol and intervention were watchwords of the Tory administration, through 
the denationalisation of road haulage and steel and iron, and the promise to build 
300,000 new houses. 52 Industrial relations were generally good with an overt 
policy of conciliation. 
4.3.2 The International Situation 
In The Case for Conservatism Hogg identified the constitutive parts of 
British greatness as follows: "The material factors which have made for our 
success are our geographical position, our power at sea, our commercial wealth, 
and our Commonwealth and Empire. " Linking the past with the future, he added 
"Conservatives are proud of .. all these assets, and they do not think it unworthy 
" Walsha R (2000) 'The One Nation Group: A Tory Approach to Backbench Politics and 
Organisation, 1950-55', in Twentieth Century British History, vol. 11.2, ppl 83-214 
49 Largely as a result of the Tory Reform Group (TRG). A small ginger group born during the 
war, it consisted of the rising stars of conservative politics who would beat the progressive drum 
during the next two decades in domestic politics. In foreign policy, its composition of largely 
leftward leaning MPs meant they were generally open to the idea of Europe, but affiliated more 
to the paterrialist-whig tradition. See Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, p45; Turner, The Tories and 
Europe, p27 
" Charmley, J (1996) A History of Conservative Politics, 1900-1996, New York: St. Martin's 
Press, p 123 
51 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, p24 8 
52 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, p25 6 
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signalled the end of seventy years of a British role in Egypt. It provoked a 
rebellion from the right in Parliament, challenging this act as one of 
appeasement. The formation of the Suez Group embodied the anti-appeasement 
argument. When Nasser nationalised the Canal in July 1956, pressure to react 
came from the Suez Group but the crisis spanned several months as several 
diplomatic solutions were proposed. Finally, in October 1956 a covert agreement 
was made at S6vres between Britain, France and Israel. It was agreed that Israel 
would attack Egypt. This would be followed by an ultimatum presented by the 
French and British. The failure to meet this would result in military intervention 
ostensibly to separate the warring factions but in reality to reclaim the Canal 
Zone. Receiving almost universal conde=ation over the action, speculative 
pressure on Sterling forced a ceasefire and Eden eventually resigned. 56 
In Cold War politics, the explosion of the atomic bomb in 1952 presaged 
Britain's decision to manufacture the hydrogen bomb. Churchill aimed to 
convene one last superpowers' meeting after Stalin's death in March 1953 but 
was frustrated by the United States. Continued competition for spheres of 
influence between the two superpowers meant security arrangements between 
the US, Australia and New Zealand forming ANZUS in 1951 and the South East 
57 
Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954. The Middle East increasingly 
became the ideological battleground of the Cold War with the Baghdad Pact of 
56 Brown, G (1972) In My Way, London: Penguin, p55; Thorpe, D. R. (1989) Selwyn Lloyd, 
London: Jonathan Cape, p202; Butler Art of the Possible, p 183; Brown, In My Way, p55; 
Nicholson, N (ed) (2005) The HaroldNicholson Diaries, 1907-1964, London: Phoenix, p448, 
449 
57 SEATO contained the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan 
Thailand and the Philippines. 
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1955 containing Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan while in February 1956, the 
Washington Declaration affirmed Anglo-American policy in the Middle East. 
4.4 tlite Beliefs and Tradition Change 
Churchill and Eden identified the dilemma of re-establishing Britain's 
traditional foreign policy role. This meant reviving Empire and Commonwealth 
relations, restoring trade links through Imperial Preference and reasserting the 
role of Sterling as an international currency. It also meant maintaining an 
influence in strategically and economically important regions such as the Middle 
East, South East Asia and Europe. Through these undertakings, beliefs 
consistent with the tradition of the patriotic right were being articulated. Changes 
created by war provoked a dilemma in that pursuing this traditional approach to 
foreign policy became increasingly difficult. In turn it prompted questions about 
Conservative beliefs about Empire, Britain's role in the world political economy 
and conceptions of national sovereignty and identity. 
4.4.1 Identifying the Dilemma 
Churchill and Eden accepted and responded to the dilemma of re- 
establishing a traditional foreign policy by articulating the "three circles" 
concept. This concept meant redefining Britain's relations with each circle: 
Empire, America and Europe. It was an approach aimed at sustaining the notion 
of Britain as a great power and attempting to forge the basis of the post-war 
relationship with each of the three circles. Strategies to achieve this were the 
attempts to establish in peace the Atlantic Alliance forged in war; to carve out a 
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leadership role in Europe; and to define Britain as the head of a flourishing 
Empire and Commonwealth. We now examine these in turn. 
4.4.1.1 Re-establishing the Atlantic Alliance 
The tactics used by Churchill to re-establish the Atlantic Alliance were 
threefold: firstly, he resorted to fear of communism and the Soviet Union. 
Secondly, he highlighted the cultural similarities and shared language of both 
nations. Thirdly, he made a direct appeal to America not to return to isolation. 
In March 1946, Churchill delivered his Fulton Speech. Invited by 
President Truman, it was expected he would deliver a speech based on 
reminiscences, but instead delivered a "single-shot salvo [behind which] he 
decided to put a great weight of explosive". 58 Called the 'Sinews of Peace', 
Churchill's speech at Fulton came on the heels of a souring of relations between 
Britain and the United States in the immediate peace. Fearful of being alienated 
as an equal player, Churchill's speech can be seen as an attempt to address this 
imbalance by reframing the dangers of communism. Reminding his audience 
that Communism was an expansionary force, the only solution was a concerted 
western alliance. As the two most powerful states in this western alliance it 
followed that an Anglo-American Alliance should constitute its core. Churchill 
went on: 
What then is the overall strategic concept which we should inscribe 
today? It is nothing less than the safety and welfare, the freedom and 
progress, of all the homes and families of all the men and women in the 
lands". [The most effective method] of realising our overall strategic 
" Jenkins, Churchill, p8 10 
145 
Conservatives, 1945-1956 
concept [is) what I have called the fraternal association of the English- 
speaking peoples. 59 
At the core of the Atlantic-Alliance was the notion of fraternity; a 
cultural and linguistic connection rooted in defensive needs. It meant "a special 
relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United 
States. Fraternal association requires not only a growing friendship and mutual 
understanding between our two vast and kindred systems of society, but the 
continuance of the intimate relationship between our military advisors". 60 
Churchill added, "let no man underrate the abiding power of the British Empire 
and Commonwealth" before linking it to the United States: 
If the population of the English-speaking Commonwealth be added to 
that of the United States with all that such co-operation implies ... in 
moral force, there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to 
offer its temptation to ambition and adventure. On the contrary, there 
will be an overwhelming assurance of security. " 
For Churchill, the long-term logical and ultimate conclusion to such an alliance 
was shared citizenship between the two countries. 
By re-articulating Britain's identity in the world, Churchill was 
identifying a common enemy; the antithetical system of society which operated 
under Communism and its expansive potential. It was a direct appeal to 
protecting the 'American way of life' and yet drew into that image those shared 
elements of identity with Britain: language; the fraternity of a linked past and the 
intimacy of recent wartime relations. By tying together the United States and 
" Churchill, The Sinews ofPeace, quoted from a copy of the Fulton speech in Chandos 114/5, 
Churchill College Archive, Cambridge 
60 Fulton speech in Chandos 114/5, Churchill College Archive, Cambridge 
61 Fulton speech in Chandos 114/5, Churchill College Archive, Cambridge; Jenkins, Churchill, 
P810 
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Britain, Churchill was identifying fears that required resolution if the process of 
re-articulating a British globa i entity was to proceed. 
The chief fear in Britain was a repeat of American isolationism after 
World War One. Identifying the United States as at the "pinnacle of world 
power" and linking this to "an awe-inspiring accountability to the future', 62 
created the sense of moral obligation, preventing a return to self-sufficiency. 
Churchill concluded: "Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by 
closing our eyes to them. They will not be removed by a policy of appeasement", 
which was as much of a parting shot at the Americans as to the Conservatives at 
home. Protection from "war and tyranny" was why Britain and America had 
fought World War Two, but the future lay in the United Nations. The success of 
that future through the United Nations, Churchill implied, hinged on the role 
Britain, through her Commonwealth and Empire, was to play. 63 
The reaction to Churchill's speech was cool from all quarters: the 
American press was hostile to Churchillian sabre rattling; British opinion was 
underwhelmed, not sharing the same positive outlook about American intentions 
as ascribed by Churchill; Stalin responded to Churchill's "racial theory" by 
recognising it as an ultimatum to "those nations who do not speak English 
recognise our supremacy over you and all will be wellii. 
64 
This provoked a dilemma in itself. For Churchill's beliefs about Britain 
in the world to succeed, it required a degree of American assent and support. 
62 Fulton speech in Chandos 114/5, Churchill College Archive, Cambridge 
63 Fulton speech in Chandos 11415, Churchill College Archive, Cambridge 
64 Gilbert, Churchill, VII, p2l I 
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This was countered in four significant ways: first, Churchill's speech in Zurich 
resulted in a more favourable reaction which in turn provided positive feedback 
from the American administration; secondly, the emergence of clearer divisions 
between East and West proved Churchill's prophecy and created a change in 
reaction; thirdly, the announcement of Marshall Aid provided the essential sign 
for Churchill to announce his 'three circles' vision in 1948; and finally, the 
founding of NATO in 1949 provided confinnation of that vision. 
Continuity of belief was evident in the 1951 election manifesto in which 
the Conservative priorities were listed in order of importance: the safety of 
Empire and Commonwealth followed by the cohesion of "English-speaking 
peoples" and only when these foundations were satisfied was Europe 
mentioned. " The manifesto went on to elaborate, arguing that peace was only 
possible with firm defence and a strong foreign policy. Reiterating the need for 
close transatlantic ties, it went on: 
In a world threatened by Soviet imperialism, the surest hope for peace 
must lie in the close association of the British Empire and 
Commonwealth and the United States of America ... under the Atlantic 
Pact ... we shall make a full contribution of arms and men ... Defence in 
depth in Europe is essential to the defence of Britain. 66 
Echoing these themes again in a speech to Congress in January 1952, Churchill 
related the importance attached by Bismarck to the shared language of Britain 
and America and urged the two countries to "tread the same path" . 
67 
65 http: //www. psr. keele. ac. uklarea/uk/man/con5 I. htm accessed 02/11/2004 
66 The Conservative Party (195 1) Britain Strong and Free, London: Conservative Central Office, 
p8 
67 Churchill, W. S. (1953) Stemming the Tide, London: Cassell, p220-7 
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Eden's beliefs differed, not sharing Churchill's expansiveness and more 
concerned with creating a unified position regarding European defence. 
Suspicious of American motives, he rebuffed perceived attempts by the 
American administration to direct Britain towards Europe. Noting the Atlantic 
Community, which without loss of sovereignty was "achieving increasing unity 
of purpose and action" and the European Community which was "moving 
towards political federation", he concluded that neither were mutually 
exclusive. 68 It was possible to play intrinsic roles in each, affirming Churchill's 
position. However, Eden had qualms about those relations in practice; the fear 
remained that if Britain was to take the lead fully in Europe, America would 
disengage. Creating an American presence in NATO was a success but Eden 
feared British involvement in the European Defence Community (EDC) would 
result in a weakening of America's commitment to the Continent. It also implied 
accepting a change of perspective about Britain's identity in the world which ran 
contrary to the three circles idea. A speech by Eden outlined his views on the 
triangular relationship between Britain, America and Europe: 
The American and British peoples should each understand the strong points 
in the other's national character. If you drive a nation to adopt procedures 
which run counter to its instincts, you weaken and may destroy the motive 
force of its action ... This is something you would not wish to do ... to an ally 
on whose effective co-operation we depend ... You will realise that I am 
speaking of the frequent suggestions that the United Kingdom should join a 
federation on the continent of Europe. This is something which we know, 
in our bones, we cannot do. 69 
" Eden, 15/02/1952, CAB 129/49, PRO 
69 Eden, speech at Colombia University, 11/0 1/ 1952, quoted in Thorpe, Eden, p3 68 
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Eden's beliefs differed little from the official Foreign Office view whose policy 
was to restate the three circles, note obstacles to creating federation not least 
experienced in America, and show a dislike for American interference with the 
4political destinies' of other countries. 70 It was defensive, not least since the 
American position supported, as integral to the Special Relationship, the 
continuation of the Commonwealth for strengthening Western Europe. 71 
4.4.1.2 Establishing leadership in Europe 
Churchill articulated a vision of leadership in Europe in three ways. First, 
he linked Europe with the 'circles', thus reformulating the traditional concept of 
the balance of power. Secondly, he connected the idea of Britain's participation 
in maintaining European security through the stability afforded by the 
Commonwealth. Thirdly, he attempted to steer the debate over the future of 
Europe in a way sympathetic to British needs. 
At Zurich in September 1946, Churchill identified the need for France 
and Germany to be equal partners in the economic and political revival of 
Europe. It provided France with the means to recover the "moral and cultural 
leadership of Europe". Complementary to the United Nations, Churchill 
continued: 
I believe that the larger synthesis can only survive if it is founded upon 
broad, natural groupings ... we British have our own Commonwealth of 
Nations [which strengthens] the world organisation ... a European 
group ... could give a sense of enlarged patriotism and citizenship to the 
distracted peoples of this mighty continent. 72 
70DBPO(1986) Foreign Office, 20/12/195 1, series Il, vol. III, pp 1191 
71 FRUS (1950) vol 3, pp874-5 
72 Churchill's Zurich speech, http: //www. ena. lu/mce. cfm accessed 05/11/2004 
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By comparing Europe and the Commonwealth, it both legitimised the strategic 
idea of regional groupings and brought coherence to international organisations 
like the UN. 
It was a paternalistic vision which recurred in the following years. First 
at a speech to the Primrose League in April 1947 in which he proclaimed "Let 
Europe Arise", and then at The Hague Congress in 1948.73 He called on the 
4great powers' to support this fledgling idea: "Great Britain, the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America- and I trust Soviet Russia, for then 
indeed all will be well - must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe and 
must champion its right to live". 74 A legitimate European grouping was 
articulated in terms modelled on the Commonwealth and Empire grouping. The 
British role was replicated: offering leadership in a hierarchical system. 
Churchill's beliefs about Britain's identity were clear; there was no role 
for Britain as an equal player within this process of unity. Britain had her 
4natural' grouping, as did the United States. Unity was important to resist 
external pressures. Using the language of a 'kind of United States of Europe' 
served to reinforce the idea of a third, independent, but ideationally similar 
regional force. Integral to Churchill's beliefs was the concept of inter- 
relatedness: the impact of states and situations upon others. On a long-term 
peace in Europe he remarked "it would be a milestone ... not only of Europe, but 
Young, Blessed Plot, p 18-20 
Churchill's Zurich speech, http: //www. ena. Iti/mce. cfm accessed 05/11/2004 
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of the world, because we must remember how everything is connected with 
,, 75 everything else. 
This was modified when Sterling was devalued in 1949. In public the 
Party supported "all practical measures to promote closer European Unity, 
consistent with the full maintenance of the British Empire ... and the continuing 
collaboration of the United States". 76 In private, it was hoped devaluation could 
mean tying together Britain, Western Europe and the Sterling Area. Britain 
could not compete with America even with the Empire but might if the Sterling 
Area were linked with Western Europe. 77 This led one enthusiastic supporter to 
write "[T]he Imperial-European marriage, spectacular and even paradoxical as it 
may seem at first sight, is the new idea which provides the hope of an ultimate 
solution ... It appeals to traditional 
Conservative loyalties: it appeals to the great 
,, 78 body of 'liberal' and idealist opinion. 
Third, the federalism debate in Europe had the potential to create a 
closed system and a third force. Both of these possibilities were antithetical to 
Churchill's vision which is why, despite attacking the Labour Goverment for its 
poor response to the Schuman Plan, the Conservatives couched their responses 
solely in terms of intergovernmental measures. Strategically, Churchill preferred 
the direction of the United Europe Movement (UEM) . 
79 The UEM's main goal 
75 Hansard, (1946-7) Parliamentary Debates, vol. 430, cols. 945, cot. 22-3 
76 DNSD 9/3/2 pt 1, Conservative Party Conference, Empress Hall, London 13/10/1949, 
Churchill College, Cambridge 4D 
77 DNSD 9/3/2/ pt I Sandys to Churchill, 24/09/1949, Churchill College, Cambridge 
78 Probably Churchill, DNSD 9/3/2 pt I Undated, unnamed, made in reference to general election 
?ý rospects, October 1949, Churchill College, Cambridge 
9 Established in May 1947 as a result of Churchill's Zurich speech by his son-in-law, Duncan 
Sandys, and paved the way for the Hague Congress in 1948 
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80 
was to secure support for its ideas, both at home and across Europe. It called 
for the free movement of people, ideas and goods, a Charter of Human Rights 
and Court and a European Assembly. 81 
Churchill offered Britain's "full contribution" to the UEM but it was 
used to steer the debate. 82 Divisions emerged when Conservative representative 
at the European Parliamentary Union (EPU), the fore-runner of the European 
Assembly, adopted intergovernmental solutions which were rejected by the 
Congress as a whole. They consequently severed their links with the EPU, 
creating rivalry between the UEM and EPU over federalist or intergovernmental 
approaches. 83 Opinion on Churchill was mixed: "[his speeches] in defence of the 
English policy of imperialism and for a union of western states ... to be used as 
weapon against the USSR ... does little to reassure us", stated a memo just prior 
to the Hague Congress inviting Labour Party representation to act as a 
counterweight. 84 Similarly Monnet was sceptical of the grand gesture of a 
Council of Europe which lacked substance. 85 At home some even felt 
Churchill's vision to be "still back in the pre-1939 or even pre-1914 
Mauter, W (1998) 'Churchill and the Unification of Europe', Historian, vol. 6 1, p67-84, p7l 
ht! p: //www. europeanmovement. org/history- message I 948. cfm accessed 10/11/2004 
Wurm, C (1988) 'Great Britain: Political Parties and Pressure Groups' in Lipgens, W and W. 
Loth (eds) Documents on the History ofEuropean Integration: The Strugglefor European Union 
1945-1950, vol. 3, Berlin: De Gruyter, p668-9 
" Mauter, 'Churchill and the Unification of Europe', p73; http: //www. ena. lu? lanp, =2&doc=285 
accessed 10/11/2004; for more detailed contemporary account of the ideological division: 'The 
Hague Congress', Le Monde, 9-10/05/1948 from http: //www. ena. lu? lanP, =2&doc=904 accessed 
07/11/2004 
11 Memorandum on preparations for the Hague Congress, 22/01/1948, 
hý /ý/www. ena. lu? lane,, --I&doc=3023 accessed 07/11/2004 
Monnet, J (1978) Memoirs, London: Collins, p2l2; Jean Monnet Foundation (1986) Jean 
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mentality". 86 Despite Churchill's claims of raising Europe above the party fray, 
he spent the first half of 1948 making partisan pronouncements aimed at forcing 
the Government's hand, and when this did not succeed, resorted to covert 
threats. 87 
Eden extended Churchill's vision of British leadership in Europe in three 
significant ways. Firstly, he offered support for measures of European defence. 
Secondly he attempted to rearticulate the European 'circle' through the Eden 
Plan and Western European Union (WEU). Finally, his strategic approach to the 
Messina negotiations was based on a gamble that it would fail. 
First, for Eden like Churchill, federalism posed no dilemma. It stood 
contrary to themes consistent with the tradition of the Patriotic Right such as 
national sovereignty. The EDC announced in 1950 envisaged an integrated 
European army, which would remove the threat of future German rearmament. 
Prompted by American concerns over the future security arrangements of 
Europe, Eden declared that Britain would not be involved in a federation. 
Although clear about the limits of British involvement, Eden was 
nevertheless intimately involved in trying to make the EDC work. As the threat 
of a French veto loomed and the Americans threatened to remove support unless 
there was ratification, Eden proposed strengthening NATO's role in controlling 
Germany. When the EDC finally collapsed during August 1954, he proposed the 
86 Julian Amery commenting of his father, Leo Amery that he was one of the few forward- 
thinkers in the Party: Amery Diaries, 22/11/1948, AMEL 49, Churchill College, Cambridge 
" Churchill to Stafford, 26/04/1948, CHUR 2/376, Churchill College, Cambridge; Bevin to 
Attlee, FO 800/460, Secretary of State's Papers, 19/07/1948, PRO 
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Western European Union (WEU) as a non-federal alternative. By bringing West 
Germany into NATO, the allied occupation ended, and German rearmament 
became possible. Eden felt the EDC must not fail for strategic reasons believing 
it would provide a bulwark against German and Soviet desires to disturb the 
peace. It was a view shared by the American administration and other leading 
Conservatives. 88 
SecondlY, the failure of the EDC did nothing to challenge the existing set 
of beliefs held by Churchill and Eden, if anything reinforcing them by continued 
French suspicions of Germany. As one commentator remarks, "The official 
British scepticism about the impractical idealism of the European Federalists 
appeared to be vindicated. With the fall of the [EDC], the initiative Britain had 
lost with the advent of the Coal and Steel Community now swung back towards 
her. 09 It gave Eden the opportunity to rearticulate beliefs about Europe's 
direction through the Eden Plan and WEU. 
The Eden Plan of 1952 redefined the role of the Council of Europe and 
was regarded as a positive development by some Europeans. " It was a response 
to attempts to create a European Political Community. In December the 
committee of ministers voted to combine the OEEC and the social and cultural 
bodies of the BTO into the Council of Europe. As it floundered, Eden proposed 
an alternative 'twin plan' which aimed to keep the Council of Europe as the 
forum for intergovernmental measures while leaving the representative of the six 
88 Young, Blessed Plot, p66 
89 Chariton, M (198 1) 'How and Why Britain Lost the Leadership of Europe,, pt. 1, Encounter, 
August, p9-21, p9 
90 Mollet, Guy, (1952) 'Rdflexions sur le Plan Eden' in Notre Europe, no. 16-17, pp59-64, from 
hqp: mww. ena. lu/mce. cfm accessed 05/11/2004 
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ECSC states free to continue integrationist measures. 91 Eden wished to "help 
reconcile the aim of the six ... to create a supranational authority with the need to 
keep Europe united". 92 
The basis of WEU was the inclusion of West Germany and Italy into the 
BTO, and West Germany in particular into NATO. In doing so, Eden crucially 
shifted the British position by offering a permanent British force on French soil 
under the BTO and accepting that it was only removable by the consent of the 
BTO powers and not British discretion. 93 
Third, the negotiations at Messina in 1955 represented a reprise of 
political and economic collaboration, resulting in the Treaty of Rome to establish 
a common market. It was in essence an extension of the Benelux customs union. 
It has been argued that Britain 'missed the bus' at Messina. 94 Instead, we can see 
that Eden undertook a strategy which developed from his approach to the EDC 
and EPC. These failures meant the most likely outcome at Messina was also 
failure, from which the idea of federal measures could be finally eliminated for 
good. Letting it fail by itself and then allowing the intergovermnental approach 
to ascend was preferable to Britain being perceived as pushing a particular 
91 Julian Amery, (1952) 'The Eden Plan' in Notre Europe, no. 14, pp4346 
http: vww. ena. lu? lanp-=2&doc=12546 accessed 05/11/2004 
92 Anthony Eden, speech to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, 15/09/52, from 
p: H, vww. ena. lu? lang7=2&doc--12548 accessed 05/11/2004 htt 
93 Eden, A (1960) Full Circle London: Cassell, p 165 
94 Charlton 'How and Why Britain Lost the Leadership of Europe', pt 1, P9; Young, Blessed Plot, 
p79 
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agenda. 95 It was an assessment based on scepticism and uncertainty in Europe, 
not least on the part of Monnet himself. 96 
Eden felt that Messina was in danger of replicating the role of the 
intergovermnental OEEC as the principal organ through which European unity 
could be achieved. The Treasury had begun to shift over the benefits of a 
customs union with Europe, believing it would enhance Britain's overall trading 
capacity rather than act as a hindrance to her Commonwealth trade. 97 The 
removal of Britain's representative from the talks in November 1955 ended 
British engagement, withdrawing to a policy of "co-operation without 
commitment". The federal ambitions of Messina, despite the open-ended nature 
98 
of the talks, were assumed. It was a policy based on an assessment of a tactical 
withdrawal to pave the way for a collapse of the negotiations. Eden was not 
alone in this belief, it being shared by Macmillan who made little effort to shift 
trading policy towards the EEC: "Macmillan, for all his pro-European 
sympathies, was no more ready to contemplate British adherence to an emerging 
supra-national European entity than Churchill or Eden". 
99 
4.4.1.3 Redefining Empire 
The reaction of Churchill to changes in imperial relations under the Labour 
Government did not provoke an acute dilemma of belief but rather the retreat to 
a safe but increasingly fluid conception of Empire. This challenged beliefs about 
95 PRO: CAB 134/1226 E. P. (55) 1 1"'Meeting, 11/11155 
96 FO 371/116040,11/06/1955, PRO; FO 371/116038 03/06/1955, PRO; Young, Blessed Plot, 
pý I 
" Young, Blessed Plot, p90 
98 Russell Bretherton quoted in Charlton 'How and Why Britain Lost the Leadership of Europe', 
FtI, p14 
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British greatness in the form of autonomous action, retaining sovereignty and 
independence, and exorcising the legacy of appeasement. 
During the election campaign in 1945, Churchill outlined his aims in 
foreign policy, presuming a return to Number 10. "We shall base the whole of 
our international policy on a recognition that in world affairs the Mother Country 
must act in the closest possible concert with all other parts of the British 
Commonwealth and Empire. 100 Stirring the emotions with an appeal to national 
greatness, Churchill continued: 
Ours is a great nation and never in its history has it stood in higher repute 
in the world than today. Its greatness rests not on its material wealth, for 
that has been poured out in full measure, nor upon its armed might, which 
other nations surpass. It has its roots in the character, the ability, and the 
independence of our people and the magic of this wonderful island. British 
virtues have been developed under the free institutions which our fathers 
and forefathers struggled through the centuries to win and to keep. We of 
this generation are trustees for posterity, and the duty lies upon us to hand 
down to our children unimpaired the unique heritage that was bequeathed 
to us. 101 
It legitimised a maintenance of the past while playing directly into classic 
Conservative traditions of the power of institutions which dated back to Burke. 
As one contemporary remarked "The right is acutely aware that the kind of 
Britain it wishes to preserve very largely depends on Britain remaining a great 
power". 102 As the Party of Empire and the intimate link in Conservative 
mythology between greatness and Empire, the "decline of Britain as a great 
100 http: //www. psr. keele. ac. uk/area/uk/man/con45. htm accessed 02/11/04 
"' Conservative Election Manifesto, 1945, littp: //www. psr. keele. ac. uk/area/uk/man/con45. htm, 
accessed 02/11/2004 
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power, therefore, would undermine the basic Conservative appeal far more 
effectively than socialist legislation. " 103 
The Churchillian conception of foreign policy 104 relied on the Empire 
and Commonwealth as the foundations of Britain's power base. This formed the 
basis of the Imperial Charter. Butler later regarded the Imperial Charter as a 
"policy for furthering the Empire's economic and political unity" while others 
felt that Britain's relationship to her Empire had changed from an 'Empire of 
105 Government and peoples' to an 'Empire of positions'. Even while it was being 
articulated, it was unravelling. Churchill could not remain unmoved by demands 
for self-determination, remarking in 1947 "It is with deep grief that I watch the 
clattering down of the British Empire, with all its glories, and all the services it 
has rendered to mankind". 106 Churchill came to represent an increasingly 
outmoded past even within the Party who feared he was becoming an electoral 
liability. Others were more alert. Events in opposition already demonstrated the 
fragility of the policy: Indian independence, the withdrawal from Palestine and 
the loss of oil refineries in Abadan revealed to Eden, for example, that the 
countryls strength must equal its obligations. 107 
Divisions emerged within the Party over interpretation, thus while the 
Empire remained the centrepiece of foreign economic policy, it created confused 
opinion, with some sections of the party calling for a reinstatement of the term 
'0' Worsthome quoted in Hoffman, The Conservative Party in Opposition, p200 
104 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, p230 
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V 116 
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Empire and celebration of Empire Day. Others felt this was a regressive step and 
urged for a more progressive form of social imperialism. Ambiguous terms such 
as colonial development were then used which meant all things to all men; 
progressives took it to mean the shift towards a post-colonial world while 
imperialists took it to mean refreshing trading ties and making them stronger. 
Calls then for a Central African Federation were seen on the one hand as 
providing much needed local autonomy by some and for others, consolidating 
British presence within the rich materials resource base of Africa. 108 Some such 
as Enoch Powell even advocated going it alone. He argued that the loss of India 
meant Britain was no longer an imperial power, but rejected links with America 
and Europe. 
Besides strong emotional ties to continuing links with the 
Commonwealth and Empire, there were historic ties within the Party that 
precluded an easy shift, and economic indicators that did not make the attraction 
of Europe inevitable. In 1955, relative trade values between Britain and the 
Commonwealth and Sterling Area far outstripped that with the nascent Six by a 
factor of 4: 1.109 It informed the Government's position to withdraw from 
Messina as did the Trend Report, which argued that the dangers facing Britain 
were a shortfall from the economic links and extended sets of preferences 
provided by the Commonwealth and Sterling Area if substituted for those in 
Europe-110 In 1956 the idea of finding a linking institution emerged under the 
name of 'Plan G' in which a looser organisation of states could find affiliation 
log Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, p263 
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without full membership. This was to develop into the European Free Trade 
Area (EFTA). 
The inability to articulate a clear policy about Britain's Commonwealth 
and Empire role created division within the party with forty-one rebels signed an 
EDM opposing the government's Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1954. The rebellion 
was suppressed by Churchill's intervention to the 1922 Committee by arguing 
that financially it was impossible for Britain to continue in the Canal Zone. It 
touched on the symbolism of appeasement. "In such debates the vocabulary of 
appeasement was a constant virility test of all Tory policies at home and 
abroad". "' It paved the ground for Eden's difficulties when the Suez Crisis 
occurred in July 1956. Initial outrage fizzled out while a policy was being 
formulated. American support for British action was noticeably absent. 112 
Pressing for conferences to find a solution, the American Secretary of State, 
Dulles, was arguably buying time to make it harder for Britain and France to 
react militarily. 113 Frustrated by Eisenhower's declaration that he was prepared 
to go to any lengths to secure peace, British and French appeals to the United 
Nations Security Council were met with further American objections. An 
attempt to establish the Suez Canal User's Association (SCUA) was scuppered 
almost immediately by American comments that it lacked teeth. It created 
"1 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, p264 
112 Memorandum of Conference with the President, 31/07/1956 from ht! p: //www. ena. lu/mce. cfm 
accessed 05/11/2004 
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tensions within the Cabinet which remained largely intact until military action 
prompted some senior resignations. 114 
The end of Eden's leadership meant the collapse of his and Churchill's 
particular articulation of the tradition of the patriotic right. Eden's position had 
been exacerbated by pressure from sections of the Party which had disagreed 
over the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954 and the Government's apparent 
abrogation of responsibility over Empire. The strength of feeling was high 
within the Conservatives. ' 15 Eden's portrayal of Nasser as a fascist in the 
Mussolini mould was initially shared by Gaitskell. 1 16 Yet critically, Eden 
continued to use this motif once he had begun to lose support from the 
opposition, even though commentators recognised that a loss of support from the 
opposition was fatal to the idea of a war. ' 17 It was a throwback to 1930s British 
insecurities about appeasement through the language of personalisation. The 
appeasement legacy represented "deep-seated emotions affecting liberal-minded 
people, but they coalesced only too easily with less generous sentiments: the 
residues of illiberal resentment at the loss of Empire, the rise of coloured 
nationalism, the transfer of world leadership to the United States". 118 
Eden had forged his premiership on sustaining British interests through 
regional security arrangements in which the United States was due to shoulder 
the financial burden. This policy had worked with SEATO, but difficulties in 
114 Heath, The Course of my Life, p 166; Anthony Nutting resigned as Minister of State at the 
Foreign Office 
115 Nicholson, The HaroldNicholson Diaries, p449 
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securing the Americans' explicit support for the Baghdad Pact through 
membership left Britain exposed. The policy had demonstrated a significant shift 
in Eden's beliefs that American ambivalence to supporting the British 
conception of her status in the world meant pursuing a more independent line. 119 
Britain's place in the Middle East and thus her role in the Pact looked to come 
under threat since a loss of security over the canal visibly cut Britain's claim in 
sustaining the Pax Britannica in the Middle East while dependence on British 
and mainland Europe's oil needs rested on the use of the Canal. "' In August, it 
was noted that "without oil, both the United Kingdom and Western Europe were 
loStii. 121 It was recognised that unless action over the Canal was resolute, "the 
general view in the Middle East and the East is that the Europeans particularly 
the British have 'had it'. That is what this row is really about". 122 The wider 
ramification was the impact on trade relations with the rest of the 
Commonwealth. 123 The Canal came to represent all the power of the remaining 
Empire. 
Finally, Suez represented a shock to traditional Conservative Party 
beliefs about Britain and Empire and Britain's role in the world. All approaches 
to foreign policy hitherto were merely papering over the cracks of a set of beliefs 
under attack. Suez provided the absolute fissure forcing a rethink of beliefs. It 
presented a humiliating end to the idea of acting independently on the world 
stage. It demonstrated the fragility of the economy which saw the outflow in one 
119 Ruane, K (2005) 'SEATO, MEDO, and the Baghdad Pact: Anthony Eden, British Foreign 
policy and the Collective Defence of Southeast Asia and the Middle East, 1952-1955', 
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week of gold and dollar reserves amounting to 15% of the total. It saw the end of 
Britain's role as a powerbroker in the Middle East and therefore, showed its 
limited ability to play a big role in the Cold War. It demonstrated the formal 
transfer of influence in the Middle East from Europe to the United States. It 
represented a vain attempt to stem the anti-imperial tide in Africa and Asia. It 
damaged Anglo-American relations and those with some Commonwealth 
countries. It damaged Britain's international standing: the UN passed a 
124 
resolution condemning Anglo-French action by 63 votes to 5. It ended the 
career of Anthony Eden. 
4.5 Modirications 
The dilemma of re-establishing a traditional foreign policy prompted the 
collapse of the patriotic right's ability to narrate a clear set of beliefs about 
Britain in the world. In this section, we examine the ways in which the dilemma 
of re-establishing a traditional foreign policy prompted Churchill and Eden to 
modify their beliefs about Britain's interests. Where Churchill and Eden 
modified their beliefs, this was the product of identifying information at odds 
with their beliefs and the application of strategies with which this was countered. 
These changes are then contrasted with the ways in which other beliefs were 
buttressed. Finally, this section deploys Bulpitt's measurements: the success of 
establishing political argument hegemony and the effectiveness of party 
management. 
124 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, p317 
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Re-establishing traditional foreign policy challenged the idea of what it 
meant to be Britain in the world and required a reformulation of its great power 
status, forcing a re-conceptualisation rather than a rejection of its component 
parts. This was defined by Churchill's 'Three Circles' relationship. 
The concept of the 'Three Circles' was established in 1948, crucially 
three years after the end of the war and with enough time to assess whether such 
a concept was viable. It was a redefinition of traditional British foreign policy by 
Churchill which articulated a distinct relationship with America. Churchill's 
strategy was to court America by explicit reference to areas of commonality, 
such as language and culture. This was entirely consistent with Churchill's 
beliefs and his own background. Born to an American mother, Churchill's 
affections for the United States were stronger than most within the Conservative 
Party. Sentiment and experience informed Churchill's beliefs and it was his 
experience in war that propelled him to seek a continuation of the Atlantic 
Alliance in peacetime. Churchill's Fulton speech was delivered at a time when 
Anglo-American relations had drifted and Britain stood to be alienated. 
The articulation of the 'three circles' concept therefore contained within 
it a significant modification of beliefs which recognised the power of the United 
States and tried to link that power to the other predominantly white, English- 
speaking group: Britain and the Commonwealth. Despite initial hostility from 
the Americans several key events served to support the notion of Churchill's 
idea: the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid gave clear indications of American 
support while the establishment of NATO secured them. 
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Eden's beliefs had mirrored this accepted party doctrine about Britain's 
place in the world. He did not share Churchill's beliefs in the essentially benign 
root of relations between the two countries, but as leader sought to restate the 
three circles concept. His realist beliefs precluded the sentimentality displayed 
by Churchill but echoed the same pervasive fear of American isolationism, more 
specifically when it carne to Britain undertaking explicit and costly 
commitments in Europe. Eden's beliefs, as well as those of officials in the 
Foreign office, began to show increasing defensiveness as the foundations of the 
reformed Atlantic Alliance showed cracks. That America became engaged in 
Europe's defensive security and economic revival undermined the concept of an 
equitable Alliance. The beginnings of decolonisation made increasingly hollow 
the traditional idea of Britain in the world. 
A second area of dilemma emerged over relations with Europe and did 
provoke, for Eden, modifications of approach, if not belief. Churchill's views 
were clear: Europe played second fiddle to Britain's relationship with its Empire 
and America. The relationship with Europe was pedagogic; British guidance 
meant Europe could provide its own security through a Franco-German 
partnership. This partnership, Churchill had identified, was sympathetic to the 
grouping of the British Commonwealth and Empire and America. He called for 
instance, the Big Three, to be sponsors of this fledgling entity. Europe had a 
function in playing alongside other big players in international relations. It was a 
simple relationship for Churchill whose beliefs never wavered; European unity 
was good for the Europeans but Britain was not simply European and therefore 
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its identity was cast as a leader not as a player. Churchill's beliefs remained 
unchanged but his views were identified as archaic by some even in his own 
Party who wished for a stronger or more decisive role in European affairs. 
Eden's beliefs reflected the modifications of approach for which some 
party dissidents were calling. A more positive outlook was needed in order to 
retain goodwill from Europeanists and to this end, Eden took a positive role in 
supporting as far as his patriotic right beliefs allowed. This showed in three key 
ways: his overt support for European efforts to secure their own defence without 
committing Britain, which was at odds with Churchill's pessimism; his solution 
to the collapse of that effort in creating the WEU as the means through which 
Germany could rearm; the modification of approach which recognised that in 
order for this solution to work, Britain would have to commit armed forces 
which significantly required rescinding the right to withdraw them unilaterally. 
Eden's beliefs did not change, as the Messina negotiations did not 
produce a different approach. Rather, the experience of one wide-ranging but 
failed attempt at a supra-national model had not challenged enough the success 
of one discrete area of integration in the ECSC. Instead, the modification of 
approach continued along traditional lines by seeking to explore ways in which 
Britain could be affiliated to this newly emergent economic force. Plan G, later 
EFTA, emerged during the time of the Messina negotiations as a means for 
Britain to access European markets at preferential rates without damaging the 
preferential trading arrangements which existed with the Commonwealth. 
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Finally, the greatest area of dilemma was the notion of Britain's status in 
the world. Churchill had expressed this belief to be intricately bound in the 
notion of Empire and Commonwealth, and it was one shared by many in the 
Conservative Party, not least Eden. However, challenges to that conception 
began immediately with the recognition of demands for independence by some 
countries such as India and the tactical withdrawal from indefensible areas or 
those of less strategic importance. The scale of change in the relations between 
Britain and its Empire was such that despite the apparent cohesiveness, this was 
not something that could be relied upon in the future, a point clear to American 
foreign policy advisors. Modifications of beliefs occurred within the Party and 
pressed themselves on the leadership. Churchill's beliefs were characteristically 
Conservative Party beliefs in that he focused on defining national greatness 
through totems of past national greatness. 
By the early 1950s, these were increasingly archaic and reflected a sense 
of Britain from the past which had increasingly little to do with the realities of 
the present. There emerged differences of interpretation about the role of Britain 
in the world, the basis of her status and how best to achieve and support that 
status which increasingly differed from that of Churchill. Perhaps most 
troublesome was that while allegiance to the notion of Empire remained an 
article of faith within the Party, the economic fruits of that relationship became 
less abundant. Furthermore, voices from outside were challenging the avowed 
status of Britain in the world. Arguably, in the midst of this emergent crisis of 
belief arose a direct challenge to the status of Britain in the world through the 
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Suez crisis. Influential in that crisis was the spectre of appeasement which I 
tapped into insecurities over the future role of Empire. 
When examining the composite parts of traditional foreign policy, 
Churchill and Eden identified key themes of traditional Conservative foreign 
policy: the need for strong leadership; support for institutions of authority and 
hierarchy; defence of sovereignty; and support for evolutionary change. When 
identifying discrepant information, it was these themes that informed their 
beliefs about how to counter the threats to the dilemma of re-establishing a 
traditional foreign policy. 
The need for strong leadership was a strategy to counter the threat of 
American dominance in western relations and from Soviet pressure from the 
East. It took form through the cult of Churchill's personality and the tying 
together of Britain's world status to that as head of Empire and Commonwealth. 
Churchill's patrician beliefs outlined the hierarchy of relations: "Hand in hand 
with France and other friendly powers we shall pursue the aim of closer unity in 
Europe", but relations with America were the pre-eminent concern: "Above all 
we seek to work in fraternal association with the United States to help by all 
means all countries, in Europe, Asia or elsewhere, to resist the aggression of 
Communism by open attack or secret penetration. " 125 
Support for institutions of authority and hierarchy meant countering the 
threat of imperial self-determination through converting relations into the 
125 hn: //www. psr. keele. ac. uk/area/uk/man/con50. htm accessed 02/11/2004 
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Commonwealth where Empire could not be retained. It meant support for 
international organisations where Britain could exert a stronger voice than 
through international relations alone such as the UN or NATO. And in European 
policy it was used to cement Britain's leadership ambitions. For example, Eden 
remained consistent in his articulations about Britain's role as a partner and not a 
participant in European unity. It was a position he restated eighteen months later 
at the Party Conference. 126 A boost to claims of British difference came with the 
explosion of Britain's first atomic bomb during the EDC negotiations, 
effectively countering pressures to become more of a European player. 127 
Defence of sovereignty operated where relations would affect the theme 
of strong leadership. The patriotic right privileged Britain's identity as separate 
and independent, sustaining its claim to be the third superpower. Trading 
sovereignty for a perception different to this was systematically rejected. There 
is no evidence that Eden or Churchill's beliefs changed over time. 128 For 
instance, Churchill was consistently opposed to British 'entanglement' in Europe 
before the war. His support of European unity was couched in terms which 
separated Britain from the mechanics of the process: 
I never thought that Britain or the British Commonwealth should, 
either individually or collectively, become an integral part of the 
European federation, and have never given the slightest support to the 
idea. Our first object is the unity and the consolidation of the British 
Commonwealths and what is left of the former British Empire. Our 
second, the 'fraternal association' of the English-speaking world and 
126 Thorpe, Eden, p372 
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third: United Europe to which we are a separate closely -and specially- 
related ally and friend. 129 
When we measure the success with which Churchill and Eden gained 
support for their interpretations of foreign policy, we examine party management 
and political argument hegemony. The period ended with the Suez Crisis 
demonstrating the loss of both party management and political argument 
hegemony. In the run up to the Suez Crisis, two key rebellions occurred, both 
about Government policy towards Suez. A secret cabal formed consisting of 
supporters of Empire or 'imperialists', such as Julian Amery, the former 
Chairman of the Party Organisation Ralph Assheton and the Conservative 
Defence Committee Chairman, Captain Waterhouse. In December 1953, an 
EDM garnered 41 signatories opposing Goverment policy in the Anglo- 
Egyptian Agreement. Support for the EDM came from the government whip, 
Harry Legge-Bourke who resigned the whip in protest. Despite attempts by 
Churchill to rally the rebels, 28 still voted against the government. 130 This was 
indicative of the approach of the leadership with "many examples in this 
Parliament of the Government changing its policy in response to backbench 
pressure without the discord reaching the stage of an open rebelli&'. 131 
This reflected the growing climax of opposition to progressive tendencies 
within the Party. The Tory press had levelled criticism at the domestic policies 
emerging from the Party since 1945 but had offered wholesale support of 
Churchill's Imperial Charter and the Party's avowed dedication to retaining the 
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Empire in 1948-49.132 The imperialists who would later form the Suez Group 
began during these years of opposition to flesh out their beliefs against the 
backdrop of Labour policy failures in Palestine and Abadan. 133 The early power 
of the Suez Group came from the tacit support lent by Churchill. It went on to 
become highly organised with contacts in the press who were briefed both 
openly and in private, and the military from which opinion was channelled. 134 
Despite the presence of some die-hard imperialists, the group composition was 
more complex with many in key positions within the Party organisation with at 
least five being members of the Progress Trust. 135 
More broadly, Eden was under attack even before the Suez Crisis, 
suffering from press hostility over his Government reshuffle in December 
1955 136 and over his leadership style. 137 Falling approval ratings and 
constituency disquiet added to the loss of coherence resulting in a short-lived 
middle class revolt. 138 Right-wing groupings formed, attacking government 
policy, such as a precursor to the BNP, the League of Empire Loyalists. 
The issue of party management goes hand in hand with that of 
establishing an easy predominance in the elite debate and a winning rhetoric 
through a generally acceptable argument. In this period, we can see that there 
was an initial, but generally accepted, expression of beliefs by Churchill. 
However, Churchill consistently refused to provide details for fear of being a 
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'hostage to fortune'. While domestic policy was being worked out in detail by 
Butler, Churchill used his personality as the guide for the Party's foreign policy. 
It was not until 1948 that he began to make this position clearer and more 
detailed policies emerged. At this point, an easy predominance seemed in place 
since much of the Conservative position was in parallel to the Government's 
approach. A rapid change in perception marked the years 1952 to 1956 as the 
articulations of the three circles became undermined, with the emergence of 
alternative positions, one of which consisted of some elite members and which 
briefly but catastrophically gained predominance in internal party debate. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to apply Bevir's interpretative theory to 
the Conservative Party both in and out of Govermnent, 1945-1956. This was 
done by tracing the conceptual and temporal links that tied Churchill and Eden 
to the tradition of the patriotic right. By outlining the historical context, the 
dilemma of re-establishing a traditional foreign policy was identified. This 
dilemma showed that the changes wrought by war affected fundamentally the 
traditional Conservative claim to be the Party of Empire and the preserver of 
historical institutions, forcing Churchill and Eden to rearticulate their beliefs. It 
was demonstrated that this dilemma continued to manifest itself despite attempts 
by Churchill and Eden to articulate Britain's identity in the world and resulted in 
the Suez Crisis. The Suez Crisis fatally undermined the ability of the tradition of 
the patriotic right to provide a consistent and feasible narrative about Britain in 
the world. Changes in imperial relations had forced the pace of articulations. 
Finally, modifications that Churchill and Eden made were largely unsuccessful 
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reflected by an increasing loss of party management and of the political 
argument hegemony. 
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Chapter Five 
The Conservatives 1957-1963 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we examine the beliefs held by the Conservative leader, 
Harold Macmillan and his Foreign Secretary, later Chancellor, Selwyn Lloyd. 
Selected as the key players involved in the strategic direction of Britain's foreign 
policy from 1956 to 1963, it is argued that Macmillan and Lloyd modified their 
beliefs about Britain's interests in response to the perceived twin-dilemma of the 
establishment of the EEC and its nascent economic success. 
We begin by positing that Macmillan and Lloyd's beliefs were part of the 
traditions of Whig Paternalism and a modified patriotic right, respectively, and 
trace the appropriate links. We then give a brief historical summary of the period 
from 1956 to 1963 covering both the domestic and international landscape. The 
content of the dilemma as articulated by Macmillan and Lloyd is examined 
before analysing the impact upon the traditions of Whig paternalism and the 
patriotic right of Macmillan and Lloyd's modified beliefs. Finally, we examine 
the impact of their articulations on party management and sustaining political 
argument hegemony. 
5.2 tlite Beliefs 
As outlined in previous chapters, the Conservative party is constitutive of 
a number of traditions summarized as the patriotic right, economic liberalism, 
the paternalist Whigs and finally the progressives. Chapter Four showed that the 
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tradition of the patriotic right had become fatally undermined by its inability to 
articulate a coherent and feasible set of foreign policy beliefs. 
In seeking to locate the beliefs of Harold Macmillan and Selwyn Lloyd, 
we examine the temporal and conceptual links in the webs of beliefs of the 
relevant individuals and locate these within traditions of Conservative Party 
thought. 
5.2.1 Harold Macmillan I 
Born to a family of Scottish crofters turned publishers, Macmillan was 
educated at Eton and Balliol College, Oxford. Marrying the daughter of the 
Duke of Cavendish, he became MP for Stockton-on-Tees from 1924-1929, 
returning in 1931 until 1945 when he then became MP for Bromley until 1964. 
A Parliamentary Secretary for the Ministry of Supply during 1940-42, then 
Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1942, Macmillan was resident 
Minister for North Africa from 1942-45 before ending the war as Secretary of 
State for Air. He was Minister of Housing and Local Government from 1951 to 
1954, Minister for Defence in 1955, had a brief spell as Foreign Secretary, then 
became Chancellor until 1957 when he took over from Eden as Prime Minister 
until 1963. He retired from the Commons in 1964.2 
Macmillan's persona played as much of a role as his beliefs in politics. 
Labelled the 'last of the Edwardians' and 'Supermac', his ambiguity won him 
Maurice Harold Macmillan, 1894-1986 
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both support and opposition. 3 While lauded for his achievements in housing 
policy, articulating the 'middle way' during the 1930s and inventing premium 
bonds, his commitment to Europe has been questioned. We can trace links that 
tie Macmillan to the tradition of Whig paternalism in four ways: the influence of 
Christian socialism; a synthesis of progressive Conservative beliefs; the 
influence of his constituency's economic depression; and a conventional outlook 
in foreign policy. 
First, close family links with Christian Socialism informed the backdrop 
to Macmillan's beliefs; F. D. Maurice and Charles Kingsley 4 were godparents to 
Harold's father, a link which Macmillan continued. 5 When Macmillan went into 
politics, despite his Christian Socialist heritage, he stood as a Conservative. 
"Macmillan became a Conservative MP because it would have been unnatural 
for him to join any other party. Temperament, culture and family impelled him 
to do itig. 
6 
Second, Macmillan's pre-war interests were domestic policy; his position 
defined as centrist and socially progressive, the culmination of which was the 
publication of the 'Middle Way', an essentially dirigiste solution to unfettered 
laissez faire economics. "It is", Macmillan argues, "along these lines that the 
' Siedentop, L. A. (1970) 'Mr. Macmillan and the Edwardian Style' in Vernon Bogdanor and 
Robert Skidelsky (eds) The Age of Affluence, London: Macmillan; Sampson, A (1967) 
Macmillan: A Study in Ambiguity, London: Allen Lane; Turner, J (1994) Macmillan, London: 
Longman 
" Turner, Macmillan, p7; F. D. Maurice founded the idea of Christian Socialism and with him, as 
part of his 'band of brothers' was Charles Kingsley. The ethic of Christian Socialism stood 
opposed to the economic basis of the Manchester School, also prominent in the mid nineteenth 
century 
' Macmillan was friends with Ronald Knox, disciple of Newman's interpretation of Christianity. 
6 Turner, Macmillan, p14 
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Tory tradition springs from the past and leads to the future". 7 It was a bold 
attempt to redirect Party tradition, one which would tap into Tory Reform Group 
and later, One Nation Group thinking. Macmillan's progressive social policy 
beliefs, supportive of some measures of state intervention, made him the ideal 
candidate for Housing Minister. He excelled by delivering the target of 300,000 
houses per year. 
Third, while Macmillan's social policy had practical applications, his 
beliefs about economic policy were defined by his experience as MP for 
Stockton during the depression of the 1930s. Later labelled as an 'inflationist' by 
Treasury ministers when he was Chancellor, Macmillan was reluctant to 
sacrifice real wealth to "maintain a figure on a price tag". 
9 However expansionist 
Macmillan's economic beliefs, as Chancellor he oversaw the cutting of demand, 
which it has been argued was a testament to the dominance of Treasury and 
Bank of England views and only served to deliver a stagnant economy. 10 
Fourth, service in World War One prompted a deep patriotism which 
defined his approach to foreign policy. His anti-appeasement stance earned him 
his first government post in a war where he made diplomatic and'personal links 
7 Macmillan quoted in Turner, Macmillan, p37 
8 For a selection of Macmillan's writing from the period see: Boothby et al (1927) Industry and 
the State: A Conservative View, London: Macmillan; Macmillan, H. M (1932) The Next Step, 
London: no information; H. M. Macmillan, (1933) Reconstruction: A Pleafor a National Policy, 
London: Macmillan; H. M Macmillan, (1938) The Price of Peace: Notes on the World Crisis, 
London: Macmillan; H. M. Macmillan, (1938) The Middle Way, London: Macmillan; H. M 
Macmillan, (1939) Economic Aspects ofDefence, London: Macmillan 
9 CHANDOS 114/5, Oliver Lyttelton to William Robinson, 16/08/56 and 27/02/57, Churchill 
College, Cambridge; Brittan, S (1964) The Treasury under the Tories, 1951-1964, London: 
Penguin, p 180 
10 Brittan, The Treasury under the Tories, p 183 
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with Eisenhower and de Gaulle" and established himself as a minister 
independent from Churchill and Eden. 12 Under Churchill he was aligned to the 
patriotic right but Macmillan's beliefs were never as emotionally defined by the 
Commonwealth as the traditional patriotic right wing of the Party; his position 
was more open to possibilities and opportunities. His early involvement in the 
European Movement alongside Churchill and his support in 1952 for a concerted 
effort to engage more fully with Europe reflected a realism akin to that of Eden. 
For Macmillan, it was a mistake for Britain to opt out of directing the process of 
European integration. An identifiable theme in Macmillan's beliefs was that of 
Britain's necessary leadership of Europe under a more desirable confederal. 
structure. As a junior minister, Macmillan pinned his hopes on the failure of 
various initiatives after the ECSC such as the EDC and the EPC and felt this 
would be the case for Messina too, finally allowing Britain to take the lead. 
Macmillan's beliefs were sympathetic to the 'three circles' concept 
though the stresses within those circles and the strategies to maintain them 
differed. While Europe represented a potential strategic opportunity, the bread 
and butter of Britain's international prominence still lay in finding the 
mechanism through which to make the Imperial relationship economically 
equivalent to the superpower status of the United States and Soviet Union. 
Young argues that "Macmillan was a man of Empire. For a country that found it 
hard to contemplate the thought of no longer being a big player in the world, 
" American foreign policy until Pearl Harbour had been to maintain friendly relations with the 
Pdtain Government at Vichy. Eisenhower was suspicious of de Gaulle as he was considered a 
loose canon. 
12 Turner, Macmillan, p55-7 
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Empire was a timeless seduction". 13 Macmillan was accused of being 'first in 
first out' over Suez. He believed restoring British acc"ess to the Canal was the 
symbol essential to curbing the erosion of British greatness but withdrew this 
support once the escalating costs demonstrated the futility of the attempt. 
Whatever Macmillan's credentials until 1956, he did not engage in the Messina 
negotiations while Foreign Secretary so that "he was ... a European only of his 
time and place, which is to say a tormented and indecisive one". 14 
His beliefs therefore were a combination of Whig paternalism at home 
and a modified patriotism of the right which valued the historical links of the 
Commonwealth but was not bound by them. Opinion of Macmillan's European 
credentials is therefore mixed from those who claim that had Britain joined in 
1962/3, he would have acted as a retarding force" to those who argue "this was 
more than a symbolic commitment to a pious aspiration. By taking part, 
Macmillan was promoting the concept of European political unity as a defence 
against communism. " He also used it as a means to jockey for position within 
the party. 16 
5.2.2 Selwyn Lloyd 17 
Educated at Fettes College then Magdalene College, Cambridge, Lloyd 
became a barrister and was active in local government until 1939. Serving in the 
war as an officer, he rose to the rank of Brigadier before being elected as 
Conservative MP for the Wirral, 1945-1976. Appointed by Churchill as Eden's 
" Young, Blessed Plot, p 114 
14 Young, Blessed Plot, p 114 
" Davenport-Hines, RPT (1993) The Macmillans, London: Mandarin, p281 
16 Turner, Macmillan, p70 
" John Selwyn Brooke Lloyd, later Baron Selwyn-Lloyd, (1904-1978). 
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Minister of State at the Foreign Office in 1951-1954, he then became Minister of 
Supply, 1954-55 and Minister of Defence, 1955. In December 1955 Lloyd was 
appointed Foreign Secretary, a post he would retain until July 1960 when he 
became Chancellor of the Exchequer. Selwyn Lloyd was one of Macmillan's 
victims in the 'night of the long knives' in July 1962. 
Selwyn Lloyd is largely a forgotten minister despite holding government 
offices for twelve of the thirteen years of Conservative governments in the 1950s 
and 1960s. 18 As Eden's Foreign Secretary, he was linked with Suez and despite 
remaining in the post until 1960, there is little written about him. 19 Presented as a 
mere cipher to the more dominant Eden and Macmillan, Lloyd appears as the 
6yes man'. Macmillan, upon becoming Prime Minister in January 1957, kept him 
as Foreign Secretary as "one head on the charger was enough" . 
20 He 
nevertheless showed significant differences from Eden, for instance, by his 
consistent search for a diplomatic answer to Suez. Lloyd was therefore a man 
whose loyalty to Party and leader was greater than his personal ambition. His 
move to the Treasury in 1960 was symbolic of the change in direction of British 
foreign policy and for that Macmillan needed someone sympathetic. 
We can trace Lloyd's beliefs to the modified tradition of the patriotic 
right in four ways: a liberal inheritance, progressive beliefs in social policy; 
alignment with centrists in Parliament; and the development of foreign policy 
beliefs as Eden's Foreign Secretary. 
Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, pxv 
Apart from D. R. Thorpe's biography of Lloyd, there exists little literature specifically about 
the man 
20 Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, pxv 
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First, Lloyd's family background was professional, middle-class and 
strictly nonconformist. Originally weavers from Wales, the rise of Wesleyan 
Methodism became a strong anchor transforming weavers to ministers and the 
family moved from north Wales to Liverpool. Lloyd's grandfather entered the 
professional middle classes as a dentist but remained a minister and opened the 
Shaftesbury Hotel, a temperance hotel for travelling ministers. 21 It was indicative 
of the backdrop to Selwyn Lloyd's tradition of beliefs. Described as "forward- 
looking ... staunch Liberals" they were supporters of free trade at a time when 
nonconformism formed the backbone of Liberal thinking. The name of the hotel 
indicated a belief in social reform while family links with Lloyd George ignited 
Lloyd's interest in politics. 
Second, this backdrop informed Lloyd's career trajectory. He trained as a 
lawyer, becoming a Kings Counsel, motivated by defending against injustice. An 
early and open opponent of capital punishment, his biographer claims this 
prevented him from becoming Home Secretary. 22 
Third, Lloyd acted on his political beliefs by standing first as a Liberal 
candidate in 19ý9. Reflecting his inherited beliefs, Lloyd's support for Liberal 
politics stemmed from the free trade tradition. In 1931 as the National 
Government reflected the dilemma between introducing tariffs and maintaining 
free trade, Lloyd split with the Liberals and modified his beliefs. His 
modification came from an assessment that spiralling unemployment needed a 
21 Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, p 1-5 
22 Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, p55 
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change of policy to stem the flow and he shifted his support to the Conservative 
Party. Initially involved in local government, Lloyd's move to Westminster in 
1945 was motivated by his wartime experiences. 
Once at Westminster, Lloyd began to establish a reputation for being 
knowledgeable about finance and taxation. Over the next few years he became 
the prot6gd of Oliver Stanley and of RAB Butler, placing him more firmly in the 
progressive liberal centre tradition. 23 His appointment by Macmillan as 
Chancellor came when the "Curzonian detachment of [the Foreign Office's] 
glory years" were coming to an end and the dividing line between foreign affairs 
and economic affairs became increasingly blurred. 24 His experience of 
international affairs meant he could more readily place in context Britain's 
changing global economy. The results were mixed - he was praised for handling 
inflationary pressures by instituting the 'pay pause' but questioned over his 
grasp of economic theory. He was also praised for more long-term policy 
initiatives such as establishing the National Economic Development Council 
(NEDC) but criticised for poor day-to-day handling of the economy. 25 
Fourth, his beliefs about foreign policy were more conventional views of 
the patriotic right but were very much undeveloped as a result of his focus on 
domestic policy. His appointment to the Foreign Office in 1951 came as a 
surprise. His early articulations indicated support for American involvement in 
European defence and a strong line against any perceived Soviet aggression. In 
23 Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, p 108,146 
24 Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, p 193 
25 Brittan, S (1964) The Treasury Under the Tories, 1951-1964, Middlesex: Penguin, p2 10- 1. 
These were criticisms with which he agreed, Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, p312 
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negotiating the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement in 1954, Lloyd took the view that 
local nationalism and anti-British sentiment were a critical shift, and became 
wary about the Egyptians' agreement to respect Sudan's independence. 26 
Lloyd's appraisal of Britain's' post-war status differed from Eden. He 
supported Churchill's attempt to recreate a meeting of the big three to establish a 
framework for detente after the death of Stalin. Lloyd agreed with Churchill's 
instincts whereas Eden and many others stood opposed. Again, like Churchill, 
Lloyd had doubts over pursuing a strong line over Suez because of the 
agreement of 1954 and because the advent of nuclear weapons made a base in 
Egypt less important. 
He differed from Eden by being sensitive to the lack of any real 
American support for a muscular response and in fact echoed Dulles's line for 
diplomacy first and foremost. 27 His pursuit of diplomatic solutions continued 
until the signature of the Sevres Protocol. We can see that Lloyd held beliefs 
consistent with the patriotic right but that these were modified in being 
significantly more practical. 
28 
it seems that above all, Lloyd's ability for detail was not matched by an 
appreciation of the broader picture which made him useful to both Eden and 
Macmillan, and which perversely meant he survived Suez. 
26 Thorpe, Sel"n Lloyd, p 169 
27 Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, p212 
28 Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd, 193 
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We can trace Macmillan's beliefs to the tradition of Whig Paternalism in 
domestic policy in his development of middle-way thinking in the 1930s and 
these beliefs were informed by the influence of Christian socialism. While 
nevertheless progressive in terms of social outlook, Macmillan was defined by a 
paternalist approach. His interests had always been foreign affairs where again 
he proved to be pragmatic in applying his beliefs, but did not deviate greatly 
ftom conventional thinking on Britain's role in the world. Similarly, Lloyd's 
nonconformist, Liberal background shaped his progressive domestic policy 
beliefs. His beliefs in foreign policy were more orthodox liberal, originally in the 
tradition of free trade beliefs. An early dilemma in 1931 shaped his beliefs on 
the need to accept the protection of British industry and economy. His post-war 
beliefs, although remaining of the patriotic right, were defined by the search for 
diplomatic solutions with an awareness of the limits of British power and the 
need for American support. 
5.3 Historical Setting 
To understand why membership of the EEC became a dilemma for 
Macmillan and Lloyd, the historical setting needs to be outlined. In the domestic 
context, economic difficulties dominated Macmillan's early premiership, while 
later he was dogged by political scandal. In the international context, the fall of 
Hungary and Britain's lag in nuclear weaponry increased Cold War tensions. 
The Cold War extended to states undergoing domestic political revolution or 
being granted independence such as Iraq, Cuba and parts of Africa. In Europe, 
the return of de Gaulle to French politics, first as Prime Minister and then 
President signalled a step change in relations. 
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5.3.1 The Domestic Situation 
The Suez crisis threatened British gold reserves, and stand-by credits 
were introduced to ease the balance of payments crisis that ensued. In the 
summer of 1957 interest rates were increased to seven percent to counter a 
speculative crisis. The pound was expected to be devalued in line with a partial 
devaluation of the French Franc. During the same summer, the Council on 
Productivity and Prices was established in an attempt to establish an incomes 
policy. It was abandoned in 1961 in favour of the NEDC which came into force 
in March 1962. 
The economy remained a central issue in domestic politics. Macmillan's 
first Chancellor, Peter Thomeycroft, resigned in January 1959 along with two 
other Treasury ministers, over a failure to impose spending cuts. The run on 
Sterling had offered an opportunity to devalue in 1957 which had been rejected 
and this led to a continued balance of payments crisis. In 1961 a mini-budget 
introduced a pay pause to offset balance of payments problems in which public 
sector wages were frozen. The same year saw the IMF make available E714m to 
Britain. The introduction of the NEDC was meant as a forum between 
government, business and workers to raise productivity. 
Political problems affected Macmillan's tenure most notably towards the 
end with the night of the long knives in July 1962 where seven Cabinet ministers 
were asked for their resignation. The Cold War also inspired domestic political 
intrigue in the Profurno Affair of 1963; the linking of a call-girl, Christine 
Keeler, to the Secretary of State for War, Profumo, and the senior naval attachd 
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at the Soviet Embassy in London, Yevgeny Ivanov. Macmillan's position was 
undermined when he defended Profurno even after it was revealed that Profumo 
had lied to the House of Commons. 29 
5.3.2 The International Situation 
As Britain and France were engaged in the Suez crisis, troops from the 
Soviet Union entered Hungary on 24'h October as internal protests in support of 
autonomy drew support from the Hungarian army. The Soviet Party leader was 
replaced by the popular Emre Nagy who formed a coalition of communist and 
non-communist parties. In order to retain the support of popular dissent he 
withdrew from the Warsaw Pact and sought protection from the West for 
Hungarian neutrality under the UN. As Britain and France were engaged in 
Suez, no support was forthcoming and on 3 rd November, Soviet troops returned 
to Budapest, closed Hungary's borders and the following day a Soviet 
Government was announced. 30 
The Cold War was beginning to show marked divergence between the 
USA, USSR and Britain. While Britain was detonating its first atomic bomb in 
1952, the US was testing its first hydrogen bomb. Britain while lagging in 
nuclear developments also became sidelined in the space race. The launch of the 
first artificial satellite Sputnik, in October 1957 was followed by the American 
Explorer in January 1958. The following year, the launch of the Soviet Luna 
probe was the first attempt to reach the moon and in April 1961 the first 
cosmonaut, Yuri Gagarin, reached space. Britain meanwhile pressed for 
" Cook and Stevenson, Britain Since 1945, p249,299; Eccleshall and Walker, British Prime 
Ministers, p327; Macmillan,. 41 the End ofthe Day, pp422-452 
30 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp288-312; Cook and Stevenson, Britain Since 1945, p272,299 
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disarmament. Britain exploded its first H-bomb in 1957 but by 1960 Britain had 
abandoned Blue Streak as the independent delivery method and opted for an 
American delivery system in Skybolt, later cancelled and replaced with 
submarine-based delivery in Polaris, 31 
The military and technological side to the Cold War showed up Britain's 
inferiority as a superpower player. The arrival of Khrushchev signalled the shift 
towards economic and political warfare. When American and British finance for 
the Aswan dam was withdrawn in June 1956 it was replaced by Soviet finance in 
1958. When Macmillan delivered his 'Winds of Chance Speech' to the South 
African parliament in 1960, recognising the rights of indigenous nationalism, it 
precipitated the ideological scramble for Africa. The same year 16 African states 
became independent. 32 The majority of these had been French colonies with 
most British colonies gaining independence throughout the 1960s. 33 The fear in 
the United States and Britain was the political vacuum this created would be 
filled by communism. 
These fears about communism extended to other areas such as the 
Middle East with the revolution in Iraq which removed the monarchy in 1958 
and the Castro-led revolution in Cuba. The prospect of Soviet nuclear weapons 
off the coast of the United States prompted the failed Bay of Pigs military 
response. A blockade of Cuba by the United States forced the withdrawal of the 
31 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, pp252-8; Cook and Stevenson, Britain Since 1945, p284,298; 
Ramsden, British Politics, p60,512,603 
32 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania. 
33 Sierra Leone and Tanzania, 1961, Uganda and Kenya in 1962 and 1963 respectively followed 
in 1964 by Malawi and Zambia, Gambia, 1965, Lesotho and Botswana 1966, Mauritius and 
Swaziland in 1968. 
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Soviet presence in 1962. In the meantime, the Vietnam War began in 1960 after 
a period of tension and division since the end of the Second World War. The 
War, considered a proxy war, was fought between North and South Vietnam; the 
north being sponsored by China and the Soviet Union, the south by the United 
States. 34 
In Europe, the Treaty of Rome was signed in January 1957. In parallel to 
the discussions at Messina was the emergence of Plan G, the British counter 
proposal. Plan G would later become the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), the 
organisational basis being intergovernmental and able to operate without 
disrupting Commonwealth relations. Attempts to create a formal association 
between the EEC and EFTA through the Maudling Committee eventually failed 
and this formed the basis of the British application for membership in 1961.35 
In January 1959, de Gaulle was elected President of the new Fifth 
Republic of France. He had returned to politics in June 1958, forming a 
government with a mandate to resolve the situation in Algeria and in December 
had won an overwhelming majority in the Presidential elections. The arrival of 
de Gaulle affected the French approach to EEC relations, which became more 
doctrinaire. In August 1961, the Berlin Wall was built making official the 
division of East and West Germany. This prompted attempts by the Six to 
increase internal cohesion with initiatives such as the Fouchet Plan, the French- 
led plan to improve political and foreign policy co-operation. 36 
34 Macmillan, At the End of the Day, pp 181-220,236-244 
35 Young, This Blessed Plot, p99-145; Macmillan, At the End of the Day, pp 1 -34,110-141 36 Gildea, France Since 1945, p79; Cook and Stevenson, Britain Since 1945, pl 1,168-9,192-4, 
278; Ramsden, British Politics, p229-234 
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5.4 bite Beliefs and Tradition Change 
In this section we explore how Macmillan and Lloyd identified the 
perceived dilemma posed by the early success of the EEC. The years between 
the Suez Crisis and the negotiations for membership of the EEC showed the 
rapid transition of belief states as dilemma after dilemma emerged. This forced 
the rapid reconceptualisation of Britain's foreign policy direction. The 
Churchillian 'three circles' concept was repeatedly challenged: by differences of 
perception, by economic constraints and by emergent nationalism. All these 
challenged conventional ideas of what it meant to be Britain in the world. 
The dilemma of membership of the EEC played itself out well before the 
formal application was made in July 1961. Attlee and Bevin resolved the 
dilemma of reduced capabilities, Churchill and Eden did not resolve the dilemma 
of re-establishing a traditional foreign policy. In the aftermath of the Suez Crisis 
Macmillan and Lloyd initially sought to re-assert the 'three circles' concept in a 
heavily modified form. Economic difficulties were in fine balance with the 
political priorities Macmillan and Lloyd wished to establish; issues of finance 
acted as a check upon political and strategic ambitions. We can identify the 
facets defining this dilemma as: first, the need to restore and retain a close 
relationship with the United States; second the formal declaration of the end of 
Empire in Africa for both strategic and economic reasons; and finally the attempt 
to establish EFTA followed by the decision to seek membership of the EEC. 
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5.4.1. Restoring American Relations 
We can break down Macmillan's attempt to restore Anglo-American 
relations into four parts. Firstly, Macmillan sought to rearticulate the content of 
the Anglo-American Alliance. Secondly Macmillan and Lloyd sought to 
establish more intimate involvement of the Americans in Middle East policy. 
Thirdly, Macmillan used his personal connection with Eisenhower to cultivate a 
renewed nuclear relationship. Finally, Macmillan sought to carve a role for 
Britain in Cold War diplomacy over summitry and disarmament discussions. 
Macmillan's first aim in foreign policy was the restoration of Anglo- 
American relations through his longstanding friendship with Eisenhower. The 
means to this end came at the Bermuda Conference in March 1957. Strategically, 
Macmillan had learnt the lessons of Suez, such as keeping Washington informed 
and co-ordinating efforts where possible. 37 In doing so Macmillan believed "that 
America would help Britain preserve some international influence despite the 
manifest weakness of the British economy". 38 At Bermuda he dressed up 
Britain's remaining political clout, telling Eisenhower "You need us: for 
ourselves; for Commonwealth and as leaders of Europe. Powerful as you are, 
don't believe you can do it alone". 39 
In November 1957 Macmillan was pleased to announce that Eisenhower 
and he had reached a 'Declaration of Common Purpose' in which the importance 
37 Ashton, N (2005) "Harold Macmillan and the 'Golden Days' of Anglo-American Relations 
Revisited, 1957-63" [online] London: LSE research online, 
http: //eprints. ise. ac. uk/archive/00000740/ accessed 05/09/06, p4; Originally published in 
Diplomatic History, vol. 29.4, pp691-723 
38 Turner, Macmillan, p128 
39 Geelhoed, E. B. and Anthony Edmonds, (2003) Eisenhower, Macmillan and Allied Unity, 
1957-1961, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p15; Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p252 
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of inter-dependence was agreed and that common tasks should be shared 
between the UK and the US. 40 Expansive in his tone, Macmillan was keen to 
establish many joint working parties across departments and at all levels to 
ensure the longevity of this 'interdependence'. He was also keen for co- 
ordination by all departments with the Foreign Office to ensure the smooth 
operation of the declaration .41 It was a significant coup in restoring Anglo- 
American relations and was part of a strategy of resurrecting the embedded 
nature of Anglo-American relations from the war. 42 By the end of the year 
Macmillan was pleased to report that a letter from Eisenhower was indicative of 
a renewed desire by the United States to want to work closely with the United 
Kingdom. 43 In short, Macmillan felt he was able to demonstrate that his strategy 
of lassoing the US into British defensive concerns was proving effective. 
A second strategy deployed by Macmillan to secure the basis of restored 
Anglo-American relations was in establishing American involvement in the 
Middle East. Despite defeat over Suez, Macmillan had identified the importance 
of retaining access to the Canal for trade, and access to the Commonwealth and 
Empire and oil. The Baghdad Pact of 1955 formed Britain's Middle Eastern 
policy but its ability to assure it was weak since it lacked American membership. 
Consisting of Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran and Britain, it had American support 
40 PRO: CAB 129/90 C(57) 27 ], 'Anglo-American Co-operation', 15/11/57 
41 PRO: CAB 129/90 C(57) 27 1, 'Anglo-American Co-operation', 15/11/57 
42 Ashton, "Harold Macmillan", p 12 
43 PRO: CAB 128/31,86(l), 31/12/1957 
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in principle but they had made it a condition of their support in the Middle East 
that Britain withdrew from the Canal Zone. 44 
The Eisenhower Doctrine in January 1957 gave an American 
commitment to help any state which asked for its assistance from the threat of 
Communist aggression specifically in the Middle East. Macmillan was still 
searching for a greater American presence in the region to protect its own assets 
and access to oil fields. In his opening address at the Bermuda Conference, 
Macmillan had raised this first -declaring the "life of Europe" depended on the 
Middle East. 45 Yet he did not achieve any further commitment to the Middle 
East, exposing the limitations of 
: 
British diplomacy. It was not until the following 
year that the US entered into the Baghdad Pact, prompted by the military coup 
d'etat in Iraq. 46 In the meantime, American fears of communism in Syria 
resulted in an agreement to a joint working party with Britain to thwart such an 
outcome, forming the basis of the Declaration of Common Purpose just two 
months later. 
47 
Third, Macmillan and Lloyd also sought to restore Britain's nuclear 
status, first by retaining an independent deterrent and second, by repealing the 
McMahon Act of 1946 to allow the sharing of nuclear information. The decision 
to opt for a nuclear deterrent as the centrepiece of defence policy was formalised 
in the Sandys White Paper of 1957. Macmillan's appointment of Sandys was 
44 Julian Amery, in 'The Move Towards The Sandys White Paper of 1957', seminar held July 
1988, (Institute of Contemporary British History, 2002, 
hilp: H, vww. icbh. ac. uk/icbhlwitness/sandys , p20 45 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p251 
46 PRO: CAB 128/32 C. M. (58), 63(l), 22/07/58; CAB 128132 C. M. (58), 65(3), 29/07/58 
47 For the extent to which Macmillan and Eisenhower were prepared to go, see: The Guardian, 
27/09/03 
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also the first step of a strategic change in Whitehall to create uniformity between 
the disparate defence intereStS. 48 Economic considerations were high in defence 
strategy, and so too were the twin political beliefs that an independent nuclear 
deterrent would provide a point of equivalence between the US and Britain, and 
second, the continuing fear stemming from the inter-war years that the 
Americans might at some point adopt an isolationist stance. 49 
The Bermuda Conference provided the conclusion to discussions over 
the placement of American Thor intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) 
on UK soil. It was not the nuclear equality that had been searched for since the 
McMahon Act of 1946. This would not be achieved until the launch of the 
Soviet satellite, Sputnik, in October 1957, prompting a rapprochement of 
American interests with those of Britain. Macmillan tried to capitalise on 
Sputnik's launch within the week, linking the effectiveness of the recent Anglo- 
American partnership over Syria with the threat posed by Sputnik: "I would like 
to see this sort of cooperation continued with a view to our working out together 
the role of the free countries in the struggle against communist Russia". 50 In 
private, Macmillan welcomed the crisis brought by Sputnik, noting that it was 
nt- akin to "Pearl Harbour. The American cocksureness is shaken ... President is 
under attack for first time". 
51 
'8 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p244 
49 Richard Powell, in 'The Move Towards The Sandys White Paper of 1957', seminar held July 
1988, (Institute of Contemporary British History, 2002, 
http: //www. icbh. ac. uk/icbh/witness/sandys), p38 
50 PRO: PREM 11/2461, Macmillan to Eisenhower, 10/10/57 
51 Harold Macmillan Diary, 23/10/57, quoted in Ashton, "Harold Macmillan", pI0 
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Macmillan describes this period in his autobiography as a honeymoon. 52 
Indeed, the rapprochement gained during 1957 only highlighted the extent to 
which relations gradually diverged over the subsequent years as British 
representations to America were less obligingly met. Macmillan finally modified 
his belief in his ability to influence Eisenhower when he could not persuade the 
President to apologise over the U2 spy plane incident just prior to the Paris 
summit of May 1960.53 
Finally, Macmillan also sought to use a restored Anglo-American 
relationship by attempting to carve a niche in summitry and detente as the Cold 
War threatened to spiral. It was a mediating role that Churchill had attempted to 
establish after the war. Macmillan took this role and in the nuclear context added 
d6tente as the alternative to an expansive nuclear programme. With the 
Declaration of Common Purpose, Macmillan believed that the newly established 
relationship would mean Washington's acquiescence over this role as bridge- 
builder between the superpowers. 
There were additional reasons for the attraction to this role namely an 
increase in tensions in 1958 in Cold War politics, particularly over Berlin and an 
impending election in 1959. To this end Macmillan had more success with 
Khrushchev than Eisenhower. While Khrushchev accepted a summit meeting 
instead of the deadline over Berlin, Eisenhower scuppered Macmillan's chances 
of securing a deal at the Paris summit in 1960 by refusing to apologise for the 
52 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, chapter 10. 
5' Ashton, "Harold Macmillan", p 13; for more on this see: John Baylis, (200 1), 'Exchanging 
Nuclear Secrets: Laying the Foundations of the Anglo-American Nuclear Relationship', 
Diplomatic History, vol. 25.1, pp55-61 
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downing of an American U2 spy-plane over Soviet airspace. The collapse of the 
summit was underlined by the open-topped ride in which Eisenhower had 
invited Macmillan. Macmillan interpreted this as a sign to the Soviet Union that 
the collapse of the summit would not affect Anglo-American relations whereas it 
could equally have meant an American resumption of control in the relationship. 
Macmillan was aware of this, his disillusionment with Anglo-American relations 
shared with Lloyd saying he could no longer "usefully talk to the Americans". 54 
It was for Macmillan both a tragedy and an epiphany, moving away from the 
Americans towards Europe through a 'hedging strategy' in which ties with 
Washington would remain while a more secure future was established in Europe. 
5.4.2 End of Empire 
Macmillan redefined Britain's relationship with the Empire, the 
cornerstone of Conservative beliefs in national greatness. Three factors 
prompted a redefinition of this relationship: the strategic value of Empire in 
defence terms, the economic costs of maintaining an empire and the response to 
political changes within the Empire. Three events demonstrated this shift in 
belief. the Sandys White Paper of 1957, changes in British currency relations, 
and Macmillan's 'Winds of Change' speech in February 1960. 
First, Macmillan's opening statement as Prime Minister was to 
reformulate Britain's defence policy through the Sandys' White Paper of March 
1957. The shift towards making nuclear arms the centrepiece of defence policy 
had been touted for some years and the call for cuts in conventional forces had 
54 PRO: F0371/152128, Macmillan to Lloyd, 24/05/60 
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been raised intermittently for at least four years. 55 The burden of defence costs 
was identified as a key reason for the sluggish economic revival since the war. 56 
Macmillan gave Sandys wide-ranging powers to achieve cuts in costs, predicted 
by the incoming Chancellor, Thorneycroft, as exceeding fl. 5 billion. This was 
of some importance since the budget was suffering a deficit of E500m. 57 
The major objectives of the defence White Paper were to "have the 
minimum forces needed to defend and maintain order in British colonies and 
protectorates; ... play a role in preventing world war by creating a 'British 
element of nuclear deterrent power'; and ... to play a modest part with other 
Commonwealth countries and allies in SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. , 58 It 
signalled the end of national service as the least cost-effective part of military 
spending. 59 The forces were due to be cut from 770,000 to 380,000, although 
bitter arguments with the Chiefs of Staff produced a brake on these numbers. 
Those imperial outposts of greatest value to Britain were also those where the 
"determination to perpetuate her control was particularly marked". 60 
Second, the post-war reformulation of the Empire was as a bulwark 
against communist expansion and as the base for Britain's economic recovery. 
These served to sustain the 'three circles' concept. The idea of reforming the 
Chronology, 'The Move Towards The Sandys White Paper of 1957', 
iitness/sandys), p 14 
56 Richard Powell in 'The Move Towards The Sandys White Paper of 1957', 
http: //mww. icbh. ac. uk/icbh/witness/sandys , p19 57 Chronology, 'The Move Towards The Sandys White Paper of 1957' 
http: //www. icbh. ac. uk/icbh/witness/sandys , p14 5' Chronology, 'The Move Towards The Sandys White Paper of 1957', 
http: //www. icbh. ac. uk/icbh/witness/sandys , p15 59 Richard Powell, in 'The Move Towards The Sandys White Paper of 19571 
Atness/sandys), p55 
60 Cain, P. J and A. G Hopkins (1993) British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 1914-1990, 
London: Longman, p280 
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remaining Empire was gradually abandoned despite the revival of imperial 
relations being integral to Britain's economic recovery up tol955. However, the 
recovery was fragile in comparison to booming European countries. By 1958 it 
was calculated that the British economy had more to gain from invisible earnings 
from the wider world than from those within the Sterling Area. 61 
The decision to forge ahead with convertibility in 1958 was based on 
recognising the waning power of the Sterling Area, the rise of Japan and 
Western European economic growth itself driven by trade between industrial 
powers. It was coupled with an attempt to establish Sterling's credibility as a 
second currency. In the run up to convertibility, Imperial Preference was 
discarded as an effective instrument of economic policy. Capital investment had 
been shifting from traditional imperial areas to Europe and the US throughout 
the 1950s resulting in even less importance attributed to the Sterling Area. By 
"the close of the 1950s, it was apparent that Britain's future international 
economic policy could no longer be based on the Commonwealth, still less on its 
colonial component". 62 For Sterling to achieve success it needed to be tied with 
the European revival and to discard colonies while keeping them close to 
Sterling and 'friendly' to the West. "Constitutional concessions offered a cheap 
and ideologically congenial alternative, as well as being an increasingly 
necessary response to nationalist pressures". 63 
The difficulty between supporting the pound and continuing a world role 
surfaced as the ability to maintain both diverged. The Empire was becoming 
" Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p266 
6' Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p285 
61 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p287-8 
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costly, not only in terms of its own defence but in terms of Sterling balances and 
diminishing trade. For Macmillan, the decision between pound and Empire was 
made at Suez, his defence review indicative of this direction. By the time he 
made his 'Winds of Change' speech, he was reacting to events rather than 
hinting at the imminence of them. As one contemporary remarked, "The 
political-military commitments remained. We lagged behind the zeitgeist". 64 
Third, Macmillan's 'Winds of Change' speech precipitated the 
independence of the majority of British colonies in Africa. Macmillan had made 
the speech at Accra in Ghana in January 1957, but it was not until he made the 
saine speech in South Africa that attention was drawn to the magnitude of what 
he was proposing. For Macmillan was not only proposing African nationalism in 
states where the white settler numbers were insignificant, but also in states 
where the powerful white minority had hitherto enjoyed protection through 
British imperial policy. 
Macmillan's use of language was important for it allowed no ambiguity 
and served to reinforce many times over the simple message of the speech. 
Likening African nationalism to that of European nationalism, Macmillan could 
not fail to draw attention to the end of Empire; the first being the Roman Empire, 
and, by implication, the second being the British Empire. 'Ihe use of the word 
'fact' was repeated: "The wind of change is blowing through this continent, and 
whether we like it or not this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. 
We must accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it". 
'4 T. G. C. James in 'The Move Towards The Sandys White Paper of 1957', seminar held July 
1988, (Institute of Contemporary British History, 2002, 
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Again later he stated, "As I have said, the growth of national consciousness in 
Africa is a political fact and we must accept it as such" . 
65 
Macmillan's implied message was that failure to accept it as such would 
ultimately lead to these states being drawn towards communism. He linked 
African nationalism with the Cold War struggle, stating that the world was 
divided into three: the west, the communist countries, and the undecided. Africa 
and Asia fell into the third group and Macmillan mused where they would be 
drawn. Pressing the 'One World' concept, Macmillan claimed "no country, not 
even the greatest, can live for itself alone". 66 It was the 'one nation at home and 
abroad' tradition of Conservative belief rearticulated to draw back towards the 
Commonwealth those countries that would seek independence. The 
Commonwealth was linked to the organic tradition of Conservative thought. 
The issue of Empire was deeply sensitive at home. The Suez Group had 
already formed a hardened resistance on the right. While the Party was licking 
its wounds, Greek claims on Cyprus in March 1957 inflamed the right of the 
Party again and resulted in Salisbury's resignation. Macmillan made a conscious 
decision to minimise African policy over the next few years. 67 It was not until 
after the general election in October 1959 that Macmillan refocused on Imperial 
policy, appointing Macleod as Colonial Secretary tasked with the hastening of 
decolonisation. Meanwhile Macmillan scheduled a month long tour of Africa, 
culminating in the speech. 
" Macmillan, H (1960) The Prime Minister onAfrica's Problems, London: CCO 
61 Macmillan, The Prime Minister onAfrica's Problems, p 11,14 
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The fall-out at home produced the Monday Club, a right-wing pro- 
Empire ginger group, and a campaign waged by Salisbury against Macmillan 
which threatened to divide the Government over the following year. 68 Salisbury 
established the 'Watching Committee' in December 1960 which had its roots in 
the anti-India Bill agitation of the 1930s. 69 In its original incarnation it had 
caused deep division within the Party, so its ambit was clear. 70 Dissent focused 
on one area of decolonization, Macmillan's effective dissolution of the Central 
Africa Federation. Throughout the autumn of 1961, membership of the Watching 
Committee increased, resulting in Cabinet division. Finally the crisis fizzled out 
and while Macmillan was left relatively unharmed, Salisbury and his acolytes 
were left marginalized. 
5.4.3. Europe 
Macmillan and Lloyd's evolution of beliefs over Europe experienced 
significant change. These fall into three phases. The first was the rejection of 
Lloyd's 'Grand Design' in favour of Plan G. The second was Macmillan and 
Lloyd's attempt to secure Plan G: the European Free Trade Area's (EFTA) 
success by seeking a link with the EEC. The third was the abandonment of 
EFTA in favour of EEC membership. 
68 For a detailed account of this see Ball, S. J. (2005) 'Banquo's Ghost: Lord Salisbury, Harold 
Macmillan, and the High Politics of Decolonisation, 1957-1963', Twentieth Century History, vol. 
16.1, pp74-102, 
69 Ball, 'Banquo's Ghost', p88 
70 Ball, 'Banquo's Ghost', p88-9 
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The first phase defining Macmillan and Lloyd's beliefs was the 
emergence of Plan G and Lloyd's counter-proposal of the 'Grand Design'. Plan 
G emerged as a response to the Treaty of Rome negotiations and became 
Conservative policy in the summer of 1956, gaining Parliamentary support that 
November. 71 Its purpose was to form a ring around the EEC which, excluding 
agriculture, would gradually eliminate tariffs; allow members freedom of action 
over external tariffs and imports within the rules of GATT; and aim for the 
continuation of Imperial Preference. 72 Plan G was a strategic but meaningful 
proposal, formulated to serve British interests but also offering an alternative to 
the EEC which itself would not be attractive to all members of the OEEC. It was 
formulated to allow Britain to continue with her own external links. 
In the post-Suez tumult however, Selwyn Lloyd presented an alternative 
policy at the NATO Council in December 1956; the idea of a 'Grand Design'. 
He "saw a grand design now emerging for [the] Atlantic Community made up of 
three elements: 
(1) high military and political directorate as represented by WEU and NATO; 
(2) economic co-operation under and associated with the OEEC [including the 
ECSC and EPU, the projected EEC and Euratom]; 
(3) single assembly in Parliamentary lines". 73 
In January 1957 he expanded in Cabinet the idea of a 'Grand Design', 
also known as "Co-operation with Western Europe", opening with the 
" Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p67 
71 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p80 
73 Telegram from US delegate, NAC to State Department, 13/12/56, Department of State Central 
Files, 740.5/12-1356, National Archives and Records Administrations, Washington D. C., quoted 
in Kane, Liz (1997) 'Europe or the Atlantic Community? The Foreign office and Europe, 1955- 
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acknowledgement that "two great powers, America and Russia, now 
immeasurably outstrip all others". To be a member of this club required, in 
Lloyd's view, the ability to construct and deploy nuclear arms: 
A country which wishes to play the role of a great power must not only 
possess certain conventional forces. It must also have the power to use 
the whole range of thermo-nuclear weapons ... Britain cannot herself go 
the whole distance. If we try to do so we will bankrupt ourselves. 74 
For Lloyd the choice was clear, either go it alone and have "an insufficient 
stockpile and inadequate means of delivery or we must seek to achieve our end 
by other means ýq . 
75 
Lloyd presented a dramatic rearticulation of British foreign policy 
choices in the light of Suez, going much Rifther than Plan G in its limited 
economic form. The 'Grand Design' proposed a western European political and 
military association from which Britain could regain her role as a world class 
power in thermo-nuclear arms. From this, Lloyd clearly believed Britain would 
lead the European states to form a collective third power, not as a third force, but 
integrated into the NATO framework: "the high political and strategic direction 
would remain in NATO as long as the Americans remained there". 76 
For Lloyd, this was the perfect solution to retaining the balance of the 
'three circles'. Britain would naturally lead this military European group because 
of prior knowledge and research "therefore we should be in a strong position to 
see that the arrangements were made on our terms". It gave Britain the 
74 PRO: CAB 129/84 C. P. (57) 6, 'The Grand Design', 05/01/57 
75 PRO: CAB 129/84 C. P. (57) 6, 'The Grand Design', 05/01/57 
76 PRO: CAB 129/84 C. P. (57) 6, 'The Grand Design', 05/01/57 
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opportunity to reclaim the political leadership of Europe which was seen as 
drifting away: "the political advantages would be solid. [The Five] and probably 
the present French Government would welcome the proposal. They have always 
wanted us to 'go into Europe"'. It did not even require supranational 
organisations to decide on the use of the nuclear capacity: "the machinery of the 
WEU could serve, developed in due course as was necessary for closer co- 
operation". 77 
Lloyd's proposal was significant for it anticipated the withdrawal of 
America from Europe, but like the Six, sought to present a coherent, feasible and 
pro-active alternative: "While we should not set up as rivals to America, we 
should nevertheless attain some degree of reinsurance against the eventual 
American withdrawal from Europe ... We should take our place where we most 
belong, i. e. in Europe with our immediate neighbours and thereby give greater 
cohesion and strength to Europe. " He remained sensitive to the risks this 
proposal had for nuclear relations with the US and Canada but believed that as 
the basis of the nuclear relationship between the Anglo-Saxon powers was of 
mutual confidence agreement could be reached. The creation of a third nuclear 
grouping had economic benefits with European partners sharing the burden of 
research and development, thus mitigating the balance of payments problem. 
In Cabinet, Lloyd's case failed to move the Cabinet chair and Lord 
President, 'Bobbety' Salisbury. 78 Stating he was "disturbed" by Lloyd's 
proposals, Salisbury returned to the Anglo-American relationship as the "best 
77 PRO: CAB 129/84 C. P. (57) 6, 'The Grand Design', 05/01/57 
78 PRO: CAB128/30 C. M, (57)3,08/01/57 
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hope of securing the free world from Soviet aggression" while Lloyd's proposals 
ran counter to proliferation concerns voiced by the Americans. Finally, Salisbury 
contested Lloyd's belief that nuclear defence would bankrupt Britain, it thus 
being necessary to join with Europe; if America became hostile, as a result, then 
they could block supplies of uranium which would end Britain's nuclear defence 
programme. Furthermore, any attempt to engage with Europeans without full 
disclosure to the Americans was out of the question after Suez. 79 Salisbury had 
support from Commonwealth Secretary, Douglas Home and outgoing Defence 
Minister, Antony Head, Salisbury's prot6g6.80 
The discussions about the 'Grand Design' were important in securing 
Cabinet agreement that closer relations with Europe were necessary since it was 
unsure about the extent to which Britain could reclaim her special status with the 
Americans. Lloyd believed that Britain would be "better able to influence them 
[the Americans] if we were part of an association of Powers which had greater 
political, economic and military strength than we alone could command. We 
ought to be in a position to deal with the United States Government on equal 
terms; and, if that position had now to be founded on economic strength and 
military power, we must seek it through a new association with other 
countries. "81 Lloyd's proposal was an important influence upon strategies 
pursued in the following six months. Liz Kane argues the WEU bomb idea must 
be seen in the context of the Sandys White Paper on defence of March 1957 and 
decisions to improve relations with the Six. 82 These efforts were stunted, until 
79 PRO: CAB128/30 C. M. (57)3,08/01/57 
so Ball, S. J. 'Banquo's Ghost', p77 
81 PRO: CAB128/30 C. M. (57)3,08/01/57 
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May 1957 when a change of strategy was made, by the avowed policy of 
pursuing in parallel the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance and political 
association with the Six. 
The second phase was the attempt to secure the future of Plan G by 
establishing a bridge between it and the EEC. Once Macmillan became Prime 
Minister, an exercise in public relations was undertaken to present Plan G as a 
benign adjunct and not a substitute to the EEC. 
In defence of EFTA, Macmillan argued, "It was then universally believed 
that our obligations to the Commonwealth and our outside interests made it 
impossible for us to adhere to a tightly drawn plan for a Common Market, with 
all its supra-national apparatus". 83 In actuality, he shared Eden's belief in hoping 
for the failure of Messina as " it was against British interests for any grouping to 
exist in Europe which was closer-knit than the grouping to which Britain could 
subscribe"84 Macmillan recognised that in the long-term, the future of Britain's 
economic trade with the Commonwealth would only continue to erode: EFTA 
"[gave] us the opportunity of re-establishing the commercial leadership of 
Europe", while retaining as much of a link with the Commonwealth as possible. 
Simultaneously adding to European security it would also be directly 
advantageous to British industry by opening up new markets in Europe while old 
ones remained. 85 He did recognise that the British position was weak and shared 
Lloyd's belief in the need to develop a political role in Europe which EFTA so 
clearly lacked. Flirting with the idea of supranationalism Macmillan confided in 
" Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p84 
84 Turner, Macmillan, p97-8 
85 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p8l 
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Thomeycroft that the management of EFTA "should be left to a European 
managing board. This might well be called a tsupra-national' institution. But 
does it matter? "86 
Throughout 1957 a strategy of pressurising the Six to negotiate 
association between the EEC and nascent EFTA was followed but stalled until 
ratification of the Treaty of Rome was complete. Attempts to elicit agreements 
before the EEC had completed its own tariff reduction programme were based 
on fears that the British economy would suffer if negotiations over the free trade 
area were not synchronised. 
In the autumn of 1957 negotiations between the Six and Seven opened. 
As member governments were waiting for the Treaty to be ratified, there was an 
impasse on any further negotiation with the idea of EFTA. Macmillan 
anticipated that stalling until ratification would weaken Britain's bargaining 
position. 87 Two strategies failed to save negotiations: concessions on agriculture 
as a precondition to entry of British industrial goods 88 and Macmillan's personal 
diplomacy in meeting with de Gaulle during the summer of 1958, backed by 
correspondence between the two during the autumn. The plan was killed off in 
November 1958. 
Linking EFTA to the EEC demonstrated two distinct sets of interests and 
beliefs between the British and the French. The Suez Crisis created a divergence 
86 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p436 
97 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p436 
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which in France prompted a refocusing of attention on the European project. 
Suez and the Hungarian revolution exposed the fragility of European security. 
The British ceasefire before completing the objectives of the operation in 
particular had left France exposed and the Americans identified as the problem. 89 
In the prelude to Suez two significant changes had already taken place: the 
pursuit of Empire by the Prime Minister, Mollet, left the ground open for the 
centre-right to claim the EEC in which it became successful. The rhetoric by the 
Eisenhower administration in reviewing foreign economic policy signalled a 
future withdrawal from Europe. 90 After Suez, de Gaulle's return to the 
Presidency in December 1958 sealed these changes with a programme of 
establishing an independent France in an independent Europe. 91 In the EEC he 
saw "that France could play the role of Europe and thus acquire greater leverage 
on the world stage. " In short, de Gaulle sought to resurrect Napoleon's 
Continental System, not only to shut out the UK as it had been used originally, 
but to extend this to the United States and to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union. 92 
While Suez had effectively ended the British narrative on the 
conventional Empire, in France it signalled a step change in political confidence. 
This would provoke difficulties for Macmillan and challenged the narrative of 
British leadership in Europe. For instance, in a stinging role reversal of 1950 
when the British refused to participate in the ECSC by requiring detailed 
knowledge over an agreement in principle, de Gaulle rejected Macmillan's 
'9 Pitman, P (2005) "'Un Gdndral qui s'appelle Eisenhower": Atlantic Crisis and the origins of 
the European Economic Community', Journal ofEuropean Integration History, vol. 6.2, PP37-59 
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search for an agreement in principle instead of focusing on the technicalities of 
-C 93 linking of EFTA and the EE . 
The failure to achieve the status of a bridge between the EEC and the 
remaining OEEC states undermined the rationale for EFTA, creating confusion 
over its purpose when it was launched in November 1959. It prompted the third 
phase, paving the way towards opening negotiations for entry into the EEC. 
When EFTA came into existence in May 1960, Macmillan and Lloyd were 
already looking for ways to strengthen economic ties with the Six. Macmillan, 
aware of the shift in political confidence in Europe adopted the language of 
strategic battle: "we are erecting a first line of defence in the economic field 
through the Seven. For the first time since the Napoleonic era the major 
continental powers are united in a positive economic grouping, with 
considerable political aspects, which although not specifically directed against 
the United Kingdom, may have the effect of excluding us both from European 
markets and from consultation in European policy". 
94 
The following year was spent pursuing two strategies. The first was to 
safeguard British industry by applying brakes to the tariff reduction process 
while appealing to American sensibilities over the inequities of the EEC's 
economic and therefore defensive direction. The second was to approach the 
EEC through the prospect of NATO reform, for which de Gaulle had been 
9' Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p457 
94 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p54-5 
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pressing, under tripartitism where France would represent the Six and Britain 
would represent the Commonwealth. 95 
Essential to these strategies was maintaining the role of EFTA for 
leverage but Macmillan conceded that "there was little reason on present 
evidence to suppose that negotiations between the Six and Seven would be any 
more successful than had the original negotiations about a Free Trade Area; the 
96 Seven had really no new ideas to put forward on this subject". 
Tripartitism was reintroduced by Lloyd. In February 1960 he had 
suggested changing "course a little" based on his belief that in the coming years 
the attention of the United States would be ever more drawn to the EEC. He 
argued to Macmillan "our assets are your personal relationship with General de 
Gaulle, the underlying French fear of Germany, and the fact that we do not really 
object to tripartite consultation which they want-At might prevent the 
diminution of our power to influence the Americans". 97 Lloyd's opinion came 
when the Future Policy Study reported that Britain's relative strength was set to 
decline over the next decade, urging a stronger Atlantic Alliance. The rising 
power of the EEC was noted but it concluded "whatever happens, we must not 
find ourselves in a position of having to make a final choice between the two 
93 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p453; PRO PREM 11/2679 'European Economic and Political 
Questions: Meeting Held at Chequers between Prime Minister, Senior Ministers and Officials', 
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sides of the Atlantic. For this it is essential that the American presence in Europe 
was maintained. 
-)M 
Tripartitism was the three-way consultation over nuclear matters between 
France, the UK and the US and was the ace to be used only when other avenues 
were exhausted. These included reworking preferences so as to include the US 
and Canada as a third tier to EFTA's second tier relation to the EEC. Although 
all recognised that this was contrary to the terms of GATT, it was judged that if 
enough powerful participants were game, then GATT would change. 99 The 
possibility of using WEU to engage politically with the EEC was discarded as it 
contravened arrangements with NATO. Reorganising NATO whereby WEU 
ended and the French gained nuclear recognition was too risky for Britain. 100 
Further reformulations of strategy included that the EEC join EFTA; the UK join 
the European Customs Union on condition that imports of Commonwealth 
foodstuffs remained untouched; or another form of EFTA with a common tariff 
but excluding agricultural products. 101 
Since the end of 1959, Lloyd had been pressing Macmillan to support a 
stronger France. Looking to the future, once Adenauer had gone, it was wiser to 
"bend our policy towards this as long as it did not harin us economically nor 
mean the end of NATO". 102 In contrast, Macmillan focused on retaining a 
position of world influence and great power status and in this he identified the 
98 PRO: CAB 129/100 C(60)35, "Future Policy Study, 1960-70 [F. P. (60) 1]", 22/02/60, p4O-l 
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EEC as a greater economic threat than did Lloyd claiming "if the threat really 
were substantial then we must do all that we can to try and thwart it. After all, 
nothing else mattered if there were a danger that our whole economy might be 
imperilled. That was the basis of our national existence". 103 He continued: 
The UK must try to preserve its position as a Great nation with world- 
wide resPonsibilities" and mused "Would we be so threatened by this 
new nation as to require us now to strain the political consequences to 
the utmost to take counter-measures? 104 
Despite Macmillan's bellicose reflections, action was limited to lobbying 
the Six and the US in a bid to create some leverage. A lack of movement forced 
Macmillan to accept the reality of the EEC by signalling a further change of 
strategy with the appointments of Edward Heath and Duncan Sandys. 105 
Anticipating the newly elected President may be more accommodating to the 
British position, Macmillan and Lloyd were quickly disabused. The ace of 
tripartitism was vetoed by Kennedy in January 1961. The following month, 
Heath, with Macmillan's backing, declared to the WEU that Britain was 
"prepared to contemplate a 'fundamental change of principle' in its approach to 
the Common Market and to participate in the political consultations of the Six if 
unanimously invited to do so". Lacking a clear direction, the subsequent months 
were spent assessing the impact on the Commonwealth and where concessions 
should be sought. 106 By June, Macmillan faced an impasse in the renewed 
negotiations between the Six and Seven on any European front while domestic 
103 PRO PREM 11/2679,29/11/59, chronological account, p43 
104 PRO PREM 11/2679,29/11/59, chronological account, p49-50 
"' Heath was appointed as Lord Privy Seal with special responsibilities over Europe and Sandys 
explored the links between Commonwealth and Europe as Commonwealth Secretary. 
Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p317 
116 Macmillan, H (1973) At the End of the Day, London: Macmillan, p5 
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economic pressures mounted. 107 On July 27h Macmillan led the Cabinet 
agreement that Britain should join the EEC remarking "This decision can be 
regarded as a turning-point in our history. " 108 
5.5 Modifications 
The dilemma that faced Macmillan and Lloyd developed progressively 
over the first four years of Macmillan's premiership. The nascent success of the 
EEC provoked three perceived dilemmas for Macmillan and Lloyd. Firstly it 
emptied of meaning the concept of the 'three circles'. Secondly it revealed 
fundamental weaknesses in the Anglo-American relationship. Thirdly it 
threatened to reduce British influence in Europe. 
If Suez had destabilized the narrative of Britain's imPerial role, failure to 
achieve entry into the EEC undermined the narrative of Britain as a power 
broker between states. In this section, we examine the ways in which Macmillan 
and Lloyd responded to the perceived dilemma of the EEC and modifications to 
their beliefs about Britain's interests. We then measure the success of Macmillan 
and Lloyd's ability to establish political argument hegemony and effective party 
management. 
The first dilemma Macmillan and Lloyd faced was not about Europe, but 
how to restore Britain's position after Suez. Macmillan and Lloyd's first strategy 
had been to rearticulate the 'three circles' concept. They identified the need to 
restore the Anglo-American relationship and undertook two strategies to 
"' Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p374 
10' Macmillan At the End of the Day, pI 
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enhance this in line with British interests: first by formalising attempts to embed 
and share information through working parties between the two countries, 
including nuclear information; and second by entreating American engagement 
in the Middle East. 
Macmillan's success in restoring Anglo-American relations was short- 
lived, experiencing a steady decline and disillusionment in his beliefs about the 
nature of the 'special relationship'. 109 Macmillan and Lloyd shared an acute 
awareness of the vulnerability of the British position in relation to the United 
States precipitating the shift in beliefs underpinning the move towards Europe. " 0 
The failure to establish an Anglo-American alliance which at least sustained the 
appearance of the 'three circles' provoked a re-direction of strategy. The 
decisive moment where Macmillan modified his beliefs were over his impotence 
at securing an American apology over the U2 spy plane incident. ' 1 
In order to restore Britain's international status after Suez, Macmillan 
modified his beliefs about the second circle, Empire. The narrative of Empire 
became focused on its value as an economic and strategic asset, its defensive 
role waning since the early 1950s. To underline this new role of Empire, 
Macmillan commissioned Sandys to formulate the defence White Paper. This 
made clear three changes to the future of British military commitments and its 
impact on Empire. By cutting conventional forces more territorial areas would 
become indefensible. Adopting nuclear weapons as the centrepiece of defence 
policy meant a decisive shift away from non-strategic areas of the Empire. The 
"' Ashton, "Harold Macmillan", p5-7 
110 PRO: PREM/2679, Macmillan to Lloyd, 22/10/57 
1" Macmillan, H (1972) Pointing the Way, 1959-61, London: Macmillan, p208 
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harmonisation of departments concerned with defence and military matters 
reflected a contraction of Britain's global presence. 
While Lloyd and Macmillan were both sensitive to restoring Britain's 
international position after Suez, Imperial defence was an area jettisoned as 
being too costly to maintain. Instead, by pursuing a nuclear policy, the essential 
great power status was retained. It was a modification of Britain's great power 
role; shifting from the traditionally large conventional army to a much smaller 
army supplemented by nuclear arms. 
A second strategy to counter indigenous nationalism was to avoid the 
French experience and take the lead in presenting the end of Empire. While it 
was possible to sustain the illusion of great power status temporarily, the 
political corollary was the rise of colonial nationalism. This forced a further 
modification of belief; if economic ties were sought elsewhere and defence 
policy had shifted away from the traditional Empire role, politically it became 
indefensible to sustain any links by force. Macmillan's 'Winds of Change' 
speech reflected this modification of belief. Significantly, he also presented a 
reformulation of the traditional Conservative foreign policy belief of one nation 
at home and abroad in light of these changes, with the slogan of One World. 
Cultivating relations by appealing to colonial states to choose the democratic 
path, and through evolutionary means to become independent of Empire 
Macmillan's vision was of interdependence in one world. 
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Finally, Macmillan and Lloyd responded to the emergence of the EEC by 
deploying several strategies. Lloyd initially used the afterinath of Suez to present 
an ambitious reformulation of British European policy. By articulating his 
'Grand Design, he sought to link Britain and Europe beyond merely economic 
terms and to include a coherent defensive arrangement and a political dimension. 
It lacked support within Cabinet although Lloyd continued to press for a greater 
British political presence in Europe. 
Macmillan and Lloyd implemented the accepted policy of Plan G which 
had been agreed before Suez. EFTA was recognised as weak by Macmillan and 
Lloyd by its timing in relation to ratification of the Treaty of Rome and by its 
exclusion of agricultural goods. The importance of securing this link precipitated 
modifications over exclusions of agriculture and the intervention of personal 
diplomacy. 
The failure to establish EFTA as a bridge prompted further modifications 
and strategies with which to boost the British position. The rapid appraisal of 
various other arrangements which could sustain the British position were 
rejected for falling foul of international agreements or being too risky. By 
relying on direct appeals to the American administration, Macmillan and Lloyd 
were left with no more options once the possibility of tripartitism was removed. 
When it came to party management, creating acceptance for Plan G 
revealed some resistance within Cabinet as some Ministers thought such an 
arrangement was still too close to Europe. Macmillan sought to counter criticism 
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at the Party Conference in 1957 with a direct appeal to tradition: "Our party has 
never been afraid of new ideas, from Benjamin Disraeli to Joseph Chamberlain. 
While our opponents still cling with all the fervour of bigoted devotees, to the 
obsolete dogmas of an outworn socialist creed, we must reach out into new and 
dramatic fields of endeavour. We must not live in the past, but for the future". 112 
Linking past and present, Macmillan sought to identify the flexibility and 
pragmatism of Conservative traditions. As the cornerstone of British European 
policy, it was articulated in tenns of the 'three circles' providing not a break 
with the past but a modification of the stresses placed upon each circle of 
interest. 
In terms of establishing political argument hegemony, Macmillan's 
address to Parliament in November 1956 made clear this continued reliance on 
the rhetoric of the 'three circles' when he drew attention to Britain's "triple 
duties". 1 13 Of the Commonwealth he stated that there continued to be strong 
emotional, economic and financial ties. Of Europe he recognised the 
geographical link and the historical link with the continent. Finally, of America 
he reiterated without a sense of irony the 'great alliance' between the two 
nations despite the current circumstances. 114 Plan G was accepted by Parliament. 
Plan G did not threaten the concept of the 'three circles' and was 
acceptable as it protected British business, retained close relations with Europe 
without federalist measures and did not affect relations with the US or 
Commonwealth. Of Lloyd's 'Grand Design', the Cabinet disquiet was greater 
112 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p87 
1" Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p87 
114 Hansard, (1956) vol 560,26/11/1956; the speech was delivered amidst the Suez crisis 
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and it was rejected as contrary to the 'three circles' concept for potentially 
threatening the Anglo-American alliance. This did not become an issue of party 
management or of establishing any political argument hegemony since it was 
cast off as a serious policy proposal by Cabinet heavyweights. 
The greatest challenge to party management, and over which there 
existed little political argument hegemony, was the decision to end Empire. Here 
we can trace the difficulties of Party management to members of the Suez Group 
and to the bitter relationship between Macmillan and Salisbury which resulted in 
the establishment of the Monday Club and Salisbury's support of the Watching 
Committee, which through stoking the fires of discontent sought to undermine 
Macmillan's authority on Africa. Macmillan was under pressure during 1961 as 
opinion mounted against him from the right of the Conservative Party. Leading a 
divided Cabinet, Macmillan was able to overcome division and dissent, 
effectively marginalising Salisbury in the process. Macmillan was unable 
however to establish an easy dominance in the debate over the end of Empire. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to apply Bevir's interpretative theory to the 
Conservative Goverment of 1957-63. This was done by tracing the conceptual 
and temporal links that tied Harold Macmillan's beliefs to the tradition of Whig 
Paternalism and Selwyn Lloyd's beliefs to the tradition of the modified patriotic 
right. By outlining the historical context, it was possible to identify the perceived 
dilemma of the EEC. This showed that Macmillan and Lloyd engaged in a 
process of rapid redefinition of the increasingly beleaguered 'three circles' 
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concept resulting in accepting the need for membership of the EEC. It was also 
demonstrated that this process of modification was incremental, and retained 
significant emotional attachments to elements of the 'three circles' concept. 
Finally, it was argued that modifications of belief by Macmillan and Lloyd were 
initially relatively successful within the Party but that a significant section of the 
public were umnoved by the shift from Empire to Europe. 
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Chapter Six 
The Labour Party 1955-1963 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the beliefs of the Labour Party leader, Hugh 
Gaitskell, and the spokesperson on defence, Denis Healey. It is argued that 
Gaitskell and Healey held beliefs expressive of the tradition of democratic 
socialism. The dilemma Gaitskell and Healey faced was over management of 
the direction of the Party which in turn shaped their responses to European 
policy. The chapter begins by tracing the conceptual and temporal links that tie 
Gaitskell and Healey to the tradition of democratic socialism. It then provides a 
contextual summary of the period, 1955-1964. Finally we measure the success 
of the two men's response to the dilemma by their effect on party management 
and the political argument hegemony. 
6.2 Elite Beliefs 
In chapter three, Attlee and Bevin modified the content of Labour's 
foreign policy traditions by formalising the rejection of anti-militarism and anti- 
capitalism and by fleshing out a new internationalism. To identify the beliefs of 
Gaitskell and Healey it is first necessary to trace the transmission of relevant 
ideas, identifying both the temporal and conceptual links in the webs of beliefs 
of the relevant individuals. 
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6.2.1 Hugh Gaitskell' 
Gaitskell is regarded as the best and most influential representative of the 
democratic socialist tradition within the Labour Party. 2 An academic, he became 
Private Secretary to Hugh Dalton as Minister of Economic Warfare in 1940 and 
then Dalton's Personal Assistant at the Board of Trade in 1942. Elected MP for 
Leeds South in 1945 until his death in 1963, he rose from Parliamentary 
Secretary to Emanuel Shinwell in 1946, to Minister of Fuel and Power in 1947, 
Minister of State to the Treasury in February 1950 and then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer the same October. By 1955, he replaced Attlee as leader of the Party. 
Gaitskell's background was affluent. With a history of public service 
either in the military or the civil service Brivati argues, "Hugh Gaitskell ... was 
not born into the Labour Movement; his world was defined by the British 
Empire [and] that unique middle-class internationalism which the Empire 
created". 3 Gaitskell was influenced by his father's conscientiousness in politics 
lif 
.4 and his mother's vivacity in his social e Educated at the Dragon Preparatory 
School in Oxford, Gaitskell went onto Winchester in 1918 and in 1924 to New 
College, Oxford, where he made significant friendships with Evan Durbiný, 
Frank Pakenham, 6 and the Coles. 7 
Hugh Todd Naylor Gaitskell (1906-1963) 
Cook and Stevenson, Britain Since 1945, p234; Williams, P (1982) Hugh Gaitskell, Oxford: 
OUP, pix 
3 Brivati, B (1997) Hugh Gaitskell London: Fichard Cohen Books, p 1,2 
4 Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p4 
5 Durbin, E. F. M. (190648), Labour Party intellectual after abandoning Gladstonian Liberalism 
for democratic socialism, Durbin lectured at the LSE, was close in intellectual outlook and 
friends with Gaitskell, working together during the Attlee governments before his early death. 
' Pakenham, Frank (1905-2001), later Lord Longford. Labour politician and philanthropist, 
whose socially inclined work was underpinned by his Christian faith. Later in Wilson's cabinet, 
but resigned in 1968. 
' Cole, GDH (1889-1959), Historian and socialist political theorist who collaborated with his 
wife, Margaret, (1893-1980). 
221 
Labour 1955-1963 
We can trace beliefs which tie Gaitskell conceptually and temporally to 
the tradition of democratic socialism. This can be demonstrated in three ways: 
the influence of the General Strike; the development of his thought on 
economics; and the impact of 1930s appeasement. 
First, the General Strike of 1926 affected Gaitskell as an event which 
Brivati describes as a "defining experience [that] entirely shifted his priorities". 
It tapped into his inherited family beliefs, and resonated with the adoption at 
university of logical positivism. Accordingly, his biographer notes "He was not 
born a socialist but he chose socialism and in turn socialism allowed him to 
combine features of his character successfully". This was possible because "it 
gave him an identity that liberated him from his family and his class, while 
combining strong rational arguments for change with strong emotional 
attachments and moral certainty that the cause was j ust' '. 9 
His shift was immediate with an offer, through the Coles, to help the 
strikers, and cemented through consequent links with senior Labour and union 
leaders. After the Strike, Gaitskell aligned himself with Cole and articulated his 
beliefs on the nature of class, politics and revolution. Rejecting revolt for 
moderate gains, he advocated a pact between classes which would see the 
middle class lead the working class on a platform of middle class ideas. 10 Such 
was the persuasiveness of Gaitskell's views that the teacher-pupil relationship 
between him and Cole became reversed by 1929.11 
8 Brivati, Gaitskell, p17 
'Brivati, Gaitskell, p 17 
10 Gaitskell, H (1929) Chartism London: Longman; Brivati, Gaitskell, p 18-9 
11 Wi II iams, Hugh Galtskell, p25 
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Second, Gaitskell studied economics at university, and returned to the 
subject as a lecturer at University College London, immersing him in the trend 
of Keynesian thinking. He injected realism into his hitherto utopian socialism. 12 
Credited with influencing Dalton's beliefs on economics, he also met Evan 
Durbin again. Both were introduced to the XYZ Club in the early thirties by 
Dalton, a club set up to avoid a repeat of the last Labour Government's 
disastrous relations with the City. 13 By now Gaitskell's beliefs had developed to 
adopt Keynesian demand management and not public ownership as the means to 
improve economic relations. 14 In this respect, Gaitskell's beliefs had developed 
further than those held by the Labour leadership whose cardinal tenet had been 
public ownership since before the Constitution was written. 
In 1945, this became evident as the Party withdrew from the more 
nuanced Keynesianism inherent in the Immediate Programme of 1937 in favour 
of the cruder, but more potent symbol of nationalisation. Although Gaitskell 
embraced these policies, once the opportunity arose he challenged their 
substance and was pivotal in outlining the need for the devaluation of Sterling in 
1949. It was regarded as a necessity to boost exports, but also to counter the 
15 memories of the Labour Government's experiences of 1931. In this he was 
joined by Jay and Wilson. It was during this time that a shift of beliefs on the 
future of Labour's economic policy was forming the bedrock of revisionism in 
12 Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p33 
" Brivati, Gaitskell, p26 
14 Brivati, Gailskell, p28 
" Brivati, Gaitskell, p84 
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the 1950s. 16 While the issue of nationalisation remained under the Morrisonian 
model, it did not allow for the socialisation of industry, merely the shift of 
control from private hands to the state. 17 However, Gaitskell was already 
showing signs of Tawney's influence" in shifting his focus on to equality rather 
than public ownership-19 Once Gaitskell became leader his attempts to move the 
Party towards redefining its relationship towards Keynesian management of the 
economy would eventually culminate in the Clause Four debate. 20 
Third, during the 1930s Gaitskell, like many of his contemporaries, 
flirted with Marxism and support of the Soviet Union. Deliberating over the 
problems facing the Chartists sharpened his thinking over the difficulties of 
revolutionary responses to social inequalities. 21 His belief in the methods and 
approach of democratic socialism was confirmed by spending time in Austria in 
the early 1930s when political opposition was being outlawed, with the 
socialists mainly targeted. 22 Gaitskell became actively involved in helping 
Austrian socialists escape, an experience which made him an "early, consistent 
and passionate anti-appeaser". 23 Gaitskell embraced realpolitik to a degree 
untypical of the Labour Party, developing by the time war broke out, two fixed 
points to his philosophy: first, that Labour needed to pursue the democratic route 
and in doing so it had to maintain independence; and secondly, that in 
16 Brivati, Gaitskell, p86 
17 Herbert Morrison, (1888-1965), was a senior Labour politician. In the war Cabinet and in 
Attlee's governments, Morrison is credited with organising the winning electoral strategy of 
1945 and is also deemed responsible for the nationalisation programme which then followed. 
Is R. H. Tawney, (1880-1962), economist and social critic who was influenced by Christian 
socialism and working in London's East End. Involved in the Worker's Education Association, 
Tawney influenced Labour's economic and ethical thought. 
" Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p48 
20 Brivati, Gaitskell, p83 
21 Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p49 
22 Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p604 
23 Brivati, Gaitskell, p38 
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international relations, democracies had to negotiate from a position of strength. 
As his biographer claims: 
Power was what mattered in this situation ... on the domestic front the 
impotence of the Labour Party after the split of 1931 made unity and 
realism his paramount political principles [while] in international 
relations his natural inclination towards internationalism was 
challenged somewhat by the feebleness of the ... democracies' inability 
to work together against the dictators. 24 
Unlike Attlee's idealised intemationalism, Gaitskell's was qualified, a point 
proved when presented with the opportunity to participate in the British section 
of UNRRA during the war. 25 According to Brivati, 
There was a strong pull on his colonial roots and away from the 
political path he had taken since Oxford. It would have offered a 
constructive way of implementing socialist principles in an 
international setting and would have made him a permanent member of 
the international civil service which developed in the post-war world. 26 
Yet Gaitskell rejected this offer, choosing instead to continue working with 
Dalton. 
The themes that emerge when we trace Gaitskell's beliefs are a patriotic outlook 
and the impact of Bevin's beliefs in shaping the contours of his foreign policy. 
Like Attlee, Gaitskell also believed in respectability in foreign affairs, 
conducted on a strong and moral base. Britain's world role was based on 
Empire, but the relationship was modified, adopting idealism about equality in 
the Commonwealth. We can trace also strong support for the Atlantic Alliance 
formed by a visit to the United States in October 1950 which "crystallised the 
24 Brivati, Gailskell, p4l-2 
" United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
26 Brivati, Gaitskell, p56 
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connection between his patriotism and his pro-Americanism. It was to have 
profound political significance for the remainder of his life". 27 This in turn 
impacted on his beliefs about the Commonwealth "based both on his patriotism 
and on his belief that Britain had a role to play: different, modernised and not 
based on colonial exploitation, but a world role nevertheless ) ". 28 
6.2.2 Denis Healey 29 
Healey's political career began in 1945 as Secretary of the Labour 
Party's International Department. Elected in 1952 as Labour MP for Leeds 
South East, subsequently Leeds East, Healey was spokesperson for Defence in 
1954 and then shadow Minister of Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs in 1959. 
He was later Defence Secretary under Wilson and Chancellor of the Exchequer 
under Callaghan. Healey's background was middle-class, professional and 
driven by self-improvement and influenced of his mother's socialism and his 
father's social liberalism. Educated at Bradford Grammar school and Balliol 
College, Oxford, Healey's early influences were art, music and literature rather 
than politics. 
Healey's relationship with Gaitskell was particularly defined. As the 
architect of the revisionists' defence policy, he articulated a narrow area of 
beliefs. In this chapter, we examine how this role impacted upon Labour's 
broader foreign policy reach. In particular, how Healey's realism impacted on 
the Party's attitude to Europe. 
" Brivati, Gailskell, p 100 
28 Brivati, Gaitskell, p 100 
29 Denis Winston Healey, Baron Healey, (1917-) 
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Healey's beliefs can be tied temporally and conceptually to the tradition 
of democratic socialism. We can identify this in three ways: the effects of 
appeasement, rejection of his early left-wing radicalism; and his role as 
Secretary of the International Department of the Labour Party. 
First, Healey was influenced by the War poets, adopting pacifist beliefs, 
and by the 1930s political upheavals. 30 At University he was a member of 
"perhaps the most political generation in Oxford's history". His early radicalism 
was reflected by his membership of the communist party and campaigning for 
the anti-appeaser and socialist Sandy Lindsay who stood as an Independent 
Progressive in a by-election fought on foreign policy. Healey rejected 
conscription and opposed the Democratic Socialist Party, the result of a split in 
the university's Labour Party and headed by Jenkins, Crosland and Phillip 
Williams. 31 
Second, these beliefs were profoundly modified by war itself. Healey's 
rejection of communism came with the fall of France in 1940 but was supported 
by witnessing the devastation wrought across Europe at first-hand. In a letter to 
the Labour selection committee, he described the wreckage he saw, arguing that 
the defeat of totalitarian leaders such as Hitler and Mussolini was not enough; 
that a "more glorious future" was needed to make up for the "annihilation of the 
past". 32 He no longer had faith in the possibility of communism and, "appalled" 
at the purges in the 1930s, was unconvinced that Stalin intended to honour the 
" Healey, D (1989) The Time qfMy Life, London: Michael Joseph, p2o 
31 Healey, The Time ofMy Life, p38; Phillip Williams, Gaitskell's biographer 
32 Healey, The Time ofMy Life, p67 
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Yalta Agreements. 33 By 1945, Healey had modified his beliefs substantially and 
was showing the nascent signs of his later cold warrior phase. 34 
Third, this transition in belief was sealed and further developed by 
Healey's appointment as Secretary of the International Department of the 
Labour Party. This had two important effects. Firstly it placed Healey at the 
heart of the social democratic leadership and government machinery. He had 
been nominated by Dalton, Laski and Bevan, securing an intellectually broad 
backing. 35 Healey's role consisted of two functions: to rebuild the relationship 
between the Labour Party and socialist parties worldwide; and to act as a bridge 
between the Labour government and the Party on international policy. 36 One of 
Healey's first tasks was to amend the Party's constitution at the 1946 
Conference to curtail the influence of the Communist Party. The communists 
had been identified as attempting to infiltrate the trade unions, exploiting their 
block vote and capitalising on increased radicalism in the constituencies. 37 it 
would be the symbolic end of his radical past. 
The second important effect this had was to introduce Healey to the 
nascent revisionist strand which influenced his own outlook on foreign policy. 
Healey became the intellectual successor to Bevin's beliefs about foreign policy 
and gained support from the right in the Party. Becoming defence spokesperson 
33 Healey, The Time ofMy Life, p74,76 
34 Pearce, Denis Healey, p54-56 
35 Pearce, Denis Healey, p64. Harold Laski (1893-1950) was a political theorist and economics 
lecturer at the LSE who was a senior figure in the Labour Party. 
36 Healey, The Time ofMy Life, p74,97 
37 Healey, The Time of My Life, p75; Callaghan, J (2005) 'The Plan to Capture the British 
Labour Party and its Paradoxical Results, 1947-1991', Journal of Contemporary History, 
vo140.4, pp707-725 
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shortly after being elected cemented his position and the direction of the Party's 
strategy despite internal difficulties. This provided a mutual stance between the 
domestic revisionism at home and the realpolitik approach abroad. A keen 
adherent of planning from his time in the army, Healey's attempts to incorporate 
this into his foreign policy approach can be seen by the establishment of the 
Bilderberg Group. 38 
Healey as the mouthpiece to Bevin's foreign policy approach differed in 
his belief in detail, though not in substance. For instance, he did not believe the 
threat of communism to be as strong in Western Europe. His role in re- 
establishing links with socialist groups elsewhere meant he met former 
communists turned moderate socialists. He felt that Western Europe did lack 
capable and effective socialist leaders. 39 Healey also echoed the need to halt 
expansive Soviet foreign policy while conceding that Britain lacked the power 
to act as the traditional arbiter of the European balance of power. Although a 
firm believer in collective security, the experiences of the 1930s qualified its 
meaning. For Healey, the failure of collective security meant that he regarded 
the basic unit of world affairs as the nation state and believed that attempts to 
build international solidarity on a common ideology were fruitless. Furthermore, 
in a world of nation states, order could not be maintained by law alone. Rather, 
through a functional form of co-operation between allies would develop a 
network of interdependence in military and economic affairs so that vested 
interests would come to maintain the co-operation. 40 
's The Bilderberg Group was established in 1954 and meets once a year. Its membership consists 
of European and North American power brokers. Healey was one of the four founder members 
Healey, The Time qfMy Life, p76,92 
Healey, The Time ofMy Life, p98- 100 
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Healey's beliefs were influenced by the works of Hans Morgenthau, 
William Fox and Christian pessimists such as Niebuhr and Herbert Butterfield. 41 
As the mouthpiece of Labour Party foreign policy he was adding theoretical 
depth to a starting point taken by Bevin. The focus of the realist perspective is 
the balance of power and Healey used this to craft a response to Britain's 
declining international power from the late 1940s onwards. 
Gaitskell and Healey's beliefs drew from the tradition of democratic 
socialism, despite their differing interpretations. The 1930s profoundly 
influenced them so the ideal of internationalism became heavily qualified. 
Healey went further than Gaitskell in adopting a hard realist outlook in foreign 
affairs in contrast to the more domestic-oriented Gaitskell. However, they both 
shared the belief in Britain's continued independence in the world and an 
acceptance that in order to maintain that, alignment with the United States was 
necessary. 
6.3 Historical Summary 
To understand why party management became a dilemma for Gaitskell 
and Healey the domestic and international context needs to be outlined. 
Pressures arose within the party as Gaitskell and Healey inherited the Attlee- 
Bevin mantle. This section examines the election manifestoes of the Labour 
Party during the 1950s showing how election defeats reopened old wounds 
which then defined the content of domestic and foreign policy. 
41 Healey, The Time ofMy Life, p 103,99 
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6.3.1 Domestic 
Attlee remained Labour leader after electoral defeat in October 1951 
until December 1955 in a period marked by inertia and latent tensions over the 
future direction of the party between the Bevanite left and Gaitskellite 
revisionists. The party's policy was still rooted in nationalisation, coupled with 
scientific and technical investment to build on the foundations established in 
1945. The 1955 manifesto echoed this safe ground by pledging to continue 
housing subsidies, the provision of health benefits and pensions, the restoration 
of a fully free national health service and abolishing the eleven plus. 42 The 
manifesto argued the Conservatives had failed to achieve a stabilised cost of 
living. Instead Labour linked a stable domestic cost of living with long-term 
trade agreements through the Commonwealth. On this basis, the party proposed 
combating monopolies and restrictive practices in the supply, and improvements 
in the quality of, consumer goods. 
The 1959 manifesto articulated the same themes 43 although Gaitskell had 
introduced some revisionist elements such as enabling home ownership and 
more controversially a promise not to increase income tax to pay for reforms. 
Gaitskell's campaign performance lifted his profile and rallied supporters but it 
also signalled the end of his conciliatory approach in managing the party and 
trade unions. 44 Feeling that appeasing the unions would ultimately lead to 
Labour's demise, he contested their power by challenging a core tenet of 
Labour's constitution, Clause Four; the commitment to the redistribution of the 
42 http: //www, psr. keele. ac. uk/area/uk/man/lab55. htm accessed 21/09/2004 
43 http: //www, psr. keele. ac. uk/area/uk/man/lab59. htm accessed 21/09/2004 
44 Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p307 
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ownership of the means of production. It was an issue over which he would be 
forced to retreat. 
With Gaitskell as leader, the revisionism of the New Fabian Essays 
published in 1952 now found a platform for consolidation, supported by the 
follow-up publication, The Future of Socialism. 45 In this, Crosland argued for 
the use of the mechanisms of Keynesian demand management rather than 
ownership of industry to regulate the economy. 
6.3.2 International 
In 195 1, Labour's aim remained unchanged, declaring in the election 
9 46 manifesto, "We arm to save the peace'. The manifesto restated the link 
between providing a defensive peace with economic assistance, with a focus on 
developing nations. Central to achieving this was a strong international 
presence: "the Labour Government decided without hesitation that Britain must 
play her full part in the strengthening of collective defence. Britain must be 
strong: so must the Commonwealth". 47 In 1955, with the development of the 
hydrogen bomb, Labour's foreign policy plan was threefold: multilateral 
disarmament; the reunification of Germany; and the narrowing of the north- 
south divide between industrialised and developing states. 48 The policies of 
disarmament and development were again features of the 1959 manifesto, 
echoing the Party's commitment to the international rule of law and an armed 
45 Crossman, RHS (ed. ) (1952) New Fabian Essays, London: Turnstile Press; Crosland, CAR 
(1956) The Future ofSocialism, London: Jonathan Cape 
46 http: //www. psr. keele. ac. uk/area/uk/manAab5 l. htm accessed 21/09/2004 
47 http: //www. psr. keele. ac. uk/area/uk/man/lab5l. htm accessed 21/09/2004 
48 Labour Party (1955) Forward With Labour, election manifesto, 
http: //www. psr. keele. ac. uk/area/uk/man/lab55. htm accessed 21/09/2004 
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peace. Just as the right put up Clause Four on the sacrificial altar, the left 
revived its pacifism in the face of nuclear arms races and called for 
unilateralism, thus posing a direct threat to conceptions on the right of the Party 
as to what Britain's international role should be. 
Chapter three discussed the idea of joining the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) as an equal member being alien to Attlee and Bevin's 
beliefs as both understood Britain's role in the world to be still that of a global 
power. Despite challenges to this perception, little change occurred in the Party 
until after Attlee departed. This defined the Party's negative stance on Messina 
despite publicly capitalising on the position adopted by the Conservative 
government. The internal wrangles of the Party ultimately came to define the 
leadership's stance on Europe: the failure to achieve refon-n over Clause Four 
meant the necessity of defeating the left over unilateralism. The Common 
Market then became the cause around which both left and right could unify, and 
that had to be in contrast to the Conservative's positive approaches towards 
membership. 
6.4 Elite Beliefs and Tradition Change 
The perceived dilemma of party management was accepted by Hugh 
Gaitskell and Denis Healey, so prompting modifications of belief about how to 
establish support for a party programme. When Gaitskell and Healey refer to 
party management, they refer to four facets of intra-party dissent. These are: 
German rearmament, Clause Four, unilateralism and membership of the EEC. It 
is argued that when Gaitskell rejected membership of the Common Market in 
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1962 he was jettisoning a weaker, under-articulated and less rooted area of 
belief in favour of the more established belief in internationalism through 
Commonwealth reform. It is proposed that this was the sacrifice around which 
the critical majority could rally to end the internal wrangling between Left and 
Right over the ideational direction of the Party. It is also argued that adopting 
this position afforded Labour important support from the general electorate. 
When we inspect each part of the dilemma we examine: what it was; 
why it was problematic to Gaitskell and Healey; what opposition it garnered and 
from where; and the articulations of the leadership's attitude. 
6.4.1. German Rearmament 
The rehabilitation of Germany meant, for many on the Labour right, the 
rearmament of Germany. However, it also tapped into a wider belief about the 
idea of rearmament which had provoked a schism within the Party in 1951. A 
commitment to rearmament in 1951 was couched in terms which made the 
Labour Party's position on the Cold War definitive: deterrence of Soviet 
aggression to Britain and its interests. In respect of German rearmament, it also 
meant accepting the need to revive Germany as an equal player in European 
economic and military affairs. The issue of German rearmament was the peak of 
a series of flashpoints requiring the clarification of party beliefs. While early 
attempts were made to bridge the gulf between a socialist foreign policy and one 
rooted in realism, the right then went on to set out its own stall against which 
Bevan launched an attack to revive the voice of the left. 
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In the prelude to German rearmament, Socialism and Foreign PoliC 9 
retraced the roots of socialist foreign policy to support of the League of Nations 
and the United Nations as the "keystone of [Labour's] foreign policy", 
reminding its readers of the belief in collective security and upholding the law 
against aggression. 50 While it sought to link policy to principle, the text 
recognised the changed circumstances of Britain meant a more realist than 
idealist foreign policy. 51 Critical of Attlee and Bevin's approach as 
opportunistic 52 it still went on to support the shift towards realism as an "effort 
to see things clearly and to see them whole [which] has already been a healthy 
development". 53 
While this attempted to bridge the cleavage between left and right, the 
revisionists went on to set out their stall. The Socialist Commentary reflected the 
values and direction of the revisionists. 54 It differed from other, mainly left 
wing, periodicals in its outlook on foreign affairs with an "awareness of the 
anarchical nature of international politics and also the irrelevance of an 
ideological approach to it" and as such "dismissed as unattainable a distinctive 
socialist foreign poliCy,,. 55 The Socialist Commentary sought to challenge the 
philosophical position offered by the Marxist and left social democratic school 
" Socialist Union, (May 1953) Socialism and Foreign Policy, London: Book House Limited. 
The foreword was written by Philip Noel Baker (1889-1982), One time PPS to Attlee, Noel- 
Baker was a lifelong advocate of pacifism and disarmament, ultimately earning a Nobel peace 
prize in 1959 for his work, The Arms Race: A Programme for World Disarmament, (1958). 
Arguably, his unshakeable pacifism prevented his ascent to higher office. 
Socialist Union, Socialism and Foreign Policy, p6 
Socialist Union, Socialism andForeign Policy, p9, pI 1-12 
52 Socialist Union, Socialism and Foreign Policy, p32 
" Socialist Union, Socialism and Foreign Policy, p33, italics mine. 
54 Haseler, S (1969) The Gaitskellites: Revisionism in the British Labour Party, 1951-1964, 
London: Macmillan, p73: Gaitskell was one time Treasurer of the wider group, Friends of the 
Socialist Commentary. 
55 Haseler, The Gaitskellites, p72 
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in the Labour movement. Even if a socialist foreign policy could be formulated, 
it argued, it would never be the sole preserve of socialism and instead urged a 
foreign policy for socialism to pursue. 56 
Finally, establishing himself as a major intellectual force behind the 
Party's commitment to collective security, 57 Healey, in his pamphlet, 
Neutralism, 58 attacked the pursuit of neutralism for oscillating between defeated 
passivism and third forcism. "As a practical policy, neutralism is vitiated by its 
failure to meet the need for an international order sufficient to prevent World 
War Three". 59 Healey's attack on neutralism by its implicit link to appeasement 
and thus reference to its failure in the pre-war period was backed up by an attack 
on the ethical claim of its adherents. 60 Healey attacked neutralism as a viable 
policy for its inherent weakness 61 and its "refusal to commit oneself in the 
struggle against Communist expansion in fact means an abdication of 
responsibility to play an active role in progressing beyond power-politics 
towards an intemational society". While the idea of a third force was deemed 
even worse "since it [depended] on dividing the non-Communist camp so as to 
create a new balance of power". 62 
56 Editorial (1952) 'A Socialist Foreign Policy', Socialist Commentary, October, p3 
57 Haseler, The Gailskellites, p73 
" Healey, D (1955) Neutralism, London: Ampersand Ltd. 
59 Healey, Neutralism, p 10- 12 
60 Healey, Neutralism, p 14; displaying virulent anti-Communism, Healey argued that neutralism 
missed the point when it came to dealing with totalitarian states. As their central thesis was 
based on being equidistant from the United States as from the Soviet Union, Healey argued that 
failure to recognize the political limitations of the Soviet system on its subjects was a far greater 
ill than recognition of its economic system. 
" Healey, Neutralism, p45 
62 Healey, Neutralism, p57,58 
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The European Defence Community (EDC) was the brainchild of Monnet 
and Pleven and a response to American pressure for the readmission of 
Germany into the defence system of Europe. Its supranational element meant 
British Government support without involvement. The Labour leadership had 
"thought it responsible" to back the idea of EDC but "in doing so they were 
damaging a solid majority for their foreign policy and weakening the right wing 
of the party". 63 The EDC would become one element within the civil war of the 
party, with the left's opposition to German rearmament gaining wider support 
than with just the Bevanites in Parliament. 64 It tapped into the continuing 
underlying dissent towards foreign policy as defined by the right of the party. 
Once it came to German rearmament, the threat of the past was a potent 
and widespread fear and provided the battleground for the left to claim ground. 
Bevan tested the left's chances by opposing the Paris Agreements, the 
mechanism through which Western Germany was able to rearm. 65 By resigning 
from the Parliamentary Committee to canvass wider support than from his 
loyalists, he was also challenging the right for the succession to Attlee by 
abandoning his secure post as constituency party representative to stand for the 
position of treasurer of the Party, a post widely regarded as a trial run for the 
leadership. 66 Union backing of the right essentially prevented the left and Bevan 
from securing success. Hinton argues that the right was "alarmed by Bevanite 
63 Pearce, Denis Healey, p 160 
64 Radice, G (2002) Friends and Rivals, London: Little, Brown, p8l 
6' This was later Western European Union, WEU 
66 Hinton, J (1983) Labour andSocialism, Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, p 182 
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advances in National Executive elections [they] organised to prevent a 
recurrence of the lurch to the left that had followed the 1931 debacle. , 67 
The core of the right's power in the early 1950s lay in the 'triumvirate' 
of trade union leaders - Arthur Deakin (TGW`U), Tom Williamson (NUGMW), 
and Will Lawther (NUM) - who had established their authority in defending 
Bevin's anti-communist foreign policy ... in the 1940s". 
68 Frustrated by Attlee's 
apparently soft approach to the Bevanites, they swung behind the new rising 
group in the PLP whose leading personality, Gaitskell, had already ensured a 
head-on confrontation with Bevan in 1951. Not only did they manipulate union 
votes to secure a positive vote on German rearmament, they put Gaitskell up for 
the treasury post and later elected him leader. Bevan's appeal beyond his 
immediate supporters, meanwhile, was already waning, with Wilson quickly 
securing Bevan's old place on the executive. 
The 1955 General Election saw Labour's vote fall. 69 When Attlee retired 
in December he felt Gaitskell's right-wing credentials would alienate him as 
leader from the left-wing. 70 However with union backing, Haseler argues: 
It was inevitable that the right wing and moderate elements would 
succeed in electing the Party leader from amongst their own ranks. The 
power-structure of the Party was inherently anti-Left and therefore 
Bevan's candidature was never realistic, at least as an attempt to grasp 
the leadership. 71 
67 H inton, Labour and Socialism, p 190 
6' Hinton, Labour and Socialism, p 182 
69 While the Conservatives increased their majority from 16 to 54, Labour lost 22 seats. In terms 
of the absolute share of the vote, the Conservatives stood at 49.7% while Labour's fell to 46.4%. 
See Cook and Stevenson, Britain Since 1945, p57; Harmer, The Labour Party, p3 6 
70 Dell, E (1999) A Strange Eventful History: Democratic Socialism in Britain London: Harper 
Collins, p284 
71 Haseler, The Gaitskelliles London: MacMillan, p34 
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By December 1955, the revisionists appeared to have won the battle between the 
left and the right. Gaitskell polled 166 votes to Bevan's 70 in the leadership 
election. 72 By creating the Gaitskell-Bevan Axis, the new leader was ensuring 
his neutralisation and discrediting by both left and right. 73 
6.4.2 Clause Four 
The attempt to establish the revisionist ideational approach in domestic 
politics focused on the challenge to Clause Four. It was the attempt to make real 
those goals argued for in New Fabian Essays 74 and The Future of Socialism. 75 
It proposed enacting the redefinition of the Party beliefs and, in turn, British 
Socialism based on a belief that "constructive political action is more than 
simply the erection of ideal political goals. It should also consist of an 
2 76 understanding of the complexities of political practice and action. This had 
wider implications since it marked an attempt to widen the appeal of the Labour 
Party in winning elections by questioning the 'means' and 'ends' of socialist 
policy. Challenging the 'cloth-cap' image of the Party, widening electoral 
appeal, resolving the ambiguity between 'ends' and 'means' and developing an 
economic strategy cognizant of advances made by the Attlee government, were 
themes that underscored the division over Clause Four in the aftermath of the 
general election defeat of 1959. 
72 Harmer, The Labour Party, p6 
73 Hinton, Labour and Socialism, p 183 
74 Crossman New Fabian Essays; Although the New Fabian Essays was the manifesto of the 
6new thinkers', the right of the Party, the series of essays was in fact edited by Crossman, 
amember of the left wing of the Party! 
75 Crosland, The Future ofSocialism 
76 Haseler, The Gaitskellites, p67 
239 
Labour 1955-1963 
Gaitskell's attempt to amend Clause Four had been preceded by the 
attempt to get union leaders to adopt demand management in 1957 through 
Industry and Society. 77 Gaitskell's ideas about public ownership had been 
voiced in Socialism and Nationalisation. 78 He argued that public ownership 
needed to be more inclusive a concept, not merely the end product of 
nationalisation, and to include other methods in a bid to improve equality. These 
ideas formed the basis of Industry and Society, which attempted to provide unity 
couching public ownership in ambiguous terms, but with enough latitude to 
"conceal the differences of purpose behind an accepted fonnula" . 
79 The make- 
up of union support changed once Frank Cousins became leader of the T&G. 
Initially won over by Bevan's official support of Gaitskell's position, Cousins 
would come to reject official policy in both domestic and foreign policy. 
Electoral defeat in 1959 and the ensuing post-mortern over the reason for 
failure split the wound open again, only this time with ferocity on both sides and 
the debate became about who would gain control of the leadership. 80 For 
Gaitskell, the only way to regain public confidence was to modify Clause Four 
which pledged the public ownership of the means of production, manifest in 
1945 via the nationalisation of key industries. It has been argued that "[B]y 
using his high office as an instrument of one side in the dispute [Gaitskell] 
purposely led the Gaitskellites onto a collision course with the 
left". 81 
Alternatively, despite defeat, there was a sense of buoyancy about Gaitskell's 
" Labour Party (1957) Industry and Society: Labour's Policy on Future Public Ownership, 
London: Labour Party 
" Gaitskell, H (1956) Socialism andNationalisation, London: Fabian Tracts no. 300 
79 Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p295 
go Robbins, L. J. (1979) The Reluctant Party: Labour and the EEC, 1961-1975, Ormskirk: G. W. 
and A. Hesketh, p3l 
" Haseler, The Gaitskellifes, p 156 
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handling of the election, the depth of which was misread by the right. 82 
Certainly, the point of the exercise had been to take Gaitskell's renewed 
endorsement from electoral defeat and translate it into a platform for action. 
Whether Gaitskell's aim was merely to renew the relevance of Clause Four 83 or 
to be bullish about effecting change, 84 the focus on domestic policy was 
significant for avoiding the minefield of foreign policy divisions. It was 
significant too for attempting to formalise change that had been argued for a 
decade by the right. 
Gaitskell's "challenge was the product of a dedicated and considered 
conviction"85 and followed the logic of the last years of the Attlee Government. 
The mixed economy, Keynesianism and the managerial society had transformed 
the nature of British capitalism. This meant that socialism was no longer simply 
about the common ownership of the means of production, "Keynesian 
techniques of economic management rendered nationalisation obsolete as a 
means of public control over economic decision making". 86 The pursuit of ends 
and means was not the only way in which to achieve a better distribution of 
wealth. 87 It altered too the emphasis placed on equality between classes in 
favour of a more dirigiste approach. 88 The party's image was deemed outmoded, 
inadequate and increasingly irrelevant . 
89 The revisionists had tapped into a long 
held belief expressed from Bernstein to Durbin emphatically rejecting the notion 
" Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p314; Pearce, R (1992) Patrick Gordon-Walker: Political Diaries, 
1932-71, London: The Historian's Press, p36 
" Haseler, The Gaitskellites, p 167 
84 Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p314 
" Haseler, The Gaitskellites, p 159 
16 Hinton, Labour and Socialism, p 183 
87 Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p324 
's Randall, N (2000) The Dynamics ofIdeological Change in the British Labour Party, 1951-64 
and 1983-97, unpublished PhD thesis, Manchester University, p208 
'9 Labour Party, (1960), Labour in the Sixties, London: Transport House 
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of a class struggle. They were now rooted in the practicalities of electoral 
considerations, while also articulating a "non-Marxist, Social Democratic 
philosophy: the commitment to social harmony and stability". 90 They urged 
unions to broaden their base to include white collar workers, hence bridging the 
gap between the essential role of the unions and shifting away from its narrow 
working class definition. 
However, for the left-wing and the majority of unions, this questioning 
of fundamentals represented a strike to the very heart of traditional socialist 
sentiment and aspiration. It challenged in a very direct way the rhetoric of the 
&new Jerusalem' concept. Gaitskell's rhetoric seemed contrary to that of the 
aspirational left. "His political sentiments were often expressed more in terms of 
human values than the quasi religious idealism many wanted to hear. Gaitskell 
also guarded himself against 'affirmationism' as a political reflex". 91 
Whereas the left recognised that change was necessary, its position 
seemed to be galvanised into an increasingly hard-line attitude. At the 1959 
Party Conference, Barbara Castle urged delegates to stop navel gazing and 
instead, to 'go out and make socialists'. 92 For the left, electoral defeat 
represented a lack of education among the electorate, not an excuse to 
surrender. 93 Indeed it was a failure to carry the unions which signalled defeat 
over Clause Four with only two of the six major unions backing the call for 
am lification. Of those re ecting the challenge, two were part of the right's pj 
90 Haseler, The Gailskellites, p145 
9' Haseler, The Gaitskellifes, pl 56 
92 LPCR, (1959), p84 
9' Haseler, The Gaitskellites, p 163 
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'faithful' triumvirate. 94 The failure to effect change highlighted the limitations 
of the revisionists without union backing. 95 Support in this sphere was essential. 
It meant Gaitskell's relationship with the left Was now very precarious with 
Bevan edging away, 96 moving within a period of a few months from the "unity 
and fervour of the general election into the worse mood of bitterness and 
suspicion since the war". 97 
The Party's statement presented to the 1961 Conference, Signposts for 
the Sixties, signalled a shift further left than expected, on the issue of public 
98 
ownership. It found favourable support from Labour voters and although 
Cousins voted against it, the Conference accepted it readily. Although this 
meant Gaitskell conceded ground over his beliefs about domestic policy, the 
statement's aim had been primarily at establishing unity after the division of 
Clause Four. 
6.4.3 Unilateralism 
Unilateral nuclear disarmament emerged as an issue in foreign policy as 
the dynamics of international relations changed. The refreezing of the Cold War 
and the concomitant search for nuclear security was at the root of the debate as 
Britain was no longer able to maintain an independent nuclear capability. The 
9' USDAW and the NUGMW supported the amplification of Clause Four vote while the 
TG WU, AEU, NUM and NIJR all rejected it. 
95 In February 1960, a compromise was reached between the aims of Gaitskell over Clause Four 
and the retention of the old constitutional Clause Four to which all could agree and eventually 
controversy subsided. 
96 Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p326: Bevan had offered ambiguous support for Gaitskell, but as 
Williams claims, was possibly more inclined to let Gaitskell deal with his own problem as be 
had been notified of Gaitskell's proposals only shortly before the speech was delivered. 
97 Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p330 
98 'Signposts for the Sixties' was a Labour Party Policy statement issued in 1961. It identified 
themes which Wilson would later make central to his successful election campaign, such as 
linking economic progress to the scientific revolution. 
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issue also emerged after Suez had revealed the limits of British military action. 
Although unilateralism represented a coalition of interests ranging from 
traditional pacifists, to those with moral belief and to pragmatists fearful of the 
economic implications, it provided within the Labour movement the spearhead 
for a counter-attack on Gaitskell's domestic reforms. 
The issue of Britain's defence position peaked at the 1960 Party 
Conference. Questions over an independent nuclear deterrent, neutralism, 
foreign bases on British soil, and nuclear testing formed a confluence of themes 
that had been the backdrop to Labour debates during the 1950s. Their renewed 
importance was driven by more general fears regarding the foreign policies and 
the political nature of the United States and the USSR. 99 
Churchill's decision to manufacture the hydrogen bomb in 1955 was a 
continuation of the Attlee Government's decision to manufacture the atomic 
bomb. Bevan's support of an independent nuclear deterrent at the 1957 Party 
Conference, where he argued that being without such defences was like sending 
the foreign secretary "naked into the conference chamber", 100 marked the 
direction of the right. It also marked the apparently surprising quiescence of the 
left. 101 Until March 1960, the Labour Party policy was to support an 
independent nuclear deterrent, but with the cancellation of 'Blue Streak', the 
British built missile, with the announcement of the American built 'Skybolt' as a 
replacement, a dilemma emerged. The right had argued that an independent 
'9 Haseler, The Gaitskellites, p 178 
100 LPCR, (1957), p181 
101 Although Bevan was seen to have been bought by other members of the left; his silence over 
domestic policy in return for a post on the Parliamentary Committee. 
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weapon gave Britain a degree of independence from the US. Gaitskell restated 
Attlee's position when he said: 
The real case for having our own independent nuclear weapons is fear 
of excessive dependence on the United States. It springs from doubts 
about the readiness of the United States governments ... to wish the 
destruction of their cities on behalf of Europe. It depends also, I think, 
on fear that excessive dependence on the United States might force 
upon us policies with which we did not agree. 102 
The multilateralist position was also a coalition between those, like 
Gaitskell, who regarded the relationship with the United States as central to 
British foreign policy and thus needed to be as equal as possible, those who saw 
it in the wider context of Britain as a global power and finally those who felt an 
independent nuclear capacity equipped Britain with the ability to counter Soviet 
posturing. The adoption of unilateralism was therefore considered as not only 
-surrendering Britain's influence in the world-wide struggle to demilitarise the 
world", 103 but also depriving Britain of important defences without the security 
being guaranteed by others. Finally, in terms of Britain's role as head of the 
Commonwealth, it was deemed a necessary evil to have nuclear weapons. Any 
moves to abandon such armoury would have to be done through multilateral 
means. 
The unilateralist element within the Party remained small, mainly for 
these reasons, but with the establishment of the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND) in 1958, whose remit was the clear demand for the 
unilateral disarmament for Britain, and the shift in Cold War politics, this 
"' Hansard (1960) House of Common Debates, vol. 23 1, col. 113 6 
103 Noel-Baker, P (195 8) Arms Race, London: no information 
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element grew. By 1960, unilateralism was making gains in the Labour Party 104 
and the unions, more so with the exposure of the economic costs of the British 
aspiration to nuclear independence. ' 05 Union frustration with the Gaitskellite 
right over Clause Four resulted in less restraint over attacking the leadership at 
Conference with the result that the multilateralist policy was defeated. 106 
It took until the 1960 Conference before Gaitskell managed to claim 
success with his 'fight, fight and fight again for the Party I love' speech and 
winning a reversal of the unilateralist vote, the intervening year having seen a 
marked coalescing of rightist forces working hard to reverse the previous 
Conference decision. Gaitskell could be more assured of party loyalty, though 
even this remained uncertain given the possibility of a volatile Conference. 
Although Gaitskell managed to reverse the vote, the year had also seen him his 
morale spiral downwards, increasingly suspicious of his own colleagues and 
seeing the drifting away of loyalists. 107 
6.4.4 Membership of the EEC 
The issue of membership of the EEC emerged in the aftermath of 
Gaitskell's defeat over Clause Four, his fight over unilateralism. and the attempt 
at conciliation with Signposts for the Sixties. When Macmillan announced 
Britain's membership application to the EEC in the summer of 1961, it provided 
Gaitskell with the opportunity to make advances against the Conservatives and 
unite the party. It was a successful strategy in which Gaitskell loyalists rallied 
Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p340 
Hinton, Labour and Socialism, p 184 
106 The NUGMW and NUM voted for multilateralism at the 1959 Conference whereas the AEU, 
USDAW, NUR and TGWU all voted against. 
107 Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p342 
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during 1961-2, mainly through the efforts of the Campaign for Democratic 
Socialism, to redefine their beliefs in international affairs on defence and the 
Common Market. ' 08 
When the Conservatives announced their decision to seek membership of 
the EEC, the Labour Party had not yet devised a policy towards Europe. 109 
Foreign policy had thus far been defined purely in military and defensive terms 
and the issue of integration interpreted only in these terms. There was continuity 
in Gaitskell's beliefs. As he commented in 1957: "The European movement may 
not have made as much headway as its supporters desired, but ... the European 
people today feel closer to one another than ever before. " Gaitskell identified the 
reason: "This would probably not have happened without the basic Atlantic 
Alliance - NATO". But over the future of integration and Britain's role within 
that, Gaitskell's attitude was more sceptical: 
I must emphasise the limits of any formal changes. It is most unlikely 
that any British government will seriously contemplate joining a 
European political federation. There are deep and profound reasons for 
this ... there are quite reasonable doubts about what exactly is meant 
about Europe: where does it begin, and where does it end? ' 10 
Gaitskell later said "that most of us felt ourselves not only European but 
the centre of the Commonwealth, a Commonwealth including very important 
Asian and African countries, and that we would not want to go in closer with 
108 The CDS was a right-wing ginger group who articulated revisionist policies and campaigned 
against the move to unilateralism. The group consisted of Gaitskell loyalists who would 
eventually split over the issue of Europe. It closed in 1964 removing an organised voice on the 
riýht with which to counter an increasingly vocal left-wing. See: Ramsden, British Politics, p195 
10 Morgan, J (ed) (1981) The Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman, London: Hamish 
Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, p945 
"0 Gaitskell, H (1957) The Challenge of Co-existence: The Godkin Lectures, Harvard, London: 
Co-operative Union Ltd. P59,61 
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Europe if this meant weakening the Atlantic Alliance ... going into a Federation 
of Europe was absolutely out of the question [unless] we were somehow cut off 
from the Commonwealth and left on our own". "' There is evidence that 
Gaitskell's beliefs remained consistent in the intervening years. As Williams 
notes, "He never felt himself primarily a European, and that in a world 
perspective the EEC enthusiasts over-emphasised a 'parochial' problem. The 
Common Market was a fact but no cause for rejoicing". 112 He would return to 
his Godkin Lectures of 1957 as proof in 1962 of his consistency of belief but he 
was equally aware that the world had changed and, although presented 
consistent beliefs, they were never closed. 
The criticism of Britain's world role became open with Dean Acheson's 
famed speech at West Point Academy in 1962.1 13 However, Acheson's speech 
contained more pertinent points, bruising though they were: 
Britain's attempt to play a separate power role, that is, a role apart 
from Europe, a role based on a 'special relationship' with the United 
States, a role based on being the head of a Commonwealth which has 
no political structure or unity or strength and enjoys a fragile and 
precarious economic relationship - this role is about to be played out. 
Great Britain, attempting to work alone and to be a broker between the 
United States and Russia, has seemed to conduct a policy as weak as 
its military power. ' 14 
1'1 Gaitskell summary of trip in The Manchester Guardian, 21/01/57, quoted in Williams, Hugh 
Gaitskell, p390 
112 Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p390 
113 Macmillan was apparently furious at Acheson's perceived effort to undermine Britain's 
V osition in the world. See Chapter Five. 
14 Acheson quoted in Stone, L, 'Britain and the World' in McKie, D and Cook, C (eds. ) (1972) 
The Decade of Disillusionment, London: MacMillan, p 122 
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His views were shared at least in part by some in Britain including Healey. He 
argued in 1961 that nuclear independence was "the virility symbol of the atomic 
age ... Britain and France 
both clutched at it in the shock of having their military 
impotence exposed at Suez". ' 15 
Traditional defence issues offered clearer divisions over moral and 
political leadership but an integrated Europe was largely uncontested territory 
having been flatly rejected in the past. It required traditional relations with the 
Commonwealth and the US to be reconsidered. ' 16 Crossman observed that 
during the summer of 1961, the Common Market was beginning to 
"overshadow" the House of Commons and that fence-sitting may be 
increasingly difficult to sustain as "slowly, Labour MPs are lining up in new 
constellations". 117 And although he found it to be largely faithful to the left-right 
divide, he acknowledged there were some unusual cross-overs. Capturing the 
enormity of what this meant for perceptions of British identity, he concluded: 
The fact that Britain must now consider entering the market is a 
demonstration that the attempt to maintain ourselves as an 
independent Great Power, which all parties have been making 
since the war, has come unstuck. Even three years ago, no-one 
was dreaming of such a thing. Everybody, not only 
underestimated the likelihood of the Common Market coming off, 
but overestimated our capacity to stay out if it did. In fact, despite 
all pretensions, for fifteen years we have been going down hill, 
while France and Germany have been overtaking us and forging 
ahead. All parties have blinded themselves to this awkward 
fact. 118 
I" Healey quoted in Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p341 
116 Brivati, Gailskell, p404 
117 Morgan, Backbench Diaries, p 193 
I" Morgan, Backbench Diaries, p951 
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The potential of the EEC to cause further divides within the Party was 
central to the strategy of non-commitment. Gaitskell kept a low profile during 
negotiations only, declaring his opinion in September 1962. While Labour had 
been accused of sitting on the fence, it was felt that they were happy for the 
Conservatives to have committed themselves. Crossman noted, "Just imagine if 
for the last two years we had discussed the Common Market as we've been 
discussing nuclear weapons". ' 19 Meanwhile Gaitskell commented: 
Macmillan ... is a very crafty man. This is one reason why I am 
determined not to let the Party get committed on the Common Market. 
If we try to reach a decision ourselves I am pretty certain we would 
remain hopelessly divided while the Tories reluctantly decide to unite 
behind whatever Macmillan decides to do. 120 
As Macmillan had made no attempt to make the issue of Common Market entry 
a bipartisan one, the traditional dividing line between the political camps 
seemed set. 
121 
Despite issues of party strategy, there were clear beliefs held by Healey 
and Gaitskell which were expressed during negotiations and which challenged 
the perception of Britain's negotiating power with the Six, the desirability of 
entry, and Britain's actual ability to enter. Healey, replying to Heath's support 
for Common Market entry in a foreign affairs debate in 1961, outlined the 
issues. In assessing the role of the French, he argued "It seems very unlikely that 
the French Government ... will now agree to our doing anything else other than 
signing the Treaty of Rome as it stands. " He called for caution over pleas of 
special needs and future plans, arguing that "we make a great mistake in over 
"9 Morgan, Backbench Diaries, p946 
120 Gaitskell to Solly Pearce, editor of the Leeds Citizen, 21/06/61, quoted in Williams, Hugh 
Gaitskell, p391 
121 Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p396 
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dramatising the dangers ... from failure to reach a settlement of the Six-Seven 
problem. " Strategically, Healey deplored "the impression [given] that there is no 
alternative for Britain entering the Common Market and signing the Treaty of 
Rome" since this meant that "the Common Market countries will be tempted to 
wait until we are prepared to sign the Treaty of Rome unconditionally". 122 
This was a belief shared by Gaitskell who, as the conditions became 
clearer during the summer of 1962 foresaw a long set of negotiations leading to 
an inevitable French veto. 123 He had remained um-noved after a meeting in April 
1962 with Monnet, who had sought to explain the philosophy of the EEC while 
Gaitskell wanted to know about its practical policies towards developing 
countries, and about the details hampering British entry. The meeting ended 
with Monnet imploring Gaitskell to have faith, while the latter retorted "I don't 
believe in faith, I believe in reason, and you have not shown me any". 124 
Gaitskell compiled his own list of five conditions, three of which 
mirrored those of the Conservatives. These required: first, strong and binding 
safeguards for the interests of the Commonwealth; second, the right to pursue an 
"' Hansard, 17/05/61, vol. 640, c. 1404-5; although interestingly, Jenkins, an ardent pro- 
European, offered a different analysis, one which would prove to be more accurate. He argued 
that the "main point here is that we should accept and make it clearly known that when we talk 
about going into the European Economic Community we are seeking no special position for 
ourselves, in the sense that when we come to the end of the day we should be less full members 
than France, Germany or Italy or any of the other three members of the Community. If we seek 
that half way position, then we might as well not start the negotiations, because they will not 
succeed. He went on to argue that the "best thing that we can hope for is to be forgiven for not 
having gone to the Messina Conference in the summer of 1955. It is a great pity that we did not 
go, because had we participated in the negotiations we should have been able to shape the Treaty 
negotiations to some extent ourselves. The best we can hope for is that we should be allowed in 
now, at this late stage, to a large extent to shape certain aspects of the Treaty to meet our special 
requirements ... but not seek some special position involving less full membership than any of the 
other participants". Hansard, 17/05/61, vol. 640, c. 1439. 
"' Brivati, Gaitskell, p410 
124 Brivati, Hugh Gailskell, 412; Williams, Gaitskell, p394 
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independent foreign policy; third, EFTA partners and their interests to be 
protected if Britain joined; fourth, the right to have a policy of a planned 
economy; and finally, guarantees to protect British agriculture. 125 The rationale 
behind the conditions was that, if acceptable to the Six, the list would induce the 
Community to liberalise their economies and shift towards a more outward 
looking group. 126 Further, these conditions were to be worked out before 
joining, not once Britain had joined. 127 It was indicative of a shift towards a 
more emotional stance, one which was revealed when he eventually chose to 
reject the terms secured by Macmillan. Williams notes, "His astonishment and 
resentment were among the reasons for his abandonment of a precise cold- 
blooded calculating style for opposition with an emotional force and fire which 
astonished friends and opponents alike". 128 While about the Six, he became 
convinced that their "political intentions were unacceptable and their economic 
outlook selfish". 129 He was spurred finally by the Commonwealth Labour 
Leaders Conference in September 1962 and "While he was never utopian about 
the Commonwealth, its critical reactions had a profound effect in finally making 
up his mind". 
130 
Although Gaitskell's beliefs had been consistently opposed to British 
involvement in the Common Market, this new development in rhetoric was 
increasingly disconcerting to his loyalists. In attempting to address the issue of 
party management and ensure he swept grassroot support with him, Gaitskell 
125 Labour Party (1962) Labour and the Common Market: Text of Speeches made at the 1962 
Labour Party Conference, London: Transport House, p34; Robbins, The Reluctant Party, p40 
126 Labour Party, Labour and the Common Market, p34 
127 Labour Party, Labour and the Common Market, p3 9 
128 Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p397 
129 Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p396 
130 Williams, Hugh Gaitskell, p397 
252 
Labour 1955-1963 
had alienated himself from his traditional base of support from the right. His 
stance resulted in Jenkins's resignation from the Shadow Cabinet and a call 
from members of the Campaign for Democratic Socialism for him to tone down 
his anti-entry articulations. 13 1 As the Conference approached however, 
Gaitskell's attitude hardened, resulting in the famous "A Thousand Years of 
History" political broadcast on the 21" September 132 and the Conference speech 
delivered on 3 rd October, 1962. In this, he repeated his attack on the 
Conservatives, pointing out the discrepancies between Macmillan's and 
Maudling's statements during the late 1950s and their present actions, while 
implying his own continuity of view. 133 At the same time, he tried to locate a 
middle ground between the little Englander sentiment expressed by anti- 
marketeers and entry with full concessions. 134 
Concerned loyalists feared Gaitskell was "isolating himself' from the 
right. Opinions expressed in his broadcast and conference speeches were noted 
for being "demagogic with no forward vision". Austen Albu, one of the 
disconcerted right, concluded that "Gaitskell now appears to have his head in a 
noosev). 135 George Brown, who followed Gaitskell onto the podium, opened his 
13 1 Albu: Diary, Europe 1962,18/09/62, Churchill College Cambridge; Brivati, Gaitskell, p411 
132 During which Gaitskell challenged Macmillan that if entry into Europe implied entering a 
European federation and if so would mean "the end of Britain as an independent nation; we 
become no more than 'Texas' or 'California' in the United States of Europe. It means the end of 
a thousand years of history; it means the end of the Commonwealth ... [to become] just a 
province of Europe". Quoted in Williams, Gaitskell, p400. It was the popularity of this device 
which prompted its repetition at the 1962 Party Conference when Gaitskell said: "We must be 
clear about this: it does mean, if this is the idea, the end of Britain as an independent European 
state. I make no apology for repeating it. It means the end of a thousand years of history". In: 
Labour Party, (1962) Britain and the Common Market: Text of Speeches Made at the 1962 
Labour Party Conference, London: Transport House, p 12 
133 LPCR, (1962), ppI54-165, p154,156; LabourParty, Britain and the Common Market, p3,4 8 
134 LPCR, (1962), p 154; Labour Party, Britain and the Common Market, p3 
135 ALBU: Diary, Europe 1962,21/09/62, Churchill College, Cambridge. Albu, Jenkins, 
Strachey, Crosland, Taverne and John Diamond had met some days previously worried about 
Gaitskell's attitude. They felt that he needed to be 'pestered' through them, the unions and a 
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speech by acknowledging that he did not hold the same opinion as the leader 136 
and received no applause at the end. 137 
This was not a question of principle for Gaitskell but about the nature of 
the proposed terms. There was no necessity of going in, and no case for Britain 
being stronger with entry, he claimed. He quoted the Conservative's chief 
economist, Sir Donald McDougall who had said: "There is no compelling 
economic argument for Britain joining unless it is thought that, without being 
exposed to the blast of competition from the Continent, she will never put her 
house in order". 138 
Arguing the case against Tory economic management and entry as the 
means of rectifying the damage already done by the 'stop-go' policies of the 
1950s, Gaitskell offered a damning critique of the Conservative's case. His case 
rested mainly on the economic argument, claiming that given there was a 
shortfall in trade with the EEC compared to the cumulative trade exchanged 
between Britain, her EFTA partners and the Commonwealth, it was reckless to 
make such a commitment. 139 Finally he returned to the emotional point of the 
Commonwealth countries being allies and co-combatants in two world wars. 140 
In political terms, membership was equally problematic. Demonstrating 
his internationalist beliefs, Gaitskell argued that "if we were presented today 
group of around 20 MPs, mainly new ones, to try and steer his hostility to Europe to more 
favourable tones. 
136 Labour Party, Labour and the Common Market, p24 
137 ALBU: Diary, Europe 1962,03/10/62, Churchill College, Cambridge 
138 Labour Party, Britain and the Common Market, p4 
139 Labour Party, Britain and the Common Market, p4-8 
140 Labour Party, Britain and the Common Market, p 16 
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with a tremendous choice, whether to go into a world federation under a world 
goverment - which alone would finally prevent war - there is not one of us 
who would say No. " 141 In Gaitskell's rhetoric, Europe represented a "narrow 
nationalism". And, although the cradle of western civilisation, more recent times 
had revealed "evil features in European history" not only with the totalitarianism 
of earlier decades, but also with the contemporary intransigence of the French in 
the UN. 142 Europe, he declared, was Janus faced and thus to lose the nation's 
independence, a thousand years of history and to "sell the Commonwealth down 
the river" needed the security of having Britain's five conditions met. 143 
According to the Party's NEC statement on the Common Market, if 
negotiations failed over the conditions, then so be it and if they did, it was 
imperative that the government of the day "join the United States in their efforts 
to negotiate downwards the Common Market's external tariff .. [and] propose a 
conference of Commonwealth and EFTA countries to consider measures to 
promote their trade and economic development". 144 It was a retreat position 
which consoled itself with safe but heavily compromised beliefs from the past. 
Healey supported Gaitskell's position by denouncing the Conservative 
policy as driven by "entirely ... negative and backward-looking reasons, because 
it has totally lost confidence in its own ability to solve the economic problems of 
our own nation". Concluding, he stated "for the Tories the decision to enter 
Europe is the culmination of a process which started at Suez. The Europeanism 
14 1 Labour Party, Britain and the Common Market, p9 
142 Labour Party, Britain and the Common Market, p 10 
143 Labour Party, Britain and the Common Market, p 10-3 
144 Labour Party, Labour and the Common Market, p3940 
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of the Conservative Party is nothing but imperialism with an inferiority 
complex .,, 
145 Echoing Gaitskell, Healey argued that Britain and Europe's 
problems were global and no regional pact would solve this. The 
Commonwealth was central as its looseness provided strength rather than did the 
rigidity of the Common Market. 146 But his was largely a lonely voice from the 
right. 
6.5 Modifications 
We earlier outlined the strategies that Gaitskell and Healey deployed to 
retain key plinths of Labour's foreign policy ideas. For instance, these focused 
on German rearmament and unilateralism. When the EEC began to show 
nascent success, Gaitskell in particular used this as a political ploy around which 
to rally support, falling back on the more firmly established belief in 
Commonwealth and Empire development. 
The dilemma of party management raised two problems for Gaitskell 
and Healey: the process of redefining an accepted interpretation of Britain's role 
in the world came under fire while changes in international relations provided a 
challenge to perceptions of Britain in the world. In this section we examine the 
ways in which the dilemma of party management prompted Gaitskell and 
Healey to modify their beliefs about Britain's interests. These changes are then 
contrasted with ways in which other beliefs were buttressed. Finally we deploy 
Bulpitt's measurement to gauge the success in establishing political argument 
hegemony and party management. 
145 LPCR (1962), p 175 
146 LPCR (1962), p 175 
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Party management can be defined as the authoritative control over the 
Party, careful defence of areas of established belief, and the ability to guide the 
process of defining emergent and evolved beliefs. Party management affected 
Gaitskell's ability to present and pursue his beliefs through policy forcing 
modifications of content and tactical retreats over various areas of his web of 
beliefs. The dilemma of party management provoked modifications in foreign 
policy, domestic policy and European policy. 
For Healey and Gaitskell, the Party's locus of beliefs on foreign policy, 
developed under Attlee and Bevin, were sustained and defended. In response to 
calls for a neutralist stance, Healey attacked the concept as antithetical to 
understandings of British identity, it being out of step with Britain's 
responsibilities and a retrograde step akin to appeasement. Healey made clear 
that Britain's aligmnent in Cold War politics did not allow for the division of 
opposition to Communism. The success of this adherence to and elaboration of 
belief was evident with union backing which served to minimise opposition 
voices such as Bevan's. The issue of unilateralism proved more problematic in 
sustaining an agreement on party belief With the loss of an independent nuclear 
deterrent, a key part of Labour's foreign policy was undermined. The attempt to 
establish a multilateral framework for discussions met with broad opposition 
beyond the party, and defeat within the party over policy. The eventual return to 
the multilateralist path restored the right's vision of Britain in the world. 
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In relation to key tenets of revisionist approaches to foreign policy, it 
restored the status quo. Intimately linked with this approach were the concepts 
of respectability established under Attlee, and developed under Gaitskell in 
terms of a socialist foreign policy. It was part of the strategy of maintaining an 
approach in parallel and sympathy to the party which traditionally dominated in 
foreign policy, the Conservatives. Gaitskell and Healey's strong defence of 
these beliefs, despite the temporary reversal of 1960, underscored the 
attachment to beliefs about Britain's role in the world irrespective of changes 
that diminished the reality of that role. 
Gaitskell's ability to lead the Party over domestic policy reforms was 
qualified from the start. His beliefs had been established before being elected 
leader and once elected, adopted a strategy by which to unify the Party over 
detailing the method of public ownership. This opaque strategy served initially 
to unify, the policy being accepted at Conference, but its foundations were 
fragile and later threats to Gaitskell's leadership meant this fragmented, 
specifically with some of the unions. In a final bid to establish this belief, 
Gaitskell confronted the dilemma of Party management head-on and failed in 
rallying enough support to end allegiance to the restrictive nature of Clause 
Four 
For Healey, modifications of belief occurred over membership of the 
EEC while Gaitskell retreated from it. This provided the most noticeable split 
between the two, although Healey loyally supported Gaitskell while many of the 
right drifted away from the leader. Healey accepted the effect of Acheson's 
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speech; that the notion of an unchanged role in the world for Britain was 
untenable. Identifying the impact of Suez on perceptions of British military 
power made the need for retaining a nuclear presence all the more essential. 
However, in his beliefs, being a nuclear power did not stand antithetically to 
membership of the EEC and Healey's opposition to Heath's approach to 
negotiations was based on style rather than substance. In this sense, Healey and 
Jenkins were alike, though for different reasons; Healey for the realist 
implications of negotiating from weakness and Jenkins from the idealist belief in 
the concept of integration. 
Gaitskell's beliefs about foreign policy demonstrated continuity. He 
restated the 'three circles' concept in 1957, after Suez, although raised concerns 
about the links Britain had with the Commonwealth. As membership 
negotiations continued, Gaitskell's expressed beliefs retained continuity, 
although in private there were doubts. However, we can see in Gaitskell how the 
needs of party management turned the issue of EEC membership into a 
pragmatic prop through which to engender internal support. His uncharacteristic 
emotionalism and fervent little Englander language came once an assessment of 
the inevitable failure of membership was made in September 1962. The effect 
was to gain essential unity from the centre, left, unions and the general 
electorate who opposed entry as it stood contrary to their beliefs about Britain's 
role in the world. 147 It also meant that within the leadership and the right of the 
Party, Gaitskell had alienated himself 
147 Gaitskell kept the letters he received from the public in support over his stance about the 
Commonwealth. This amounts to over three boxes of material held at the Library of University 
College London. 
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When we assess the success of Gaitskell and Healey in establishing their 
beliefs and carrying the Party with them, we turn to Bulpitt's measurements of 
political argument hegemony and party management. As this chapter has been 
dedicated to the issue of party management as the dilemma, we can identify that 
this was not established. When it comes to establishing political argument 
hegemony, the issue of sustaining the right's interpretation of foreign policy 
came under pressure when a key tenet, the independent nuclear deterrent, was 
removed. The modification to accepting American nuclear deterrence was a 
modification reached under the continued importance of the Anglo-American 
relationship for the right. This was translated with difficulty to party dissidents 
whose interpretation tapped into wider societal concerns over the direction of 
the Cold War. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to apply Bevir's interpretative theory to the 
Labour Party of 1955-63. This was done by tracing the conceptual and temporal 
links that tied Hugh Gaitskell and Denis Healey's beliefs to the tradition of 
democratic socialism. By outlining the historical context, the dilernma of party 
management was identified. This dilemma showed that the success experienced 
in the 1945-51 governments raised an internal struggle over the direction of the 
Party. These struggles had salient features which we identified as the attempt to 
establish the revisionist agenda through Clause Four and the retreat to shoring 
up the traditional beliefs in defence and foreign policy by Gaitskell in 1960-62. 
Finally, it was argued that the modifications of belief that Gaitskell and Healey 
made were modest. Both stoutly defended revisionist defence policy against an 
260 
Labour 1955-1963 
attempted return to the anti-militarist strand of thought. Over unilateralism, the 
basis of Labour's position had been undermined and it became harder for 
Gaitskell to defend. Neither modified their beliefs about the necessity of 
Britain's defensive role. Over Europe however, Healey's beliefs softened to 
allow for the possibility while Gaitskell's expressed beliefs maintained strict 
adherence to the traditional approach of the Labour Party to the Commonwealth. 
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Chapter seven 
The Labour Party 1963-1975 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we focus on Harold Wilson and Roy Jenkins. These actors 
have been selected as key players in shaping beliefs on Europe: Wilson for 
explaining shifts in government policy and Jenkins for remaining faithful to a 
particular revisionist interpretation of Europe. We begin by tracing their inherited 
beliefs to the traditions of corporate socialism and democratic socialism 
respectively. A brief summary of the period provides the historical background 
impacting on Wilson's leadership. 
It is proposed that Wilson and Jenkins accepted the perceived dilemma 
over the direction of party ideology. It is argued that Wilson modified his beliefs 
in order to sustain the economic programme which formed the basis of his 
election manifesto in 1964. In contrast while Jenkins's beliefs remained 
unmodified, his attempts to remain in the debate resulted in his actions becoming 
more radicalised. The chapter ends with a measure of the success of Wilson's 
party management and his ability to sustain political argument hegemony. 
7.2 Elite Beliefs 
In chapters three and six, we identified that Attlee and Bevin forinally 
rejected the anti-militarist and anti-capitalist strands, rearticulating beliefs about 
internationalism and Britain's imperial policy. Healey and Gaitskell continued to 
develop these themes, injecting realist beliefs into the revisionist's view of 
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British defence policy and responding to emotive calls to honour moral 
obligations to the Commonwealth. In identifying Wilson and Jenkins's beliefs we 
trace them to the traditions of corporate socialism and democratic socialism 
respectively but it is first necessary to trace the transmission of beliefs, 
identifying both conceptual and temporal links, which tie them to these particular 
traditions. 
7.2.1 Harold Wilson' 
Wilson's formal political career began in 1945, when he was elected 
Labour MP for Ormskirk and later for Huyton, 1950-1976. He became 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Works 1945-7, Secretary for Overseas 
Trade in 1947, and then President of the Board of Trade until 1951. Resigning 
with Bevan in 1951 and as a signatory of the Keep Left pamphlet, Wilson gained 
left-wing credibility. However, in 1954 he replaced Bevan on the Party's NEC 
and was appointed shadow chancellor under Gaitskell. Labour's defeat in the 
1959 general election prompted a failed leadership bid. Succeeding Gaitskell as 
Party leader in 1963, he served as Prime Minister, between 1964 and 1970 and 
again between 1974 and 1976.2 
We can trace four links that tie Wilson to the tradition of corporate 
socialism: his nonconformist origins and early family experience of 
unemployment; his early interest in liberal-labour ideas in his work with 
Beveridge on social reform; the impact of his economic training in focusing on 
I Sir (James) Harold Wilson, Baron Wilson of Rievaulx, (1916-1995) 
2 Eccleshall and Walker, British Prime Ministers, p333 
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the delivery end of corporate socialism; and his adoption of an approach to 
foreign policy entirely circumscribed by domestic policy. 
First, Wilson came from a lower middle-class nonconformist family near 
Huddersfield, Yorkshire. He described his childhood as one of "an intense 
feeling of family loyalty ... bred in all of us, reinforced in my young days by 
regular chapel going and a sense of community which found expression in 
countless voluntary organisations". 3 Pimlott makes frequent references to 
Wilson's uniqueness: the hopes pinned on him by ambitious parents, his 
expectation of praise with achievement, his potential singled out at school, all of 
which went to cultivate, he claims, an image of Wilson to himself of being 
4 
special. This formed the basis of his career choice, propelled initially by 
personal achievement rather than the pursuit of principle. Wilson was to remark 
that the event which awakened his political consciousness was when his father 
became unemployed, the status being considered a family disgrace. 
Second, displaying little political direction at university, Wilson gained a 
first from Oxford in 1937. He then worked for William Beveridge until the war 
catapulted him into government first as a statistician for the Anglo-French Co- 
ordinating Committee, later to the Economic Section, and then Manpower, before 
ending the war in Mining Production statistics. 5 This early immersion in central 
government policy work meant a rapid evolution of beliefs. Wilson adopted the 
Fabian tradition of rational and fact-based argument "bequeathing a firm 
3 Wilson, H (1986) The Making of a Prime Minister: 1916-1964, London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, p9 
4 Wilson makes some references to this in his autobiography. See: Wilson, The Making of a Prime 
Minister, p24,42 
' Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p74; Wilson, The Making of a Prime Minister, p56,57,67 
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commitment to the socially progressive benefits from rationally designed, 
statistically grounded policy initiatives; his undoubted desire for change within 
British society was inseparable from the belief that reform could be administered 
only from above, by a trained bureaucratic dlite". 6 
Third, his commitment to solving Britain's intractable unemployment 
problem locates his beliefs within the tradition of corporate socialism. The 
corporate socialist tradition was the modification of labourism and fabianism. It 
provided a model of state ownership of the means of production through the 
nationalisation of key industries under the rationale that it would be more 
equitably run this way. 
Wilson's beliefs were balanced by pragmatism. For example, in the 
1930s his political allegiance was not defined. His active interest in both the 
Liberal and Labour Parties may be explained by the diminution of Labour's 
prospects at that time. 7 By the 1940s, his corporate socialism had been modified 
to include indirect economic guidance, a modification which reflected sensitivity 
to public frustration and prompted his 'bonfire of controls' in 1948-9. Yet, "he 
did not ... modify his firmly held belief in the desirability, even the moral 
correctness, of planning compared with the market system. "8 Rather, he 
continued to believe some controls were necessary, and viewed them as central to 
the economy as a means of harnessing capitalism, and not taming or destroying 
6 Eccleshall and Walker, British Prime Ministers, p334 
7 Marquand, Progressive Dilemma, p 155; Pirnlott, Harold Wilson, p60-66 
Pirnlott, Harold Wilson, p126 
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it. Thus, there is no inconsistency in his idea of a National Plan in 1963 which 
argued for the root and branch application of corporate socialism. 9 
Wilson's outlook was shaped by the currents of debate on corporate 
socialism during the 1930s but his opportunism meant a divergence from 
contemporaries, in particular Gaitskell. Initially clashing over devaluation in 
1949 and again over rearmament spending in 1951 Wilson resigned, aligning 
himself with the left. 10 With the failure of Bevan's challenge Wilson modified his 
rhetoric and presented himself as a centrist, the bridge between left and right. 
When this position was threatened by defeat in the 1959 election, Wilson went on 
the offensive to prevent a pre-emptive move by Gaitskell to oust him. It was in 
his leadership bid that he articulated the antipathy of a large section of the party 
towards Gaitskell: first, by advancing the need for a compromise defence policy; 
secondly, by repudiating Gaitskell's 'fight and fight and fight again' speech over 
unilateralism; thirdly, by advocating that the leader and shadow cabinet needed to 
be more accountable; and finally, by urging the press to not be so partisan 
towards the right of the Party. " 
Fourth, in foreign affairs however, Wilson's views were less clear. As Foote 
remarks, "[i]t was [his] contempt for theory and public debate which makes it 
difficult to weigh Wilson's contribution to Labour's political thought. He was too 
9 Thomas Balogh provided many of the arguments that Wilson used. An Oxford don who later 
worked with the UN, he was economic advisor to the Wilson Governments, 1964-1970. Foote, 
Labour Party, p23 1; see PRO: CAB 147 series for Balogh papers. 
10 Few of Bevan's friends believed this however, assuming that Wilson's motivation was self- 
interest: Wilson assumed the left was on the rise and as the right distrusted him, felt he needed to 
court the likes of Bevan whom he assumed would become leader. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p161, 
169 
11 In part, the antipathy Wilson felt towards Morgan Phillips was that he briefed the press about the 
right but not the left. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p243 
266 
Labour 1963-1975 
responsive to party and popular moods while in opposition to have many fixed 
principles". 12 His fondness for the Soviet Union was sparked by initial success in 
trade talks in the 1940s. It was indicative of a belief in working class solidarity 
and conviction in the application of state planning. His cautious opposition to the 
Common Market was based on the Party's conference decision rather than a 
position of his own. Rather like Bevin before him, Wilson's beliefs about foreign 
policy were secondary to what foreign policy could deliver for the domestic 
economy and maintaining full employment. Unlike Bevin, Wilson's approach 
was not defined by the politics of the Big Three but was more nuanced at a time 
when the 'three circles' concept was disintegrating. 
7.2.2 Roy Jenkins 13 
Roy Jenkins's political career began in 1948. Winning the Central 
Southwark by-election as Labour candidate he was then elected MP for 
Birmingham Stetchford from 1950 until his resignation in 1976. PPS to Noel- 
Baker, the Secretary of State for the Commonwealth in 1949, in opposition, 
Jenkins was a biographer and political commentator for the 'Spectator'. 14 Writing 
Fair Shares for the Rich in 1951 and Pursuit of Progress in 1953, Jenkins was 
associated with the right of the party. 15 A Gaitskellite, he opposed Wilson's 
election as leader. In Wilson's government he became Minister for Aviation until 
December 1965, Home Secretary until 1967 and Chancellor after devaluation 
12 Foote, Labour Party, p230 
13 Roy Harris Jenkins, Baron Jenkins of Hillhead (1920-2003) 
14 Jenkins, R (1948) Mr Attlee: An Interim Biography, London: Heinemann; Jenkins, R (1964) 
Asquith, London: Collins; Jenkins, R (1954) Mr Batrour's Poodle, London: Heinemann; Jenkins, R 
(1958) Sir Charles Dilke, London: Collins; Jenkins went under the pseudonym of 'Taper' at the 
Spectator, see Campbell, Roy Jenkins, pl 10 
15 Jenkins, R (195 1) Fair Shares for the Rich, London: Tribune Publications; Jenkins, R (1953) In 
Pursuit ofProgress, London: Heinemann 
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until June 1970. As Chancellor he instituted a 'hard slog for two years' to tackle 
the nation's balance of payments difficulties. In 1970 he was elected deputy 
leader of the Labour Party but resigned from the Shadow Cabinet in April 1972 
over European policy. Home Secretary again in 1974 he was appointed President 
of the Britain in Europe Referendum campaign in January 1975. 
We can trace Jenkins's beliefs to the tradition of democratic socialism in four 
ways: the influence in his family background of democratic socialism; his early 
understanding of economics; his pro-American outlook and adherence to the 
revisionists; and his modification of belief over the need for British membership 
of the EEC. 
First, Jenkins was born in Abersychan, Wales, the son of a miner and Labour 
MP, Arthur Jenkins. 16 His childhood was middle-class but firmly rooted in labour 
beliefs having been born into the dlite of the Labour movement. 17 His father was 
well connected within the union movement and the Party and later, developed 
contacts across Europe with other union and socialist groupings. So while Roy 
Jenkins may have grown up in the valleys, his was a comfortable and 
cosmopolitan existence with wide intellectual and political horizons. The social 
distinction instilled a firm belief in Jenkins that the Labour Party was not the 
exclusive preserve of the working class. 
When we locate Jenkins's beliefs we identify strong commitments to ideals 
of equality but framed within a powerful pragmatism. His politics were not those 
16 Campbell, J (1983) Roy Jenkins: A Biography, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, pI 
Campbell, Roy Jenkins, pI 
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of the ideologue but rather of seeking practical solutions for the improvement of 
those worse off. Jenkins's politics were always those of "optimistic humanism", 
seeking the improvement of society not the perfection of mankind. 18 Jenkins's 
beliefs echoed the social liberalism of the late nineteenth century: "[h]e grew up 
with a strong inherited belief in the urgency of progress towards an order of 
society in which injustice should be mitigated or abolished". 19 Jenkins lived and 
breathed politics, becoming a 'groupie' who listened to debates from the galleries 
in the House of Commons, meeting senior Labour Parliamentarians through his 
father, and later, meeting contemporaries at university equally imbued with 
political interest. 20 Gaining a first in PPE from Balliol College, Jenkins's 
contemporaries were Edward Heath, Denis Healey and Tony Crosland. Unlike 
Wilson, Jenkins was fully immersed in university politics, being an active 
member of the Oxford Union and the university's Labour Party. 21 
Second, once elected MP, Jenkins delivered his maiden speech in support of 
Cripps' budget thus voicing an interest in economic affairs. From this sprang his 
pamphlet Fair Sharesfor the Rich in which he called for the abolition of private 
incomes facilitated in the meantime by a sliding scale of tax of up to 95%. It 
indicated a radical belief in redistribution which went further than most 
democratic socialists. 
Third, Jenkins's foreign policy beliefs were framed by realism about 
Britain's international standing and the role of other states. A brief stint at the 
Campbell, Roy Jenkins, p40 
Campbell, Roy Jenkins, p8 
20 Radice, G (2002) Friends andRivals, London: Little, Brown, p16 
" Campbell, Roy Jenkins, pII 
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American Embassy in London after graduation marked the beginning of his 
64strong [beliefl in the central importance for Britain of the Atlantic Alliance". 22 
A loyalist, Jenkins supported the Party line in opposition to the Schuman Plan in 
1950. 
When the 1951 party split came and Jenkins aligned with the Gaitskellites, he 
continued his earlier mainstream loyalism. His views on foreign policy mirrored 
closely those of Gaitskell and Healey, rejecting the lefts call for a socialist 
foreign policy. This he felt to be based on two delusions; first the outdated view 
of Britain's importance in the world about which he declared that "the essential 
foundation of utopianism ... [is] a subconscious faith in the ornnicompetence of 
British policy". Secondly, Jenkins was a realist; a British goverment was not 
sovereign so had to deal with the world as it was as opposed to how it wanted it 
to be. 23 Like Healey, Jenkins rejected the call for neutralism favouring a role for 
Britain commensurate with its world status. 24 
Fourth, the area in which Jenkins's beliefs developed to be most at odds 
with the leadership was over his appraisal of Britain's power status. Britain, 
Europe and the Commonwealth formed a set of interconnected beliefs. There was 
no obligation other than sentimental which accounted for continued relations 
with the Commonwealth. He dismissed as unrealistic arguments that the 
Commonwealth was a political or economic alternative to the EEC; neither did 
Britain have any responsibility to 'lead' the Commonwealth. "The new 
imperialism of believing that the emergent countries want to be led by us" he 
22 Campbell, Roy Jenkins, p 17 
23 Jenkins, R (1953) Pursuit and Progress, London: Heinemann, p24 
24 Campbell, Roy Jenkins, p3 9 
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argued "is only a few steps forward from the old imperialism of believing they 
want to be dominated by US.,, 
25 
Unsentimental appraisal led Jenkins to the conclusion that "Our neighbours 
in Europe are roughly our economic and military equals. We would do better to 
live gracefully with them than to waste our substance by trying unsuccessfully to 
ý 26 keep up with the power giants of the modern world'. Failure to become 
involved in Europe would result in a political division with the Continent; for 
Jenkins, the political dimension of Europe was all important. 27 While these 
beliefs had been developing throughout the mid to late 1950s, it was Gaitskell's 
increasingly anti-European stance that led Jenkins to resign from the shadow 
cabinet and set up the cross party common market campaign group as Macmillan 
was leading his party into accepting the principle of membership of the Common 
Market. 
Jenkins was not an ideologue; he had never be drawn into the ideological 
roots of his beliefs. Rather he was essentially an empiricist and pragmatic in his 
search for progressive solutions. For Jenkins, the point of the Labour Party was 
to improve the lot of people. It did not need social blueprints or economic 
structures since gains made in the short-term were as significant and important as 
those hoped for in the long-term. It was a principle that he practised as Home 
Secretary by leading significant changes in civil relations. He defended his 
15 Campbell, Roy Jenkins, p52 
26 Crossman, RHS and Janet Morgan (eds. ) (198 1) The Backbench Diaries ofRichard Crossman, 
London: Hamish Hamilton, 14/05/1959, p748 
27 Jenkins, R (1967) Essays and Speeches, London: Collins, p221 
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policies as libertarian, defending the rights of the individual against the state. 28 
Again, as Chancellor Jenkins prioritised the export market to maximise the 
economic gains to be made from devaluation by introducing a credit squeeze and 
tax rises to curb inflation. 29 Jenkins's rise both saved Wilson's government but 
threatened his leadership. 30 
We can trace in Wilson and Jenkins beliefs that tie them to the traditions of 
corporate socialism and democratic socialism respectively. With Wilson, we 
traced the influence of his non-conformist upbringing and his father's 
unemployment in providing a clear work ethic with a purpose. His subsequent 
ideas about social reform were influenced by working with Beveridge and his 
economic beliefs developed towards delivery end solutions. Finally, he 
demonstrated an ambivalence about foreign policy beliefs consistent with a 
tradition which defines itself first by domestic politics. 
Jenkins's early democratic socialism was traced to his family background and 
by early encounters with its leading members such as Attlee and Dalton. These 
beliefs were reinforced at university where Jenkins rejected radicalism in favour 
of a moderate approach. At Westminster he was influenced by the redistributive 
economic approach of Stafford Cripps. Otherwise, Jenkins adopted a loyalist 
stance in line with revisionist thinking. He switched from believing the American 
Alliance was central in safeguarding British security to the potential offered in 
Europe in the early 1950s. In Europe, Jenkins believed Britain could be a 
decisive player in a new entity powerful enough to rival the superpowers. 
28 Roy Jenkins obituary, h!! p: Hnews. bbc. co. uk/l/hiluk politics/980382. stm. accessed 05/10/2004 
29 Jenkins, Life at the Centre, p222 
30 Radice, Friends and Rivals, pI 59 
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7.3 Historical Setting 
To understand the circumstances in which Harold Wilson and Roy Jenkins 
identified the dilemma of the direction of party ideology and the context which 
defined their articulations of this dilemma, it is necessary to summarise the 
domestic and international situation. We will examine the economy and Trade 
Unions in domestic policy and the state of the 'three circles' concept in the 
international setting particularly in reference to the contraction of Britain's 
defensive world presence and the state of the 'special relationship'. 
7.3.1 Domestic 
Labour's electoral appeal in 1964 was based in part on its plans for the 
economy. The slogan of 'thirteen wasted years' was an effective jibe at the 
perceived failure of the British economy under the Conservatives to match the 
economic growth, productivity and capital investment of competitor economies. 
The incoming Labour Government kept the NEDC established by Macmillan. 
The NEDC or 'Neddy' was a tripartite body of worker, industry and government 
representation. Wilson also introduced the Department of Economic Affairs 
(DEA) whose remit was to limit the Treasury's power. The DEA was to plan and 
modernise the economy to improve efficiency and competitiveness. The DEA 
became the body through which the National Plan was administered. 
The National Plan was published by the Labour Party in September 1965. 
In it, the Labour Government set ambitious targets for economic growth and 
development of 4% per year between 1964 and 1970. It used indicative planning 
in which private companies were given incentives to increase output by an 
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expansionary economic policy. Almost immediately the Plan came under 
pressure from balance of payments problems. The first economic act the 
incoming Labour government instituted was a 15% import surcharge and a f70m 
export rebate to stave off an impending balance of payments crisis. 31 Then, in 
December 1964, the government drew a loan of $1 billion from the IMF with a 
further loan of $1.4 billion in May 1965. Wilson set up a National Board for 
Prices and Incomes which attempted to smooth out wage control although this 
would become a political football between the Treasury and DEA on the one 
hand and the goverment and the unions on the other. 
In early 1966 proposals for industrial reorganisation were formalised in a 
White Paper. In May, Callaghan introduced the Selective Employment Tax 
(SET) to shift labour from services to manufacturing. However, pressure on 
Sterling continued to grow prompting a six-month wage freeze and deflationary 
measures during the summer of 1966. Finally in November 1967 Sterling was 
devalued from $2.80 to $2.40, Callaghan resigned as Chancellor and was moved 
to the Home Office. To sustain devaluation and maximise potential benefits 
Jenkins, Callaghan's replacement at the Treasury, instituted immediate public 
expenditure cuts. The Basle Agreement of September 1968 meant Sterling 
balances were buffered "to offset most of any reduction in their reserves caused 
by fluctuations in Sterling held both publicly and privately overseas". 32 One 
threat to Sterling was removed since "[o]verseas Sterling Area (OSA) countries 
undertook to hold a proportion of their reserves in Sterling. In return, they 
" Lapping, B (1970) The Labour Government 1964-1970, Harmondsworth: Penguin, p32,57; Cook 
and Stevenson, Britain Since 1945, p 168 
32 Oliver, M. J and Arran Hamilton (2006) 'Downhill from Devaluation: The Battle for Sterling, 
1968-1972', Economic History Review Online, October 2006, http: //www. blackwell- 
synergy. com/doi/full/10.1111/i. 1468-0289.2006.00365. x accessed 05/12/2006, p7 
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obtained a dollar value guarantee covering the greater part of their Sterling 
holdings". 33 
The weakening of Sterling resulted in planning towards floating the pound 
which would eventually take place in 1972 once the US abandoned the Bretton 
Woods system in 1971. More immediate practical concerns were to buttress the 
position of Sterling by introducing higher taxes and duties in a major deflationary 
budget package in March 1968 and six months later with a worsening of the trade 
gap, a credit squeeze. In 1969 and 1970 Jenkins introduced two budgets both of 
which were aimed at creating a balance of payments surplus rather than pre- 
election tax cuts. 
Economic difficulties were in part defined by relations with organised 
labour. The shift towards economic planning meant greater trades union 
involvement in economic policy-making both through the NEDC and the 
National Plan, while the Prices and Incomes Board became a particular focus of 
conflict between unions and the Labour goverment during the late 1960s. A 
number of high profile strikes indicated antipathy towards this policy, notably the 
May 1966 National Union of Seamen's strike in London. 
In a bid to ease industrial relations, Wilson appointed Barbara Castle to the 
newly established Department of Employment and Productivity. Castle 
subsequently published the White Paper In Place of Strife which aimed to 
counter escalating strike action by reforming industrial relations laws. These, she 
33 Oliver and Hamilton, 'Downhill from Devaluation', p7 
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proposed, would now be backed by penal sanctions and 'cooling off periods for 
unofficial strikes in an attempt to stop wildcat strikes. The paper split the Cabinet 
and united the unions in their opposition so that it was dropped in favour of the 
TUC improving its management of strikes. 
7.3.2 International 
The most significant shift in defence policy came in 1966 with Healey's 
defence review. It signalled the contraction of British defensive obligations East 
of Suez and made specific the focus on European defence as the limit of Britain's 
defence policy. It was a review which had been some two years in the making, 
since Healey was appointed as Defence Secretary when Wilson was elected, and 
was intended to provide the redirection of British defence interests and resources 
to limits which were acceptable in terms of costs. 
The terms of the review included needing to cut E400m from the defence 
budget and the first casualty was the cancellation of the TSR2 strike- 
reconnaissance aircraft on grounds of costs. Instead, the American F 111 was to 
be ordered although in 1968 this too was cancelled because of costs. 34 The 
cancellation of the aircraft carrier CVA-01 (on the grounds that it would have 
only limited use and lacked the manpower to use it East of Suez) also formed 
part of the decision to slough off the East of Suez role. Yet despite these 
cancellations almost half of the budget cuts needed to be found. 35 Healey's 
outlook had always been global, although he preferred cutting NATO troop 
commitments in favour of a continued presence in the Middle East. The real 
34 Healey, Time ofMy Life, p271-3 
" Healey, Time ofMy Life, p279 
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result was a mixture of withdrawal from Aden and Singapore and a continued 
international presence where the host country provided the facilities. At home, 
amalgamations of regiments provided more cuts. 36 
Healey had indicated that future commitments would be reduced too, with a 
programme running up to 1970. This was accelerated and extended in the wake 
of the 1967 devaluation. All British bases outside of Europe and the 
Mediterranean were to be closed by 1971. While remaining a member of 
SEATO, Britain would not provide any forces to the group. Withdrawal from 
Malaysia and Singapore was substituted with an integrated air defence system in 
which commitments were shared with New Zealand and Australia. Finally, the 
Labour Government, although split over the continued use of a nuclear deterrent, 
maintained the Polaris commitment undertaken by Macmillan, reducing the fleet 
by one, to four submarines, one with a specific role East of Suez. 37 
Finally, the Anglo-American relationship came under pressure during the 
late 1960s as the Vietnam War intensified. British policy had assumed the role of 
passive spectator during the 1950s. As the Americans took over the French 
mantle in the conflict from 1964, Wilson resisted pressure from the Johnson 
administration to commit troops, although was equivocal in his denouncement of 
the conflict at home. His position became ambiguous since Wilson had sought 
American support for his position on Rhodesia. Ian Smith's Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965 had been met with an 
" Cook and Stevenson, Britain Since 1945, p204-5 
37 Healey, Time qfMy Life, p301-5 
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almost obsessive response by Wilson. 38 American support of a British economic 
embargo on Rhodesia meant British support of the American presence in 
Vietnam, and continued presence East of Suez was required in return. The 
implied continued world presence was welcomed by some in Cabinet although 
the left and pro-European members were critical of this apparent retrograde step. 
While it caused anger and demonstrations at home from the autumn of 1967 until 
at least the summer of 1968 and opposition from the Labour Party Conference, it 
meant American support was less forthcoming over British Sterling 
fluctuations. 39 
7.4 Elite Beliefs and Tradition Change 
The perceived dilemma of maintaining control over the ideological 
direction of the Party was accepted by Wilson and Jenkins so prompting a 
modification of belief about how to secure argument hegemony on Labour Party 
policy. When Wilson and Jenkins refer to this dilemma, they refer to four facts in 
particular: the failure of Wilson's national plan at home; the failure of the 
Commonwealth strategy abroad; the radicalisation of politics; and using Europe 
as the point around which to rally support. It is argued that the party's failure to 
engage with the idea of Europe meant it remained a consistently weak and less 
rooted idea in the Party's beliefs creating an essentially ambivalent attitude and 
marginalising those who genuinely supported it. 
39 Gowland and Turner, Reluctant Europeans, p155 
39 Wi Ison, The Labour Government 1964-1970, p96-98,187,43 6,55 8 
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7.4.1 Identifying the Dilemma 
Wilson faced a dilemma over how to shore up, in the face of economic 
difficulties, the corporatist socialist model on which he had been elected and 
more crucially upon which he felt the unity of the Labour Party rested. He 
eventually rearticulated the position of Europe within the Party through the two- 
pronged argument of economic gains of the common market and from the 
advantages such a union had for science and technology. The failure of Wilson's 
domestic economic policy was mitigated first by the failure of the bid and 
deflecting this towards French intransigence and second by Jenkins's 
Chancellorship which eventually restored some economic equilibrium. 
Jenkins later experienced his own dilemma over how to shore up the 
Labour Party's aim of EEC membership in the face of internal division and the 
radicalisation of the left. He first considered challenging the leadership over 
Wilson's increased anti-European articulations. Jenkins would not allow a party 
regrouping through a return to scepticism once Wilson was out of office in 1970. 
Becoming radicalised himself by the polarisation within the Party, Jenkins defied 
the Party and led rebels to vote with the goverment over EEC entry in October 
1971. Damaged by this he resigned as deputy leader in April 1972. In opposition 
the issue of the EEC became the arena over which the left and right within the 
party fought not only over the principle of membership, but also a proxy battle 
over the ideological direction of the party's future economic policy. 
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7.4.1.1 The Failure of the National Plan 
Wilson established himself as the bridge between left and right within the 
Labour Party on a platform of personality and dynamism and a return to the 
corporate socialism of the 1940s. Changes in relations with the trades unions and 
the international economy would also impact on the national plan. 
Wilson was elected by a party tired of internal fighting; his mission was to 
restore party unity under the politically neutral banner of science and technology. 
Wilson had cultivated the credentials of someone able to speak to both left and 
right. As Robins notes, "[t]he programme appealed to fundamentalists because it 
involved more planning and public ownership [and] it appealed to the revisionists 
because it would generate economic growth and efficienCY99.40 Further, Wilson 
had electoral appeal: "what Harold offered was not just an image but to some 
extent the reality of a modem man, a competent man - none of the old labour 
business of lumbering along ... He was on the move. He knew what the modem 
world was all about". 41 Wilson's electoral appeal was based also on the contrast 
to the aged and spent leadership of the Conservatives. 
The election platform on which Wilson fought was progressive, energetic, 
and in sharp contrast to the Conservatives and their "thirteen wasted years". It 
was a platform specifically based on fighting the balance of payments problems 
by creating a National Plan under which Britain would rejoin other Western 
40 Robins, The Reluctant Party, p48 
41 Alec Douglas Home quoted in Murphy, D (ed) (2000) Britain 1914-2000, London: Collins 
Education Press, p292 
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42 powers whose economic growth was outstripping that of Britain. Labour's 
programme aimed to rejuvenate the British economy by applying in full the 
corporate socialist model of planning and nationalisation, first used during the 
Attlee Governments. It argued that only the root and branch application of 
planning could deliver the dynamism needed in the economy. It was more than 
the Attlee governments had hoped to achieve. The National Plan embodied this 
programme and required a holistic approach to policy implementation which was 
to emanate from the DEA as an alternative to the orthodoxy of the Treasury. 43 It 
was a bold and radical plan. Yet as we saw above, it failed. 
The National Plan was an ambitious policy almost inevitably doomed to 
failure given inherited economic difficulties. It came under pressure almost 
immediately from continued balance of payments deficits; it was the point at 
which Wilson fully understood the extent to which the difficulties in effecting 
change at home were dependent on a positive reception from international 
trading markets. 44 The nail in the coffin came with the Seamen's Strike in May 
1966. It lasted nearly two months and provoked a state of emergency, effectively 
torpedoing the corporate socialist solution to economic problems as it stood. A 
run on Sterling as a result weakened the economy and only pushed Wilson 
45 further on the defensive, eventually leading to devaluation in 1967. Debates 
over when Wilson should have devalued overlook the beliefs underpinning the 
reasons why he did not. The theme of respectability which had developed in 
42 Labour Party Manifesto, 1964, http: //www. psr. keele. ac. uk/area/uk/man/I 64. htm accessed 
01/10/2004 
4' Brown, In My Way, p97 
44 Radice Friends and Rivals, p254 
45 Prior attempts to prop up Sterling to avoid devaluation had resulted in surcharges levied at EFTA 
imports, straining relations with the members and borrowing almost $2.5 billion from the IMF and a 
further $3 billion from central banks form 1964-1966. 
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relation to Labour's economic competence during the 1930s was the feature of 
the Attlee governments. Even under Attlee devaluation became necessary, 
undermining claims of competent economic management. The legacy of Labour 
aside, devaluation challenged the potency of Wilson's programme for growth. 
The rest of his term in office was characterised by a subtle but absolute shift 
towards the left, indicative of his weakened status, which culminated in the 
government back-down over Barbara Castle's White Paper, In Place of Strife, on 
industrial relations reform. 
The collapse of the National Plan could have ended Wilson's career and re- 
opened barely concealed schisms within the party. To prevent the creation of a 
vacuum in domestic economic policy and foreign policy, Wilson sought to find a 
response by shifting attention towards EEC membership. 46 From the summer of 
1966 until devaluation was no longer avoidable, Wilson's shoring up strategy 
was to seek entry into the EEC. Entry was used to buttress Wilson's flagging 
position and to revive the National Plan by rearticulating the technological 
revolution in terms of economies of scale. Using Europe as the means of reviving 
a beleaguered set of policies was double-edged. With de Gaulle still President 
there seemed little chance of success but to deflect the blame for failure on to the 
French offered an opportunity to avoid a fresh cleavage at home. 
" Robins, Reluctant Party, p58; Contrasted with successful legislation undertaken by Jenkins at the 
Home Office on social affairs, including the abolition of the death penalty, the legalisation of 
homosexuality, and of abortions, reducing the age of voting and later, the age of majority, to 
eighteen. Further, progressive laws on censorship and equal pay were enacted; divorce law was 
simplified while partial attempts were taken to tackle race discrimination. See: Cook and Stevenson, 
Britain since 1945, p 15-6,132,142,157,161 
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7.4.1.2 The Failure of the Commonwealth Strategy 
The second part of Wilson's plan was to continue with traditional 
commercial relations with the Commonwealth but this was challenged, forcing 
Wilson to modify his beliefs. The failure of the Commonwealth strategy began 
with recognising that economic figures confirmed the fall in trade, and continued 
with attempts to link with Europe in rearticulating Britain's international role, to 
capitalise on a shift in public opinion favourable towards entry and with using 
Europe as a means of compensating for poor domestic economic performance. 
In 1964, the Labour Party manifesto, despite its proclamation of "A New 
Britain" in domestic policy, and in foreign policy, "A New Role For Britain", it 
offered no such thing. Instead, it offered the orthodoxy of Labour thinking in 
foreign affairs, firmly re-established by Gaitskell, of pursuing Commonwealth 
relations and developing Atlantic relations in terms of defence needs and 
capabilities. It made no mention of a European policy. 47 By 1966, however, the 
Labour Party manifesto had included, as one of its central strategies in foreign 
policy, membership of the EEC. 48 
The shift was twofold. The orthodoxy of the 'three circles' was over. The 
Commonwealth trade figures showed a steady drift towards the United States 
away from the UK in both imports and exports, while UK trade with the EEC 
47 http: //www. labour-12Lriy, orR: uk/manifestos/1964/1964-labour-manifesto. shtml accessed 
01/10/2004 
48 http: //www. labour-paLty. or. g. uk/manifestos/1966/1966-labour-manifesto. shtml accessed 
01/10/2004 
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doubled over the same period, between 1948 and 1967 . 
49 Basing UK foreign 
policy on sustaining links with the Commonwealth was proving absurd and 
economically dangerous in terms of balance of payments. The second reason was 
a corollary of the first, namely the political dimension of foreign policy. The shift 
in US foreign policy to involvement in Asia and the Rhodesian crisis in 1964 
within the Commonwealth were external changes over which Britain was 
demonstrably impotent. 
By early 1965, "the European issue began creeping into prominence"50 an 
initial attempt at reviving the Maudling initiative of 1959 was swiftly rebuffed by 
the EEC and would be replaced in October 1966 by the proposal to create a free- 
trade area between the EFTA and EEC countries, a move flatly rejected by the 
EEC. In October 1966 the strategy shifted to full membership through an 
investigation conducted by Wilson and Brown in January 1967 into the 
possibility of opening negotiations, and was formally announced in May 1967.51 
In private, Foreign Office advice had been sceptical of alternatives to 
membership of the EEC arguing that reformulations of the 'three circles' concept 
would only see Britain's international voice fatally undermined. It was only 
through membership that Britain had a positive future. 52 In private Wilson was 
voicing concerns over making a declaration of intent which accepted the Treaty 
of Rome. 53 It was a formal acceptance of Britain's changed role in the world. 
'9 Robins, Reluctant Party, p58. For trade figures to and from the Commonwealth from 1948 to 
1967 and percentages of UK exports to and from the EEC and the Commonwealth over this period, 
see Kitzinger, The Second Try, p334-5 
" Robins, The Reluctant Party, p45 
51 Lord George Brown, (1914-19 85) deputy Labour Party leader from 1960 to 1970 
52 PRO: FC030/154, 'The Political Case for Entry', May 1967 
5' Parr, H (2002) 'Gone Native: the Foreign Office and Harold Wilson's Policy towards the EEC, 
19 64-7' in Daddow, 0. (ed. ) Harold Wilson and European Integration, London: Cass, pp75-99, p80 
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In Wilson's European policy there existed a distinct difference in strategic 
approach. A broad consensus had been reached in industry, the press and civil 
service and despite some divisions in Cabinet the majority were also in favour of 
entry. This shift towards favouring entry was helped by the outcome of the 
Luxembourg Compromise which established the veto over 'important issues', 
providing members with a safeguard from unwanted majority decisions. 54 
Convinced by Foreign Office arguments that an application had to be simplified, 
worked well with Wilson's own preference for broad agreement. 55 The difficulty 
was more how to explain the apparent volte face of Labour's foreign policy. 
Furthermore, as Robins argues, "[i]f the EEC was to be reassessed, a new set of 
beliefs had to be learnt; new beliefs which would result in new attitudes". 56 
Labour needed to believe in entry with the conviction which would help 
convince the EEC to accept British membership. The Conservative opposition, 
now led by the pro-European Edward Heath had made Europe central to its 
foreign policy strategy so Wilson's strategy was to add the technology 
dimension, which had been successful in unifying the Party and broadening the 
electoral appeal of the Labour Party during the 1964 and 1966 elections. It had 
the added value of providing a distinctive difference in approach to the 
Conservatives thus bringing in those who opposed entry as an extension of 
opposing the Conservatives. The new intake of MPs in 1966 included many with 
54 Young, Britain and European Unity, p85 
'5 For a more detailed analysis of how the Foreign Office came to love Europe, see Parr, 'Gone 
Native', pp75-99 
56 Robins, The Reluctant Party, p46 
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pro-European sympathies. 57 Finally, the worsening economic situation proved to 
others the necessity of membership as a remedy. 58 
Yet Wilson's strategy and approach tell us little about his beliefs about 
Europe. Wilson's conversion to Europe was, according to his Paymaster General 
George Wigg, not one of conviction but of necessity in f inding a solution to 
domestic economic problems . 
59 Having undermined Brown at the DEA, Wilson 
offered him support over Europe and the post of Foreign Secretary, 
commensurate with his seniority within the Party. Rearticulating Europe as an 
extension of the symbolism of technology earlier employed by Wilson and the 
party provided the possibility of a solution to the economic difficulties. The 
significance of both of them doing a tour of Europe was a measure to placate the 
divisions within Cabinet for if Brown alone had gone then anti-marketeers would 
have disregarded his findings while had Wilson gone alone, the pro-marketeers 
would have been suspicious. 60 
Wilson's convictions over the issue of Europe have raised speculation that 
this was a tactical move to manage the party, or a decisive shift in the face of a 
failing domestic economic situation, or a diversionary tactic to conceal the real 
plight of the economy. Robins locates the rise and fall of Wilson's Europeanism 
as intricately linked to the rise and fall of George Brown's political fortunes. 61 
Once it became clear that Brown and his faction had won over the majority 
within the Cabinet it was politically wise for Wilson to remove him as the 
57 Young, Britain and European Unity, p90 
58 Robins, The Reluctant Party, p57 
59 Wigg, G. (1972) George Wigg, London: Michael Joseph, p33 8-9 
60 Brown, In My Way, p206 
61 Robins, The Reluctant Party, p60 
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government's most ardent advocate of entry. Elsewhere this would seem to be 
challenged. Parr, for example, argues that Wilson, although behind the Foreign 
Office curve on accepting the need for membership of the EEC, became 
convinced of its necessity after the summer of 1966.62 
There are indications that even after de Gaulle's veto, Wilson continued 
with efforts to achieve entry. The Hannel Initiative in December 1967 was the 
Belgian-proposed united front to oppose the French position involving the 
reinvigoration of WEU and European defence. 63 For Wilson it was a counter- 
challenge to the French position and involved the propagation of this position in 
the European press to impress on European opinion that Britain was not about to 
change and revert back to either a 'little Englander' position or to the 
Commonwealth. In an interview in the German press Healey argued for a 
distinctive European identity within NATO which was indicative of this strategy 
during 1967.64 The 'Soames Affair' of early 1969 was important in that it 
represented an attempt by Wilson to present the French in further bad light and 
galvanise support against them though the proposal of a free trade area between 
the Six and Seven was what both the Conservatives and Wilson had at one time 
wanted. Underlying this approach was the belief that there was no alternative 
except full membership and as long as the Government had nowhere else to go, 
must stick to its guns". 65 Even as de Gaulle resigned, the official advice 
remained to seek entry, having decided to reject 'going alone' in Cabinet in 
1966-7 on the grounds that it would diminish Britain's world voice, the 
62 Parr, 'Gone Native', p87 
63 PRO: FC030/395 'Future Policy after the Veto', P. F. Hancock 30/10/68 
64 Robins, The Reluctant Party, p78 
65 PRO: FC030/421 'Study of British European Policy', P. F Hancock, 02/04/69 
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Government should also recognise that vested interests were so great among the 
Six that it would weather de Gaulle's intransigence. 66 It was this belief that 
formed the basis of the revival of negotiations in early 1970 which began under 
the Conservatives just a fortnight after the British election. 
7.4.1.3 Return of Partisanship 
The polarisation of politics had its roots in the 1960s and Wilson identified 
the rise of partisanship by: an increase in radicalism within the Labour Party's 
ranks; increased radicalism of the Labour Party dlite; greater domination by the 
unions in agenda setting; and the discrediting of the revisionists. 
The return to opposition meant a return to internal division. The left found a 
new champion in Tony Benn who provided establishment credibility to claims of 
direct action and worker participation. The reaction to the Heath government's 
Industrial Relations Bill prompted organised dissent in March 1971. The 
perceived failures of the Wilson Governments' type of corporate socialism meant 
a reaction against the Labour leadership. The Campaign for Labour Party 
Democracy (CLPD) was established in 1973 to make the Labour Party more 
responsive and accountable to the rank-and-file activists. 67 The TUC-Labour 
Party Liaison Committee was set up in February 1971 to avoid the disruption 
between the two that had characterised the late 1960s and led to the Alternative 
Economic Strategy (AES), a six-part programme including the "reflation of 
66 PRO: FC030/421 'European Policy', J. Robinson, 28/04/69 
67 The aim of the CLPD was to make mandatory the reselection of Labour MPs to make sure they 
enacted Conference decision and aimed to make this a condition of the leadership which eventually 
happened in 1981 creating an electoral college whereby the leader was selected by a combination 
vote of MPs, Trade Unions and constituency activists. For more information, see: 
http: //home. freeuk. net/clpd/history. htm (accessed 20/12/2006) 
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demand, a substantial expansion of public ownership, formal and compulsory 
planning with privately owned firms, price control and industrial democracy". 68 
Titled Labour's Programme 1973 it embodied the beliefs of the newly 
emboldened left with a call for "a fundamental and irreversible shift in the 
balance of power and wealth in favour of the working people.,, 69 The limits to 
Wilson's version of corporate socialism had been met. 
While the left's demands crept towards a more dominant position, including 
adopting an overtly negative approach to EEC membership, the right fragmented. 
Healey had never been supportive of entry and despite a brief change of mind, 
continued to oppose. Crosland had wavered because of constituency opposition 
but being overlooked for the Chancellorship in favour of Jenkins brought 
personal resentment also to bear over the issue. Jenkins remained steadfastly 
supportive of entry on the grounds that this was the best future direction Britain 
had available and that to change the agreed policy of the party for partisan gain 
was reckless and dishonourable. More importantly, however discredited Wilson 
was over the failings of the 1960s, the old revisionists were seen as more 
discredited, none more so than the ideological arguments which had been 
presented by Crosland. 
The new battle lines emerging between left and right employed EEC 
membership as a proxy for the ideological direction of the party and were drawn 
in 1971 and set by'April 1972. Wilson's dilemma was how to maintain the unity 
of the Labour Party after electoral defeat and the disappointments generated after 
"' Harmon, M (1998) 'Book Review: Economic Strategy and the Labour Party: Politics and Policy 
Making 1970-83' in American Political Science Review, vo192.4, pp968-9, p968 
6' Laybourne, A Century ofLabour, p 116 
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six years in office. In an effort to maintain unity he rearticulated his domestic 
economic outlook and his approach to the EEC. It would lead to accusations of 
opportunism but Wilson managed to sustain enough support for EEC entry to 
prevent the issue from being killed off for discussion. He also sustained a 
strategy of deflection. Throughout the period his speeches were constructed to 
appeal to unity and consistency of view and to construct during this period in 
opposition, be it the Conservative Party or the EEC, a low-level threat against 
which the Party needed to mobilise. It was a strategy which had its merits but 
inspired hostility. 
In January 1971,132 Labour MI's tabled an anti-EEC motion in what 
spiralled towards an ever negative position so that by October it was expected 
that the Conference would vote outright against the EEC. Jenkinsites tabled their 
own pro-EEC motion in May gathering 100 signatures but it exposed the inherent 
weakness of the right in the Party where Jenkins was being portrayed as the 
Bevan of the right. 70 
The slide towards the left continued, highlighted by Callaghan's 'non 
merci' speech and Wilson's reaction to the perceived threat from Callaghan as 
pretender to the throne of the centre-left by his anti-EEC position at the Labour 
Party's special conference in July 1971. At this conference he presented his 
previous articulations as consistent, arguing that he had only been prepared to 
enter the EEC if the terms were satisfactory adding "[n]ever have we said- nor 
is a single word we, or I, have said capable of being construed as meaning- that 
70 Marquand, D (2004) "The Welsh Wrecker" in Adonis, A and Keith Thomas (eds) Jenkins: A 
Retrospective, Oxford: OUP, p 115 
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we have to accept whatever terms emerged. We reserved the right to judge the 
terms of entry against the potential benefits, and on that test, and on no other, to 
decide for or against entry, and this we shall do" . 
71 
It was a carefully constructed speech aimed at channelling fire towards the 
Conservatives and focused specifically on the perception that Heath, in his 
enthusiasm for entry, was selling British interests short. Crucially however, 
Wilson never allowed Conference to vote against the EEC. 
As Deputy Leader of the Party, Jenkins was unable to participate in the 
conference. He articulated his position two days later at a PLP meeting by openly 
criticising Wilson's equivocation and Callaghan's 'Little Englandism'. 72 For 
Jenkins, EEC entry was a matter of being open and outward looking rather than 
73 
narrow, and of maintaining the responsibilities of leadership. He identified the 
dilemma that party ideology posed with an ascendant left within the Party and 
formulated his articulations in response to this. The dilemma became acute for 
Jenkins, revolving around an issue of principle rather than partisan politics. His 
increasing radicalisation was indicative of this shift. 
Jenkins articulated his beliefs about Britain's international status and future 
global role in a speech in March 1972. Surnmarising British foreign policy since 
1945 as one of over-extension based on traditional precepts, he identified Suez as 
a critical juncture which continued to define British foreign policy. Britain clung 
71 http: //www. ena. lu? lang, =2&doc=17409 Harold Wilson speech to the Special Conference of the 
Labour Party, 17/07ni, (accessed 20/12/2006) 
72 Marquand, Jenkins Retrospective, p 116 
73 Marquand, Jenkins Retrospective, p120 
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more closely to her American 'nurse' whereas the French used it to establish an 
independent presence, away from American post-war patronage of European 
affairs. 74 Reappraising the three circles, he suggested that the waning of 
American interest in European affairs meant attempts to retain the Anglo- 
American Alliance as traditionally formulated were unhelpful for Britain. 75 
Britain's future lay in Europe and not in a mid-Atlantic position. The other circle 
of Commonwealth had been shown to be "without substance" which despite 
loosening ties had eroded the concept of Britain as a heavy-weight middle 
ranking power by an inability to achieve results in the Middle East and 
Vietnam. 76 
Jenkins articulated instead a set of beliefs about how Britain's future 
interests would be best served and why Britain needed to move towards Europe 
in a world full of power blocs. He reinterpreted traditional labels of Labour 
foreign policy. Establishing an equitable partnership between the United States 
and European Community was essential to British interests, as was the 
entrenchment of Germany in the EEC. It meant the end of Franco-German rivalry 
for good in a secure three-way relationship between Britain, Europe and the 
United States. Jenkins also reinterpreted the notion of duty to Commonwealth 
countries through the lens of EEC membership. An economically stronger Britain 
through the EEC could use growth, fortune and resources to help the countries of 
74 Jenkins, R (1972) British Foreign Policy Since 1945, text of a speech made to the Thank-Offering 
to Britain Fund Lecture, British Academy, March 1972, Oxford: OUP, p8-9 
y Since 1945, p9 75 Jenkins, British Foreign Polic 
76 Jenkins, British Foreign Policy Since 1945, pII 
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the third world. He even used this to link it to the fear of Communism by 
claiming it could be used as a means of fostering improved East-West relations. 77 
It was a reformulation of traditional Labour Party foreign policy values but 
with a decidedly regional focus. It was a set of beliefs that took seriously the 
reality of Britain's declining world role and rearticulated a vision of how Britain 
could once again provide a credible and powerful voice in the world in 
partnership with European allies. Jenkins's beliefs were increasingly 
marginalised within the Party. By October, predictions were borne out with a 5: 1 
vote against continued EEC membership at the Party Conference. It provided the 
necessary stand off which meant Jenkins led 69 rebels into the yes lobby when 
the vote came on 28th October, defying Wilson's three-line whip and leading to 
accusations of disloyalty and of being a splitter. By the time Jenkins did resign, 
over the Party's decision to adopt the Referendum as part of their manifesto 
pledge, the balance had tipped inexorably to the left. 
7.4.1.4 Uneasy Peace 
The final dilemma Wilson faced was how to win office once again and 
maintain that unity once elected. He did this in three ways. Having cobbled 
together a left-wing coalition, Wilson tried to keep them pegged to relatively 
middle ground. Firstly, he assumed an ambivalent and at times negative attitude 
to Europe. Secondly, he tied those who threatened his leadership, such as 
Callaghan, to his political fortunes. Finally, he successfully channelled Party 
77 Jenkins, British Foreign Policy Since 1945, p 11-2 
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debate away from any issue of the principle of membership to one about the 
terms of entry, something which the left were slow to pick up on. 78 
First, Wilson's articulations over Europe had shifted early on, becoming 
more negative while not rejecting membership. Speculation at the time of a 
leadership challenge from Callaghan may have affected Wilson's shift, but the 
evidence suggests that Callaghan's own increasingly sceptical position was 
entirely in line with Wilson's, acting more as dutiful lieutenant rather than as a 
contender. 79 By February 1974, the Labour Party manifesto was able to claim 
triumphantly that renegotiations for continued membership would start within a 
matter of weeks, and that "this year, unlike 1961-1963, Britain will be 
negotiating from a position of economic strength ... But it means, too, that if 
satisfactory terms cannot be secured in the negotiations Britain will be able to 
stand on her own feet outside the Community". 80 This attitude was reiterated 
later in the year, in the October 1974 manifesto. Whereas the manifesto remarked 
that "Britain is a European nation", it would not commit itself to anything more 
than the nebulous promise of "always seeking a wider cooperation between the 
European peoples", continuing with its list of necessary changes. 81 
The polarisation of left and right about the principle of membership was 
articulated as the undemocratic creation of international capitalism, the long- 
standing critique of the EEC, coupled with support for maintaining national 
" Gowland D. and Arthur Turner (2000) Reluctant Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 
1945-1998, London: Longman, p 190 
79 Robins, The Reluctant Party, p 10 1 
so http: //www. labour-party. orp,. uk/manifestos/1964/1964-labour-manifesto. shtml accessed 
01/10/2004 
" http: //www. labour-party. org, uklmanifestos/1964/1964-labour-manifesto. shtml accessed 
01/10/2004 
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sovereignty as the means of retaining control over domestic policy. For the right, 
it was integral to the reformist and social democratic programme. For Jenkins, in 
particular, it had become an issue of national interest transcending party 
loyalties. 82 Wilson deflected and defused any attempts to oppose membership on 
principle, defeating Conference votes on this. By engaging both pro- and anti- 
marketeers in the fortunes first of renegotiation and then in fighting the 
referendum he was successful in redirecting attention away from the most 
divisive issue: the principle of membership. 
Second, perhaps Wilson's most successful coup was to tie Callaghan's 
fortunes to his own. Appointing him as Foreign Secretary meant he was 
intimately linked with the success or failure of renegotiations and, later, with the 
referendum. Callaghan posed a greater threat to Wilson in 1974-5 than anyone 
else. Renegotiation was an oblique term capable of meaning all things to all 
politicians and despite claims of a fundamental renegotiation, it was understood 
that discussions would only be held at the margins of the Heath agreement. 
Wilson had no interest in extending difficulties to EEC partners so the terms of 
debate were fixed to lie within the treaties. 83 
Third, renegotiations focused on four areas: reform of the CAP; access for 
products of some Commonwealth states; state aid to industry and the regions; and 
Britain's budgetary contributions. 84 Despite the overstated nature of Wilson's 
renegotiation programme there were notable gains, namely a change of attitude 
towards the ever expansive CAP, and the Lome Convention in 1975 which 
" Gowland and Turner Reluctant Europeans, p 187 
83 Gowland and Turner Reluctant Europeans, p 190 
84 Gowland and Turner Reluctant Europeans, p 191 
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secured more favourable trade relations for developing countries and a specific 
deal for Caribbean sugar products. Enough ground moved over New Zealand 
dairy products to claim success, regional development was regarded as 
unthreatening, and budgetary talks, although ultimately empty, showed Wilson as 
a tough negotiator-85 Both Callaghan and Wilson proposed to the Cabinet and 
PLP to support the new terms and agree to remain in the EEC. While the Cabinet 
voted in majority to accept, the PLP and then later the wider party voted against. 
Wilson remained undeterred about pursuing the referendum since polling 
had suggested there was support to remain in the EEC throughout the period of 
renegotiation. 86 Significantly polling suggested much more divided opinion 
unless the government provided direction. In late February 1975, a twenty 
percentage point gap emerged between those in favour of staying in and those 
against. 87 Callaghan in particular was pressing for a strong majority, arguing that 
"it is important that we should have-an overwhelming yes majority. In the 
world as it is now and in the circumstances in which we find ourselves, a no vote 
would have the most serious consequences". 
88 The government provided MPs 
who supported staying in the EEC with a series of sheets providing rebuttals to 
anti-EEC claims, mainly over the costs of entry, the costs of staying in and the 
erosion to sovereignty. 
15 Gowland and Turner Reluctant Europeans, p193-5 
86 PRO: FC030/3066, polling information from November 1974 to May 1975 
87 PRO: FC030/3066, Robert Armstrong to Stephen Barratt, European Community poll findings 
1975,11/04/75, polls conducted between January and March 1975 showed a reversal of public 
opinion from anti-market to pro market, increasing dramatically with government support for 
staying in. 
88 PRO: FCO 30/3066 Callaghan to all ministers and backbenchers supporting the government, 
27/05/75 
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While the government occupied one position, the issue had cut across both 
parties and supporters of either side grouped to join either the pro-market Britain 
in Europe group (BiE) or the anti-market National Referendum Campaign 
(NRC) . 
89 The 'yes' campaign was headed by Jenkins and bore all the hallmarks 
of the responsible, mainstream voice in organising nightly rallies in which equal 
representation was afforded to all parties. While Heath played an active role in 
the campaign, and the Conservative political machinery was used for the 
campaign, both Thatcher as the new leader and Wilson played low-key roles. The 
more mainstream unions offered support as did the NFU and industry, giving the 
impression of a comprehensive coverage of support in the nation. In contrast, the 
NRC was a collection of different groups whose only shared belief was 
opposition to the EEC. It coalesced around two groupings: the Common Market 
Safeguard Committee (CMSG) and Get Britain Out. It lacked the finance and 
therefore was unable to match the professionalism and machinery of the BiE 
campaign. Of the campaign Jenkins remarked that it was necessary despite 
always being in sight of winning. Public perception would disagree with his 
appraisal, shared with Heath, that what fired audiences was the broad discussion 
about Britain's future foreign policy direction. Rather, it was about how the cost 
of entry would be felt and it was here that the pro-marketeers gained leverage as 
EEC food prices dipped below world market prices. 90 
7.5 Modifications 
The dilemma of the Labour Party in the late 1960s and during the 1970s 
was diffuse in its reach but absolute in its meaning. Three phases mark its 
89 For the detail of these groups' arguments, see Butler, D and Uwe Kitzinger, (1976) The 1975 
Referendum, London: 
9' Jenkins, Life at the Centre, p417; Gowland and Turner Reluctant Europeans, p212 
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passage, each with responses by Wilson and Jenkins. The first phase was marked 
by the breakdown of the national plan and the failure of the Commonwealth 
strategy early in Wilson's leadership. The second phase was marked by the 
adoption of radicalised positions to gain control of the debate over the Party's 
direction. The third phase was marked by the marginalisation of the right but the 
directing of the left towards Europe. 
We can see how Wilson modified his beliefs about the need to join the 
EEC when attempts to enact the National Plan came under fire. Wilson's 
interests were far from European in 1964 and only began turning in this direction 
as the reality of Britain's economic position became clearer. His move towards 
the principle of EEC membership remained ambiguous. It was what had reunited 
the Party under Gaitskell and was a debate with an emotive force within the 
Party. He arguably modelled himself on Gaitksell's approach of being 
ambiguous. While Gaitskell had appalled the right with his eventual rejection of 
Europe, he had remained ambiguous on the subject long enough to, when the 
time required, reflect the least divisive opinion. Wilson's approach adopted this 
strategy. We can see in 1966 that he had little emotional attachment to the 
concept of membership. Wilson's beliefs had been based on support for the 
Commonwealth and on the development of third world countries, and he had 
worked on this during the 1950s. 
The 1964 manifesto reflected this continued adherence to traditional 
axioms of Labour internationalism. His first two years in government provided a 
shift: despite promises to revive Commonwealth trade, the reality was impossible 
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to achieve and trade continued to grow, in contrast, with EEC countries. Second 
to Wilson's shift was the ineffectiveness of British action over Rhodesia. The 
idealised notion of Commonwealth was undermined by apartheid South Africa 
followed by the UDI of Smith in Rhodesia in 1965. While Wilson may not have 
lacked the will to resolve Commonwealth issues, he lacked the resources, 
arriving in office to find an E800m trade deficit. Political and economic schisms 
continued to grow as the three circles concept unravelled. Wilson began to turn to 
Europe, which, though lacking the emotional appeal of the Commonwealth, 
contained economic, and the making of political, coherence. In view of Party 
opinion, he maintained a qualified support for membership, one based on 
conditions. 
There are competing interpretations of what Wilson's motivations and 
beliefs about the second application were. Pimlott rejects the argument that 
Wilson was Machiavellian in seeking to make an application which had no 
chance of success. It does not explain, he argues, why Wilson then worked 
closely on it and ran the risk of personal humiliation. 91 We might argue that 
Wilson's approach was tactical and based on party advantage: it defused the 
power of the Conservatives' weapon and deflected criticism for not even trying, 
while closer to home it offered a qualified response to the failings of Wilson's 
domestic economic policy, especially remaining unmoved on the need for 
devaluation until it was forced. 92 
91 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p438 
92 Gowland and Turner, Reluctant Europeans, p 163 
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It was clear that despite understanding the need for change, and that in fact 
the pace of change was being forced on, rather than led by, the Wilson 
government, there lacked an emotional dimension to the future direction which 
manifested itself in Wilson's presentation. By focusing on economic gains, the 
appeal was muted, reflecting his own mixed response to it as much as fearful of 
opening old wounds in the party. 
Once the Party went into opposition, Wilson was forced to adopt a more 
proactive position about his beliefs over Britain's membership of the EEC. The 
Conservatives had been elected on this ticket and again we can see Wilson 
reprise the role he had in 1966 of becoming more ambiguous about the merits of 
membership and channelling criticism of Conservative, and in particular Heath's, 
pro European beliefs. The attack had already pushed Heath into a more defensive 
public position, a concession to the power of Wilson's argument and the 
mobilisation of anti-marketeer opinion. 
It was the point at which Wilson was at his weakest, unable to prevent the 
Party from adopting a radical programme of nationalisation. His beliefs about 
corporate socialism had been undermined completely and he had little alternative 
to offer. He could not counter the radical calls from the left on this strategy, only 
to curb and temper their excesses. While his underlying belief remained to 
sustain party unity, he conceded ground on domestic policy but retained enough 
input to guide debate on Europe. Accepting the challenge from the left for a 
referendum on whether Britain should stay in Europe, Wilson attached to it the 
condition of renegotiation. 
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For Jenkins, once considered Wilson's successor, the period marked the 
marginalisation and eventual ostracism of the principled, national-interest driven 
view which had been the foundation of the social democratic approach since 
before World War Two. It also marked his eclipse by Callaghan as both potential 
successor and rival to Wilson. Jenkins modified his beliefs about the Labour 
Party. Believing the party to be diverting itself from the post-war ground it had 
occupied towards a more radicalised and sectional programme he fought against 
it, then decided to fight within it by seeking re-election to the NEC and finally 
decided to fight for the principle from without the NEC. Once elected again in 
1974, Wilson demonstrated Jenkins's lesser value by appointing him Home 
Secretary rather than Foreign Secretary, a post which went to Callaghan. It 
signalled the end of Jenkins's hope of the leadership as Callaghan was now 
perfectly poised to take over and once he did in 1976, Jenkins formalised the split 
between the right and left within the party by resigning his post, becoming a 
European Commissioner in Brussels and leading the formation of the Social 
Democratic Party in 1981. 
Jenkins stood on principle against the Party shift towards sectional interests 
and the apparent opportunism of leadership. Both he and Wilson were forced to 
modify their positions in a battle which turned tactical over defending ideological 
ground. In this section we examine the way in which the dilemma of EEC 
membership prompted Wilson and Jenkins to modify their beliefs about British 
and party interests. This section deploys Bulpitt's measurements: the success of 
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establishing political argument hegemony and the effectiveness of party 
management. 
Once Wilson was re-elected his position in some ways became easier 
despite only commanding a slim majority. Again, Wilson's forte was the 
deployment of tactical measures rather than ideological messages. To prevent the 
left from steering the party and the nation out of Europe he had successfully 
shifted the terms of the debate and tied Callaghan to the European message. 
Enough concessions were gained in the renegotiations to claim success and both 
pressed for acceptance. While Wilson expected little change within the Party's 
attitudes towards staying in the EEC, being focused on the principle, he reached 
out to the general public who had consistently been supportive of staying in 
throughout the period of renegotiation and remained so to the vote at the 
referendum. By taking on the left with their own rules, Wilson hoped to snuff out 
the power of their argument. In the meantime he had been successful in 
preventing the party from splitting and keeping Britain in Europe. Marquand 
claims that Wilson lasted so long because despite occasional cabals against him, 
"his conservatism his vacillation and his corrupting mixture of left-wing talk and 
right-wing deeds were also theirs". 93 
We now turn to measurements of the success of Wilson and Jenkins in 
securing support for their interpretations of foreign policy and the effect of this 
on Labour's domestic economic policy, beginning with Party management. The 
PLP, like the Cabinet, was divided in three, with pro-EEC, anti-EEC and 
93 Marquand, Progressive Dilemma, p 161 
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undecided groups. The anti-EEC group remained largely impervious to the 
technology dimension which Wilson introduced to the debate on membership, 
but until 1970 this group remained largely muted over the issue of entry for four 
reasons. First, they had failed to prevent the Govenunent pursuing a policy of 
membership. Second, having failed, they remained largely silent on the issue 
believing in the likelihood of a second veto from de Gaulle. Third, as there was a 
number of high profile Cabinet members opposed to entry who did not resign 
over the issue, this supported their second point. Finally, and perhaps most 
significantly, they lacked a credible alternative foreign policy. 
The pro-EEC group had more success during Wilson's first two terms. 
Composed mainly of the right wing of the party, former CDS members now 
created the Labour Committee for Europe (LCE). The LCE's objective was to 
recruit support and win over uncommitted MPs. Loyalty to the Government in 
whatever guise its European policy took lent the group greater support from MPs 
who shied away from controversial policies and total membership of the group 
peaked at over 100 MPs in March 1967. 
Finally, the undecided centre were largely acquiescent in part to avoid 
unnecessary party rifts and in part because of personal confusion over the initial 
meaning of Europe defined in contrast to Germany and the Commonwealth, to a 
new meaning of Europe defined in terms of technological possibilities. This 
group showed a genuine shift in beliefs towards support of Europe with numbers 
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doubling from 53 in late 1964 to 104 in March 1967, though this included many 
new MPs elected in 1966 who were more sympathetic towards Europe. 94 
Both Brown and Douglas Ja 5 made contrasting speeches after Wilson had 
declared the Government's intention to seek membership of the EEC, leading to 
censure within the Cabinet and the immediate application of Cabinet collective 
responsibility. Having at least concealed the majority of differences within the 
cabinet, Wilson's next strategy was to present a united front with the PLP. To 
prevent dissent he reapplied stricter discipline and collective responsibility on the 
issue of Europe to prevent individual MPs from either side voicing a different 
line from the Government, and if they did, then to discipline them accordingly. 
When MPs voted in May 1967 over the application to join, fifty-one MPs 
abstained while thirty-five voted against the Goverment. Disciplinary action 
saw seven PPSs dismissed from their roles. 96 
Once in opposition, the Party openly split again over the failures of the past 
six years. As Robins remarks, "[fln an atmosphere of increasing partisan 
cleavage, conflict within the party intensified as the factions revised their goals 
and drew new lines of conflict. The battleground and the central issue around 
which all conflicts coalesced, was Labour's policy towards EEC entry". 97 Europe 
had ceased to be solely an issue of foreign policy; it was now firmly rooted in the 
domestic policy sphere. It had been linked to Wilson's domestic platform but 
there was no longer a firm party line as the Conservatives took over negotiations. 
" Robins, The Reluctant Party, p5O 
95 Douglas Jay, (1907-1996) member of Attlee and Wilson's governments. Ostensibly associated 
with the revisionists, he stoutly opposed EEC membership 
96 Robins, The Reluctant Party, p63 
97 Robins, The Reluctant Party, p78 
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In the initial phase of opposition, all factions were clearly staking out their 
territory in a bid to gain a leading influence in the policy direction of the Party. 
Michael Foot represented the old Bevanite left but was unable to present a 
modification of Wilson's economic strategy, agreeing with the belief that 
corporate socialism needed to be applied in full. In addition Foot had been one of 
the Third Force group in the 1940s who were early advocates of unity with 
98 Europe. Instead, the left within the PLP were influenced by the rise of the New 
Left during the late 1950s and it is worth elaborating here the main facets of New 
Left thinking and their impact upon the PLP since this is of significance to the 
beliefs expressed over the meaning of membership to the EEC. 
The New Left emerged from the section of the left that had been 
sympathetic to the Soviet Union until the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. Their 
legacy was felt in three ways. Philosophically, the New Left advocated 
"libertarian socialism in tune with the traditions of working class radicalism, 
romantic yet pragmatic in its collective attitudes and actions", aiming to provide 
a synthesis of communist and social democratic ideals. 99 It drew attention to the 
democratic forms of government operating in a society that was not democratic. 
Culturally, this raised the concept of dominators and dominated with social 
systems created for, not by, the people to mould them into accepting the 
hierarchical structure of society in which dissent was only manifest through 
strike action or apathy. ' 00 Politically, then, the result was to mobilise people into 
action as a form of direct democracy. The Labour Party had been influenced by 
98 Foote, Labour Party Political Thought, p298 
99 Foote, Labour Party Political Thought, p280-1 
100 Foote, Labour Party Political Thought, p284-5 
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ideas such as direct democracy and direct participation which were consistent 
with corporate socialism. 
The left blamed the EEC for all the failings that had happened 
domestically. This strategy was necessary as otherwise their radical interpretation 
of corporate socialism which would allow for direct participation would be 
associated with the failings of Wilson's version of corporate socialism. The 
external threat of the EEC was thus identified and targeted for its inflationary 
impact on the domestic economy, for having 'prompted' In Place of Strife, and 
underpinned the Conservative's Industrial Relations Bill. 101 Bowing to Europe 
was at the cost of the unionised working class. 
Throughout 1971, the party moved towards the anti-market faction while 
the right, pro-market faction waned in significance, failing to find support in their 
arguments about hypothetical gains as statistics emerged about the prospective 
slowdown in EEC economic growth. It continued to use the Wilsonian formula 
based on technological advance created with and by entry but found opposition 
from newly emerging envirom-nental groups. It failed to convince the party that 
the terms secured by the Conservatives were of no significant difference from 
those the Labour Party hoped to achieve and finally was seen as part collaborator, 
part saboteur; in collusion with the Conservatives while maintaining the rift 
within the Party. 
101 Robins, The Reluctant Party, p8l 
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The other base of Party support, the trades unions also began to make their 
position felt as distinct from the flat support they had traditionally offered. 
Though guarded, unions were generally supportive of EEC entry in 1967 but the 
rise of the New Left by the late 1960s was also felt here. Hugh Scanlon and Jack 
Jones as leaders of the Engineers' Union and the TGWU were both advocating 
worker control and a specific rejection of the Labour Party's corporate socialism. 
The basis of their beliefs rested in recapturing the spirit of syndicalism and guild 
socialism with workers being equal in the workplace. They also drew from the 
libertarian strand of socialist thinking to achieve freedom rather than the 
alleviation of poverty. 102 Participation therefore would not work as this 
represented the practices of the past which had led them to this point. The 
polarisation made itself felt through the union sponsorship of MPs with the 
TGWU, AUEW and NUM retracting automatic sponsorship, instead considering 
the record of a candidate based on their views towards Europe with support 
understood as a betrayal of class consciousness. 103 The rise of radicalism clashed 
with the attempts by the Heath government to curb union power, effectively 
crippling the latter and leading to the birth of the Social Contract between Labour 
and the unions. The unions would offer their support again to Labour in return 
for more radical economic measures. 104 
At the economic level, an alternative argument was provided by Michael 
Barratt Brown who located the failings of Wilson's corporatist strategy applied to 
a society still divided by class where the natural fall back was to cut wages to 
maximise profits. Additionally, he identified the transnational basis of private 
Foote, Labour Party Political Thought, p300 
Robins, The Reluctant Party, p87 
104 Foote, Labour Party Political Thought, p307 
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capital as a threat to national sovereignty, of which the EEC was symptomatic, 
and at odds with the economically sovereign application of Keynesianism. 105 it 
was a compelling argument, though highly nationalistic, which was able to 
identify that the Labour Party had failed to recognise a change in phenomena 
operating at the international level. 
In terms of political argument hegemony the most critical factor is 
cohesiveness; a united voice is more likely to sway voters behind the argument. 
The issue of Europe cut across party cohesion with significant numbers of 
opposing groups on both sides leading to the suspension of collective 
responsibility by the time of the referendum. 
7.6 Conclusion 
We have used Bevir's interpretative theory to analyse the Wilson years, 
1964-1975. This was done by tracing the conceptual and temporal links that tied 
Harold Wilson and Roy Jenkins's beliefs to the tradition of corporate socialism 
on the one hand and democratic socialism on the other. By outlining the 
historical context, the dilemma of reformulating traditional Labour foreign policy 
axioms emerged, reviving the need to join the EEC. This dilemma showed that 
the 'three circles' concept was now redundant as a foreign policy structure thus 
modifying beliefs about where Britain's interests would be best served in future. 
By modifying his position, Wilson had moved towards the ground occupied 
by many on the right of the Party but his sensitivities were not about a fervent 
105 Foote, Labour Party Political Thought, p304 
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belief in EEC membership, but only as the means of fulfilling the stronger belief 
of sustaining the corporate socialist domestic economic policy. Jenkins on the 
other hand had long supported EEC membership as the means of establishing a 
more stable and commensurate foreign policy in which to extend revisionist 
reforms. It was shown that despite sharing the same end of entry, Wilson and 
Jenkins believed in entry for competing and antithetical ends which although not 
resulting in a formal break in 1971, paved the way for the split by the 'gang of 
four' ten years later. 
Belief about the EEC and the redirection of British foreign policy became 
secondary to Wilson's domestic concerns, using the same dilemma of 
membership to shore up the pursuit of corporate socialism. The focus on tactics 
and the strategic need to keep Britain in Europe both for reasons of national 
interest and personal political survival meant a lack of debate over what Europe 
could mean. In searching for a solution to the here and now, Wilson's legacy was 
a lack of vision in the future, ground which became occupied by the emotive 
arguments of the left in the late 1970s. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Conservatives 1964-1975 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the beliefs held by Edward Heath as leader of the 
Conservative Party and his Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home. These 
players have been selected as key players in the strategic direction of Britain's 
foreign policy between 1964 and 1975. We begin by tracing Heath to the 
progressive tradition and Home to the tradition of the patriotic right. We then 
provide a historical summary of the period 1964-1975 covering both domestic 
and international aspects. It is proposed that Heath and Home did not face a 
dilemma over their beliefs, but rather over securing argument hegemony on the 
merits of EEC membership. The attempt to establish political argument 
hegemony focused on three areas: the boundaries of partisanship with Labour; 
attempts to minimise the controversy of entry; and playing down alternatives as 
long-term solutions. Heath and Home faced a ftu-ther difficulty of argument 
hegemony from within the Party: the right-wing imperialists. These were 
beginning to modify their position by embracing themes consistent with 
economic liberalism. 
8.2 Elite Beliefs 
We have traced the beliefs held by Churchill, Eden, Macmillan and 
Selwyn Lloyd to the tradition of the patriotic right. Significant modifications to 
this tradition were made from adopting a muscular stance as a member of one of 
the Big Three at one end, to accepting the relative decline of international 
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political authority and economic strength at the other. Actors whose beliefs were 
consistent with the tradition of the patriotic right were increasingly those with 
progressive beliefs in domestic policy and this too can be seen as impacting on 
interpretations of foreign policy. Heath is the first of our actors whose beliefs 
were consistent with progressivism in both domestic and foreign policy. Home's 
beliefs were consistent with the progressive-influenced modifications of the 
patriotic right. It is to tracing these links that we now turn. 
8.2.1 Edward Heath' 
Bom in Broadstairs Kent, Heath's father was a carpenter and his mother 
had been in service. His modest background meant Heath used education as his 
means of elevation, gaining a scholarship to Chatham House School and later 
going to Balliol College, Oxford, where he became President of the Union and of 
the University Conservatives. Serving in the Royal Artillery, Heath then stood as 
MP for Bexley in 1950. A Whip from 1951 to 1954 and Chief Whip until 1959 
Heath then briefly became Minister of Labour before becoming Lord Privy Seal 
from 1960 to 1963. Over the next two years he served as Secretary of Trade and 
Industry and Chancellor of the Exchequer and finally, in 1965 won the first 
election in the Conservative Party for Leader, a position he would retain for 
almost ten years. 
We can trace four conceptual and temporal links that tie Heath to the 
progressive tradition: the influence of Christian socialism; the One Nation Group 
1 Sir Edward Richard George Heath, (1916-2005) 
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(ONG); his modernising and technocratic style of leadership; and his long-term 
support for British involvement in Europe. 
First, Heath was influenced by A. D. Lindsay, claiming his Christian 
socialism served not to convert but to strengthen his innate conservatism. 2 
Lindsay furnished Heath's moral code with a greater theoretical content. His code 
came from his family background where the importance of hard work, service to 
others, honourable ambition and clean living were stressed. 3 At the time of 
Lindsay's anti-appeasement by-election candidacy in 1938, Macmillan's letter of 
support "could not have echoed my own feelings more accurately or potently" 
when he wrote "the times are too grave and the issue is too vital for progressive 
Conservative opinion to allow itself to be influenced by Party loyalties or to 
tolerate the present uncertainties governing our foreign policy". 4 
Heath was also influenced by more progressive thinking while at 
university, in particular the writing of Keynes, Macmillan's Third Way, and the 
Christian teachings of William Temple. 5 While Lindsay offered a form of 
Christian socialism in action, Temple offered it in spiritual form. An idealist, 
Temple believed the good society was built up of morally responsible individuals 
who recognised their duty to help others. Although sympathetic to Temple's 
beliefs, Heath was always conscious of the propensity of individuals to use power 
Heath, E (1998) The Course of My Life, Coronet Books, p3l; A. D. Lindsay, (1879-1952) 
rofessor of moral philosophy. 
Campbell, J (1993) Edward Heath: A Biography, London: Jonathan Cape, p7 
4 Heath, Course ofMy Life, p60 
' Heath, Course ofMy Life, p33; William Temple (1881-1944), Archbishop of Canterbury 
312 
Conservatives 1964-1975 
for their own ends and not for the good of all. 6 Heath subscribed to the 
Conservative tradition of pessimism in man's ability to rise above himself. 
Secondly, once elected, Heath followed Butler's style of conservatism 
7 
and was a founder member of the One Nation Group (ONG). The ONG 
articulated a moderate and progressive Toryism which aimed to encourage social 
cohesion. It linked Heath with his earlier beliefs about Macmillan's Third Way as 
66a sound set of answers to our economic and social problems, avoiding the evils 
of both an unregulated capitalist system and a dirigiste socialist approach. "8 
Members of the ONG were often "from a less privileged background ... with an 
interest in social policy and reform and often employing a rhetoric of 
cmeritocracy' and 'classlessness"'. 9 The importance of classlessness was 
particularly acute, reflecting the group's emergence as a response to the 
inadequacies of the traditional Conservative front-bench response to Labour's 
social policy agenda. Therefore its genesis was in formulating a new 
Conservative position on social policy. 10 The ONG articulated the tradition of 
one nation through traditional totems of Conservatism: tax cuts, competition, 
private enterprise and initiative. Although a member of the ONG, Heath played 
only a minor role. ' 1 
'Heath, Course ofMy Life, p34 
7 RAB Butler, (1902-1982) architect of Conservative social reform policies during the war and 
immediately after; Founder members of the ONG included Cub Alport, lain Macleod, Enoch 
Powell, Edward Heath, Angus Maude, Robert Carr, Gilbert Longden, and John Rodgers. 
Heath, Course ofMy Life, p5O 
Walsha, R (2000) 'The One Nation Group: A Tory Approach to Backbench Politics and 
Organisation, 1950-55', Twentieth Century History, vol. 1 1.2, ppl 83-214, pl. 86 
10 Walsha, 'The One Nation Group', pI88 
11 Walsha, 'One Nation Group', p201 
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Thirdly, Heath was a Tory reformist in the tradition of Peel and Pitt, 
where the aim was not to increase state power but to "sweep away whatever was 
antiquated and inefficient in our public institutions and create a new framework 
within which the individual could take his [sic] own responsibilities and create 
his own opportunities". 12 Heath was the modemiser, the first elected leader of the 
Conservatives and the symbol of a meritocratic society. It was this reformism 
which propelled Heath's leadership: to modemise British institutions and the 
government, halt economic decline and redefine a new role for Britain in the 
world. 
Fourth, Heath was "English through and through"13 and much is made of 
the location of his birth within view of the French coast. Travels from his early 
teens exposed Heath to the realities of European politics. The experience 
convinced him of the inevitability of war, and later, would influence his opinions 
regarding Germany's future after the war. 14 War service served to strengthen, like 
many of his generation, the wish to avoid any similar conflict. 
His views on European reconstruction and unity were the subject of his 
maiden speech. In the context of Churchill's own brand of pro-European support, 
it was not exceptional, remaining faithful to the Party line. Presenting the case for 
engaging in the Schuman Plan, he articulated a view of the future of Europe 
between the German aim of restoring relations with France and securing unity 
12 Douglas Hurd quoted in Eccleshall and Walker, British Prime Ministers, p344 
13 Campbell, Edward Heath, p4 
14 Campbell, Edward Heath, p3l 
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against the threat from the East. 15 The revival of German economic power, Heath 
concluded, meant Britain had two options: "One is to attempt to prolong control 
[already dismissed by the Labour Government]. The only other way is to lead 
Germany in the one way we want her to go, and I believe that these discussions 
would give us a chance of leading Germany into the way we want her to go". 16 
Heath's beliefs on Europe were distinctive for remaining largely 
unmodified until he took office. An economically strong Britain in Europe 
reflected an adherence to a progressive liberalism. Heath recognised early on that 
greater economic gains might require measures of federalism. This was 
acceptable to Heath in defence of the principle of European security. After the 
war, Heath witnessed first hand the devastation caused and was deeply affected. 
He recognised too that Europe's first task was reconstruction and unity to prevent 
such destruction from ever happening again. 17 
As Whip and then Chief Whip, Heath's ability and loyalty was noted, 
particularly over Suez. 18 Macmillan acted as mentor to Heath: both Balliol men, 
both influenced by Christian socialism and both linked to the anti-appeasement 
wing in Oxford-19 Finally, Heath saw in Macmillan someone who, despite his 
limits, was evidently more pro-European than many within the Conservative 
party. 20 Macmillan appointed Heath as Lord Privy Seal, tasked with leading the 
15 Roth, Heath and the Heathmen, p79; Campbell, Edward Heath, p74-5; Laing, Edward Heath: 
Prime Minister, p96; see chapter three of this thesis. 
16 Hansard, (1950) Parliamentary Debates, vol. 476, cols. 1959-1964, col. 1963 
11 Campbell, Edward Heath, p48; Laing, Edward Heath: Prime Minister, p62 
18 Heath, Course ofMv Life, pp 163-200; Roth, Heath and the Heathmen, p 106; Campbell, 
Edward Heath, p92-7; Laing, Edward Heath: Prime Minister, see chapter 9, esp. p 122-3 
19 Laing, Edward Heath: Prime Minister, p 12-3,40; Roth, Heath and the Heathmen, p 114 
20 Campbell, Edward Heath, p 100; Roth, Heath and the Heathmen, p 127 
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negotiations for entry into the EEC. Assent was gained within the Party on 
economic grounds. 21 In security terms, entry was couched as maintaining a 
bulwark against communism which appealed to the Party Conference. Despite 
the veto Heath modified his beliefs about the strategy through which to gain 
entry, not the merit of entry. If Britain was to gain entry then it had to go to the 
Community unreservedly and not expect the Community to come to Britain. 22 
8.2.2 Alec Douglas-Home 23 
Home was the eldest son of the Earl of Home and was educated at Eton 
and Christ Church, Oxford. He became MP for South Lanark in 1931 and was 
elevated to the Lords in 1951 upon inheriting his father's Earldom. Minister of 
State in the Scottish Office from 1951-1955, then Commonwealth Secretary from 
1955-1961 and Foreign Secretary until 1963, Home renounced his peerage and 
became Prime Minister after Macmillan until defeat in 1964. Home was Heath's 
Foreign Secretary in 1970 until his retirement from the Commons in 1974.24 
We can trace four conceptual and temporal links that tie Home to the 
traditions of the patriotic right: his family heritage influenced his paternalism; 
strong ties to the Empire, Empire protection and his support of appeasement; his 
suspicion of indigenous nationalist movements in parts of the Empire; and his 
virulent anti-Communism. 
21 Roth, Heath and the Heathmen, p 157 
22 Campbell, Edward Heath, p 117 
23 Alec Douglas-Home, Baron Home of the Hirsel (1903-1995) 
24 Eccleshall and Walker, British Prime Ministers, p329 
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Home is an important member of this study for he represents a significant 
shift in beliefs between classic concepts of the patriotic right and their radical 
modifications over the twenty year period after the Second World War. 
First, Home's birth into the Scottish nobility and the family's strong sense 
of noblesse oblige establish his location within the paternalist wing of the 
Conservative Party. 25 His mother was identified as holding Whiggish beliefs and 
voted Labour while Home's siblings also manifested progressive and liberal 
thinking. 26 Religion was an influence on Home, via an "ethical rather than a 
speculative or mystical Christianity". 27 It was the Christian code by which he 
lived, and had been inculcated from an early age and which formed the basis of 
his schooling. 28 Home's entry into politics was in 1931 on a centrist and 
constructive platform. 29 
Like Macmillan, Home's interests in the late 1920s and early 1930s were 
defined by local, domestic politics and not foreign policy. Also like Macmillan, 
Home's beliefs in domestic policy were formed by the idea of Tory Democracy 
and influenced by the ideas of Noel Skelton, a reforming Scots MP who coined 
the notion of a 'property-owning democracy'. It was a Conservative response to 
the Socialist challenge which did not extend to accepting or supporting 
Keynesian economics. 30 
25 Young, K (1970) Sir Alec Douglas Home, London: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd, pl, 4 
26 Home, A. D. (1976) The Way the Wind Blows, London: Collins, p45; Eccleshall and Walker, 
British Prime Ministers, p330 
27 Young, Sir Alec Douglas Home, pI 7 
28 Home, The Way the Wind Blows, p27 
29 Young, Sir Alec Douglas Home, p28 
30 Young, Sir Alec Douglas Home, p37 
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I Second, Home was deeply affected by the First World War, stating that 
"while I revere the patriot, I detest the jingo tub-thumper, the narrow nationalist 
and the advocates and practitioners of violence". 31 The conciliatory approach was 
one which Home's father had always advocated and it would inform Home's 
pragmatic patriotism. 
Home entered Parliament on a centrist and protectionist ticket in 193 1. 
Although a keen supporter of Empire free trade and keen to sustain the economic 
development of Imperial trade, spiralling unemployment forced a change of 
belief so he supported protectionism in order to safeguard domestic industry. it 
was on this subject that Home had made his maiden speech. 32 
Third, he was deeply sceptical of indigenous movements for 
independence, most critically during the 1930s with the rise of Indian 
nationalism, Home's beliefs were paternalist. They linked him to the Churchill- 
led opposition to the granting of independence to India in the 1930s. Almost with 
regret, Home remarked: "From the start of our administration of our overseas 
territory we had set out to train the native peoples to play their part in 
administration and government. From the beginning, therefore, the seeds of 
33 independence had been sown". Home's beliefs were firmly grounded in the 
tradition of evolutionary change. 
Fourth, Home made the link between nationalist movements and the rise 
of Communism, stating that it was a "horrible quirk of fortune that [the Russian 
7- 
31 Home, The Way the Wind Blows, p43 
32 Home, The Way the Wind Blows, p5 8 
33 Home, The Way the Wind Blows, p5 1; Young, Sir Alec Douglas Home, p37 
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Revolution] came at a time when impatience for the emancipation of colonial 
territories was in the air. The Communists were thus able to pose as the 
champions of liberation and that gave a great boost to the militant freedom 
fighter". 34 Home would remain a vociferous anti-communist. This was the 
rationale behind his support for appeasement believing it was preferable to have a 
stronger Germany to act as a bulwark against creeping communism from the 
East. When war broke out, Home feared a division of Europe afterwards. 35 He 
was critical of concessions made to the Soviet Union under Yalta36 and believed 
that it had only been through American patronage of NATO that Western Europe 
had resisted a communist take-over. 37 He continued to link the danger of 
communism to fledgling nationalism, particularly in Africa, a belief he held 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
On Britain's future role, Home recognised that the "regaining of our 
relationship with the Empire and the Empire's with the world outside will be one 
of the biggest [problems]". Assuming an increasing level of autonomy by 
Dominion states, Home concluded that "the answer to a lot would seem to be the 
closer co-operation with America, but how far can we merge with her without 
losing our identity and world influence? "38 He adopted a consistent view on 
Britain's need for a strong system of security to prevent the weakness revealed at 
Munich from ever being repeated. To this end, he resisted Britain's financial 
dependence on America but recognised that no involvement in Europe was 
possible without full American support. It was therefore essential to maintain 
Home, The Way the Wind Blows, p5l. 
Home, The Way the Wind Blows, pS 8 
36 Home, The Way the Wind Blows, p914 
37 Home, The Way the Wind Blows, p62 
38 Letter to J. C. Masterman, Home's old school teacher in Young, Sir Alec Douglas Home, p65 
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"that degree of warmth and intimacy which should always be maintained 
between the leaders of the greatest English-speaking peoples". 39 
As Commonwealth Secretary Home believed strong ties were important 
in maintaining the image of a strong Britain, those ties being between themselves 
as well as with Britain. 40 Supportive of the Suez expedition, Home had defended 
it as an essential diversionary small-scale war to prevent a wider, more 
destabilizing war in the Middle East. Equally, he was a keen advocate of 
Britain's possession of nuclear weapons. 41 However, Home's foreign policy 
views were very fully defined by an appreciation of 'weakness' and his strong 
antipathy towards Britain being weak, either perceived or real, matching this with 
a vision of a strong system of national security. 
What makes Home an interesting member of the patriotic right is that 
unlike some of his contemporaries, who clung to the vestigial Empire or 
advocated an isolationist stance, he embraced the idea of the EEC. He went 
further, arguing for a World Government if Communism ended. At the core of 
this belief was Home's interpretation of sovereignty claiming that "the question 
of sovereignty should be judged by whether there would be any compensating 
gain. It is really a question of balance of advantage. We should not make 
sovereignty into a shibboleth". 42 Home had engaged with the concept of 
, conceding 
sovereignty at a regional level through the EEC which marked a 
departure in conventional Conservative thinking. At the root of his support was a 
'9 Home, The Way the Wind Blows, p68 
Home, The Way the Wind Blows, p 105,117 
Young, Sir Alec Douglas Home, p99 
Young, Sir Alec Douglas Home, p 129 
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belief that entry would provide the necessary economic salvation by market unity 
and the potential to mobilize wealth. Importantly, membership of the EEC 
provided the means of creating security on the continent against Soviet influence. 
In contrast to Heath, Home's beliefs were modified over time from a 
position of being Empire-minded to support for British entry of the EEC. Neither 
of these beliefs contradicted each other as they were both underscored by a 
greater, pragmatic belief in the need for a strong, secure and powerful Britain in 
the world: this identifies Home with a modified form of the traditional patriotic 
right. For Home, accepting a role in Europe would sustain the Anglo-American 
relationship which he identified as the key to British strength and security in the 
world. 
In this section we have located the beliefs of Heath and Home in the 
traditions of progressivism in Heath's case and a modified form of the patriotic 
right in the case of Home. Despite both being, by 1970, supportive of entry to the 
EEC, the underlying difference between them, about where Britain's future 
strength would lie, was clear. Heath's pro-Europeanism was at the expense of the 
classic concept of the Anglo-American relationship and sought to redirect 
Britain's strategic future towards a secure and independent European 
Community. Home was part of a wider tradition which saw Britain's membership 
as the means of strengthening Britain's hand in relation to world affairs, and in 
terms of leverage, particularly to the Americans and the Soviet Union. 
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8.3 Historical Setting 
Complicating Heath's quest for entry into the EEC were national and 
international events which would make his administration appear under siege and 
lacking control. The domestic context focuses on issues such as a revival of the 
right within the Conservative Party, economic problems, industrial militancy and 
violence in Northern Ireland. Internationally, the right continued to express vocal 
opposition to Heath's foreign policy. The Conservatives reinstituted defence 
policy East of Suez and Arab nationalism in the form of OPEC added to domestic 
economic difficulties. Finally, we briefly summarise negotiations for entry into 
the EEC. 
8.3.1 Domestic 
Heath's period of opposition lacked a clear PoliCY. 43 Both the 1966 
manifesto, Action not Words, and the 1970 manifesto, A Better Tomorrow 
demonstrate the continuation of Conservative thinking with references to 
reforming industrial relations, introducing selectivity to social provision, and 
immigration control as a more effective means of tackling racial tensions. 
Efficiency measures in government and a clearer tax system were meant to create 
expenditure savings and promote individual wealth creation and incentives. 44 In 
searching to present the Conservatives as a clear, alternative government, Heath 
presented four themes to make the approach coherent. Tax reforms would reward 
competitive sectors of society and were coupled with an attack on restrictive 
practices in both sides of industry to boost the British economy. Selectivity 
would replace universality in social provision, while underpinning the whole of 
43 Rarnsden, Winds of Change, p281 44 bttp: //www. psr. keele, ac, uk/orealuk/man/con66. htm and 
bttp: //www. 12sr. keele. ac, uk/area/uk/man/con70. htm 
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Heath's strategy was entry into the EEC. As Ramsden points out, "[i]n effect, this 
all came down to the modernisation of British industry and the public sector to 
allow the country to make the most of the European opportunity" . 
45 
Underlying economic problems were those of productivity. Despite an 
overall increase in productivity, pay demands were outstripping the value of 
increased productivity to the extent that Heath felt the 1967 devaluation under 
Wilson would hold no value in redressing the market. 46 Heath believed union 
reform was necessary, and set the tone of his approach in the 1966 General 
Election campaign: "we need greater prosperity if we are to support those in 
need, and partnership, not confrontation, in our industries to create that 
prosperity". An industrial relations bill proposed to give the lead to industry in 
providing for positive co-operation in the future. 47 Heath also identified the need 
to improve management in industry. 48 This view was refined in 1968 in a 
pamphlet entitled A Fair Deal At Work which aimed to make both employers and 
unions corporate legal bodies which would be responsible for making their own 
legal contracts and for acts committed by members. The aim had been to balance 
the needs of both parties to make registration in their mutual interests. 
In January 1970 at Selsdon Park, these two changes to the post-war 
Conservative approach to domestic politics were formalised. Within six months 
of the Selsdon Park meeting, the Conservatives were elected into office and 
started by scrapping the prices and incomes board. They introduced the Industrial 
45 Ramsden, "The Prime Minister", p27-8 46 Heath, Course ofUy Life, p325 47 Heath, Course ofMy Lye, p281 
48 "Action Not Words", Conservative Election Manifesto, 1966 
hqp: //www. psr-keele. ac, uk/area/uk/man/con66. htm accessed 04/04/05 
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Relations Bill in the same year. Both of these acts, argued Heath, were essential 
to restore public and international confidence in Britain's economic management. 
Finally, Northern Ireland became a deeply problematic issue for Heath. 
Civil rights demonstrations quickly developed into 'the Troubles' but violence 
peaked in the first two years of the Heath Government culminating in Bloody 
Sunday in January 1972. Spiralling violence resulted in the introduction of 
internment without trial in 1971 and a return to direct rule. In March 1973 a 
White Paper proposing a 78 member Northern Irish Assembly based on 
proportional representation was published. The election of a power sharing 
executive followed. An agreement to set up a Council of Ireland was signed in 
December 1973 in Sunningdale, but it collapsed in May 1974 after the Ulster 
Worker's Council called a general strike which lasted two weeks and prompted 
more rioting and violence. 
8.3.2 International 
In international affairs, three areas of difficulty would trouble Heath: the 
Commonwealth and Empire; defence, and the Cold War. First, there was the 
continued vocal opposition from the right over foreign policy. Secondly, there 
was a commitment to withdraw military positions East of Suez. Thirdly, there 
was the oil shortage and relations with OPEC. 
The Salisbury-led right-wing revolt over Rhodesia continued under 
Heath. In January 1966 Angus Maude, Heath's shadow spokesman on Colonial 
Affairs, was sackcd for dcnouncing party policy. A furthcr 80 Conscrvativc MPs 
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voted against the Party in a vote over oil sanctions. 49 Enoch Powell would also be 
sacked as Shadow Defence spokesperson over his 'Rivers of Blood' speech 
delivered in Birmingham in April 1968. Powell had also been opposed to 
sanctions on Rhodesia in 1965 and contested the influx of Asians expelled from 
Kenya in October 1967. Strongly opposed to EEC membership, Powell left the 
Conservatives in 1974 to become an Ulster Unionist MP and urged the public to 
vote Labour to secure a referendum on membership. Darling of the right, Powell 
believed the threat of the Cold War was minimal and urged Britain's 
independence on the grounds that the EEC was the political wing of NATO and 
part of US Cold War grand strategy. 
The end of Empire meant the official end to military commitments 
beyond Suez, a policy confirmed by the 1966 defence review. This stated that 
British policy was no longer to engage in wars outside of Europe without the co- 
operation of allies. Home however was keen to restore a British role East of Suez, 
and internal party difficulties militated against a complete break. Conservative 
policy was to restore an East of Suez presence resulting in ANZUK and 
preserving a continued military presence in Malaysia and Singapore. 
In 1973, Heath faced another crisis over oil supplies. The Arab members 
of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) refused to ship oil 
to countries that had supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War of October 
1973, principally affecting the US and its western allies. The impact of oil price 
increases coupled with the decision by the National Union of Mineworkers to ban 
49 Heath, Course ofMy Life, p276-7 
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overtime in support of a pay claim produced a state of emergency and the three- 
day week. This in turn prompted Heath to call a snap general election over 
confidence in his leadership, an election which he lost. 
8.3.3 Europe 
When de Gaulle left office in April 1969 and was replaced by Pompidou, 
the European project was given a new lease of life at an EEC summit. Held in 
The Hague in December 1969, the Six agreed to complete the first stage of 
economic integration, to proceed with economic and monetary union (EMU) by 
1980 and to open negotiations with Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway. 
Labour published a White Paper on EEC membership in February 1970 but 
before it was put to effect, Heath was elected Prime Minister in June and 
negotiations began ten days later. Within a year of formal negotiations agreement 
had been reached. In October 1971 both Houses of Parliament voted in favour of 
membership. In January 1972, the Treaty of Accession was signed with actual 
membership beginning in January 1973. Finally, during the referendum campaign 
in 1975 Heath voted yes and the Conservative's official policy was to remain in 
the EEC. 
Once negotiations began Heath's strategy was one of deferment; entry 
became the most important achievement coupled with a time lag in which to iron 
out the details. George notes, "[flo gain entry, and then sort out any difficulties, 
was the approach taken by the Heath Government" as a means to overcome the 
biggest obstacle, the possible application of the veto. 50 As Michael Butler, head 
50 George, An Awkward Partner, p56 
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of the European Integration Department at the Foreign Office attested, "applicant 
countries don't actually have a negotiating position, except about transitional 
measures ... I 
[know] Heath's position in the entry negotiations was that he and 
, 51 his team should get the best deal on offer. 
There were four areas upon which negotiations focused: the 
Commonwealth, agriculture, budgetary contributions and sterling. The first issue, 
the Commonwealth, had almost resolved itself since the first attempt to join, as 
trading patterns had shifted. Outstanding issues were New Zealand dairy products 
and Caribbean sugar. The government lobbied for these to have direct entry to the 
Community even though it was in direct competition to European agricultural 
products, mostly French. 
European agriculture now fell under the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) which again proved problematic in two ways. It was a system favouring 
agricultural producers, not net importers of agricultural products, like the UK. In 
turn, the CAP impacted upon the thorniest of negotiating points, the budgetary 
contributions. Set up to reflect the interests of the incumbent members, Britain's 
contributions stood to exceed any gains as a net importer of agricultural goods 
with a high level of industrial imports. Finally, sterling's role as a reserve 
currency and sterling balances were considered obstacles to membership by the 
French as they were not complementary to the aim of European Monetary Union 
(EMU). 
51 Michael Butler, interviewed by Dr. Andrew Crozier, conducted 10/08/98, 
http: //wwwarc. iue. it/oh/OralHiStoi3ý, htmi p9 
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In fact, Heath still lobbied for special arrangements to take into 
consideration Britain's economic situation. Negotiations resulted in a five year 
period of budgetary contribution increases starting from just under 9 percent to 
19 percent of the total. As for the CAP, the best Heath could achieve was a five 
year transition period to soften the shock of adjustment. Me same applied to New 
Zealand meat and butter and Caribbean sugar. 
An impasse the following spring was surmounted in May 1971 through a 
bilateral summit between Heath and Pompidou. This bilateral meeting, the "most 
significant meeting [during] the course of the negotiations, 52 had been arranged 
in great secrecy to avoid the heavily Gaullist Quai D'Orsay's involvement. 53 The 
final communiqu6 indicated the two had reached a "complete identity of view on 
the working and development of the Community", agreeing over monetary union, 
the progress made so far and that still to be made. 54 Finally, as the EEC attempted 
to establish EMU, the role of Sterling needed addressing and agreement was 
reached in the private discussions between Pompidou and Heath which would 
lead to the running down of Sterling balances by repaying debts accrued during 
the war in favour of EMU. 
Yet, one clear reason for the French interest in Britain's membership 
came from the development of Germany's economic independence, a direct 
threat to France, but one which Britain's membership could offset. The German 
52 O'Neill, C 'Britain's Entry into the European Community, 
http: //www. fco. p, ov. uk/Files/kfile/2c458d7fudi-2foneillreport. O. pd 
53 PRO: PREM 15/368-372, January-May, 197 1, files associated with negotiations and the 
meeting set up in private between Heath and Pompidou 54 Hansard, (197 1) Parliamentary Debates, vol. 818, cols. 48-9 
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decision to float the Deutschmark only two weeks before Heath and Pompidou's 
meeting clearly helped in bringing the two closer to an agreed vision. 
Butler argues that the negotiating team, consisting of Con O'Neill, John 
Robinson, Geoffrey Rippon and Eric Roll achieved the best possible outcome 
under the circumstances, a claim backed by Roy Denman, for the period of the 
transition. 55 Hannay added that over the budgetary contributions, the best the 
negotiations could achieve was adding a clause which could be used later if it 
could be demonstrated that the contributions proved the initial negotiations to be 
incorrect, and thus paved the way for Thatcher's Fontainebleau Agreement. 56 
Con O'Neill's assessment, now famous, was that Britain had to "swallow the lot, 
and swallow it now" although he added the essential riders, crucial to the 
negotiations, that all community decisions were essentially a compromise of 
interests and exceptions were dangerous for setting a precedent. 57 This was at 
once the limitation upon, and a tool used by, the British negotiating team. 
Perversely, it worked against the government over budgetary contributions but 
was a necessary political sacrifice to maintain New Zealand's dairy trade and 
thus mollify sections of the British polity too. 
8.4 Elite 13cliefs and Tradition Change 
For Heath and Home there was no dilemma either about the principle of 
membership or the means of achieving it. There was a dilemma however in 
53 Butler, http: //``wwwarc, iuc. it/oh/`0ralflistory. htmi p10; Roy Denman interviewed by Dr. 
Ruggero Ranieri, conducted 23/04/98 httR-, Hwwwaýc, iuc. it/oh/OralHistory. htmI p7 
56 David Hannay, interviewed by Andrew Crozier, 05/09/98, 
htt2-Hwwwarc, iue, it/oh/OralHistoiy, htmI p5 
57 O'Neill, C 'Britain's Entry into the European Community, 
hqp: //www. fco. p, ov. uk/Files/kfile/2c458d7fudi-2foneillreport. O. pd 
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translating that belief into a sustainable and successful argument. Although 
ultimately successful the strategies they deployed created difficulties in 
translating 'Europe' as an alternative traditional foreign policy. At the root of this 
problem were two difficulties: first that Heath and Home had differing 
interpretations over what EEC membership meant and secondly, by focusing on 
the political opportunities to recmft foreign policy afforded by entry, Heath was 
behind the zeitgeist which had developed a domestic and economic set of beliefs 
surrounding entry. 
Heath and Home supported EEC membership for different reasons. Heath 
was in the progressive and Europhile tradition and Home remained essentially an 
Atlanticist. Both agreed about the necessity of membership and pursued it in four 
ways. The first was by differentiating the Conservative case once Labour adopted 
entry as a foreign policy goal. The second was playing down the controversial 
aspects of membership once membership became a possibility. The third was by 
rearticulating a set of priorities for Britain which played down alternatives to the 
EEC. The fourth was marginalising the imperialist right-wing and other 
opponents within the Conservative Party. 
8.4.1 Differentiating the Conservative Case 
When the Labour Government announced that it too was seeking entry to 
the EEC in 1966, Heath set about differentiating the Conservative case. First, 
Heath sought to gain the advantage by presenting the Conservative approach as 
the natural approach. Pressing for a more 'responsible' approach to membership, 
Heath argued that circumstances were imperfect for British entry in 1967. In 
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private, he urged the Conservatives to present themselves as more positive and 
progressive in their attitude than the Labour Government until the circumstances 
improved. 58 Heath's argument rested on the importance of the Conservatives' 
leading that change. 59 It also preserved entry as the central pillar of Conservative 
foreign policy. Labour success would remove this policy established since 1961 
and fatally undermine Heath's leadership. 
Second, Heath responded to Wilson's attempts to restrict the debate to 
economic terms only. Heath's critique of Labour's approach to the issue of EEC 
entry rested on their failure to link the economic impact to the wider political 
implications. 60 Heath deployed a counter-strategy to bring in the political 
dimension. Heath's strategy was to elevate the debate about EEC entry back to an 
area of high politics and use it to frame the more charged economic debate .61 As 
part of this strategy Heath adopted a position above the fray so as to remain 
relatively untouched by the arguments over Europe. 62 Resistance to this strategy 
resulted in Heath appearing lofly and limited the success of elevating the subject 
matter above the "cost of butter". 63 
Heath had articulated his view of British foreign policy in his 1967 
Godkin lectures. He recognised that a Britain out of Europe carried an 
58 Heath, Course ofmy Life, p355 59 Heath, Course ofmy Life, p356 60 Lord, C (1993) British Entry to the European Community under the Heath Government of 
1970-4, Aldershot: Dartmouth, p105 
61 Karvounis, A (1999) A Critical Analysis of the Labour Party's Discourse on Europe, 1961-2, 
unpublished Mphil, University of Newcastle. Karvounis argues that Gaitskell's stout defence of 
the Commonwealth and traditional British approach to foreign policy removed Europe from the 
area of high politics to low politics. 62 PRO: PREM 15/372, Michael Wolff to Edward Heath, 10/05ni; PREM 15/3 7 1, Douglas Hurd 
to Heath, 07105nI and 22/04m 63 Heath, Course ofmy Life, p3 61 
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increasingly weak voice with the Americans. He also recognised the limit of the 
Commonwealth to be one of emotional attachment. The 'three circles' in this 
sense were over. Instead, he believed Britain had a role to play within the EEC in 
relation to the Commonwealth and America. He hoped Europe would become 
equipped to play a more worthwhile role in international relations from which 
would spring greater political and economic stability beyond the frontiers of the 
EEC. 64 
Thirdly, by championing the public right to debate and targeting the youth 
vote, Heath attempted to broaden the appeal of the Conservative case. Heath 
claimed ground by arguing that, unlike in 1960 and 1963, the lack of a thorough 
debate deprived people of understanding the issues. He then expanded the 
Conservative claim to guide EEC entry by linking it to traditional totems of 
foreign policy and by appealing to youthful idealism. Reminding MPs that the 
young were looking for leadership from Parliament in breaking down artificial 
barriers, Heath said "[i]n Europe today is the opportunity of breaking down those 
barriers in the relations not only between Europeans but between Europe and the 
countries of Africa, Asia and the West Indies. This is why, as an internationalist, 
I feel so deeply about working for a wider Europe and European Community. , 65 
Again, 11cath returned to trying to establish the Conservative case for 
entry as the natural case. By linking EEC membership with a continuation of 
Britain's traditional outward-looking global role and with patriotism, he 
" Heath, E (1970) Old World, New Horizons: Britain, the Common Market and the Atlantic 
Alliance, London: OUP, p7 
ýh 63 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 796, col. 1216-7, Edward Heath, 25 
February 1970 
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continued: "[I] believe in this policy, perhaps more so because I am a patriot. I 
know Britain can contribute to this movement for wider unity in our own 
continent because of our history, our parliamentary institutions, our traditions and 
our skills". 66 
Finally, Heath's attempts to differentiate the Conservative case were also 
aimed at the Six. The success of the Treaty of Rome challenged the 'three circles' 
axiom that France and Germany would never achieve enough agreement to make 
67 'Europe' work . Heath also recognised that 
Britain had a long way to go in 
influencing EEC foreign and defence policy as it was the stronghold of the 
French . 
68 Between 1963 and 1970 two key understandings became clear to 
Heath: the first was that it was impossible to negotiate to keep existing trading 
patterns since patterns change all the time, so 'satisfactory terms' for the future 
were impossible as there were too many variables subject to change. 69 This 
informed his downplaying of the economic argument and signalled to the Six that 
he was a serious candidate for negotiations. 
Heath also believed that there was little advantage in irritating the French 
in negotiations since Britain had more to lose. 70 This challenged conventional 
Conservative thinking in which Britain would join to reshape the EEC to meet 
Britain's needs. It now had to accept that the EEC was designed to suit the 
interests of its members who were all deeply committed to its success. The key 
66 Hansard, Fifth Series, Vol. 796, col. 1217, Edward Heath, 25, h February 1970 
67 Lord, C (1993) British Entry into the European Communities Under the Heath Government of 
1970-1974, Aldershot: Dartmouth, p 11 68 Heath, Old World, New Horizons, pI5,54,58,70 69 Heath, Old World, New Horizons, p28 70 Heath, Old World, New Horizons, p3,32 
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was to adapt, allowing Heath to turn the question around so that "prospective 
- ? 9971 members need to ask, is this the sort of community we want to join. 
For Heath entry was a zero-sum game. Either Britain wanted membership 
or not. Debating the conditions of entry was futile since change could be sought 
once Britain was a member. He also queried the implied negativity of the Soames 
Affair in which apparent French duplicity was exposed by the Wilson 
Government as a means of securing support for the British position against the 
French. 72 Heath instead urged working with the French rather than against them. 
These were controversial arguments when the Labour Party were still debating 
the merits of the EEC conditions and it left Heath open to the criticism that he 
was happy to accept entry at any cost. 73 It was an argument that forced Heath 
onto the defensive to accepting a position where in 1970 he argued for 
negotiation only, a point highlighted in the election manifesto. 74 
Heath achieved predominance in the debate about joining Europe by 
being seen as the torchbearer of the shift in policy. By advocating and sustaining 
a policy of membership throughout the 1960s, the Labour Party appeared late to 
convert. Critics however point to Heath's lack of movement over Conservative 
European policy as indicative of a traditionalist position particularly at a time 
71 Heath, Old World, New Horizons, p30 72 Christopher Soames was the British Ambassador in Paris. The Soames Affair of 1969 came in 
the wake of the France's second veto of British entry to the EEC and general French intransigence 
towards integration measures between the Six. The Wilson Government leaked a French proposal 
to link EFTA and the EEC in a free trade grouping, which Britain had long hoped for. Fearing it 
was a set-up to show that Britain was not as European as it claimed, the proposal was leaked and 
prompted a French outcry of betrayal. It backfired on Wilson for its divisive effect between the 
Six. Within months de Gaulle had resigned and Britain's entry into the EEC regained momentum. 
73 Gowland and Turner, Britain and European Integration, p 127-8 
74 http: //www. 12sr, keele. ac. uk/area/uk/man/con70. htm ; See also Hansard, vol. 796, cols 1216- 
1239 
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when the landscape of British foreign policy was undergoing significant 
change. 75 The implication was that attempts to differentiate the Conservative case 
were set on untenable ground. 
8.4.2 Playing Down the Controversies 
Differentiating the Conservative case was complemented by a strategy of 
downplaying the controversies over entry. The key areas of controversy were 
budget contributions, the CAP, the end of Sterling as a reserve currency and the 
loss of sovereignty. Focusing attention on the budget and CAP which were 
obvious problems deflected attention from the weakening of sterling's traditional 
role and the loss of sovereignty. 
Before being elected Prime Minister, Heath was already forced onto the 
defensive. The 1970 Conservative manifesto reiterated the core aim of British 
foreign policy being entry into the EEC, but a change in language over four years 
revealed it was no longer on 'favourable' terms, but on 'the right terms. It was 
an ambiguous difference reflecting the greater politicisation of Europe in Britain 
after the second veto. A further change in language revealed only a commitment 
to negotiate rathcr than the enthusiastic support for entry in 1966. Finally, the 
manifesto rccognised explicit problems that would result from negotiation and 
possible entry. "There would be short-term disadvantages in Britain going into 
the European Economic Community which must be weighed against the long- 
term benefits. Obviously there is a price we would not be prepared to pay. Only 
75 Smith, Smith and White, British Foreign Policy, p32; Lord, British Entry Under Heath, p 13 
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when we negotiate will it be possible to determine whether the balance is a fair 
one, and in the interests of Britain. 76 
Once Heath was elected Prime Minister, his strategy continued to be to 
raise the Conservative approach above the party fray and diminish areas of 
controversy. Heath placed pressure on media outlets to give favourable coverage 
to the issue of entry. 77 Heath's strategy targeted opinion formers and wooed 
public opinion with the added support of pro-Europe opinion formers. 78 These 
opinion formers were heads of BBC and ITV news programmes, including radio, 
and these were invited to regular private meetings at which attempts were made 
to court programming towards a more favourable outlook on negotiations. 79 
Arguably, the effect was of supplying inside infonnation and exclusive data 
which then went on to skew the agenda. With letters sent to the press from 
favourable sources, or written by the civil service for MPs who would then send 
them under their own names, there was a concerted effort to make as positive and 
as broad as possible the press coverage of Europe. 80 While elsewhere, attempts to 
diminish the coverage opponents of entry might get meant that the idea of regular 
4progress reports' on membership was floated, and meant also the briefing of 
participants in discussion programmes on the progress of negotiations in favour 
of membership. 
76 http: //www. psr, keele. ac, uVarealuklman/con70. htm 
77 Gliddon, P (2006), 'Programmes Subjected to Interference: The Heath Govenunent, 
Broadcasting and the European Community, 1970-l', History, vol. 91, issue 303, pp401-424; 
This seems to contradict earlier research which indicated low-levels of interest by Heath in using 
the media. Kavanagh, D and A Seldon (1999) The Powers Behind the Prime Minister: The 
Hidden Influence offumber Ten, London: Harper Collins, p83 
78 Gliddon, 'Programmes Subjected to Interference, p406; PRO: PREM15/368, February 1971 
79 Gliddon, 'Programmes Subjected to Interference', p409-12 
so For more detailed arguments on this see: Evans, (1975) While Britain Slept, Kitzinger, 
Diplomacy and Persuasion, 
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Assurances that the negotiations did not mean a loss of sovereignty were 
buttressed by the existence of the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966.81 To deflect 
attention away from the issue of sovereignty, emphasis was placed heavily on 
expected economic gains, presenting the EEC as the answer to Britain's declining 
industrial sector; injecting competition to force domestic industries to invest in 
capital and improve their productivity. Heath had relied implicitly on the support 
of industry in making his argument. 82 A budget designed to enter the EEC with 
an expanding economy was threatened with derailment by an NUM pay award of 
27 percent. Poor labour relations between the unions and government, 
exacerbated by the Industrial Relations Bill, were soured further with Heath's 
renunciation of a promise not to freeze statutory pay and prices. 
Heath's ability to play down these controversies was made difficult by the 
return to partisanship of the Labour opposition on Europe and by Heath's small 
majority of 3 0.83 Controversy remained however for one simple reason: Heath's 
vulnerability in office. When negotiations were complete, Heath needed the 
support of pro-EEC Labour MPs to win the House of Commons vote on British 
entry into the EEC in October 1971. Heath could not rely on more radical sectors 
of his Party for their support. With this precarious balance of support in the 
Commons, Heath came under attack for not allowing the people of the country a 
greater say, specifically since he had stated in the Conservative's general election 
manifesto of 1970 that the "Community could not be enlarged without the 'full- 
" The Luxembourg Compromise meant member states effectively retained a veto over decisions 
which they felt threatened important national interests. 
82 PRO: PREM 15/368, Cl3l meeting with Heath, 08103ni 13 Cook and Stevenson, Britain Since 1945, p59 
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hearted' consent of the peoples and parliaments of the nations involved". 84 
Without the full-hearted consent of Parliament, the argument for a referendum 
grew. 
The Heath government therefore employed specific strategies to minimise 
controversy surrounding negotiations. Downplaying the negatives of entry, 
namely the cost of entry and adherence to the CAP, and highlighting the idealism 
of a wider, peaceful Europe coupled with the economic gains to be made from a 
new large market only went so far. Strategies to guide public opinion included 
making the argument about the everyday prices and for Heath to adopt a 
statesman-like position, drawing attention to EEC entry as part of a global policy 
and appealing directly to the youth vote. 
85 This was supplemented by targeting 
opinion formers over specific aspects of negotiations such as New Zealand butter 
and the budget. Finally, feeding information to media outlets set the agenda of 
debates around negotiations. This was especially so of those outlets identified as 
favourable to the Government's policies. Despite this, the Labour opposition 
retained the case for renegotiating the terms and calling for a referendum which 
show only limited success in this strategy. 
8.4.3 The EEC as the only alternative 
Heath had been consistent in his beliefs about the strategic needs of 
Britain. His Godkin lectures testify to this, as do the phrasing of the 1966 and 
1970 Conservative manifestoes, and articles written after entry. David Hannay, 
part of the negotiation team for entry stated: 
" Heath, Course ofmy Life, p362; A Better Tomorrow, Conservative Party Manifesto, 1970 
85 PRO: PREM 15/372, Wolff to Heath, 10/05/71; PREM 15/371 Hurd to Heath, 07/05/71 
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[Heath] certainly thought that the strategic decision to enter the 
European Community was a fundamental one for Britain and one which 
he was convinced, and had always been convinced from when he first 
got into Parliament, was the right one for Britain, and that did not mean 
that he simply ignored the costs or the terms but he believed the costs 
and terms had to be situated within an overall framework which took the 
strategic direction of Britain joining the European Community. 86 
Presenting the EEC as the only alternative meant rearticulating Britain as 
able to protect its traditional interests from within the organisation. 
First, Heath addressed concerns within the Party's policy group. 
Discussions in the Conservative Research Department (CRD) in which Heath 
was intimately involved, recognised that "Britain had few trumps, France few 
weaknesses" and while Britain had an edge over France in some wider economic 
areas, the Party "should espouse the cause of Europeanism with far more gusto 
than the Six themselves, and provide a focus for more integration as a rival to that 
of independent nationalism offered by the French". In the meantime it was 
decided to seek interim solutions until membership was possible. 87 These 
included the idea of Association or returning to EFTA. The latter course was 
considered by the CRD after the Kennedy Round of GATT reduced tariff 
discrimination so as to make entry unnecessary. Yet the speculative EFTA 
88 
envisaged was one now including the United States and the Commonwealth. 
By April 1968, a memo by David Howell identified two paths for Britain's 
European policy, to keep trying or to find an alternative. His own view was for 
86 David Hannay, interviewed by Andrew Crozier, 05/09/98, 
h isto[y. html p4 
97 Sandys, D, The Conservative Party and European Integration, DSND 9/6/6/, '1968: Post 
Second Veto Proposals', 21/12/1967, Churchill College Archives, Cambridge 
88 DSND 9/6/6,7/2/1968, Churchill College Archives, Cambridge 
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the alternative, arguing that the EEC was stagnating and that persuading de 
Gaulle was fruitless. The only alternative was to persuade the Gennans or to 
isolate France to gain leverage with the Five. 89 
It took six months before the idea was definitively snuffed out by Heath 
who argued that joint action with the Five was unlikely given Germany's past 
record of support for France, while without France or Germany, Britain's action 
was useless. "My own feeling is that the British Govenunent should look at 
proposals for joint action strictly on their merits as they affect British interests. 
We should not go into joint projects with the Five simply to prove ourselves 
European; we passed that particular test some time ago". 90 
Once agreement was reached in private, Heath addressed criticisms of 
entry based on previous vetoes. He downplayed the criticisms of the first 
negotiation as being bogged down in economic detail, claiming the main purpose 
was political. 91 This was the spur to making simple the economic case for entry 
in 1970 and reducing the membership bill to a mere twelve clauses. The end of 
the 'three circles' signalled the need for a new vision of Britain's world role 
which was sustained by focusing on the political potential of entry rather than 
solely on its on economic benefits. 
He then articulated the way in which Britain's world role would be 
maintained. His rhetoric changed to meet the shift in circumstances, arguing that 
the old world must be brought together to redress the balance of the new. He 
89 DSND 9/6/6, April 1968, Churchill College Archives, Cambridge 
90 Heath to Sandys, 8/10/1968, DSND 9/6/6, Churchill College Archives, Cambridge 
91 Heath, Old World, New Horizons, p26 
340 
Conservatives 1964-1975 
identified three ways in which to do this: the end of nationalist rivalry and 
warfare, realising that what unites is greater than what divides, and the economic 
benefits of a greater market. 92 It was a rearticulation of Conservative foreign 
policy themes at a regional and middle-ranking level. 
Heath then projected outwards from this new regional basis a powerful 
conception of Britain in the world. He declared, "Britain must be part of a wider 
grouping if she is to exert her full influence in the world ... A strong Britain can 
provide a powerful trading partner, and a growing source of skill, knowledge and 
capital, for the other members of the Commonwealth. This way also lies the best 
chance of Britain helping the developing countries". 93 The success of Britain's 
international status was thus made synonymous with entry into the EEC while 
links of duty to the Commonwealth were safeguarded. 
The change in emphasis redefined the relations between Britain and the 
Commonwealth, as a competitive trading partner to the industrialised members 
and as paternalist benefactor to the developing countries. It was similar to 
Britain's previous approach, but subtle changes register the shift in balance 
between the industrialised and predominantly white countries of the 
Commonwealth seeking their own competitive trading relationships without 
necessarily being bound by historical links. Further, the continued link with 
developing countries was a necessity for the trade in some raw materials, was a 
pre-emptive measure recognising that this was the direction in which the EEC 
92 Heath, Old World, New Horizons, pI 1- 12 
93 http: //www. psr. keele. ac. uk/area/uk/man/con66. htm 
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was heading, and was a modified form of continued sentimentality felt within the 
UK to the former Empire. 94 
Heath and Home diverged most over the vision of Britain's future in 
Europe. Heath's vision encompassed redressing of the European-American 
balance by using America as a template for the potential success of an integrated 
Europe. 95 Unlike previous Conservative leaders who coveted the 'special 
relationship' Heath's views reflected a dispassionate stance, even including a 
mild jibe, at the United States's open discussion of policy which could have the 
equal effect of openly sidelining allies. 
96 This was a strategic distancing from the 
Gspecial relationship', a term which he avoided using. 97 
8.4.4 Marginalising internal dissent 
The issue of EEC entry prompted two problems of party management for 
Heath by reigniting right-wing dissent and highlighting issues of leadership. 
Three clear but mutually sympathetic groupings were emerging critical of 
Heath's brand of Conservatism. These were: the reformed old right wing; the 
maverick Enoch Powell; and the emergent new right. 
The old imperialist right-wing had developed into the Monday Club at the 
time of the first application, establishing a base outside of Westminster at this 
time. It counted eleven MPs as its members in 1962, including 'Bobbety' 
94 The EC's Lomd Convention of 1975 contained much the same approach. 
Heath, Old World, New Horizons, p48 
Heath, Old World, New Horizons, p67 
97 Hill, C and C Lord, (1996) 'The Foreign Policy of the Heath Government' in Ball and Seldon, 
(eds. ) The Heath Government, p306 
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Salisbury and Alan Lennox-Boyd. 98 By 1970 it counted 35 MPs and 35 peers as 
members, six of whom held government posts, including Geoffrey Rippon, chief 
negotiator on membership. 99 By 1971 it had eclipsed the Bow group as the 
influential pressure group within the Parliamentary Conservative Party. 100 It was 
a pressure group which claimed it represented traditional Conservative values and 
beliefs. Their constitution pledged to defend the crown and the nation and uphold 
the sovereignty of Parliament, protect the liberty of the individual and sanctity of 
the family in line with traditional values while upholding British law, constitution 
and national heritage. ' 01 
The growth in the influence of the Monday Club was clearly dangerous to 
Heath. In 1967 the Club became more proactive in organising opposition to 
Conservative policies that it considered to be neo-socialist. 102 While the Monday 
Club was officially opposed to EEC entry, their criticism was more widespread. 
They organised opposition to the dissolution of the Stormont Assembly and the 
imposition of direct rule, being the standard bearers of Conservative unionism. 
On the mainland, they organised opposition to the Race Relations Act of 1968, 
which aimed to make harmonious community relations and make overt racial 
discrimination unlawful. The Monday Club's policy was one of repatriation. 
Withdrawal East of Suez was seen as the second part of the 'great betrayal' 
98 Alan Tindal Lennox-Boyd, (1904-1983) minister in Churchill and Macmillan governments 
99 Messina, A (1989) Race andParty Competition in Britain, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p138; 
Copping, R (1972) The Story of the Monday Club: The First Decade, Ilford: Current Affairs 
Information Service, p14 
" Copping, The Story of the Monday Club, p 14; The Monday Club had established a number of 
outposts in universities and constituencies to increase their support base. 
10' Copping, The Story ofthe Monday Club, piv 
102 Copping, The Story of the Monday Club, pII 
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although this support of a continued British presence overseas focused itself on 
white minority rule in Rhodesia. 
The second problem for Heath's party management came from the 
maverick MP Enoch Powel . 
103 Powe 's power arguably rested on his role as an 
ideologue to Heath's more managerial approach. His drift from the Party in 1963 
was based on a belief that the Conservatives needed to distinguish themselves 
more clearly from Labour; his vision was of a "post-imperial, nationally-minded, 
High Tory and economically liberal, party". 104 Powell's beliefs developed during 
the war in which he became convinced that the United States aimed to destroy the 
British Empire. 105 A member of the initial Suez Group, he opposed activity in 
1956 on the basis that Britain no longer had the resources to continue Pretending 
such a world role. Heath appointed him shadow Defence Secretary but he became 
highly critical of Britain's dependence on America. 106 His sacking from the 
shadow cabinet for his 'Rivers of Blood' 107 speech only made his public 
popularity increase, but above all had brought enough attention and support to his 
vision of Conservatism. A consistent supporter, though not a member, of the 
Monday Club, Powell's beliefs overlapped over Northern Ireland, repatriation of 
immigrants and the EEC. 
103 John Enoch Powell (1912-1998) considered himself a High Tory with liberal economic beliefs. 
He supported Burke's conception of the evolutionary society, but that society was founded on 
competitive capitalism. 
104 Shepherd, R (1996) Enoch Powell: A Biography, London: Pimlico, p269 
105 Heffer, S (1999) Like the Roman: The Life ofEnoch Powell, London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, p75 
106 Heffer, Like the Roman, p431 
107 Powell delivered this speech in Birmingham, April 1968. 
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After Heath's dismissal of Powell, he continued to garner public support 
and became a focal point for anti-EEC beliefs. For Powell, the EEC was a sham 
organisation. First, it was a sham organisation since the Cold War was a sham 
conflict given the dependence of the USSR on cheap grain subsidies from the US 
and Europe. Second, the EEC was seen by Powell as the political arin of NATO 
and therefore fitted within their grand strategy of directing European security and 
politics. In doing so, this undermined the UK and elevated the Americans' world 
role. Powell reversed the classic post-war Conservative view, claiming that 
Britain and Russia were more natural allies in establishing a European balance of 
power than with the US whom he classed as the enemy. For Powell, the focal 
point remained the nation-state and he advocated an independent international 
position which did not support the essentially emotional link with the 
Commonwealth since these states were no longer Britain's responsibility. 
Powell is also associated with the new right for his work with Keith 
Joseph, Conservative Party architect of Thatcherism. Powell and Joseph 
articulated a vein of conservative thinking which had lain relatively dormant for 
almost twenty years, with a firm belief in economic liberalism which found 
renewed force from Milton Friedman's works on monetarism and the Hayek- 
inspired Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA). Joseph's first challenge to the 
economic doctrines of One Nation conservatism came in 1967. He questioned the 
assumption that public provision was better than private and from this developed 
a serious political platform encapsulating the nascent beliefs of neo-liberals. 108 
log Halcrow, M (1989) Keith Joseph: A Single Mind, London: Macmillan, p 115 
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Joseph also spearheaded the Selsdon programme but Heath's return to 
Macmillanite corporatism in 1972 created widespread disillusionment. 
Significantly however, this disaffection happened too late to affect beliefs about 
Europe. While Powell and Joseph may have shared many beliefs about applying 
economic liberalism, their beliefs diverged over Europe, Powell's anti- 
Europeanism stemmed from his romanticism about the nation-state, Joseph's 
liberalism welcomed the potential of Europe to liberalise trade. 109 Joseph saw in 
Europe the means to "breaking down ... artificial barriers to trade, which had 
always been central to his beliefs... 'Europe' appealed to the romantic in him". " 0 
The groupings that were emerging on the right by 1970 posed a challenge 
to Heath. Having risen from relative obscurity to lead the Party, Heath cemented 
his position in three ways: his own dominant personality, the eclipse of those 
who posed a threat and the lack of other political heavyweights who might 
challenge him. Yet his dominance resulted in his detachment from the rest of the 
Party and provoked a lack of communication between government and electorate 
from which it is argued the Heath administration never fully recovered. "' 
Kavanagh and Butler were clear in 1974 that "in public and in private, it 
was a Heath Government throughout". 112 Heath's domination of his party began 
when Home was Prime Minister, involved in the Party's Advisory Committee on 
Policy (ACP) and the Conservative Research Department (CRD), his influence 
pervading the 1966 Conservative Manifesto, Action not Words, which contained 
As the descendent of German Jewish dmigr6s, Joseph was repelled by Powell's jingoism. 
Halcrow, Keith Joseph, p 114 
Rarnsden, Winds of Change, p319,322 
Butler, D and D Kavanagh, (1974) The British General Election of 1974, London: Macmillan, 
p25 
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all the policy initiatives of the previous two years, and was "in effect the core of 
the programme with which the Conservatives entered government in 1970". 1 13 
The Conservative manifestoes of 1966 and 1970 contained the policy 
manifestations of Heath's particular brand of One Nation Toryism. It was a 
continuation of much of the Conservatives' progressive approach, but enacted 
much of the One Nation criticisms of the socio-economic changes brought about 
by Labour. However, there were some who felt the changes were too subtle. 
Powell's own modification of One Nation conservatism reflects this, and during 
the election campaign there were plans to find a replacement if defeat ensued. ' 14 
The problem with such an approach, it is argued, is that it did not allow 
for changes that were taking place in political relationships, most notably 
between the government and trade unions, so that by the time the Selsdon 
Conference took place in 1970 the details were already concluded, the decision 
being only about priorities. 115 Others are more forthright in their assessment, 
claiming that "with the single exception of 'taking the country into Europe' 
Edward Heath did not really have the slightest idea of what he wanted to do". 116 
Once elected Prime Minister, Heath's internal management of the 
Conservative government was divided between the absolute loyalty he had from 
the Cabinet and the growing fractiousness of the backbenches. Heath's party 
management was affected by two issues of personality: his style of leadership and 
113 Ramsden, "The Prime Minister" in Ball and Seldon, The Heath Government, p24 
114 Clark, The Tories, p410; The result was an overall majority of thirty for the Conservatives, 
with a 4.5% increase in the share of the vote. See Cook and Stevenson, Britain Since 1945, p59 
'" Clark, A (199 8) The Tories, London: Phoenix, p4ll, 412 
116 Clark, The Tories, p411 
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his priority of electoral rather than ideological concerns. Heath could only claim 
limited success in Party management for even while he maintained Cabinet 
loyalty, once he failed at two general elections in 1974, Margaret Thatcher 
announced her intention to stand against him for the leadership. An essential 
dimension of success was his ability to present the Conservatives as more united 
over Europe than Labour; this reaped gains in the referendum. 
Heath's personality was abrasive, creating tensions with his style of 
leadership and the conduct of the policy review where "the electoral rather than 
the philosophical... was central to it from the start". 117 Whereas the philosophy 
was assumed, the detail focused on methods of modernisation, efficiency and 
progress, embodied in the 1965 document, Putting Britain Right Ahead. 118 
Central to achieving these essentially domestic policies was entry into the EEC, 
so that entry was now the core aim of both domestic and foreign policy. 
Despite Heath's background as a party whip, as leader it became clear 
that he would not operate the traditional strategy of mollifying backbenchers, 
either through charm or inducement, to achieve party political ends. For instance, 
his restoration of political honours which had been stopped by the Wilson 
Government was criticised for its sparing use in awarding only 34 to 
backbenchers in his time as Prime Minister when Wilson and Callaghan would 
grant 144 over the next five years. 119 Additionally, Heath's relationship with 
Edward du Cann, leader of the 1922 Group was also sour. Having sacked du 
"' Rarnsden, The Windy of Change, p253 
118 Conservative Party (1965) Putting Britain Right Ahead. A Statement of Conservative Aims, 
London: Conservative Central Office. 
'19 Heath, Course ofmy Life, p324 
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Cann as Party Chairman in 1966, the friction between party leader and leader of 
the backbenchers was considerable. 120 
The significant shift from the first attempt to join the EEC and Heath's 
attempt was the formal acceptance of Britain's changed world status, and was a 
radical reworking of the traditional foreign policy calculation on how best to 
"manipulate multilateral and bilateral contacts to achieve maximal influence and 
manoeuvre for the British state". 121 In effect, this created a new dilemma of how 
Britain could lead Europe or adapt to Europe which had shifted from the dilemma 
of whether Britain should lead Europe or keep out. This inherent tension was 
minimised with the promise of regaining the initiative that it was assumed entry 
would provide, while aspects of membership which had proved unappealing in 
the past were simply deflected in favour of a definition of the EEC as a 
conventional model of international organisation. 
8.5 Conclusion 
In all previous chapters there has been a marked dilemma which has 
provoked a response in beliefs. Here we argue that Heath and Home offered no 
change in their beliefs and only modified their strategy at the margins to attain 
the end product of entry into the EEC. 
As entry to the EEC was the centrepiece of the Heath Goverment's 
political strategy, it also provided a point of polarisation. Some areas of 
conservative legislation provoked critical responses which spilled over into the 
"' 'Edward Heath, TV documentary aired July 2005 
121 Lord, British Entry, p 14 
349 
Conservatives 1964-1975 
issue of EEC entry. The government's Immigration Act of 1971 enacted much of 
the Party's policies established by 1968 but was met with opposition on three 
fronts; from anti-Common Marketeers, Powellites and the Monday Club. 
Immigration and the EEC highlighted a growing split over interpretations of 
British nationalism. The Industrial Relations Act of 1971 created a neat divide 
between the government and its aims to modernise industry and curb union 
power with a view to economic expansion in Europe while unions fought to 
retain their status by sabotaging the Act and deploying anti-European rhetoric. 
Further, as divisions grew more acute as the objective of entry came closer to 
realisation, some anti-Europeans within the PCP sought to use the small majority 
to their advantage while at constituency level there was greater support for the 
government policy over MP's personal positions. 122 
It cannot be argued that Heath and Home established an easy predominance 
in the debate about EEC membership. The attempt to establish EEC entry as an 
issue of high politics failed. Focusing on the political potential of entry as the 
base for Britain to be a significant world player failed to provide a coherent 
vision of Europe. Finally, by focusing on the political, Heath and Home failed to 
articulate a clear domestic and economic vision. Where Heath and Home 
benefited was from divisions elsewhere, the marginalisation of internal dissent 
and the public appearance of greater unity than the Labour Party. Crucially this 
meant the passage of the European Communities Bill was successful in all its 104 
votes. 
122 Ramsden, Winds of Change, p336 
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There are perhaps two further things to remark on here. First, EEC 
membership happened against a backdrop of internal unrest, both industrial and 
political which left the Heath government under siege in several areas. This 
affected the negotiations in that they had to be successful since a further failure in 
the context of Heath goverment's difficulties would be disastrous. While there 
was a personal spur for Heath, this extended to his political survival as well. 
Second, while Christopher Lord and David Hannay contend that negotiations 
effected the blurring of traditional foreign policy boundaries they also signalled 
an effort to appeal in political argument hegemony terms to the Six as much as at 
home. Interpretations of the effectiveness and success of the Heath Government 
are varied and reflect debates around whether the decision to join the EEC was 
right at that time, whether the Government reneged on its nascent new right 
promise or whether the conditions it faced were inexorable thus forcing a retreat 
in policy. 123 On his ability to articulate a vision of EEC membership, it was clear 
that Heath's success was qualified and relied on a display of unity rather than a 
decisive argument. 
123 Seldon, A "The Heath Government in History", ppl-19, in Ball, S and A. Seldon, (1996) The 
Heath Government 1970-1974: A Reappraisal, London: Longman, pl-2; Rarnsden, J (1996) "The 
Prime Minister and the Making of Policy", pp2l-46 in Ball and Seldon, The Heath Government, 
p2l 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
To understand a man one has to know what was happening in the 
world when he was twenty. ' 
Introduction 
This thesis set itself an ambitious and complex task: using Mark Bevir's 
interpretative theory to study the extent to which the issue of European 
integration, from 1945 to 1975, prompted changes within Conservative and 
Labour Party traditions of thought. The thesis has aimed to assess the 
explanatory power of Bevir's theory when accounting for ideational change over 
this period. This has not been a straightforward endeavour; as the chapters of this 
study show, it has been necessary to resolve a number of methodological and 
theoretical issues. Before we arrive at any conclusions about Bevir's theory, a 
summary of the limitations and shortcomings of this study is necessary. 
9.2 Limitations and Shortcomings 
A number of limitations and shortcomings arising from the research 
design of the thesis were noted in chapters one and two. Some of these limits 
were self-imposed. For instance, this study has self-consciously placed itself in 
the post-revisionist school identified by Daddow in chapter one. This study has 
not engaged in the debate about the rights or wrongs of the timing of Britain's 
entry into the EEC. It has used many of the same or similar sources as other 
revisionist and post-revisionist studies. Nevertheless, it has attempted to 
1 Attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte. 
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contribute to the post-revisionist school, a theoretical perspective absent from 
both the orthodox and revisionist schools. 
Another example is the time frame purposefully selected to examine the 
change in beliefs about Europe over time. The shortcoming of a study of this 
nature is the inability to allow for as much detail as in a study which 
concentrates on a shorter period of time. The sheer scale of examining two 
political parties over a thirty year period necessitated a selective approach. By 
examining popularisers, namely'the leadership dlite of both parties, this study 
has focused on only one part of a'complex picture. 
By focusing only on two -individuals in each case, this study only 
provides a partial explanation of broader trends in belief change. Also, using two 
actors as popularisers of ideas and concepts does not always work as effectively 
as we might hope. For instance, although Healey offers clear articulations on 
defence policy, his role in defining European policy is less evident. Again, 
although Selwyn Lloyd does not fit the mould of populariser, he does make 
important contributions towards belief change on European policy. Although 
these are shortcomings of this study, they do reveal important gaps which still 
exist in our understanding of post-war British political figures. They may be at 
the heart of the political process and yet may not necessarily make a great 
impact. 
One final limitation of the focus on actors is the problem of isolating 
actors from the structures and organisations in which they are embedded. This 
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has only partially been addressed by invoking concepts such as political 
argument hegemony and party management. By using two actors from the 
political 61ite, the range of suitable data was identified as the statements and 
documents produced by the popularisers to assist the tracing of dlite 
articulations. These limits preclude the possibility of drawing conclusions about 
other political parties, industrial or labour groups and, in fact, the grassroots of 
the two main parties during this time. 
9.3 Theoretical Concerns: Bevir's approach 
The ambitious scope of the thesis has generated theoretical concerns. 
Bevir's interpretative approach has been reviewed in depth in chapter two. Here, 
however, we should re-acquaint ourselves with the hypothesis this theory 
proposed and the potential problems it raised. Bevir claims individuals develop 
their beliefs against a backdrop of inherited traditions which are relayed through 
narratives. New beliefs can force a dilemma which is resolved for the sake of 
coherence. Traditions are constitutive of shared beliefs and so equally, change 
their content over time. Bevir responded to criticisms that he collapsed meaning 
and intention by highlighting the role of the historian in locating an author's 
intended meanings. He responded to criticism that he presumed beliefs to be 
sincere and rational by stating that individuals seek internal coherence in their 
beliefs. Finally he responded to claims that he made the concept of traditions 
relative by implicitly accepting the criticism in using shorthand for their 
existence. 
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This study supports some of the criticisms made about Bevir's approach, 
in particular over its application. Given that Bevir argues that the content of 
belief webs and traditions can change over time, it is logically consistent to 
suggest his theory may do so also. In chapter two we proposed to examine the 
role of popularisers and this was defended as being in line with the general 
principle of Bevir's theory. The potential difficulty of measuring whether belief 
change for our actors was translated into a significant change for their audience 
was met with the concepts, taken from statecraft theory, of political argument 
hegemony and party management. Further criticisms from Bevir's theory emerge 
as we draw some tentative conclusions about its application. To illustrate these 
we ask a series of questions related to the concepts he proposes. What narrative 
emerges from this thesis? Does Bevir's theory help us to trace beliefs and belief 
change? Does Bevir's theory help us to trace tradition change? Finally, what is 
our overall assessment of Bevir's theory in practice? 
9.4 Applying Bevir's approach 
Bevir defined a narrative as the telling of a story by postulating links 
between entities and events by using conditional and volitional connections. The 
principal finding in this study is that there are three narrative shifts in the story 
of Britain's relationship with Europe as it was articulated by popularisers in the 
Labour and Conservative parties. Broadly corresponding to ten year intervals, 
these begin by articulating a period of foreign policy confidence defined by the 
'three circles' concept. This was followed by a period of uncertainty and ends 
with a period of reformulation and consolidation. 
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For instance, for both parties the period 1945-1955 indicates the 
recognition of changed circumstances but with a strong desire to shore-up 
existing practices, methods of operating in international relations and the image 
of Britain in international affairs. In the narratives of chapters three and four, we 
can trace self-confidence about the pursuit of British foreign policy. While 
Attlee and Bevin make assertive pronouncements about Britain's foreign policy, 
Churchill and Eden are both more muscular and assured in their assumptions 
about its direction. We can attribute to this confidence the ability of our actors to 
establish the narrative of British foreign policy which dominated the dlite 
account of both leading parties. 
The period 1955-1965 indicates a shift in narrative state, reflective of a 
gradual but disparate awareness of the inability to shore up existing practices, 
methods of operating and retaining intact the desired image of Britain in 
international affairs. We can identify this by the rapid retelling of the foreign 
policy narrative and the rise of alternative narratives. In chapter five Macmillan 
and Lloyd increasingly articulated a foreign policy narrative of the end of 
Empire and the turn towards Europe. In contrast, a significant group within the 
Conservative party did not understand Suez as representing a dilemma of 
traditional foreign policy axioms and issued their own counter narrative. 
Again, in chapter six we also see Gaitskell and Healey respond to 
challenges to the traditional foreign policy narrative by rallying support coupled 
with an articulation of moral obligation. This period brings significant changes 
to ideas of foreign policy definitions as economic considerations challenge the 
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boundaries between foreign and domestic policy. The foreign policy narrative 
was scrutinised in search of answers for the relative failure of the domestic 
economy. In chapter five we see Macmillan articulate the economic aspects of 
EEC membership, moving away from the political narrative of Churchill and 
Eden about Europe. In chapter six we see Gaitskell link the economic and moral 
well-being of the Commonwealth with Britain's own economic future. 
The final period, 1965-1975 represents the consolidation of a number of 
different and competing narratives. In chapter seven, we can locate the growing 
division in the Labour party between pro- and anti-Europeans. Wilson reacted to 
pressures about Europe from the Bennite left while Jenkins stoutly defended a 
rearticulation of Britain in the EEC. In chapter eight, Heath's unquestioning faith 
in joining the EEC limited debate within the party. He also marginalised the 
opposing narrative that was gaining coherence on the iight. Perhaps because of 
this, Heath and Home were unable to gain complete political argument 
hegemony around a positive narrative for membership. 
We may conclude that during the period, the leadership of both parties 
experienced a significant shift in its ability and confidence to narrate Britain's 
international role. While it began on a series of shared assumptions which had 
been carried over from before the war, both parties stressed different dimensions 
of that role such as a robust role as defender of three intersected interests or to 
align Britain's international prestige with newly founded international 
organisations. As that joint narrative unravelled, both parties claimed different 
emphases creating a number of different and competing narratives. 
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9.5 Beliefs and Belief Change 
A second question which the thesis can address is does Bevir's theory 
help us to trace beliefs and belief change? 
Bevir urges historians to trace beliefs by locating temporal and 
conceptual links that tie the beliefs of an individual to a tradition or set of 
traditions of thought. When we seek to do this we encounter some difficulties 
which were anticipated in chapter two. How would we know, as historians 
seeking to recover the meaning from the past, which were the links most 
pertinent for our actors when we seek to understand their beliefs? 
Bevir's theory does not work as a form of shorthand. If we seek to use it 
to indicate an actors' past, it resembles a standard biography. We can trace an 
actor's social class, religious beliefs, type of schooling and level of education 
which they received. If we look to the past of an individual for conceptual clues 
to their beliefs, we can identify what they point to as significant in their 
autobiographies but in the absence of personal memoir, we rely on the works of 
biographers. Unless we are prepared to make a detailed study of the individuals' 
beliefs from the earliest record to the point of interest, we need to accept that we 
will present what is essentially a conventional biography of our actors. 
One further criticism of Bevir's theory which this study suggests is its 
binary character. Either an individual changes or retains unchanged their belief 
set when confronted with a new one. This form of logic gate can readily explain 
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incremental belief states at a micro level but it remains difficult to understand 
how we might make sense of these changes. In short, Bevir, by limiting these 
states to just two, does not offer a sense of perspective on belief change. In 
contrast, Jervis presents four states of belief of which three indicate at least an 
acknowledgement of alternative beliefs. What Jervis indicates is that belief 
change is actually more conservative than Bevir would credit. We might draw a 
tentative conclusion that we are less inclined to change our beliefs unless it is 
proved to us that it is absolutely necessary in order to retain coherence. 
One significant finding which has emerged is the importance of early 
adulthood experiences. While this is remarked upon in Jervis and other texts that 
use psychological methods, Bevir is quiet about whether points in an 
individual's life are more momentous than others. The majority of our actors 
have expressed references to and draw upon symbols which hark back to their 
early twenties. For instance, Heath identified his experiences travelling in 
Europe during the 1930s as significant for beliefs he subsequently developed 
about European integration. Attlee meanwhile reached adulthood at the turn of 
the twentieth century and the peak of the Empire and expressed beliefs about 
foreign policy which reflected a role separate from Europe. 
A further tentative conclusion drawn from the analysis in this study is 
that with an average of thirty years between important early adult experiences 
and achieving high office, contemporary events may be interpreted through 
beliefs formed some three decades earlier. While this does not preclude 
individuals revising their early adulthood beliefs significantly, as Jenkins did 
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with his later support for the EEC, the trend has nevertheless been that early 
adulthood beliefs typically are consistently held by political actors throughout 
their careers. While we might accept Bevir's claim that there are no core beliefs, 
it is clear that some beliefs are more entrenched and less open to modification 
than others. 
Where Bevir's theory works well is when we examine a discrete period 
of time in which small but relevant changes occur. Points of novelty have 
emerged such as in chapter three, where Attlee's plea to Congress resulted in the 
significant re-articulation of beliefs about anti-capitalism. Chapter four 
demonstrated the sidelining of Churchill as his beliefs became unable to narrate 
a feasible foreign policy direction. In chapter five, Selwyn Lloyd is shown to 
articulate ideas about Britain in Europe which were ahead of their time and 
undoubtedly facilitated Macmillan's shift towards entry. Chapter seven shows 
that Wilson's apparent ambivalence about EEC membership was coupled with 
tying opponents of the policy to its success. 
Three further conclusions may be drawn about beliefs and belief change 
in this study; the role of fear, the economy, and Europe as a collective dilemma. 
One key underlying belief state for all our actors except Jenkins and Heath has 
been of fear which we might attribute to the scar of Munich. This was articulated 
in terms of a German resurgence, French political weakness, encroaching 
communism in the East from the Soviet Union, and scepticism of the ability of 
unstable European states to launch successful economic co-operation. These 
fears were based on the greater fear that if true, Britain would have to engage 
360 
Conclusion 
militarily with Europe again. The spectre of war loomed large in the beliefs of 
our actors and explained in part corresponding beliefs about the need for a 
continued American presence in European defence. While fears of the economic 
impact of the EEC resulted in articulations about the political dangers of 
integration, such as federalism, these fears were significantly downplayed once 
membership became imperative for economic reasons. 
The economy features immediately in the narrative of the actors about 
Britain's international position, although it does not occupy the same position in 
public debates until the 1960s. Attlee and Bevin's narrative about British 
economic difficulties impacted upon decisions about accepting the Washington 
Loan, Marshall Aid and devaluation. Churchill and Eden, although aware of 
economic constraints, were less impacted by them until too late, arguably 
leading to the collapse of Eden's Suez adventure. Equally, while in opposition 
Gaitskell and Healey expressed preferences over the direction of foreign policy 
that, once Wilson and Jenkins were in office, became challenged by economic 
constraints and the reality of the trade figures, forcing their abandonment. Those 
realities had been experienced by Macmillan and Lloyd, although the 
incremental steps towards moving foreign policy to address economic concerns 
was initially conservative. Heath's experience provided the continuity over 
appraising the economic benefits of membership which led to his success in 
achieving it. 
Finally, while we might have expected the idea of entry into the EEC to 
loom more as a collective dilemma, it did not. It became manufactured as a 
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collective dilemma for reasons of party politics, but for the actors involved, the 
slow and uneven process of responding to the dilemma of how to maintain 
Britain as a relevant international player led to only one ending, resolving the 
relative decline of economic competitiveness. 
9.6 Tradition Change 
Our third question is does Bevir's theory help us to trace tradition change? 
Bevir defines a tradition as the unit of shared understandings into which 
individuals are socialised and with which they can interact, accepting, modifying 
or rejecting aspects of it. Traditions have no immutable core and are contingent 
entities produced by the activities of individuals. This study finds that Bevir 
provides us with a method of establishing a narrative of tradition change over the 
period concerned. However, this study first finds three significant criticisms of 
Bevir's conception of traditions. 
Bevir offers little guidance on the operative method for retrieving a 
narrative of tradition change. The principal stumbling block is his adherence to a 
relativism which has theoretical explanatory purchase but which suffers in 
practical application. To retain flexibility, Bevir contests the idea of fixing 
traditions in any way, but this renders them almost meaningless. In chapter two 
was shown that Bevir used shorthand to label Thatcherism and its constitutive 
traditions. It assumed that we understand what is meant by such traditions, which 
seems at odds with the theoretical bottom-up approach he proposes. 
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second criticism was that traditions were not treated as entities in their 
own right and his ambiguous use of short-hand for the existence of traditions 
adds conftision here. Frohnen challenged this precisely because traditions require 
significant levels of acceptance between individuals to be coherent. This study 
posits further that while a tradition need not have an immutable core, there are a 
series of socially accepted checks and balances as to the shared meaning of a 
tradition which makes changes to that tradition a slow process. The findings of 
this study indicate an inherent conservatism when seeking to modify composite 
parts of shared traditions. 
Finally, while tradition change is to be measured through changes in 
individuals' beliefs, this offers us little perspective. To provide a guide to the 
limits of tradition change beyond the individual concerned, we have employed 
from statecraft theory the concepts of political argument hegemony and party 
management; the first establishes an easy domination of the political debate, the 
second secures unity within the party. Using these concepts meant we could 
measure the general acceptance of statements by actors and the degree of party 
cohesion behind the leader. It was proposed that the transmission of belief 
change and subsequent alteration of shared traditions required success in these 
fields. 
9.7 The narrative of tradition change 
The above considerations aside, this study has a narrative of tradition 
change for both parties. Two dominant traditions have emerged for each party in 
this study: the traditions of democratic socialism and corporate socialism for 
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Labour and of the patriotic right and progressive for the Conservatives. These 
traditions have all demonstrated significant changes during the period of the 
study. 
In chapter two, four themes constitutive of the Labour Party's foreign 
policy tradition were identified: internationalism, international working class 
solidarity, anti-militarism and anti-capitalism. In chapter three it was shown that 
Attlee was significant in rearticulating key parts of these themes in relation to 
the tradition of democratic socialism. In the 1930s his strong rebuttal of anti- 
militarism was based on opposing appeasement and the need for rearmament. 
After 1945, he rebutted anti-capitalism by securing the Washington Loan and 
seeking the approval of Congress. While rejecting these two plinths, Attlee 
boosted the tradition of internationalism by securing material changes within a 
global structure. For instance, support for the UN was coupled with pressing for 
the pooling of nuclear weaponry. Underlying Attlee's re-articulations was a 
strong belief in patriotism, the importance of governing respectability, and a 
guiding moral code to international affairs. 
Continuities were evident in both Gaitskell and Healey's articulations, 
establishing longer-term themes of a strong international presence and 
identifying a patriotic outlook. Healey's rejection of neutralism by retaining a 
nuclear defence was a further rejection of anti-militarism although rooted in a 
morally superior policy of disarmament, as was support by Gaitskell and Healey 
for German rearmament. While the social democratic tradition had been global 
in outlook, Gaitskell attempted to link the tradition's hitherto negligent interest 
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in international working class solidaritY with the moral obligations of 
internationalism in the defence of Empire over Europe. This attempt was poorly 
defined and lacked purchase but a split in the social democratic tradition ensued 
over foreign policy. Healey for instance remained an exponent of the traditional 
unmodified outlook. Jenkins articulated all three traditional areas of democratic 
socialism in terms of entry: the defensive power of a united Europe, the potential 
of its economic reach, and its nascent defence of internationalism through such 
arrangements as Yaound6. 
Corporate socialism was defined by its domestic agenda and adhered to 
by Bevin and Wilson. This study shows that its foreign policy outlook has been 
less consistent, responding primarily to domestic concerns. Bevin broke with 
Attlee over the themes of anti-militarism and anti-capitalism. His defence of 
rearmament was couched in terms of domestic priorities but after 1945 his initial 
resistance to rejecting anti-capitalism was modified in part by necessity and by 
engaging with structuring that relationship. He rejected the third force idea on 
balance, rather than in principle, and came to understand the pursuit of a 
conventional foreign policy as a secure means of defending British labour 
interests. Unlike Attlee, Bevin was interested in establishing international 
working class solidarity but believed this would amount to nothing unless 
domestic working class solidarity was secure and to this end established modest 
changes by instituting labour attach6s in UK embassies. Also unlike Attlee, 
Bevin countered his critics by emotional appeals to loyalty which ultimately 
marginalised his long-term success with backbench corporate socialists. 
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The 1950s marked a return to anti-militarism through neutralism, and an 
increasing revival of anti-capitalism resurfaced, triggered by the dilemma 
presented by Korea and budgetary constraints. Again the internationalist 
tradition determined the limits of the corporate socialists, rallying around to 
sustain the Commonwealth link on moral and humanitarian grounds and 
rejecting Europe as a capitalist construct. While Wilson was sympathetic to this 
view, economic appraisal shifted him towards Europe but his ambiguity was 
significant for leaving intact the inherent antagonisms of the corporate socialist 
strand towards Europe. He presented the case for Europe on a basis of 
technological advantage, the same basis of his domestic corporate socialism. 
With rejection and increased domestic difficulties, Wilson claimed Europe 
needed to submit to five conditions. While largely for show, the idea was to 
indicate that working class solidarity did not simply accede to the demands of 
capitalists, replicating a worker-employer dynamic that formed the basis of the 
corporate socialist tradition in domestic politics. Wilson had navigated the party 
into Europe while allowing them to always question the merits of that move. 
The Conservative Party was dominated by two traditions over the period 
of this study; the patriotic right and the emergent progressive tradition. In 
chapter two we identified four themes constitutive of the Conservatives' foreign 
policy tradition: the strong state; the historic link of the strong state with Empire; 
patriotism, with its emphasis on loyalty and tradition; and the idea of a civilizing 
mission in the world. 
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We saw that Churchill and Eden were stalwarts of the tradition of the 
patriotic right. Churchill remained an unmodified member of this tradition; his 
concessions were on costs, as in the case of granting India independence. His 
beliefs were frequently couched in terms of Britain's leadership role, indicative 
of the missionary tradition. Eden was a more emollient member of the patriotic 
right, less romantic than Churchill and concerned to establish a sustainable basis 
for Britain's international position but one which became different from a rump 
of umnodified patriotic right MPs. While those MPs were concemed solely with 
sustaining the image of a potent and imperial Britain, any concessions on these 
grounds, despite the realities of costs, became problematic. Churchill and Eden 
shared the belief that Britain's continued international standing rested on 
American support, fearful of repeating the interwar abandonment. This fear 
manifested itself in the desire to lead Europe and to chastise it when it sought to 
lead itself Fear also informed a continued scepticism about the eventual 
outcome of attempts at integration. 
The nascent progressive tradition was first articulated by Macmillan, 
Selwyn Lloyd and Heath and to a lesser extent, Home. It seems that a 
progressive outlook in domestic politics was helpful in adopting a more flexible 
approach to interpreting the beliefs of the patriotic right in foreign policy. All 
four were important in redirecting beliefs about Conservative foreign policy. 
Macmillan and Home were more conventional in their outlook, seeking to 
rearticulate a shift towards Europe while sustaining the belief in Britain as a 
powerful actor and cementing her post-war role of acting as broker between 
Europe and America. It was a re-articulation of the 'strong state' tradition and 
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contained an implied leadership ideal about Britain's role in Europe to 
compensate for the loss of that role in Empire. Significantly it offered an 
alternative direction for foreign policy which the unmodified tradition of the 
patriotic right was unable to do. Heath's progressivism went further, identifying 
Britain in Europe as essential to sustaining her own international power and 
presence by acting in unity and specifically not seeking to act as a power broker. 
Either way, the articulations of Britain in Europe came to assume the important 
message that Britain would be more powerful inside Europe than out. 
9.8 Applying Bevir's Theory: overall findings 
Our final question is what are our overall findings in applying Bevir's 
theory? 
Bevir's theory offers the historian of ideas a series of tools and methods 
with which to retrieve information from the past. This study has shown that by 
adopting Bevir's four conceptual elements, we have a narrative from our actors 
which has shifted from a point of confidence to one of uncertainty and to a point 
of change and consolidation. This study has also shown that the belief changes 
of our actors can be dynamic and this is best seen when analysed over short 
periods of time. The traditions of thought in this thesis have undergone some 
change, with the social democratic and progressive conservative traditions 
presenting as the most dynamic ones. These have been based on the success of 
the popularisers associated with them. 
There are also significant shortcomings in Bevir's theory. It cannot 
effectively be used for the shorthand assumptions of beliefs. It fails to register 
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that some beliefs may be less open for modification than others. This would 
seem to imply that his 'web' concept is not a useful tool for the historian of 
ideas. Bevir offers little practical guidance on tracing traditions, using shorthand 
assumptions for their existence. Further work needs to be done on this area. In 
the meantime, traditions could be viewed as requiring large areas of agreement 
in order for their existence to be coherent which goes some way in answering 
this weakness of Bevir's theory. Finally, Bevir's emphasis on the individual 
makes it difficult for the historian of ideas to recover the impact of diachronic 
tradition change and this has led in this study to the supplementary use of criteria 
from statecraft theory. 
Such a conclusion remains highly tentative. Nevertheless, it is hoped that 
this thesis has demonstrated the explanatory power of an interpretative approach 
to explaining belief change and its impact on the traditions which inform 
political parties. It is also hoped that this study encourages others to contribute to 
and extend our knowledge of the Conservative and Labour Parties and their 
political beliefs. There are three areas which would seem appropriate areas of 
further research by applying this approach. 
Firstly, actors who have held consistently unmodified beliefs about 
Britain's foreign policy throughout the period, more commonly found within the 
tradition of the patriotic right in the Conservative Party and the Corporate 
socialists in the Labour Party are worthy of examination to search for clues 
about this resistance and to test further the effectiveness of Bevir's theory. 
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Secondly, while this study has limited itself to ideas relating to European 
policy, a study which emphasised other dimensions of post-war foreign policy, 
such as ideas relating to defence policy or imperial policy would provide a more 
rounded account of the period. 
Finally, this study may aid our understanding of the period 1975 to the 
present by highlighting themes which still retain currency in beliefs and 
articulations about Britain's place in the world. For instance, we might consider 
beliefs held by Margaret Thatcher about foreign policy to be consistent with 
themes of the patriotic right and that her foreign policy articulations during her 
first term in office were attempts to reassert a strong international presence, 
reinvigorate ideas of patriotism and to impose a leadership attitude towards 
Europe, reminiscent of beliefs held by Churchill and Eden. Or we could consider 
humanitarian interventionist beliefs held by Tony Blair to be a continuation of 
democratic socialist themes of a strong international presence coupled with a 
moral dimension. 
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